

MASTER'S THESIS

Online video political satire in post-handover Hong Kong: the competition for discursive power in Mainland China and Hong Kong relationship

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**Online Video Political Satire in Post-handover Hong Kong:
The Competition for Discursive Power in Mainland China and Hong Kong
Relationship**

LAU Hiu Ming

**A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Philosophy**

**Principal Supervisor:
Prof. Alice Lee (Hong Kong Baptist University)**

March 2019

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis represents my own work which has been done after registration for the degree of MPhil at Hong Kong Baptist University, and has not been previously included in a thesis or dissertation submitted to this or any other institution for a degree, diploma or other qualifications.

I have read the University's current research ethics guidelines, and accept responsibility for the conduct of the procedures in accordance with the University's Research Ethics Committee (REC). I have attempted to identify all the risks related to this research that may arise in conducting this research, obtained the relevant ethical and/or safety approval (where applicable), and acknowledged my obligations and the rights of the participants.

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ABSTRACT

The relationship between mainland China and Hong Kong has not been smooth since the 1997 handover. The relationship has deteriorated further in the past decade, and at the same time the Chinese government has been tightening its grip on Hong Kong with a series of national policies.

With this backdrop, some among Hong Kong's media have adopted video political satire as their way of reporting, thereby pushing video political satire into the limelight. Political satire in Hong Kong has a long history, but it did not receive much attention until the emergence of video political satire in the digital age. Hong Kong media that supports both the pan-democratic and pro-establishment camps utilise political satire as a political weapon to criticise and delegitimise the opposing camp.

This study has modified Hallin's sphere as its theoretical foundation, and the sphere of legitimate controversy is understood as the battlefield between the pro-establishment and pan-democratic camps. Political satire is used as a weapon to jam the discourse of the opposing camp in the sphere of legitimate controversy.

This study investigated the influence of online video political satire in post-handover Hong Kong, in light of the increasingly intense relationship between mainland China and Hong Kong. Six long-held ideological struggles have been used as analytical tools to identify the embedded packages. This study has achieved three research objectives: it has identified the changing face of political satire in the digital age, namely, the shift from political cartoon to video political satire; it has displayed the difference in production synergies from individual-based producers to institutional-based producers; and it has challenged the

assumption that political satire is subversive in nature by uncovering the ideological packages of different political camps.

This thesis has chosen four policy cases as case studies. These policies are highly related to China and are controversial. This study employed quantitative content analysis, qualitative content analysis and interviews with relevant stakeholders. Results showed that video political satire has room to include more varied information than the political cartoon, including the effect on audio and visual elements. Video political satire also has higher spreadability as it is distributed online, whereas the political cartoon is disseminated via newspaper. The different production synergies (from individual-based to institutional-based) are constituted by individual freedom and the self-positioning as a journalist. This study could link video political satire study in Hong Kong to a wider scope of foreign political satire research, which mostly focuses on individually-produced political satire works. This study also revisits the concept of culture jamming, and has developed an advanced concept called discourse jamming. Unlike cultural jamming, discourse jamming neither assumes that political satire is subversive nor that it is an “eye-opener” which jams mainstream culture. Discourse jamming is a more flexible concept, indicating that political satire can be used by both the pan-democratic and pro-establishment camps.

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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION

Political satire is not something new. It is funny and witty but at the same time critical, with the purpose to launch criticism. It emphasises and criticises the incompetence of government actions or flaws of political leaders. Its history can be traced back to ancient Greece in forms of texts, and later—in the 19th century—appeared in the form of political cartoons. Traditionally political satire only existed in the print medium, but in the past decade it expanded to encompass a large variety of mediums, including newspapers, TV shows, and social media. This change in medium and the advancement of technology allowed more room for political satirists to create not only cartoons but also moving images and resulted in the attachment of new characteristics to political satire.

The development of political cartoon in Hong Kong are closely related to those in China. Before we jump to the modern world, we must first understand the word “manhua (i.e. cartoon in Mandarin)” when it started to develop in China back in 1920. “Manhua” was considered as graphic arts at first, but it had developed its satirical and social dimension overtime, and revealed the absurdity in life and connecting the life of common people (Wong, 2002). In a land full of war and politics, cartoonists from Shanghai moved to Hong Kong to continue their drawing when Shanghai was occupied by Japan. Hong Kong had served as the backup of a greater China in terms of manhua development.

Hong Kong style “manhua” started to be developed after war. It was in the direction of leisure and entertainment at first, and did not start to have the political

vibe until 1960s. In the late 1960s, the pro-communist and anti-communist adapted political cartoon to attack the British government or the Communist party respectively. But a majority of cartoon remained to base on everyday life of Hong Kong people, with seldom attention to the political sphere (Wong, 2004). This was the result of general political apathy and the strategic consideration of the publisher.

The political cartoon did not start to re-enter the central stage until the 1980s, when 1997 handover started to become evident. Political satire in the form of cartoons rose to its peak in the early 1980s while the Sino-British Joint Declaration was being signed and expanded significantly in the early 1990s after the Tiananmen Square crackdown. One of the earliest artists was perhaps Yim Yee-king, otherwise known as Ah Chung, who held his first exhibition in 1956. Other political cartoonists such as Malone, Zunzi, and Emu started their careers as political cartoonists in the 1980s and have been part of the Hong Kong newspaper scene since then.

The rise and contraction of the political cartoon is highly linked to political events and the social atmosphere at the time. The political cartoon at the pre-handover era mostly discuss topics about China's internal politics, while after the handover era, they focus "overwhelmingly on Hong Kong troubles" (Lai, 2005). Perhaps the peak of political cartoon in the first decade of handover, was when the first chief executive of Hong Kong, Tung Chee-wah, served his first term. Political cartoonists had created characters targeted against the government officials such as Tung Chee-wah as "old and stupid Tung (老懵董)" and Regina Ip as "broom-head(掃把頭)". Local publisher sub-culture used these characters and published dozens of political books between 2000 to 2002. According to the president

Jimmy Pang Chi-ming, the “old and stupid Tung” series was sold over 100,000 copies (Cheng, Sin & Yip, 2005). After Tung Chee-wah stepped down, political satire did not take centre stage in the media until 2009, when Apple Daily went online and employed video political satire as a form of news representation.

This study aims to investigate the influence of online video political satire in post-handover Hong Kong, regarding the increasingly intense Mainland China/Hong Kong relationship. Political satire acts as a weapon to fight for discursive power in the ideological struggles between the two places. Media organisations in both the pro-democratic camp and pro-establishment camp attempt to define and frame the problem in such conflicts. The media outlets from both camps aim to legitimise and publicise their views and ideology to win over public opinion.

This dissertation will mainly focus on video political satire which predominantly uses the internet as a mode of delivery. This research will seek to explore how political satire in Hong Kong changed its medium from cartoon to video and its possible role as political propaganda from an institutional perspective. It also hopes to provide new insight into the existing literature of political satire by extending the context of research from the West to Hong Kong. There are three main purposes for this dissertation: a) examine the characteristics of video political satire with reference to political cartoons; b) investigate the production mechanism, namely, how the change from individual based production to institutional-based production may alter the content of video political satire; and c) investigate the political ideological package embedded in the satire to see how different political camps legitimize their ideological discourses. This study will also question two possible assumptions in contemporary political satire literature:

a) satire is individually produced, and b) satire as part of the culture jamming process is subversive.

Four Hong Kong policy issues related to Chinese influence will be used as case studies. Also three media outlets which produce video political satire with different political stances and backgrounds will be examined in order to understand their framing and (de)legitimising techniques. By examining the discourse about the policy cases in Hong Kong, this thesis hopes to enhance the understanding of the development of video political satire.

1.1 Context of study

1.1.1 The political situation in Hong Kong: 20 years after the handover

Hong Kong has never been more politically polarised. Francis Lee (2016) pointed out that the degree of political polarisation in Hong Kong has steadily increased in the past two decades. A few peaks were identified after analysing monthly evaluations and trust in the Hong Kong SAR government from monthly polls conducted by the Public Opinion Programme at Hong Kong University. We can attribute the peak of polarisation to the anti-national education movement in 2012, the Umbrella Movement in 2014, and the government's discourse against the idea of Hong Kong independence in previous years.

The media serves as the essential platform for "opinion formation and expression" in Hong Kong's underdeveloped democracy (Chan & Lee, 2007). The government has tried to influence this platform decades ago.

1.1.2 Media manipulation? Tightening grip and setting up the mouthpiece

It is common for governments in demi-democratic and authoritarian regimes to try to contain media influence from oppositional forces. Media manipulation can be

achieved by either direct ownership of the media, or indirectly by providing political and economic rewards to media owners, or by encouraging pro-government businessmen to buy existing media (Chan & Lee, 2007; Fong, 2016). Hong Kong media tycoons have long been the targets of Mainland China's united front work (統戰). Such united front work started during the 1980s and 1990s (Fong, 2016). Unlike foreign media concentration, media institutions in Hong Kong were not controlled by a few big players. Yet we cannot jump to the conclusion that Hong Kong media has diverse opinions as media outlets are in fact being taken over by many pro-Beijing businessmen (Fung, 2007). These businessmen share similar values and often have political and (or) business bonds with the Chinese government. Almost all owners of TV stations and newspapers have been absorbed into the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conferences (CPPCC). Even if some of the owners are not formally included into the Conferences, they still have a "substantial business interest" in mainland China (Fong, 2016). The background of the owner could have an impact on how journalists report China-related news.

Prior research concluded that journalists working in media organisations acquired by "Pro-China" businesses tended to steer the media towards 'objective' and 'neutral' positions (Fung, 2007). Research during the transition period (1984-1997) was concerned about the potential loss of press freedom and freedom of expression due to two forces: the change of media ownership (Fung & Lee, 1994) and journalists' self-censorship (Chan, Lee, & Lee, 1995). This line of research is pessimistic as to the watchdog role of the media, especially when it comes to political issues, as the power centre "has employed various means to tame the media" (Chan & Lee, 2007).

Silencing the traditional media did control oppositional voices—at least until the age of technological change. The internet has become a new source of information as information is no longer being produced by mainstream media. Scholars who focus on China, therefore, often emphasise the internet’s role in social change, namely, “the potential democratization of China through the use of technology” (Herold & de Seta, 2015). This perspective, however, may be too optimistic and put too much hope in the subversive role of the internet. The internet is a neutral tool that can be utilised by both opponents of the authoritarian regime and the authoritarian regime itself. Following this perspective also assumes the government is too rigid and thus might not utilise the internet for its own use. The government does have the capability to evolve strategies over time. The Chinese Communist party, for instance, has allowed online criticism of government officials but curbs possible collective action and therefore reinforces its official status (Herold, 2015).

