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The Master's Student Learning Outcomes and Assessment Methods:

An Alternative Perspective on Pedagogy

By Mark J. Boone

Abstract: Although current educational priorities tend to avoid strong moral positions, one of the world's most venerable yet persistently influential moral traditions not only lays out a number of major moral principles but also incorporates them into its pedagogy. Confucius teaches us about the importance of seeking knowledge, learning how to learn, applying ancient wisdom to contemporary situations, valuing virtue over material gain, following the Golden Rule, and living by our principles. He also has ways of assessing his own students' progress in these matters. Confucius' pedagogy is an interesting model to consider and contrast with contemporary models. This chapter introduces these principles and assessments from the *Analects* and draws out some comparisons to and contrasts with two alternative theories in western moral thought, Augustine and John Dewey.

Keywords: Confucius, pedagogy, student learning outcomes, Augustine, John Dewey

What would Confucius say about today's educational establishment?

I suspect he would marvel at how much effort we put into measuring our students' achievements while saying so little about what are the ultimate goals of education. Part of the burden of the modern educator is to measure, measure, measure. But what is our *unit* of measure? A view on the purpose of life usually has nothing to do with that goal of education progress towards which we are tracking. The *Analects* of Confucius suggests a different way of thinking about education: An understanding of the purpose of life and some fairly specific moral claims are Confucius' goals for education, and may be used as such in the measuring of a student's progress. In short, Confucian ethics includes student learning outcomes and corresponding assessment measures.

In what follows I shall first take a brief look at a sample of educational goals, showing that, although educators nowadays are dedicated to measuring, an understanding of the purpose of life is often not much involved in the measuring process. Then I shall show how this deep

involvement of a detailed understanding of the purpose of life in the assessment of pedagogical success is an aspect of Confucian philosophy. Finally, I will note some of the major points of comparison and contrast with two alternative western perspectives, that of Augustine and John Dewey, who agree on the importance of a moral education although their own philosophies of education, like their own moral philosophies, are somewhat different from Confucius'.

Goals, Assessment, and Ethics

Education, according to the current pedagogical fashion, is all about measurement. We must have our student learning outcomes, and we must measure the progress of our students towards them using quantifiable assessments corresponding to these outcomes. Yet the outcomes tend to be remarkably short and thin, morally speaking. A university's goals typically say something about such things as critical thinking, appreciating diversity, global citizenship, the practicality of knowledge, or preparation for responsible participation in democracy. Yet nearly all other values seem to be almost entirely lacking. A few short examples should suffice for our purposes.

"The mission of Harvard College is to educate the citizens and citizen-leaders for our society" (Harvard College n.d.). Harvard College, a program within Harvard University, further references things like "new ways of understanding," "a diverse living environment," "social transformation," and the importance of students "assessing their values and interests, and learning how they can best serve the world." The University of Chicago claims that "We empower individuals to challenge conventional thinking in pursuit of original ideas" and has for its motto "Let knowledge grow from more to more; and so be human life enriched" (University of Chicago n.d.).

Institutions with a religious heritage are sometimes, not surprisingly, a bit more detailed. Berry College, a liberal arts university with a Christian heritage, has for its stated purpose “To provide an integrated education of the head, heart and hands as the means by which to graduate responsible adults with the knowledge, experience, character and passion to improve the communities in which they live, work and serve” (Berry College n.d.). Berry, whose mission statement references “Christian values” and “Christian principles,” has a further biblical concept in the motto “Not to be ministered unto, but to minister.” On the other side of the world, Hong Kong Baptist University, among other graduate attributes, states that graduates should “Be responsible citizens with an international outlook and a sense of ethics and civility;” “Be independent, lifelong learners with an open mind and an inquiring spirit;” “Be able to think critically and creatively;” and “Be ready to serve, lead and work in a team, and to pursue a healthy lifestyle” (General Education Office n.d.)

Plainly, these *are* ethical goals, within a sufficiently loose definition of the term; these universities want to contribute to the good life. Curiously rare, however, are the normal constituents of the good life from our most venerable moral traditions—loving God, loving our neighbor, faith, hope, love, filial piety, the Golden Rule, the Categorical Imperative, wisdom, courage, justice, and moderation. These moral principles, of course, can be traced to the Torah, the New Testament, Augustine, Confucianism, Mill, Kant, Plato, and Aristotle (to name only a few). These are diverse traditions, which may be a reason why our ethical commitments at university are so minimal: The normal pedagogical custom of our era is to be as morally neutral as possible.