1.1.3 Demobilisation by media

The Hong Kong government attempts to manage street politics by not controlling street politics directly (Cheng, 2016). It has developed sets of demobilisation strategies from the micro-, meso- to macro-levels, so as to neutralise threats posed on the legitimacy of the regime from bottom-up activism. These hybrid strategies include elite cohesion in LegCo, targeted arrest against social movement leaders, and setting up pro-establishment social organisations. These organisations have a long history in Hong Kong, but they have been working underground until recent years. Pro-establishment “civil” organisations started to form in 2010, mostly with claims to represent the silent majority of Hong Kong. The argument of “the silent majority” aims to neutralise the pro-democracy force; as the latter usually, if not

always, has more advocates when it comes to collective action and voting. For example, these “civil” organisations had assembled to organise “blue-ribbon movements” to neutralise the “yellow-ribbon” Umbrella Movement.

While Cheng’s focus is on counter-agencies, similar attempts of demobilisation may be found in pro-establishment media. Government mouthpieces began to digitise in 2013, and at least six digital media platforms with a pro-establishment stance or background have been established (Lok-siu , 2016). Working with a similar logic as those “civil” organisations, such media has the goal to neutralise and crowd out the influence of traditional democratic media. Yet they are different to the “civil” organisations with similar backgrounds as not all of these media platforms contain explicit political claims against the democratic camp. Here this thesis’ focus is on Speak Out Hong Kong, a media platform that has explicitly voiced out its political stance while publicising its political agenda using political satire. This pro-establishment media platform has adopted the style of the liberal press to disseminate its own political agenda.

1.1.4 Emerging influence of Political Satire: An Overview

The United States has a long culture of playful critique against the government, and the satirists publicise their work not only in newspapers but also on TV. The entertaining TV shows targeting politicians were first called late-night shows. Late-night comedy shows were developed as early as the 1990s, but they did not receive much attention from political communication scholars until January 2004. Pew Research Centre at that time released the result of a highly regarded survey aimed to shed light on American media-use regarding political candidates and campaigns. The results revealed that some Americans were moving away from traditional sources to the internet and comedy TV shows. Although the overall

consumption of satire TV shows only increased from 6% in 2000 to 8% in 2004, it had a significant effect on youngsters aged 18-29, which is the most politically apathetic group. Nearly 50% of them said they “sometimes” learned about political campaigns from shows like Saturday Night Live and The Daily Show in 2004, compared to 9% in 2000. The result of this survey revealed the increasing influence of political satire in attracting audiences who are not political junkies. This phenomenon attracted communication scholars to look into the effect of political satire on the American public, from voting behaviour to cynicism towards electoral politics. Since then the political entertainment field took off and has become one of the fastest-growing topics for scholarship in the last decade (Holbert, Weinmann, & Robinson, 2017).

Unlike the United States, political satire in Hong Kong did not use TV as a medium and was not the primary source of information until last decade. Before 2009, political satire only occupied a small corner in newspapers’ columns in the form of political cartoons, and a large majority, if not all, were produced by individual political cartoonists. Media institutions, despite their political stances, did not use political satire in their reports. In other words, they did not use a playful way to criticise politicians or political issues. One special case was the cover of Next Magazine (under Next Digital Limited) in their 1st July 2003 issue. That signature cover, which is photoshopped, “throws” cake on Tung Chee-wah’s face and urges people to fill the streets and express their dissent against the Hong Kong government. According to Zo Siu-jan (左少珍), chief editor at the time, the editors decided to change their role from “recording history to making history”, which implies they would more or less abandon their journalistic objectivity and encourage people to take to the streets. The editors also chose to print and release

the magazine one day earlier than usual to match the annual protest of Hong Kong on 1st July (Chan & Ching, 2017). This attempt was a ground-breaking but rare one: it did open the subversive possibility of institutionally produced political satire, but this was merely a one-time cover.

About six years later in 2009, Apple Action News was launched as a branch of Apple Daily (under Next Digital Limited), and serves as the digital department under the newspaper to produce video news. Apple Daily works in the flavour of pan-democrats and has been accused of being sensational and too entertaining.

Apple Action News pushes the line even further as law and traditional journalistic norms did not bind online video news as much.

Using entertaining and sensational reporting, Apple Action News has quickly absorbed enormous support of netizens and gained over 2 million likes on Facebook from 2013 to the end of 2017, which is the highest among Hong Kong media. Young people are turning away from the physical newspaper and turn to social media for news. Although there is no direct data to suggest youngsters only consume Apple Action News, many believe Apple Action News has the potential to become—if not already—a prominent news source for youngsters. This sibling of Next Magazine places satire in a more central role, and playfully criticises pan-Beijing politicians in political news reporting.

Other media institutions did not adopt similar strategies until 2013. 100 Most first appeared in the form of a magazine in March 2013. This weekly satirical magazine quickly gained popularity and later launched the online platform TV Most in 2015. They have a similar political stance as Apple Daily but tend to support the localists and not the traditional pan-democrats. Their “News at around

6:30 pm”, or “Most News” provides “daily news reports”, which had plagiarised the form of TVB’s news reporting.

Speak Out Hong Kong, the pro-establishment media platform launched in 2013, has plagiarised the form of Apple Action News to promote its agenda. Student activist Joshua Wong commented that one of the sections “One-minute Funny News”, which is broadcasted twice a week, has the same tone as Apple Action News. This implies that the pro-establishment media tried to gain popularity by using the satiric form and unfolds possibilities for future political satire research. Even if these media outlets have their own unique stance, one cannot directly jump to conclude that their reports are anti-government or anti-democrat simply because of their standpoint. The media reports could vary when reporting different issues. The techniques and frames used by such media will be examined in the following sections.

1.2 The significance of the study

This study contributes to the scholarly research of political satire in three ways: Firstly, it examines how the changing face of political satire in the digital era opens possibilities for variation in content and presentation skills. Secondly, it examines the differences in political satire when production changes from individual-based to institutional-based. Political satire in the west is mostly produced by individual satirists who represent their own personal views while those in Hong Kong have to work according to the political stance of the institution. It is hard, if not impossible, to link the research from two places together without understanding their differences. Thirdly, this research will seek to revisit the underlying assumption of a large body of research on political satire.

Many studies on political satire spontaneously assume that satire is subversive and targets those in power, and therefore fails to recognise the potential of political satire to become a propaganda tool.

1.2.1 Definitions of terms

Political satire is an umbrella term. Political satire has many forms, including text, political cartoon, late night TV talk shows, and video political satire. Here this thesis defines political cartoon as the cartoons produced by the political cartoonists. Political cartoon is text oriented, TV political satire refers to the individually-based produced TV talk shows in the west, which start flourishing a few decades ago, represented by star hosts Jon Stewart and later Stephen Colbert and John Oliver. These TV shows highly rely on the star hosts. Video political satire, which is the main focus of this thesis, refers to the political satire produced in video format. The main disseminate platform of these videos is internet.

1.3 The Organisation of the Chapters

Chapter 1 “Introduction” sets the stage and lays out the political context of Hong Kong. It traces the development of political satire in Hong Kong and sets the stage for the following chapters. It also outlines the purpose and significance of the study.

Chapter 2 “Literature Review” traces the development of the concept of political satire and reviews the literature that mostly places satire as part of a subversive force. Here I adopt and modify Hallin’s idea on three spheres to define satire as a battlefield of legitimation, which media organisations in the flavor of different political forces fight upon.

Chapter 3 “Methodology” explains the method and cases chosen for a detailed account. Content analysis and interviews were used to answer my research questions. I decided to adopt Gamson’s idea on frame analysis and construct ideological packages.

Chapter 4 “The changing face of political satire” reports the characteristics of online video political satire and illustrates the differences between political cartoons and political satire, regarding the form of representation, production, freedom of the satirists and how these changes affect the content of political satire.

Chapter 5 “Frames in political satire” analyses the ideological packages embedded in video political satire and utilises content analysis and interview data to explain why some ideological struggles are more prominent than others.

Chapter 6 “Discussion” revisits the concept of culture jamming and paves the way for future research. Limitation will also be discussed.

Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

The blurring lines between news and entertainment is not a new phenomenon. Popular culture has been marching into political culture, and political news no longer needs to be hard but can be funny and entertaining. The area of political entertainment research is still in its infancy but has become one of the fastest-growing fields in the past decade (Holbert et al., 2017). Political satire in particular received specific attention and stood out from entertainment media scholarships. It is because a nation-wide study showed that young people were turning away from traditional news-coverage and increasingly used satire as their primary news source.

Satire can be traced back to ancient Rome (Holbert et al., 2011), but it did not enter the public agenda until the launch of *The Daily Show* and the *Colbert Report*. Both shows gained a significant audience in the United States and received enormous attention in political communication scholarship. Before we start to build the foundation for our theoretical research, let us first clarify what satire is.

2.1 What is satire?

The term “political satire” is often associated with umbrella terms like “infotainment”, “political entertainment” and “political humour”. Scholars often use these terms interchangeably with satire: “political talk shows” (Vraga et al., 2012); “late night (television) comedy” or “TV” (Amarasingam, 2011; Chen, Gan, & Sun, 2017); “political” or “news parody”(Baym & Jones, 2012); and “fake

news” (Reilly, 2013) making political satire notoriously hard to define (Kumar & Combe, 2015; Yang & Jiang, 2015).

There are three main components of political satire: argument, humour, and political dimension. Political satire takes stances. It is in favour of something and is against something else, while negative behaviours of the opposing sides are often heavily painted (Young, 2014). It is commonly used to point out the inconsistency of claims of politicians over time (Tandoc, Lim, & Ling, 2017). Its argument is constructed in a “thesis-exempla essay” form: the main point followed by a supporting argument, and later supported by an example (Kumar & Combe, 2015).

Unlike traditional forms of political information, satire is a product that targets the active audience (Young, 2004). It does not provide explicit political statements or arguments, thus giving room for audience interpretation (Holbert, 2005). The audience has to understand the specific context before they find satire meaningful and funny. Previous studies show what satirists said or presented explicitly do not necessarily reflect their stance on the issue addressed, as a signifier has different meanings to the signified. For instance, coverage on the Occupy Wall Street Movement on The Daily Show and The Colbert Report—two primary sources of political satire which attracted massive public and scholarly interest—adopted the delegitimise framing of protest paradigm but “the underlying meaning was anything but [to] delegitimize” the movement (Young, 2013). The audience has to read (watch) between the lines to understand the real meaning of satirists. Moreover, most political satirists in the US explicitly endorse neither politician nor public policy issue. As Holbert (2005) puts it, “you will never see Jon Stewart explicitly endorse a political candidate”.

2.1.1 Two types of Satire: Juvenalian and Horatian

Satire, as a literary form, hopes to educate, entertain as well as to persuade (Holbert et al., 2011). All sorts of satire are “a playfully critical distortion of the familiar” (Feinberg, 1967, p.86), but satirists use different methods to achieve the same goal. It is important to note that satire should not be described as one single entity (Holbert, Tchernev, Walther, Esralew, & Benski, 2013). Literary satire could be classified into two most prominent types: Juvenalian and Horatian (Cutbirth, 2011; Hill, 2013). Both types include humorous material intended to make the audience laugh, but the core tendency is to attack which is often achieved with “a blend of amusement and contempt” (Highet, 1962, p.21). This “inescapable aggressivity” (Bogel, 2001, p.50) means satirists are playing the role of a “skeptical and bemused observer” (Knight, 2004, p.3). Apart from these similarities, however, the two types represent two very different methods to challenge existing ideas, which are the underlying norms and assumptions of current society (Griffin, 1994, p.160). To offer clarity, Juvenalian satire is a tragedy while Horatian satire is a comedy (Sander, 1971). This classification is essential as they adapt different ways and thus persuasive force.

Juvenalian satire’s goal is “to wound, to punish, to destroy” (Highet, 1962, p.235), and is “savage and merciless” (Sander, 1971, p. 254). The word “Juvenalian” is derived from ancient Rome satirist Decimus Junius Juvenalias, who wrote 16 satires in the late first and second centuries. The tone used in this type of satire is acidic, dark, sarcastic, and filled with anger. Satirists in this tradition are pessimistic and do not believe in a chance for reform. Instead of suggesting an ideal, satirists in this tradition “expose, criticize, and shames humanity” for the

belief in such an ideal. The laughter expressed in this type of satire is meant to wound.

Horatian satire is lighter than Juvenalian satire. Its name derives from the Roman lyric poet Quintus Horatius Flaccus (65BC to 8 BC). This type of satire comments on the ruling class and macro level societal norms with a playful and teasing tone, hoping to provide a wry smile to the audience (Highet, 1962; Sander, 1971). This type of satire is more tolerant when compared to Juvenalian commentary on the world. Horatian satirists present truth with “a smile” so that satirists will not repel the audience but cure the ignorance of the audience, which is “the worst fault” (Highet, 1962). Unlike Juvenalian satire, Horatian satire has the goal to persuade rather than denounce. Horatian satire exposes deficiencies in society and assumes humans are willing to change once they see false doings (Highet, 1962). In other words, they provide a more optimistic worldview than Juvenalian satirists. Most work of modern satirists fall in line with Horatian satire. Yet by appealing to an ideal situation, Horatian satire does not assail master narratives directly but mocks the inability of a human to occupy the moral positions offered by the master narratives. These boundaries of Horatian satire led scholars to assume that political satire is “essentially conservative in thought and impact” (Schutz, 1977, p.9). This assumption, however, may be problematic when putting modern media consumption into focus.

As an assumption developed decades ago, it overlooked the modern characteristics of media consumption. With more than enough information from fragmented news sources in a competing media environment, citizens are capable of selecting information that suits their needs and attitudes (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008).

2.2 Political Satire in the political entertainment field

Political satire is a media product described by the umbrella terms “media entertainment (infotainment)” or “political humour”. Contemporary political humour and entertainment are defined somewhat loosely, with media from static cartoons to late night comedy talk shows, and *The Simpsons* all included.

Political satire occupies a unique role in the political humour or entertainment category. Similar to other products, it is designed to arouse laughter; but different from other products, a judgment or critique is cast while laughter is aroused.

Political jokes often offer little or no evaluation of the legitimacy of the current system, namely, its institutions, policies and societal norms. Satire, however, places political topics into a critical position. It highlights the inconsistency between ideals and reality, questions the existing (usually dominant) system and norms, and eventually points to how the system should work. The degree of optimism differs between forms of satire, but as criticism, it implies improvements could be made.

Political satire and political parody are close siblings; they often overlap with each other, “while parodies are not always satirical, they can be” (Young, 2014).

Parody relies on the audience’s prior knowledge, as it exaggerates the most familiar aspects of an original text (Gray, 2005; Gray, Jones, and Thompson, 2009).

2.2.1 Political Satire: Information or entertainment as primary?

Political satire might seem to place entertainment in a more critical role than information, but it is in fact not the case. It is undeniable that humour provided in political satire is meant to entertain its audience, but it is hilarious because of its

judgmental characteristics, for instance, it often attempts to underscore inconsistencies or contradictions in statements of politicians. Political satirists do not adopt humour as a tool because it is funny. Use of humour in political satire is not pre-functionary, it is a tool to provide “critiques about political, economic or social affairs” (Tandoc et al., 2017).

While satirists often label themselves as entertainers, scholars argue that satirists usually serve as information providers, and individuals who watched satire are as knowledgeable as those who consume traditional media (Hardy, Gottfried, Winneg, & Jamieson, 2014). Thus, satire’s role of informing and entertaining are equally important.

2.2.2 Political Satire: fake news or alternative journalism?

Some scholars have taken political satire with a grain of salt, arguing that satire is fake news that has real impact (Amarasingam., 2011); or even use “fake news” interchangeably with “political satire” (Balmas, 2014). Labelling something as “fake” not only directs us to the “real” thing, but also implies that “real” is more preferred (Tandoc, Lim, & Ling, 2017). “Fake news” in journalism refers to deception, and to intentionally provide and share false information.

The core content of satire is not fake; they’re based on actual events. Satire employs the fake news style to report the news, but the information provided in both TV political satire and video political satire cannot be more real. The faking in satire refers to the playful political critique other than the information provided. In fact, satirists have explicitly emphasised the importance of accurate information. Fact-checking needs to be “as rigorous as you can” as jokes cannot be built on sand (Ramos, 2015). A “joke disintegrates” if political satire provides false information.

Prior research tried to separate opinionated news from political satire (Boukes et al., 2014). Boukes and his colleagues (2014) argue that political satire can be differentiated from opinionated news due to two reasons: a) opinionated news claims itself to be “news” while political satire does not, and b) opinionated news does not leave much room for the audience to interpret the message like satire does, but it will “provide epistemological certainty”.

This classification might seem reliable at first glance but is unsuccessful when placed into reality. Claiming specific media products as “news” does not make it “news”, and by claiming certain media products as “not news” does not make it “not news”.

Political satirists claim that what they’re doing is “not journalism”. Jon Stewart, a key political satirist and former host of *The Daily Show*, said “satire is not journalism”, but did not stop him in being placed on the list of the most admired journalist in 2007. He got 2% of the votes while no individual journalist has more than 5%. John Oliver, the host for *Last Week Tonight*, made even more explicit statements. He claimed “I am not a journalist...I am a comedian” and his show “is not (investigative) journalism”, as it is a comedy and “everything” they do is in pursuit of comedy (Carr, 2014). A columnist from *TIME* magazine responded by saying that “unfortunately, John Oliver you are a journalist” and claims what Oliver does is “explainer journalism” (Poniework, 2014). Oliver is just unwilling to admit what he does is journalism as he hopes to dodge the journalistic baggage, for instance objectivity.

2.3 Political satire as counter-narratives

Before we understand how political satire serves as a playful challenge to the master narratives of the existing political system and politicians, let us first understand what master narratives and its critical functions are. Understanding the shared background context is the foundation for any type of incongruity to be disruptive. The matter must be “in place” for a majority of the time so that the matter “out of place” can be remarkable (Douglas, 1966).

Political leaders need to construct narratives to help them gain obedience and respect, especially in dictatorial regimes (Ringgen, 2016). These narratives have the capability of imposing the legitimacy of the regime on its people, therefore justifying the framing of issues and crowding out subversive opinion in order to help the dominant party successfully propose certain political agendas and values (Lakoff, 2002, 2004). Master narratives in society allows individuals to understand and make sense of the world, providing the rules about how the world works, and naturalising the roles of individuals in it (Hill, 2013). Particular actions, events or rituals are often classified as normal, legitimate, and are performed as part of routine.

Narratives are invisible and work in a similar way to “lenses in a pair of glasses, they are not the things people see when they look at the world, but the things they see with” (Bennett, 1980). This invisibility is the key characteristic of narratives, as it provides taken for granted assumptions, the definition of “normal” (in other words what is right and wrong, what is good and bad), and templates to norms and roles in society (Randall, 2001) for members in a culture to make sense of daily life. Hence it is powerful in determining and dominating societal norms and belief, providing legitimacy for people to believe things as they are. It is a set of beliefs that flow around members in a certain culture and make up shared

understanding in the culture (Hill, 2013). The scale by which master narratives penetrates most, if not all, aspects of the discourse of culture had made it hard to identify and analyse (Andrews, 2002; Bennett, 1980). The existence of such “grand” master narratives had undergone severe critique in the postmodern era (Wood, 2004), but Jameson argues that master narratives only embedded itself more deeply in societal structure (thus making it even harder to identify) rather than disappearing (Lyotard, 1984). The master narrative continues to influence the way of thinking and “there remain ‘official’, and ‘hegemonic’ narratives of everyday life” as this set of cultural ideals were propagated for “specific political purposes” to manipulate consciousness (Peters & Lankshear, 1996).

Political satire works as particular counter-narratives that challenge and refute the master narratives and is “essential for an engaged, sustainable democratic public culture” (Hariman, 2008). The certain, stable reality and “absolute truth” provided by the master narratives are being problematised and thus deconstructed in satire (Combe, 2015). Using the metaphor of Bennett (1980), satire works to provide another pair of lenses that allows an alternative way of seeing to individuals. It critically questions, confronts and deconstructs the seemingly unquestionable dominant discourse in order to arouse and awaken and therefore bring about the potential for social change. If we extend the effect of counter-narratives to a cultural level, satire can challenge “a culture’s predominant sense-making strategies” and speak truth against power (Hill, 2013).

Three major defects of master narratives are particularly vulnerable and are usually the weak spots being exposed or emphasised by satirists (Nelson, 2001). These flaws could be understood as a gap in the dominant narratives that open up the space for discussion of counter-narratives. They include: a) master narratives

become a set of repeated themes and are not unified as a whole; b) inconsistency between bonded master narratives; c) the gap between the master narrative and real life.

Under this backdrop, other scholars build on the above counter-narrative claim and argue that satire has the capability to do more due to its resistance characteristics. This perspective investigates the role of satire in social change, claiming satire is a form of resistance (Sandlin, 2007) as it deconstructs dominant discourse (Ibrahim & Eltantawy, 2017), or even a kind of media activism (Ferrari, 2017). Taking this perspective to the global level, Baym and Jones (2012) argue that satire works as a popular response to power, and represents the emerging distrust against representational institutions across culture and national borders.

2.4 Theoretical framework: Placing political satire into Hallin's sphere

Hallin's spheres argue that political discourses could be categorised into three spheres: the sphere of consensus, the sphere of legitimate controversy, and the sphere of deviance (Hallin, 1989). Media objectivity varies when political issues are placed into various spheres. The sphere of consensus represents dominant values and norms, and journalists will assume everyone agrees and act as an advocate for that issue. The sphere of legitimate controversy represents standard political debates where journalists would act objectively and report opinions from both sides. The sphere of deviance refers to marginal, peripheral values and norms and journalists would serve as agents of social control to ignore and critique such issues. The boundaries of these spheres are not solid. These lines are fluid and subject to change according to public opinion.

Hallin (1989) observed that there were two key frames when it came to Nixon's decision on the Vietnam war and the subsequent anti-war movement this policy provoked. Nixon framed the war as a national security issue, and therefore placed the war to an unquestionable level (sphere of consensus) calling for the vast silent majority to stand by him. He however did not seek to satisfy the anti-war movement participants by responding without new initiatives. Nixon also tried to pressure the media, as journalists were considered active opponents of this policy, by organising owners of television stations since many were Republicans. The anti-war movement was represented on television as a threat to "law and order" on US soil, and heavy emphasis was placed on the "most radical faction and the most militant tactics" (P. 194).