In other words, in our era we make it a very high priority to measure the success of our pedagogical efforts, yet often we do it with the barest account of what we are actually aiming for.

We spend enormous amounts of time on our Learning Outcomes, Learning Goals, and Assessment Measures. We measure quite a bit, but hardly know what is the measuring stick.

It was not always so. In earlier times, the measuring stick was some account of the meaning of life—frequently employing concepts of human nature, moral law, divine commands, the Dao, and so on. Education was understood as a deeply moral enterprise. Among the many sources on this, the interested reader might consult Book VII of Plato’s *Republic*; Eugene Kevane’s *Augustine the Educator* (1964), and chapter 2 of C. S. Lewis’s *The Abolition of Man* (1947).

In short, this is our interesting situation: In the contemporary world we are seemingly at least as committed as educators ever were to measuring the success of our education, yet seem much removed from the old traditional accounts of what a successful education actually is.

I set aside various questions: Are things *really* as they seem? Would things look differently with a more exhaustive survey of university goal statements? And is this situation even a problem? If it is, what is the solution? Instead, I aim to show just one small thing: There is precedent in the history of pedagogical thought for stating some very high moral standards as the goals for education and also for assessing them.

Confucius’ Outcomes and Assessments

I take as my primary evidence Confucius—Kong Zi, Master Kong—as portrayed in the *Analects*. In this text we find a number of goals for student learning outcomes, and we find paired with them some assessment measures.

Let us consider five of these outcomes and their accompanying assessments.

Outcome # 1: The Student Shall Learn How to Learn

I shall use the Dawson translation from Oxford World's Classics (Confucius 2008). Like Socrates in the west, Confucius emphasizes the importance of knowing what we do not know, even suggesting that this is the definition of knowledge (*Analects* 2.17). And it is *very* important to always be learning more (*Analects* 2.4, 5.28, and 7.22).

Of course, the importance of always learning is a value Confucius wants his students to imbibe (*Analects* 6.3). Accordingly, they must learn something about *how* to learn.

And how *do* we learn? Well, books can help—not merely read, but reflected on. So can moral practice; hence learning the ritual requirements of morality—Confucian *li* (禮 / 礼)—is important, and reflecting on the meaning of *li* is also important. So is reflection on the observed behavior of people. But there are other ways we can learn, and ways to show that we have learned something about *how* to learn. Let us look at two of them—measures by which Confucius assesses his students.

Assessment Measure: The Student Shall Talk in Class

It is with this particular assessment measure that we see Confucius' favorite student, the famed Yen Hui, put in what at least appears to be his poorest showing:

The Master said, "I spend the whole day talking with Hui, and he does not put any counter-arguments but seems stupid; but when he is no longer with me and I study his private conduct, he is after all capable of setting the example. Hui is certainly not stupid."
(*Analects* 2.9)

What to make of this? We shall consider later the obvious positive assessment of Hui in this passage, and we should not make too much of the negative assessment. However, it is still significant that Confucius seems willing to draw at least a provisional negative conclusion regarding his student on the basis of his silence during times of instruction. Intelligent

commentary and questioning is an indicator of a good student, although its absence does not prove a bad student. (11.4 suggests that the critique, or a similar one, may be maintained.)

Let us consider another measure of the same goal.

Assessment Measure: The Student Shall Infer Additional Truths from What the Teacher Says

This particular assessment measure is so significant that Confucius makes it a requirement for someone to remain his student (*Analects* 7.8).

Here the Master is, apparently, most affirmative of Hui:

The Master said to Zigong: ‘Out of You and Hui which is the better?’ He replied: ‘How dare I even have a look at Hui? Hui is the sort of person who, by hearing one thing, understands ten; but I am the sort of person who, by hearing one thing, understands two.’

The Master said: ‘You are not as good as he is. Both you and I are not as good as he is.’

(*Analects* 5.9)

There are some textual and interpretive issues here which I am not qualified to sort out. Gardner joins the Dawson translation in this reading of the textual tradition (Gardner 2014, 21). However, Legge leaves out the last clause, voicing his skepticism of this reading in his notes, and stops with the observation of Hui’s and Zigong’s inequality (Confucius 1971, 176). Although I myself once suspected that Confucius is calling *Zigong* superior on the grounds of his personal humility, I have not come across any scholarly support for this reading—just Legge’s ambiguity.