Another frame was not publicised by the media until the Vietnam war was heavily under-fire. This frame treated the war as a political issue. In other words, instead of placing the war at the sphere of consensus, this frame placed the war (and anti-war movement) into the sphere of legitimate controversy. Once the anti-war movement was considered a participant in the political debate, it would simultaneously be removed from the role of "traitor". To question the national security issue and sympathise with one's enemy is betrayal; but to criticise whether the enemy is actually an enemy is a mere political opinion from a particular point of view and thus negotiable.

History does repeat itself. Almost three decades after Hallin's book was published, similar frames could be found on the other side of the globe. Chinese President Xi Jinping took office in 2012 and advocated a new framework on governing China and Hong Kong, while his concentration of power is "dangerous" moving China in a more authoritarian direction (Scheuer, 2017).

Under this backdrop, Chinese officials, including the Liaison Office in Hong Kong, have been more vocal when it comes to local matters in Hong Kong. Since Xi is in power, Beijing has begun to tighten its grip on Hong Kong, and emphasise “one country” over “two systems” when Hong Kong citizens and opposition camps question its policy (Cheng, 2016).

Pro-establishment media, both in Hong Kong and Mainland China, often frame confrontation and opposition against policy related to Beijing in Hong Kong as challenges to Beijing’s authority and as preparation towards the ultimate goal of Hong Kong independence. Protests related to these policies are often being represented as disruption against existing order, and the violent means used are highly emphasised. Pan-democratic media, on the other hand, often frame the policies related to China as attempts to “absorb” and undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy. Such media is often more sympathetic to the violent means in protests and will report the rationale behind the protests in more detail.

Here I made a few modifications to the framework provided by Hallin so that it could apply to a time of political polarisation (See Figure 1).




Figure 1. A modified version of Hallin's Sphere

Hong Kong's public opinion has been increasingly polarised over the past decade, which challenges the assumption of Hallin, namely, the existence of consensus. While various parties might seem to agree on specific existing values, their definitions and implications about the same thing often differ, making it hard to define the concept of "consensus". Therefore, I replaced the sphere of consensus with the government's policy, and the sphere of deviance may be understood as the opposing political camp. The sphere of legitimate controversy in this sense could be perceived as the battlefield between two forces, which either legitimise or delegitimise current policy. Political satire is used as one of the tools to fight for a say in the public discourse, that is, how to frame the policy in one's desirable way. Now we move into details of how political satire works.

2.4.1 How satire works in countries with a different political system

In democratic countries, scholars focus on political satire has been viewed as alternative journalism or the “reinvention of political journalism”(Baym, 2005); while in semi-democratic or authoritarian societies, scholars emphasise satire’s capability in the perspective of media activism, focusing on its subversive role and its potential power to provoke social change (Kumar & Combe, 2015; Miazhevich, 2015). In other words, political satire is closely linked to the resistance force, especially in non-democratic countries where some citizens or activist groups are seeking democratic change or social transformation (e.g., Ibrahim & Eltantawy, 2017; Marzouki, 2015).

Two theoretical approaches could guide us to understand the role of political satire in a non-democratic or semi-democratic context (Marzouki, 2015a). The first approach views political satire as a tool for consolidation and self-celebration within the resistant counter-force and is a fight against hegemonic ideas. The second approach is more dominant in the field over the past few years, and its focus is on the contended capacity to influence social change (Rosen, 2012). It is the extension of the former perspective that further pushes the role of political satire to a contextual level, viewing political satire as a kind of activist media practice in society. While political satire might not directly bring social change, it does provide the soil for future changes to be developed or realised (Ferrari, 2017). One crucial branch in this perspective is culture jamming.

2.5 Culture Jamming as activism

The idea of culture jamming can be traced back to resistance against global consumer capitalism, consumerism and the consuming culture. This term follows Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of carnival (Robinson, 2011), where individuals use

rebellions and critiques (may include indecent words and expressions) to subvert the “authoritative, rigid, or serious” master narratives constructed by dominant forces (McLean & Wallace, 2013). Existing transmissions under the control of dominating powers of cultural life are being “disrupt[ed], interrupt[ed], sabotage[d] and blocked” using culture jamming. Instead of only stopping the flow of ideas generated by corporate media, Harold (2004) argues that culture jamming is more useful when considered as an “artful proliferation of messages, a rhetorical process of intervention and invention, which challenges the ability of corporate discourses to make meaning in predictable ways”.

Culture jammers are regarded as part of activist groups, or individuals, trying to push forward change in society. Lasn (1999), a media activist, states that the primary goal of culture jamming is detournement, which means a “perspective-jarring turnabout in your everyday life”. Culture jamming is a process to reclaim the meanings of everyday life by reversing and subverting the interpretation of spectacular images, environments, and events, with the ultimate aim to bring progressive transformation in society qualitatively by creating alternative voices (Lasn, 1999).

Culture jammers adopt diverse methods to achieve such goals. One way of achieving such goals is to create subvertisements to jam (and thus have the potential to replace) the dominant brand images with alternative ones. These images adopt a similar, if not identical, layout, form and branding technologies as advertisers do to replicate the look and feel of targeted advertisement. The difference between the two is that the subvertisement intentionally employs a problematised twist, so as to prompt the “double-take as viewers realize they see the very opposite of what they expect” (Lasn, 1999, p.131). These twists do not

seek to cancel out the dominant claims by calm critique; instead, they offer “provocative counter images that use incongruous words and images designed to jolt” the audience to re-evaluate the dominant messages.

2.5.1 Political Satire as political culture jamming

The original target of culture jamming is consumerism, but this idea has been used to analyse political satire (Ibrahim & Eltantawy, 2017; Warner, 2007). Warner (2007) argues that The Daily Show with Jon Stewart functions as “political culture jamming” by working in similar ways, as a “popular and cogent critic”. Political satire channels opposing interpretations of current political views and is therefore “jamming” the master narratives provided by dominant political discourse. Stewart disseminates “dissident images with messages designed to provoke the same type of subversion against the dominant meanings”, and thus has similar goals to Lasn and other culture jammers. This subversive copy is strategically altered to emphasise existing loopholes from politicians and sometimes the media, including factual errors, logical contradictions, and incongruities in the dominant political message. These dissident interpretations of current political events have the potential to jam the transmission of a political brand message from the dominant power in society. More specifically, the plagiarised news format and the strategic use of sound bites have created incongruity and thus bring the dominant political discourse into question. Scholars recognised the obstructive potential of incongruity long ago (Douglas, 1966). This inconsistency or “matter out of place” characteristic has the potential to disrupt the system and thus be regarded as dangerous, thereby needing to be removed to return the system to its normal state, similar to how pollution is purified.




Figure 2. Visualisation of culture jamming in theory

Figure 2 tries to capture the gist of current literature. Political satire blocks the message delivered by the government by criticising their sent message. This graph, however, cannot adequately mirror the situation in Hong Kong. I, therefore, put forward a modified version below (see Figure 3). In the following graph, there are messages of the two camps, and both have their sent messages blocked. While the existing literature captures the upper part of the figure, the lower part (i.e., how the opponents' messages are blocked) is underdeveloped.




Figure 3. A modified version of culture jamming

2.5.2 Is satire truly subversive?

It is sensible for contemporary political satire researchers to adopt the cultural jamming and activism perspective. But previous scholarship might not be sufficient to capture the changing environment.

Firstly, one cannot conclude that satire is subversive simply because it is satire. Satire is subversive because it is used mainly by opponents. It is a neutral media product, which could be employed and used by both dominant and subversive forces, especially when two sets of ideology co-exist in the same context. When we adopt the idea of media activism to explain the role of political satire, at the same time the theoretical assumption of media activism is also carried into our interpretations, meaning that political satire is assumed to be resistance proposing a change to the current situation. While this assumption is sensible and sufficient in most cases around the globe, it is a perspective that overlooks some possibilities of political satire.

The subversive potential of satire was mentioned in the 1990s by Judith Butler (1990), but she also stated that the correlation between satire and subversion is not necessary (Butler, 1993). In her work in 1993, Butler (1993) paid a lot of effort to underscore that satire “is not unproblematically subversive”, even though readers of her book *Gender Trouble* published in 1990s understood political satire as a method to subvert dominant norms. From her point of view, the subversive characteristic of satire is merely a contingency. In other words, she considered satire as an efficient and highly effective marketing strategy, but this aspect was unfortunately underdeveloped in contemporary studies. The research of modern contemporary satire had mostly neglected, if not ignored this plausible opposite perspective.

Satire is a media product usually but not necessarily used by non-dominant forces to publicise one's agenda. Political satire may be used but satire itself is not inherently subversive and can be used against, as well as in the service of, dominant political narratives. If we assume that political satire only appears in resistant forms, we will fall into the false optimism as previous social media researchers did. Social media did open more possibility for connective actions thus democratic social change, but it also proved itself to be a double-edged sword.

Leaders from authoritarian and semi-democratic regimes (those claimed to be democratic but the necessary process of democracy is highly monitored for it to work in favour of those in power) have the capacity and the need to evolve in an attempt to sustain their power (Dobson, 2012). The Chinese government, for example, do not ban or delete the posts on online forums that challenge the party, but remove the posts that have the potential to lead to collective action (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013). The strategy later adjusted to crowd out government criticism by strategic distraction (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2017). The Chinese government adapts to the technological change of Web 2.0 and changes their strategy accordingly. A similar logic can be used to understand the limitations (and the fake optimism) towards progressive change stemmed from political satire.

Previous literature did show that political satire could have the potential to be used as propaganda and marketing strategy, but this branch of research is underdeveloped when it comes to contemporary video political satire. Back in the age of World War II, political comics in 1939 had become vehicles for American propaganda. Many comic writers even cooperated with the Office of War

Information to publicise a positive image of the war, so as to “give children hope to the outcome of the war, escape from the actual events”, and encourage them to contribute to their own country (Scott, 2007). Research shall be extended to cover this area. For example, is political satire from the pan-democratic camp and pro-establishment camp using the same format, frames, and tone? This thesis will seek to compare how different media platforms, which support the pan-democratic camp and pro-establishment camp respectively, report the same issue.

2.5.3 From individual efforts to institutional efforts

Secondly, the political satire scholarship focuses on either individually produced video satire shows or user-generated content. Such work is of course influential, however, by focusing most scholarly research on individually produced work, the comprehensive understanding of the whole picture comes into question. Most of the political satire literature adopts a vertical perspective as it only focuses on individual professional satirists’ satirical content (Ferrari, 2017). Recent research points to the importance of studying the role of grassroots user-generated satire, as satire is no longer only in the hands of professionals (Crittenden et al., 2011). This call for studying satire in a more horizontal perspective is an attempt to include the satirist content of various micro-publics and investigate the role of user-generated satire within a broader media system. Both methods, however, are not sufficient to understand the role of political satire in a more general sense.