Moreover, Hui is highly praised by the Master in *Analects* Book 6. I now side with what appears to be the dominant interpretation, that the passage is more or less straightforward. Hui is indeed the superior student.

In any case, it is unambiguous that Zigong's criterion for praising Hui is legitimate. Inductive inference from what the teacher teaches is very important, as Gardner helpfully describes (Gardner 2014, 21).

Outcome # 2: The Student Shall Be Able to Draw New Wisdom From Old

This is what Confucius does. He emphasizes strongly his interest in ancient wisdom. "I transmit but do not create. Being fond of the truth, I am an admirer of antiquity" (*Analects* 7.1). "I am not one who knew about things at birth; I am one who through my admiration of antiquity is keen to discover things" (7.20). And ancient wisdom is never outdated. By studying it we ought to be able to apply it in new circumstances: "If by keeping the old warm one can provide understanding of the new, one is fit to be a teacher" (*Analects* 2.11). Indeed, to a rather large extent the whole point of Confucius' own work was to rediscover the wisdom of the old Zhou Dynasty and apply it in the contemporary social circumstances which so badly needed it.

Assessment Measure: The Student Shall Recognize Moral Teachings in the Old Texts

Confucius considers that he can test the ability of his students to do this sort of thing by their finding moral wisdom in the *Shijing*, the *Odes* or the *Songs*. He compliments on their ability to interpret a line from the *Songs* as applying to his own moral teachings both Zigong (in *Analects* 1.15) and another student (in 3.8).

Outcome # 3: The Student Shall Value Virtue and Righteousness Above Material Gain

Socrates, the Stoics, and others in the ancient world thought likewise. Confucius' teaching to this effect is certainly not unique. He says, "Riches and honours—these are what men desire, but if this is not achieved in accordance with the appropriate principles, one does not cling to them. Poverty and obscurity—these are what men hate, but if this is not achieved in accordance with the appropriate principles, one does not avoid them" (*Analects* 4.5). More

succinctly, he notes that “riches and honours acquired by unrighteous means are to me like the floating clouds” (7.16; see also 7.12). Moral good is greater and more important than material gain.

Assessment Measure: The Student Shall in Hard Circumstances Show Contentment with Virtue

This is one of those passages where Hui comes in for high praise: “A man of quality indeed was Hui! He lived in a squalid alley with a tiny bowlful of rice to eat and a ladleful of water to drink. Other men would not endure such hardships, but Hui did not let his happiness be affected. A man of quality indeed was Hui!” (*Analects* 6.11). By this happiness in poverty, Hui shows that he cares about moral goodness more than material goodness. He is a good man, and has achieved this goal of his education.

Outcome # 4: The Student Shall Learn to Practice the Golden Rule

That Confucius promotes the Golden Rule is well known. A good introduction to this topic may be found in Harry J. Gensler’s *Ethics and the Golden Rule* (Gensler 2013, 53, 171). It is indeed so well known that the idea that he teaches the negative Golden Rule *and not the positive* has achieved the status of a popular philosophy myth. The negative Golden Rule (or the Silver Rule) is: Do *not* do to others what you want them to *not* do to you. The positive Golden Rule teaches us: *Do* to others what you want them to *do* to you. One clue to the positive Golden Rule in *Analects* is the sentence “Now the humane man, wishing himself to be established, sees that others are established, and wishing himself to be successful, sees that others are successful” (6.30). So far, this has the structure of the Golden Rule, but not its universality: We are told to treat others as we want to be treated in this matter and that matter—but not necessarily in everything. However, Confucius continues: “To be able to take one’s own familiar feelings as a guide may definitely be called the method of humaneness.” The

definition of virtue is that we learn to be guided in our interactions with others by our own needs and wishes. Gardner explains using conventional Golden Rule language: “True goodness lies in the direction of empathetic behavior. In dealing with others, we are obliged to treat them as we ourselves would wish to be treated” (Gardner 2014, 24). Similarly, Herbert Fingarette explicitly connects Confucian *ren* (仁, virtue, benevolence, humaneness, humanity) to the Golden Rule as expressed in the Bible: “Thus perfect community of men—the Confucian analogue to Christian brotherhood—becomes an inextricable part, the chief aspect, of Divine worship—again an analogy with the central Law taught by Jesus” (Fingarette 1998, 16).

Assessment Measure: The Student Shall Follow the Negative Golden Rule

I notice two passages in the *Analects* in which Confucius and his student Zigong discuss the Golden Rule. In one striking passage, the negative form of the Rule is singled out as “a single word such that one could practise it throughout one’s life,” a lifelong goal (15.24). In another passage Confucius addresses whether Zigong yet measures up:

Zigong said: “If I do not want others to inflict something on me, I also want to avoid inflicting it on others.” The Master said, “Si, this is a point you have yet reached.”
(5.12)

In fact, Zigong fails to achieve his learning outcome of practicing the Golden Rule when measured by the test of practicing at least the negative Golden Rule. Not that we should worry too much about Zigong at this stage: Learning is a lifelong process.

Outcome # 5: The Student Shall Achieve a Harmony of His Principles and His Way of Life

Another lifelong process is living up to our principles—at least for most of us. Consider this passage in the *Analects*:

The Master said: ‘Can, by one single thread is my Way bound together.’ Master Zeng said: ‘Yes.’ When the Master went out the disciples asked: ‘What did he mean?’ Master Zeng said: ‘Our Master’s Way simply consists of loyalty and reciprocity.’ (*Analects* 4.15)

Confucianism, as I read it, aims to achieve harmony in several spheres: harmony between our *human nature* and our *principles*, which ought to be correctly formed in light of human nature; harmony between those *principles* and our *lives*, which ought to measure up to them; harmony between how we treat *others* and how we treat *ourselves*, as taught in the Golden Rule; and the harmony of a well-ordered society marked by the customary practices (*li*) of virtuous care (*ren*) one for another. In this passage Confucius apparently emphasizes harmony obtaining between our principles and in how we treat people. However, in Legge’s translation he seems rather to emphasize that our principles should be in harmony with our nature, and that we should have lives informed by those principles. The latter harmony is certainly emphasized elsewhere, if not here—as when the Master points out that we should never neglect *ren* for any amount of time (4.5) and when he points out the pleasure of applying what we have learned (1.1).

Assessment Measure: After Ethics Class Is Over, the Student Shall Live by What the Teacher Teaches

We ought, moreover, to be able to discern whether a person is really living up to those principles; a man’s character is not inscrutable (*Analects* 2.10). Confucius is recorded to have observed from the way of life of one of his students whether he was applying what he learned. In fact we already know both the student and the anecdote:

The Master said, “I spend the whole day talking with Hui, and he does not put any counter-arguments but seems stupid; but when he is no longer with me and I study his

private conduct, he is after all capable of setting the example. Hui is certainly not stupid.”

(Analects 2.9)

In this particular story we see how wonderfully Hui tends to measure up to the Master’s learning outcomes. Confucius recognizes that there appear to be grounds for concern in the case of Hui for not raising any objections. But if Hui fails this particular assessment, he passes the next one with flying colors—showing that talking in class is not as important to Confucius as applying what one listens to. And this is the measurement by which Hui is determined to live up to the goal of a harmony between life and principles: After ethics class is over, he applies what his teacher said in class.

Comparison to Two Western Philosophers

Now let us take a quick journey westward and look at two philosophers from the western canon who are much interested in education. Augustine the Christian natural law philosopher and John Dewey the American Pragmatist should be adequately different for the comparison and contrast we need. We do not need a thorough look at their own student learning outcomes and assessment measures (which in any case would require a study triple the length of this one). What we need is merely this: evidence that other great moral thinkers have their own moral pedagogies, which are also somewhat different in keeping with the differences in their moralities.

We will look at Augustine first and then Dewey with particular attention to the following points. Augustine, like Confucius, views education as, at least in large part, the inculcation and practice of moral principles. However, the context of his morality is deeply Christian and submissive to the propositions of orthodox theology. Dewey’s vision for education is democratic: Education is to preserve the life of a society, and Dewey recommends that society

both be democratic and pass on democratic practices in the structure and methods of education. Confucius, however, wants to continue—or, rather, restore—the norms and customs of an ancient Chinese social structure—the culture of the Zhou dynasty, not excluding its social hierarchies. But, like Dewey, he thinks education is fundamentally meant for the preservation and cultivation of a moral order.