Both professional and user-generated satire is individually produced, or at the very least, individual satirists have a significant role when deciding what to include and what not to include in satirical content. Both perspectives are important, but to investigate the role of satire based on individual efforts is not sufficient to capture the importance of satire in journalism as well as in society as

a whole. The individually-produced political satire is therefore not included in this study as this thesis hopes to sharpen the focus on media-produced political satire.

2.5.4 Theoretical modification: discourse jamming

This thesis will revisit the concept of culture jamming using the data derived from content analysis and interview, and develop a new concept called “discourse jamming” (See Figure 3). Culture jamming focus only on the subversive nature of political satire, and therefore have neglect the possibility that those in power could also utilise political satire to jam the message of their opponents.

Discourse jamming do not seek to replace the concept of culture jamming, but to modify the original concept by adding one more layer; i.e. to include not only the messages sent from the government which later being blocked by the subversive force but also the messages sent from the subversive force blocked by the pro-establishment camp. Culture jamming remains applicable in many cases while discourse jamming is an enriched concept while all parties nowadays will use political satire as political tool. Some of the political satire remains subversive and alternative, but others may be used as means of propaganda. Techniques originally used by the subversive forces are used by the pro-establishment camp. The subversive nature of political satire only maintains when political satire is produced by the pan-democratic camp. When political satire is produced by the pro-establishment camp, the subversive nature ceased to exist.

2.5.5 Why study of individual professional satirists is not enough?

Much political satire literature is focused on America, and programmes like the Colbert Report and The Daily Show dominate the field (e.g., Amarasingam., 2011; Ferrari, 2017). While it is true that both Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert

are influential figures, they are, after all, individuals that are hired by TV stations, and thus have the resources to produce satirical products and later broadcast the products. The problem is, no matter how influential they are, individuals are replaceable, fluid, and have more flexibility than institutions. It is inevitable for individuals to have their agenda, approach, and political stance. Thus findings may not be consistent. For instance, Jon Stewart left *The Daily Show* after 16 consecutive years, and the show was taken over by Trevor Noah in 2015. Could studies based on Stewart be directly applied to Noah's era? If not, how are the two different from each other? These questions are yet to be answered by western scholars. The foundation of and building of a large chunk of literature on two individual shows is thus dangerous. Future western research should expand their scope to institutionally produced satire, and examine the "media logic" behind the product.

Meanwhile in Hong Kong one of the things this thesis hopes to capture is the logic of producing satire institutionally, namely, satire as a product produced in a media organisation and not as an independent segment of such institutions. For instance, how radical can the journalist be? What sound bites are more likely to be included? And what are the reasons to add in movie clips of Steven Chow? Political satire need not be subversive and individually produced, but a mass majority of political satire literature often presumes these assumptions. It is thus crucial to look beyond the existing scholarship to investigate and absorb underdeveloped roles of political satire in the literature. Video political satire in Hong Kong has only been produced since 2009, and thus few studies have been done so far to examine its development over time.

The existing literature also does not emphasise much on the changing form of satire under the new media backdrop, which is understandable as TV political satire appeared as early as 1990 in the US. While online video political satire in Hong Kong only started in 2009, it is important to look back to the roots of political humour products, one of which is the political cartoon. This study hopes to capture the changing trend from static political cartoons to video political satire.

2.6 Ideological struggles in Hong Kong

Political satire is culture specific. It is the discourses battlefield for different political camps. Before this study moves on to analyse the discourses in political satire, we must first understand the ideological struggles in context. Six conflicts of ideologies between the mainland government and Hong Kong are identified. These ideologies are sometimes highly related but are deeply rooted in the culture of Hong Kong that can be traced back to colonial years. These ideological conflicts are useful analytical tools.

2.6.1 Identity crisis

Hong Kong identity has always interacted and often overlapped with Chinese identity. The Hong Kong identity is a compound of ambivalence and resistance from local and national identities, and the formation of such identity is a dynamic process. To understand the trend and change of identifications in recent years, we must first review the changing process of the local identities rooted in these two decades. Research conducted at the time of retrocession argued that the local identities of Hong Kong people could be understood as the compound of local identities with a “Chineseness Plus” (Matthews, 1997). Three clusters of identities

could be identified: Chineseness with affluence and capitalism; Chineseness with colonialism; and the Chineseness with the upholding of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Hong Kong people at that time adopted the cultural cluster of the Chinese identity but kept a distance from political China, and striking an “optimal distinctiveness” between local and Chinese identities allowed them to keep dual identities.

The identification to cultural China is, however, not based in reality but built on a vague imagined larger China and the traditional Chinese culture contained in it. The loyalty to the Chinese nation is not based on the “Chinese constitution” (the Chinese authority itself), but to “the land and the people” (Matthews, 1997). The multiple interpretations of “tradition” are the characteristics of authentic Chineseness, and this recognition to China is contrary to the party’s monotonic approach. Generations of Hong Kong people grew up and identified themselves as Chinese and associated their Chineseness to neither local Hong Kong nor contemporary China (Luk, 1991). This Chinese identity is not connected to concrete reality but is a Chinese identity created in abstract to open up room for a dual and coexisting Hong Kong identity in the near future. Many accept the fact that Hong Kong is part of China, but at the same time underscore the uniqueness of Hong Kong from the rest of China, “identifying themselves with a special kind of Hong Kongness” that is “different from those of mainland Chinese” (Matthews, 1997).

In the first post-handover decade, the contest between “Hong Kong is a part of China” and “Hong Kong is apart from China” continued. Hong Kong people remained to be ambivalent when faced with the domination of the Chinese identity. They can be proud of China’s accomplishments but at the same time

remain critical of the negative sides of China. The main reason for this phenomenon is due to the complexity and multi-dimensional nature of the Chinese label: Hong Kong people accept parts of the label but keep distant from other parts. The Chinese label may be broken down and understood in three categories: culture, politics and economic (Chan, 2014). Hong Kong people were willing to accept the cultural ties with China but keep political China in the distance. Many differentiated “political China” with “cultural China”. They accepted the shared cultural roots and history with China, such as the great wall; but at the same time upheld “collective resistance to domination imposed through labels such as ‘Chineseness’ and ‘Chinese identity’”. China had been perceived as an enormous market, and many emphasised the possible monetary return one could gain. This strategic calculation and instrumentalism allowed Hong Kong people not to give up their local identity and at the same time recognise China as a land filled with opportunity.

This delicate and fragile balance was based on Hong Kong people’s “expectations of maintaining a strong sense of autonomy as a SAR within China” (Chan, 2014, P.28). Hong Kong people were capable of keeping both national and local identities as these two identities were not in conflict; it was not a zero-sum game until interactions with the mainland increased. The co-existence of the identities was not challenged until the friction between Chinese and Hong Kongers arose in reality; or in other words, when the identity based on sand was met with brutal reality and forced some Hong Kong people, especially youngsters, to choose both intentionally and unintentionally, between Hong Kong and Chinese identity.

In the second post-handover decade—as mainlanders and Hong Kong people had more interaction and integration—the tension between the two groups has risen

and the balance of multiple layers of identity was challenged. China began to tighten her grip and was not shy to voice her opinion and agenda in Hong Kong. Thus the equilibrium of the balanced identities was upset. Decoupling the “political China” is not as easy as it used to be; after all Chinese officials are more vocal in the once “local” issues of Hong Kong, instead of using the laissez-faire policy as it used to.

2.6.2 Nationalisation and localisation

One key reason for the lack of emotional attachment to contemporary China may be traced back to colonial times. The colonial government had purposely avoided topics related to contemporary China (Deng, 2009; Morris, 1997) and ancient virtues from Chinese culture were deliberately distant from modern China as being forgotten and unlearned.

The Hong Kong government had tried to redefine the Hong Kong identity after the retrocession, but multiple attempts had proved to be in vain. Similar to their colonial predecessor, the lack of political legitimacy in the government and the public resistance against the change of educational policy had reduced the possibility in socialising pupils by civic education. Despite the attempts of re-nationalisation by the government, national education and the cultural perception of mainland people by Hong Kong locals, the local label of “Hong Kong people” sustained. Tung Chee-wah, Hong Kong’s first Chief Executive, expressed his hope to redefine the identity of Hong Kong by the carefully calculated employment of the cultural ethos of “pan-Chineseness”. But due to his failing governance and resistance from civil society, this official painted picture merely existed in dreams. The promotion of national education also encountered similar resistance from both the educational sectors and the general public.

Almost a decade after Tung's attempt, the attempt to introduce the "Moral and National Education" as a mandatory school subject in 2012 provoked a similar objection on a much larger scale against the mainland ideology. The local resistance could be understood as the manifestation of the Hong Kong identity constructed by viewing the Mainland and Beijing government as an alienated "other" (Chan, 2014).

One point worth noting is that the emphasis on Hong Kong's national identity and uniqueness was often regarded as the opposition to the "politically correct stance" or patriotism (Liu, 2015). Even if one is being associated with the category of "delocalised nationalism" and "localised isolationism", it does not spontaneously represent one to hold explicit opposition to the Chinese government. It is often the false (and possibly intentional) assumption from the convention and actors following "delocalised nationalism". For instance, at the government-student meeting during the Umbrella Movement, the convention often reemphasised the principles of Basic Law and contrasted it with the propositions by the pan-democrats and localists, a contrast between a "semantically larger scope" stemmed from the status of Hong Kong in the "One country, two system" model and a local level of resistance (Liu, 2015). The government and their allies often positioned their opponents as rejecting such principles so as to frame them into a blasphemous and resistant position to Mainland China. By framing the opponents as unpatriotic, the government had effectively de-legitimised their request. Hong Kong, after all, is merely a local government, and its sovereignty is vested with Mainland China but not Hong Kong itself (Cooray, 2010).

2.6.3 Depoliticisation

The Hong Kong government has a very limited definition of politics. Tung Chee-wah adopted an insufficient definition of politics which only included democratic reform and civil liberties but no other policy issues (Lai, 2007). These discourses persisted even though critics repeatedly pointed out that the depoliticisation of policy was “political rhetoric” (Lai, 2007). This tendency of depoliticisation is rooted in the historical background, due to the extremely sensitive political atmosphere in post-war Hong Kong (Lam, 2004). Politics in Hong Kong had been framed as an obstruction to the progress of social development, and therefore such empty talk should be reduced and replaced by more hard work instead. Politics was undesirable and was perceived as negative in this culture. Three types of defining discourses were identified along this theme, and they were often adopted to work in favour of the status quo by both the government and the media as an agent of social control.

The first type of discourse is the pursuit of stability and prosperity. Politics was deemed as a potential threat to social order, and the observance of the law in protest was vital as it is essential to preserve the current system which works well. Political demonstrations were, therefore, being criticised as “too confrontational to be productive”. The former discourse focused on the protest as a whole, while the second type of discourse focused on a few icons or leaders in the politics of opposition. The leaders of the protest were often framed as “troublemakers”, and thus shall be blamed for the disruption of stability. This discourse seeks to limit the number of advocates to “a few”, which was an attempt to distance the general public from the political event and therefore alienate the opponents of government.

The discourses above are usually the frames adopted by convention to delegitimise opponents of government. The below discourse, on the other hand, is often adopted by opponents themselves to distance themselves from politics. By claiming they do not have political intentions behind their opposition, the opponents avoid the negative impact of being labeled as “political” and dissident against the government and voluntarily refrain from the accusation of political manipulation.

The pro-establishment camp on the other hand often depoliticises political issues when being challenged, including elections and policy implementations. They often criticise obstructions in the policymaking process as “politicisation”, blaming failed policy on pan-democrats.

Under these discourses of depoliticisation, the government also seemed to develop its conceptualisation and implementation of citizenship (Lam, 2005). Both colonial and Hong Kong governments painted a picture of passive citizenry, with concerns about political rights and critical minds discouraged in favour of qualities of civil obedience and social responsibility to create well-mannered and well-adjusted individuals. These civic qualities are in line with the pursuit of prosperity and stability and are “essential to maintain stability and harmony” of society, which are the cornerstones of a stable environment for investment.

Traces of depoliticisation may also be found in the construction of national identity and nationalism. As discussed in detail above, the HKSAR government has made multiple (unsuccessful) attempts to rewrite the Hong Kong identity. In the reconstruction of national identity, discourse highly related to nationalism is usually used to reconstruct identities in the post-colonial regime, for instance, in India. Yet different to other places, nationalistic discourses in Hong Kong had

avoided democratic discourses, limiting the degree of politicisation to the boundary of “good citizen as nationalist” (Lam, 2005).

Another interesting trend observed in the post-handover period is that this culture of depoliticisation seems to spread throughout a majority of political issues, including elections and civil disobedience. For example, pro-establishment LegCo members often stated that the polls, including the Hong Kong Election Committee and LegCo, are “too politicised” which would erode the professional sectors. Their discourses in elections often emphasise the ability to engage in “practical matters (做實事)” and improve people’s wellbeing; normal interrogatory in the Council in this sense is discouraged. The series of decisions in disqualifying elected candidates from LegCo as they failed to take the oath of office sincerely are also plain examples of how political issues are trying to be non-political: by covering the political issues with the veil of law, the convention could easily claim this as not a political issue but a legal issue. Political issues have room for discussion but this is not so for legal matters. The more obvious example is the injunction to demand the clearing of the road during the Umbrella Movement. Blocking the road is by itself illegal and police have the right to arrest and clear the scene, but the police did not do so directly to avoid having blood on their (and the government’s) hands. The injunction had introduced a third party to the political struggle between the two camps to grant more legitimacy to the government.

This usage of law with the end of depoliticisation has the advantage of distancing, if not separating, the convention from the political issue, and putting the opponents between the devil and the deep blue sea, as it is no longer a fight between the two camps but a battle against the court.

2.6.4 Means to opinion expression in protest

This point could be better understood alongside the culture of “stability and harmony” in the previous section. Hong Kong has been described as the city of protest (Dapiran, 2017), but the citizens have merely been more tolerant of “radical means” in protest in recent years. Social movements were often portrayed as the destruction of normal order. Hong Kong is traditionally less accepting of “radical means” in protest, which is often regarded as normal if such radical means took place in other countries. Hong Kong people had long upheld the culture of “law and order” and “rationalism and pragmatism”, therefore the resistance of radical social movement activists can hardly gain advocacy in the media (Chan & Lee, 2007). The media often contained a “dominant discourse of order” (Ku, 2007) and even if some acts of civil disobedience gained initial support from the press, the media will turn back to its beliefs in “order” and “rationalism”.

Early research on media representation of social movements had pointed to the dominance of a protest paradigm (Lee, 2014). The media tends to cover these movements with disapproval, delegitimising these challenges against the status quo by emphasising the violent and discursive aspects of protest, describing it in the pattern of crime news (Gitlin, 1980; McLeod & Hertog, 1998). Empirical studies on media coverage of protests concluded that media coverage of protests became “relatively less negative” as the protests became routinised and normalised in Hong Kong (Lee, 2014), or a social movement society (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998). While the media are less likely to frame protests as deviant, the question whether a similar trend could be observed in political satire is still

unknown as the purpose of political satire is not merely to represent reality but to delegitimise the opposing party.

2.6.5 One country, two systems: national sovereignty, local autonomy and localisationalism

“One country, two systems” is by itself a paradoxical concept. Invented by the former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, it is the attempt to maintain Hong Kong’s status as an international financial centre, in order to allow and stabilise the existence of capitalism in a city under Chinese sovereignty; in other words, an innovative policy created to preserve the uniqueness of Hong Kong. Similar to the identity struggle, the concern over one country, two systems may be classified into political, economic, social, and cultural aspects (So, 2017). Here I focus on the implementation of this “promise”; namely, how the boundaries between China and Hong Kong have been gradually blurred or maintained in the post-handover years. The concept of “one country, two systems” is often related to concepts of “Hong Kong People ruling Hong Kong”, “high autonomy”, and “no change in the future 50 years”, but studies showed these related concepts are less likely to associate with the phrase “one country, two systems” after the handover (So, 2017).

“One country, two systems” represents a delicate balance which takes effort from both Hong Kong and China to maintain and nourish. So (2017) concluded that this fragile boundary could only be maintained by constraint from both parties: “the stronger side must exercise more self-restraint while the weaker side must observe the limit of what it can realistically achieve in the process.”

Yet quite the reverse is true as local social movement leaders and their huge base of advocates seemed neither committed or willing to compromise, as they showed

indifference towards the impact of Hong Kong local policy to the national level (Tsui, 2015). This resistance and neglect towards the Chinese government might have in turn encouraged more suppression and interference from the Chinese government, which is contrary to the successful implementation of “one country, two systems”.

2.6.6 What is the rule of law?

Other than the identity crises, another essential perspective we have to take into consideration is the belief in upholding the judicial system and the rule of law. The rule of law had been conceived as the cornerstone of prosperity and stability in Hong Kong, yet different political actors have different, often opposing interpretations of this concept. Similar to the conflict of identities, the tension between actors intensified due to the increasing interference with and from China. Hong Kong has the image of “a city of law”. The legal system is highly cherished (Yuen, 2015). I will start by summarising how law gradually gained its paramount and supreme role in the pre-handover period, then move on to analysing how the discourse about law diverges over time in the post-handover period.

Due to multiple riots and strikes in the 1960s, the colonial government suffered from a legitimacy crisis and therefore needed to close the gap between the people and government. They could have mooted a representative government, but they chose to develop a “welfare colonialism” (Jones, 1999) and absorb politics into the administrative process (King, 1975), founding a society without democracy but with the rule of law. Law played an essential role in terms of the introduction of new policy and facilitated engagement between the government, people, and the state. The belief in the rule of law continued to yield in the 1970s, as Hong Kong at the same time rooted its “textbook model of a competitive economy”

with the barest overlay of government (Rabushka, 1973). The strength of the economy is based on the foundation of law, as law protects the unprivileged, tackles corruption in the police force and ensures “fair and just” capitalism (Jones, 1999), providing the vision of Hong Kong’s version of the American Dream by ensuring “law and order” in the city. Law had also been more open to the general public through means of legal aid and had become a means to curb the abuse of power. In the 1980s, there was radical politicisation in Hong Kong, and the general public started to worry about the future of the city after the transition period. The rule of law thus became “the talisman against the anticipated depredations” under Chinese rule when the shadow of the handover unveiled. This attachment to the rule of law (so as to differentiate Hong Kong from China) intensified as the Tiananmen massacre occurred and facilitated the legal consciousness in the city. This critical event had demonstrated not only the difference between authoritarianism and semi-democracy but also the tremendous gap between the city of law and the city of tanks.

The rule of law continues to be the cornerstone for prosperity and stability in Hong Kong in the first post-handover decade, as the legal playing field could provide transparent regulations to business around the globe. The upholding of the rule of law remained a belief and breaking the law was deemed unacceptable and immoral. Entrepreneurs in Hong Kong were confident that the stable environment for business could be safeguarded by the rule of law, which also allows effective business transactions (Child, Ng & Wong, 2003). The legal system itself also seemed to work effectively to keep the government in line, as people could overturn controversial policy in court by judicial review in Hong Kong.

Meanwhile, Chinese sovereignty was not vocal about their power of interpretation

of the Basic Law. The definition of the rule of law remained more or less the same to the public until 15 years after the handover.

Hong Kong University law professor, Benny Tai, proposed the idea of civil disobedience in a series of commentaries in 2013. His argument on civil disobedience opened up possibilities to re-define the concept of “rule of law”.

Two sets of discourse about the “rule of law” could be observed during and after the Umbrella Movement. Both the Beijing and Hong Kong government had gone in depth to delegitimise the Umbrella movement, condemning it as detrimental to the rule of law, dissident, disruptive to social order and too radical. The HKSAR government had appealed to the authority and legality of the existing legal/political system, stating that the decision of the National People’s Congress could not be swayed by the local government. Beijing followed a similar point of view. They stated that illegal social movements impaired the rule of law and provoked disruption to social order, which “seems to showcase its national agenda to promote ‘ruling the country according to law’” under Xi Jinping’s rule (Yuen, 2015). Occupy Central is indeed illegal regarding the law, but its leader does not seek to avoid this accusation but instead to embrace it: breaking the law and defending themselves in court is a crucial part of civil disobedience, as these actions can showcase the injustice of the existing system. They argue that by accepting the punishment from the court, they are defending, instead of jeopardising the rule of law. Benny Tai argues that the rule of law can be classified into four levels in a pyramid model: the most basic level is the existence of law, to regulation by law, then to limitation by law, and the ultimate end of law is to achieve justice through law, including but not limited to social justice and procedural justice. If the existing law is insufficient or even fails to achieve justice

in its implementation, it will be necessary, or even inevitable to achieve justice by breaking the law in an attempt to publicise the unjust law and provoke possible change in society. Civil disobedience is an act that might break the law but does not undermine the rule of law, and scholars have urged for a distinction between the two as civil disobedience supports a higher ideal.

The conflict on the definition of the rule of law intensified as the Chinese government tightened its grip on Hong Kong. For example, the State Council's white paper in June 2014 had defined Hong Kong's high degree of authority as the "power to run local affairs as authorized by the central leadership". Recent disputes such as disqualifying elected lawmakers and co-location arrangements also sparked concerns over the rule of law in Hong Kong, as one commentator puts it: "The standing Committee can interpret any part of the Basic Law at any time and in [as] many ways [as] it likes. And when it does so, the courts must follow that interpretation."

2.7 Summary

This study's theoretical foundation is based on a modification of Hallin's sphere, which places political satire as a battle between the media in favour of pan-democrats and the pro-Beijing camp. This study also challenges the current assumption that political satire must be subversive and individually produced and therefore modifying the current literature of culture jamming into discourse jamming.

Chapter 3 METHODOLOGY

Attempts at social change either form bottom-up (social movement) or top-down (change or implementation of policy) initiatives that can be understood as a fight of meanings between the status quo and less powerful opponents. The status quo wins only at the expense of their opponents and vice versa. Political actors (such as activists, interest groups, politicians, or governments) will frame the issue in a way that favours their position and (or) the social change they are pursuing; their opponents will understandably frame the issue differently. Behind these frames lie the ideological packages.