Augustine was trained as a teacher of rhetoric, where he was accustomed to sell for money the skills of persuasion and pleasing speech, a tale recounted eloquently in his *Confessions*. When he turned to follow Christ in Milan in 386 A.D. he did not cease to be an educator and a rhetorician; rather, he became an educator for Christ who used his rhetoric in service of the truth. (Much on this is written in the likes of Kevan 1964, Kolbet 2009, and Topping 2012.) As Eugene Kevane explains, in Augustine's thought every field of study "ought to be a quest for wisdom: its relationship to God ought to be clarified explicitly for the youthful minds. When this is done, the culture of the human arts and disciplines orients the students toward the theistic concept of human life and destiny which is the very essence of wisdom" (Kevane 1964, 296).

Let's take just one useful example. In one of his earliest writings, *De Ordine*, Augustine gives us a glimpse of his new Christian pedagogy. Having retreated to a country estate at Cassiciacum, he is engaged in philosophical discussions with his students Licentius and Trygetius. In an attempt to resist an idea suggested by Licentius, Trygetius flirts with heresy (*On Order* 1.10.29). He suggests that Jesus—God *the Son*—may not be called "God" quite so properly as God *the Father* is called "God." When Augustine reprimands him, Trygetius is ashamed and wishes that his own words not be recorded in the notes being taken of the conversation. Licentius then insists they be written down, and he is in turn reprimanded by his

teacher, who next notices Trygetius sinning in his turn by enjoying the reprimand of his classmate!

This situation is a bit of a mess. Augustine's response is a delightful depiction of a Christian pedagogy (*Ord.* 1.10.29-30). He reprimands them for their vices and in particular for caring more for personal glory than for truth. This is the very corruption of the pagan school of rhetoric to escape which was largely the purpose of retreating to Cassiciacum. Instead of training youths in the pursuit of glory through rhetorical prowess in return for money, Augustine is now seeking an education that will inculcate morality in return for a different form of payment. Tearfully, he asks Licentius and Trygetius to give the right sort of payment to the sort of teacher he has now become: *Si me magistrum libenter vocatis, reddite mihi mercedem: boni estote*; "If you willingly call me 'teacher,' render to me the payment: Be good!"

This passage teaches us two important things about Augustine's Christian pedagogy. First, he is, like Confucius, deeply interested in an education which intentionally draws from and inculcates a moral perspective, central to which is the rejection of personal glory as a priority for one's life and the commitment to gaining wisdom as an overriding priority. These are moral principles central to the Augustinian perspective. Second, Augustine's pedagogy is explicitly Christian and shaped by Nicean doctrine: The whole incident begins because someone failed to recognize the full deity of Christ! A proper education is an orthodox one, and indeed orthodoxy tells us what sort of wisdom we are looking for: an understanding of the truths of the Christian faith (on which see *On Order* 2.5.16).

Moving from the Mediterranean to America, and jumping ahead about one and a half millennia, John Dewey understands democracy in deeply moral terms:

Democracy is a way of life controlled by a working faith in the possibilities of human nature. . . . The democratic faith in human equality is belief that every human being, independent of the quantity or range of his personal endowment, has the right to equal opportunity with every other person for development of whatever gifts he has. (Dewey 1939)

In his *Democracy and Education*, Dewey explains how education continues the life of a democratic society (Dewey 1916). Dewey's philosophy regularly considers society after the model of a biological organism. It is the nature of life to renew itself. As with biological life, so also with the life of a society, which renews itself by education. Education initiates us into and trains us to participate in the experience of humanity. The right understanding of humanity must be expressed in education. Now Dewey rejects any dualism of mind from the rest of the human being, and his views on education concur: Education must not be purely intellectual and neglect to involve the whole person. Moreover, Dewey also rejects any unequal social structure, for these mirror the same dualism: As the individual human is not separated into unequal parts, so also society should not be separated into unequal parts. The best form of social organization is democratic. Not that "best" means *perfect* in any sense implying that it no longer needs to change; to the contrary, a society, like an organism, grows and develops. And a healthy, developing democratic society will renew itself by an equal education that involves the whole person. It will be an active education—not one where students passively absorb information, but one where young humans learn to use and channel their energy into creative and useful action. This will, of course, involve a good bit of scientific education. But it will also involve some old ideas and old books as introductions to and training in the moral and intellectual life of the society's past. (This is the more conservative aspect of Dewey's philosophy of education,

although it would be more accurate to say that Dewey rejects the idea of a dichotomy of conservative vs. progressive, as clarified further in Dewey 1938.)