The argument presented in political satire is often in line with the frame of some politicians. Policy issues (and the often-subsequent social movements) are ideal cases to examine what frames have been used in political satire in Hong Kong. As mentioned above, video political satire in the city is produced by three sources; one from a pro-Beijing background and two from pan-democrats. As social change from both top-down and bottom-up are covered, we will provide a more comprehensive picture of how political satire is used as a tool to (de)legitimise these changes backed by various actors.

3.1 Method

This study has employed quantitative content analysis, qualitative content analysis and interviews as tools for its method. These methods have different functions: quantitative and qualitative content analysis can provide numeric data and subsequently point to possible strategies and frames used in political satire, while

interviewing the producers and scholars could explain the reason behind the production operation of political satire. The codebook of the quantitative content analysis and the questions for the semi-structured interview are attached in the appendix.

There will be two rounds of content analysis. The first round of content analysis will identify the quantitative elements about the products, such as duration and overall story valance. The focus, however, is on the second round of content analysis, which is frame analysis. The frame analysis will focus on the ideological packages embedded in the political satire. This qualitative analysis will be based on Gamson's idea of "ideological packages" (1989) to analyse discourses from different media on four policy issues, as this tool best captures the gist of political satire. Each ideological package could be divided into two parts: the framing and justification of the position taken; which is similar to the thesis-example form argument of political satire.

3.1.1 Quantitative content analysis

The codebook (Appendix 1) and the subsequent focus on various ideological packages is developed by looking at the cultural roots and sponsor activities in Hong Kong. Six conflicts of ideologies are identified in the above literature review. These ideologies are sometimes highly related, are deeply rooted in the culture of Hong Kong, and can be traced back to the colonial years.

3.1.2 Qualitative content analysis

There are three determinants in an ideological package: cultural resonance, sponsor activities, and media practices (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Gamson (1989) argued that the idea elements in a culture could not be understood in

isolation as they combine with each other to form an interactive package. Within that package, idea elements support and reinforce each other. A package is made up of an overall frame and position to a policy. Gamson concluded that there are eight signature elements in one package and they can be classified into framing and reasoning devices. Framing devices include metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions and visual images, while the reasoning devices include roots, consequences, and appeals to principle. Competing packages exist when it comes to political policy. Policy issues could be understood as the competition between these packages and different parties will provide different packages. Which package will prevail and continue to dominate the discourses depends on three broad categories of determinants (Gamson, 1989). Cultural resonance, sponsor activities and media practices combine and result in the sphere of particular packages.

Gamson's original proposition assumes that journalists are active and "undoubtedly give official packages the benefit of the doubt". His analysis assumes that the media have to work according to "balanced norms" and media practices. Therefore the challenges that are marginal in society will be neglected and thus excluded from political discussions. While the underlying assumption of this research framework might have worked well decades ago, the changing environment of media industries allows more room for different interpretations of the same issue to publicise and more frequently for media to take their unique stance. Here I will assume the media outlets that produced political satire have a more independent role; namely, media not only reproduce the existing packages from politicians but also create their own frames often by disposing of the frames provided by opposing parties or actors. Below I will continue to explain the

strength of Gamson's approach when compared with other approaches. Gamson's approach could take the neglected visual part of political satire into account effectively.

Video political satire, similar to television news, is challenging to analyse due to its complexity. The combination of verbal and visual track in video political satire allows more room for satirists to represent the issue. Research focused on political satire, however, often considers the media product as a whole and concentrates heavily (if not exclusively) on the textual component (e.g., Ibrahim & Eltantawy, 2017; Warner, 2007). Analysing the text alone is insufficient to represent the real meanings of the political satirists. Such content-based research fails to take the diversity of meanings from the visual track into account, which does not fully capture the implications and possible interpretations from political satire and therefore overlooks the potential embedded in the video for meaning and understanding creation.

Various scholars had proposed systems or models to analyse the verbal-visual relationships in television news. These models can be roughly classified into two main categories: the first one emphasises the importance of visual track, arguing that information contained in the verbal track is determined and relies on the access to images (Altheide, 1987); while the other line of research emphasises the importance of the verbal component as it is news stories that provide meanings to the visuals (Griffin, 1992). Current studies of video political satire's content mostly follow the latter line. This way of handling video focuses primarily on verbal track; in other words, this method might overlook the hidden meaning of images. Ibrahim and Eltantawy (2017), for example, do not seek to look into the visual elements of video political satire. Similar to prior studies, the scholars do

not analyse the visual and verbal track separately but merely seek to briefly describe what is presented in the visual track in the satire, and at the same time put more detailed effort towards the verbal track. This method is less problematic when used to examine video political satire with few or no voiceovers; which is not the case in Hong Kong.

The analytical framework of TV News from Piazza and Harrman (2015) hopes to capture the possible embedded meanings in images. They considered how meanings are constructed by visual track when combined with verbal track, and concluded three relationships of images to text. This perspective argues that part of the meaning of the images will be missed if the synergy between images and text is not considered. Illustration describes the more-or-less close co-reference between the visual and verbal track. This type of relationship does not describe neat synchronisation between two tracks but “a gradient of more or less transparent overlap”: from close fit (an extension of the meaning) to slim fit (not immediate transparent) then to unfit (image merely represent the actors or the particular event). Adding meaning is another level when compared to illustration. Different from the co-reference visual-verbal relationship, this level of involvement allows the image to contain other definitions which words had not wholly catered. Style mainly refers to metaphors and wordplay, which describe the stylistic relationship between verbal and visual texts.

While the above methods are delicate and detailed, here I do not seek to state every relationship between the visual and verbal elements in political satire as it is unnecessary for my goal to look into political satire to discover the embedded frames. The audio and visual track often combine with each other to create an exaggerated or even opposite meaning in the message. Here I hope to focus on the

frames embedded in the compound, not the elements. It is the message they construct matters the most, not the relationship between elements. For instance one technique often used in the political satire is the discord between the audio and visual track: while the audio part is showing criticism to certain political party, the visual part showed the exact opposite, and thus twisted the meaning of the whole video. Moreover, the method from Ibrahim and Eltantawy might seem to work well when it comes to small sample size, but is not cost effective if one has hundreds of videos. Gamson's framework had already taken the visual elements into account. I, therefore, will develop my frames by looking into the combination of the visual and audio track. This consideration is essential to the analysis of political satire. Satirists often make their point by stating support in the voiceover and show the exact opposite stance in the visual track.

3.2 Procedures

To investigate the characteristics of video political satire, the differences between individual and institutional producers of political satire, and the ideological packages of the video political satire, content analysis (including both quantitative analysis and frame analysis) and semi-structured interviews were conducted.

3.2.1 Content analysis

Video political satire from three media outlets (Apple Daily, TV most and Speak Out Hong Kong) are analysed. Cases existing in the selected timeframe, which is stated above, are chosen for further studies.

The procedures for obtaining data from the three media outlets are slightly different. For Apple Daily, the lists of the script from year 2012 to 2018 were first downloaded, and the files from the selected period are carefully reviewed by

keyword search of the title to filter out videos that do not relate to policy issues.

Then the footage is watched one by one to determine if it is satire, namely, if it contains humour and if it had criticised specific issues/politicians. For TV Most, the list of their satire from the selected period is reviewed on their website.

Keyword search is also used. For Speak Out Hong Kong, their programme “One-minute funny news” is searched on their YouTube channel, and their videos in the selected timeframe are reviewed to see if its themes relate to the chosen policy cases.

The quantitative analysis and frame analysis were in progress at the same time.

Every video was watched twice, the first time was to obtain quantitative data and fill the coding sheet and the second time was to select the catchphrases and the exemplars in the cases to construct the ideological packages.

3.2.2 Interview

Semi-structured interviews were conducted after the content analysis, with the aim to verify the findings in the content analysis and to investigate if there are possible new findings. The questions asked could mainly be divided into a few categories, including their working process, what will be included in their work, how do they select and re-frame their opinion, the stance of the company when it comes to ideological struggles and their political position (see Appendix 2). The interviewees included three employees from Apple Daily (including a reporter in Hong Kong News, one video editor, and the Chief Editor Edward Li), two employees from TV Most (including one artist manager and one in the commercial sector), three employees from Speak Out Hong Kong (two reporters and one video editor), the popular cartoonist Zunzi, and two scholars (Chan Chi

Kit from Hang Seng Management College and Benson Wong from Hong Kong Baptist University).

The interviews are conducted with the aim to understand the operation of production and why only some ideological packages are included in the political satire. Zunzi had been working as a political cartoonist for about four decades, on top of that, he is the founder of the Hong Kong Cartoon Research Centre.

3.3 Case Sampling

Here I select four policy cases (each followed by protests) to examine the dynamics and ideology behind the representation of such media.

These cases represent the long-standing political struggle between the media in support of either the pro-establishment or anti-establishment camp. These controversial policies are highly emotional, fuelled by nationalism, “local” identity crisis, and tradition.

These issues can be divided into two categories: one is inaction of government (opposing parties are dissatisfied with the current policy), and the other is the action of government (opposition parties are dissatisfied with the new policy).

These policy issues are chosen for the sake of more comprehensive coverage. The cases selected reflect the decisions of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) on Hong Kong’s electoral reform, multiple entry permit plan for Mainlanders, the Belt and Road initiative, and co-location arrangements.

Here I will briefly introduce the cases chosen.

3.3.1 NPC’s decision on Hong Kong’s Electoral Reform

It had long been controversial whether Beijing would fulfill its promise of universal suffrage for Hong Kong. In early 2013, Benny Tai, a law professor in

the University of Hong Kong, raised the idea of civil disobedience to fight for democracy in Hong Kong. This “last resort” was aimed to paralyse Central, the heart of the financial centre in the city for a few days, to increase the bargaining power of the pan-democracy camp. Since then, Beijing officials had become more vocal about their criteria and concerns, if not constrains, on Hong Kong’s constitutional reform. There are two main criteria: an electoral system that is in line with Basic Law and the decisions of the NPCSC, and candidates of Chief Executive have to love the country and Hong Kong. Politicians that confront Beijing, in other words the pan-democracy camp, are not qualified to be candidates as they are a threat to the PRC’s national security.

In the meantime, the “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” movement continues to explain their purposes and fight for public support. Three deliberation days and a civil referendum were held. This movement is not without opponents, however, as the “Alliance for Peace and Democracy” launched a signature campaign and took to the streets.

On August 31 2014, the National People’s Congress had announced their decision on the selection method for the 2017 Chief Executive election. Under the constraints, the pro-democratic camp was very unlikely—if not completely impossible—to be candidates. This decision sparked criticism and subsequent social movements. Two student groups, the Hong Kong Federation of Students and Scholarism, announced a one-week class boycott to protest against the NPCSC’s decision. The campaign was scheduled to end on 26 September after an assembly in front of the Government Complex. At approximately 10:30 pm, Joshua Wong, leader of Scholarism, suddenly urged students to “retake” the Civic Square. Dozens of protesters climbed across fences, entered and gathered around

the flag stage. Several student leaders, including Joshua Wong were arrested that night. By noon the next day (27 September), the Civic Square was cleared and a total of 61 protesters were arrested. Demonstrators gathered and Benny Tai, the co-initiator of OCLP, announced the official launch of the OC campaign on 28 September midnight. The crowd started to gather in the afternoon around the Government Complex and blocked the highways of Admiralty. At around 6 pm, police fired tear gas to disperse protesters, but this attempt backfired. This unexpected use of strategy generated and “mediated instant grievances” from the public (Tang, 2015), which in turn mobilised more layman to join the protesters. The Umbrella movement did not end until 11 December 2014.