To keep our study to a manageable length, we will consider just two salient passages. After considering education in general, Dewey turns in chapter 8 to “the democratic conception in education.” He describes his recommended society thus: “A society which makes provision for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated life is insofar democratic” (Dewey 1916, 99). And a proper education preserves this democratic life by giving youth “a personal interest in social relationships and control” as well as “the habits of mind” which bring out useful change in society “without introducing disorder.” How, then, is this practically to be done? In chapter 26, the final chapter, Dewey considers “theories of morals” and looks directly at the characteristics of a moral education, explaining that “the measure of the worth of the administration, curriculum, and methods of instruction of the school is the extent to which they are animated by a social spirit” (358). The good for a human being is not only what he *is*; a person ought not only to be good; “he must be good *for something*” (italics added). Now that for which a person “must be good is capacity to live as a social member so that what he gets from living with others balances with what he contributes” (359). And this means that “the school must itself be a community life,” and moreover that “learning in school should be continuous with that out of school.” There is to be no separation of a democratic community life from education, but an interpenetration each of the other.

Like Confucius, then, Dewey is interested in a moral education. Education is for conveying a society’s morality and order. Of course, the major difference here is that Confucius looks to the moral order of the early Zhou dynasty while Dewey’s social ideal is thoroughly

democratic. (The reader interested in a closer look at Dewey's ethics might consult Rosenbaum 1998. Although there is a vast literature on Dewey in relation to Confucius which I cannot pretend even to have begun to master, I can at least suggest Sim 2009 as an insightful analysis of this divergence of the two thinkers.)

Of course, there are any number of other salient points of comparison and contrast between Confucius and Augustine, between Confucius and Dewey, and also between Augustine and Dewey! This is just a glance, but it is enough to show that these two great western moral philosophers also have their own moral pedagogies. These pedagogies are different in some respects from each other as well as from Confucius, but in all three cases we see the idea that major moral theories and commitments can and ought to be applied in education. There are differences between the east and the west, and there are differences between ancient and modern thought. But this at least is not one of them, for Augustine, Dewey, and Confucius all agree on the importance of morality in education.

Conclusion

In short, Confucius in the *Analects* is very much interested in tracking the progress of his students; he has measures by which he assesses that progress; the measures are in reference to moral goals which he takes to be the purpose of education; these moral goals are no less than the whole Confucian teaching on the meaning of life; and this pedagogical perspective has interesting similarities and differences with western moral philosophers such as Augustine and Dewey.

And, speaking of education, this little study leaves us knowing very little, but hopefully better aware of what exactly it is we don't know. There is a great deal more to say about the pairings of learning outcomes with assessment measures in Augustine and Dewey, and more to

say about Confucius besides. And what pairings of learning outcomes with assessment measures might we find in Mencius, the Daoist tradition, the Buddhist tradition, Plato, Aquinas, or Kant? If we think Confucius is right, what should we actually *do* with this information? How would we apply it today in our own educational systems? These are salient questions—for another time. However, I can at least make one suggestion. In education, it is not the case that one size fits all. A diversity of different educational systems will allow for experimentation with different ways of applying moral principles. For example, educational settings with a lower student-teacher ratio would allow teachers more room for close mentoring of students and tracking their progress in relation to moral standards.

And, absent all this further salutary investigation, why does this matter? Here is one possible reason, the same which Lewis articulated so eloquently in *The Abolition of Man*. There is a great tradition of human thought which teaches that there is such a thing as objective moral truth, and that it *matters*. The tradition may actually be (as I hold that it is) correct. If so, we ignore it at our very great peril.

For the skeptics among us, I suggest two words as a second reason this topic matters, something we all seem to agree is a goal of education: critical thinking. There are other philosophies, other views on and ways of doing education. Some of them, as with Confucius, have already achieved a greater degree of influence than most of us could ever dream of. Some of us do not agree with them, and perhaps may not even know whether there is any good reason we should. But we might as well know what views on education we do *not* accept, or begin to know them, or, at the very least, know that there is something here we do not yet know about.

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