On 18 June 2015, the reform package which upholds the Basic Law and 831 decision was rejected as expected. The result was unexpected: eight pan-democrats voted yes and only eight pro-establishment lawmakers voted yes. The surprising result was due to confusion between government allies. Thirty-one of them left the LegCo chamber to wait for Lau Wong-fat, a failed attempt to adjourn the ballot.

3.3.2 Multiple-Entry Permit Plan of Mainlanders

This policy was aimed to allow mainlanders to come to Hong Kong without joining tours, but it also gives room for parallel trading. The parallel traders from China have come to Hong Kong to buy products, as these products are at a lower cost and more trustworthy than those in mainland China. The shops catering to Chinese tourists, however, has driven up rental fee and forced out local businesses.

Some Hong Kongers complained about the shortage of necessities, higher cost of goods, and crowded public transport due to the increasing number of Chinese

tourists. Only places near China's borders were affected at first, but this problem soon flooded to nearby towns such as Yuen Long. Hong Kong and the Chinese government did not impose any restrictions to decrease the number of mainland travelers despite intensified opposition against mainlanders. Starting from February 2015, protesters marched into the streets of Sheung Shui, Tuen Mun, Sha Tin and Yuen Long for consecutive weekends. They claim to “defend the local” and “reclaim Hong Kong (from Chinese tourists)”.

On 31 July 2015, protester Ng Lai-ying, who took part in the reclaim Yuen Long protest was convicted for assaulting police with her breast.

This series of protests might seem to be only related to the livelihood of citizens at first glance, but they can be related to complicated ideological issues and political struggles when examined closely.

3.3.3 Belt and Road initiative in Hong Kong

The Belt and Road initiative refers to the economic policy of Chinese president Xi Jinping. This policy seeks to strengthen cooperation with countries along Asia and Eastern Europe, a majority are countries along the ancient silk road and new maritime silk road. Here we solely focus on how this policy will relate to Hong Kong.

The policy of Belt and Road did not enter public discussion until CY Leung mentioned this over 40 times in his policy address. CY Leung described this national policy as presenting a unique opportunity to Hong Kong and the only dark side about this policy “is to let this opportunity slip away”.

In May 2016, Zhang Dejiang, Chair of the National People's Congress visited Hong Kong for three days. The highlight of this visit was to attend and speak at a forum on “One Belt, One Road”. Anti-terrorism level security was implemented

during his visit possibly because of his high status in Chinese government and intense political atmosphere. Five million dollars was spent: roads were blocked and construction sites were shut down creating traffic jams and monetary loss. Protesters were kept in zones which were “deliberately designed to keep protesters out of sight”.

3.3.4 Co-location arrangement

On 26 July 2017, the Hong Kong government revealed the details of the co-location plan for the high-speed railway, allowing Chinese mainland law to be implemented in the city. Passengers of the railway will be able to complete the border clearance procedure for both mainland and Hong Kong in the West Kowloon Station. It is the first time that mainland laws will be in effect in parts of Hong Kong. This plan sparked controversy in the city as it was understood that Beijing has been meddling in Hong Kong politics.

On 27 December 2017, Beijing approved the joint checkpoint plan despite opposition. This decision will allow mainland laws to be enforced in part of the cross-border railway station on the Hong Kong side. Li Fei, head of the NPCSC’s Basic Law Committee, said this arrangement “complies with the constitution and the Basic Law”, and the decision carries constitutional authority which “cannot be challenged”. He reassured the legality of this arrangement and dismissed concerns that Hong Kong has given up its high degree of autonomy. This arrangement only allows a designated zone to be subject to national laws and reflects the high degree of freedom enjoyed by Hong Kong. Li Fei also emphasised the convenience of this mode of transport and reminded those who do not feel comfortable about this arrangement to opt for other alternatives. Opposition lawmakers and law experts, however, see this decision as a precedent which

opened the back door for China to interfere with the valued rule of law and judiciary in Hong Kong.

Days after this decision on 1 January of 2018, demonstrators took to the streets and protested against this decision along with other suppressions from Beijing.

This study focuses on four cases studies between 2014 to early 2018. As the number of political satires produced is enormous in these periods, the number of cases needed to be trimmed down to a manageable level. Political satire produced in a three-week period around each key date of the event was chosen (one-week-before and two-weeks-after the milestone date). The selected time frame can be found in the Appendix 3.

3.4 Summary

Quantitative content analysis, frame analysis, and interviews are used in this dissertation. The quantitative content analysis is used to generate data to answer the characteristics problem. Gamson's idea on ideological packages can help to identify the ideological packages in political satire, and the interviews can go straight to the producers, verifying and explaining the observation and analysis. I shall report the findings in the following chapters.

Chapter 4 THE CHANGING FACE OF POLITICAL SATIRE

The history of TV political satire in the US can be traced back to the 1990s, so it comes as no surprise that the literature which outlines the differences between contemporary political cartoons and political satire is underdeveloped. Online video political satire in Hong Kong only started in 2009 and so it is essential to look back to the roots of political humour products in Hong Kong, with an essential type being the political cartoon. Apart from changes in format, this research will also try to connect with the existing research in the West by focusing on the fundamental difference in terms of the producers. The video political satire in the West is mostly produced by a star host, who has decisive power over the products while those in Hong Kong are mostly institutionally produced. This shift from individual producers to institutional producers must be recognised as this change could result in significant differences in the production processes and final products.

This chapter is written with two goals: a) to identify the characteristics of online video political satire and explore the differences between political cartoons and online video political satire; and b) to investigate the change in political satire production, from individual-based to institutional-based. Stating these fundamental differences is to set the scene for further analysis and future research. Without doing so, it would be hard—if not impossible—to connect this research with other research in this nascent field. I will first capture the changing trend from static political cartoon to video political satire in Hong Kong, then move

onto explaining the production of political satire as changing from individual-based to institutional-based.

There are two main differences between political cartoons and video political satire.

4.1 Cartoon vs video political satire

In the first part of chapter 4, I seek to identify the characteristics of video political satire with reference to the political cartoon in terms of dissemble platform and information contained. Table 1 summarises the differences between political cartoon and video political satire.

Table 1. The differences between political cartoon and political satire

	Political Cartoon	Video Political Satire
Duration & Format	Short, usually one frame only (some in HK use six frames)	Longer, each section usually up to a few minutes
Producers	Individual-based cartoonists	Media outlets act as institutional-based producers
Resources needed	Less due to shorter duration	More due to longer duration
Include factual information	Hard to include due to space constraint; often provided exaggerated (if not imagined) scenes	Usually included but “truth” has been framed, usually to exaggerate negative behaviours; have longer durations

Dissemble	Usually newspaper platforms	Mainly online, especially social media
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4.1.1 Characteristic 1: video political satire dissembles online

Video political satire mainly exists online, while political cartoons mostly exist as part of a column in a newspaper. Dynamics in the newspaper and online media (especially social media) are very different. Unlike newspapers, online media is a platform without limited time and space. This lack of time constraints can be observed from the duration of video political satire. The average duration of political satire in this study is over two minutes, or 120 seconds ($M = 124.49$, $SD = 41.23$). Video political satire in the West could be up to 30 minutes. Political cartoons on the other hand, have only one frame or two. Newspapers have limited space for cartoonists, and thus video political satire may contain more information than cartoons.

4.1.2 Characteristic 2: video political satire has a different media format

Video political satire allows more forms of representation. The form of representation is no longer limited to static images but has expanded to include visual and audio tracks. These added dimensions allow more room for the creativity of political satirists. Political cartoonists could only use their drawings to vilify politicians, but video political satire could defame politicians by a large variety of methods, including repeating the sound-bites and facial expressions of politicians, using emojis or key texts on the screen to cooperate with the voiceover.

4.1.3 Characteristic 3: video political satire has higher spreadability

The main disseminate platform of political cartoons is the newspaper while the disseminate platform of video political satire is the internet, especially social media. The spreadability of the political cartoon in newspapers is limited to its readers, while video political satire online has much higher spreadability. The spreadability of social media is described as the “cornerstone” of viral marketing (Mills, 2012). Compared to the political cartoon, video political satire has an advantage when it comes to disseminate platforms.

4.1.4 Characteristic 4: video political satire contained more factual information

Video political satire often provides more background information about the whole event. It gives more room to factual information, such as sound-bites and background information for the politicians, and can paint a more detailed picture about the whole event or topic of the whole story. Therefore, video political satire requires less news background information from the audience and has the potential to have a broader market.

Political cartoons have less room to include facts. Most of the cartoonists merely get one frame to express their point of view, and therefore they have to select the most eye-catching essence and gist in the news and exaggerate it. There is no room for factual information but the subjective framing, imagined characters and scenes for politicians.

The internet allows more room for information, but at the same time this information surplus facilitates the fragmentation of information (Bennett & Iyenger, 2008). Information online is usually fragmented, and therefore it is essential to include more information in one post so that the readers could understand. Critiques over one political issue cannot be understood unless one knows about the political issue at hand.

Newspapers, on the other hand, have less fragmented information. The reports in newspapers are like puzzles; they combine with each other to form a complete picture of the whole society. Political cartoons act as a piece of the puzzle.

Political cartoonists will usually follow or coordinate with news headlines (Lai, 2006). Readers are therefore likely to have the background information needed to understand the cartoon. Hence, cartoonists do not need to include facts in their products. While it is not impossible for readers to understand the meanings of political cartoons targeted on specific topics on social media, video political satire is more adaptive to the ecology of the internet.

4.1.5 Characteristic 5: video political satire is produced by a group of producers

Video political satire has included more producers than the political cartoon. The producer(s) of the latter are often one-man bands while the former have to include a group of producers. Every individual in the producer group serves a role. Some are journalists, some are video editors, and some are editors. Each one of them has the potential to add some spice to the final product. This point will be further illustrated in the following section.

4.2 From individual to institutional: individual freedom in the seemingly boundaryless world

Here I will focus on how the production synergy changes when the producers are no longer individual-based but institutional-based. Political cartoonists and political satirists in the West are working as individual-based producers while the video political satirists in Hong Kong are working as institutional-based producers. The differences between these producers could be explained by: a) the degree of individual freedom (i.e. whether one considers him/herself as part of the

institution and is willing to cooperate with the media organisation); and b) whether the individual/institution itself positioned themselves as journalists, which comes with a journalistic burden.

4.2.1 Cartoonist: Individual freedom as a columnist in a newspaper

According to interviews and secondary data, political cartoonists regard themselves as columnists of the media. Their work is independent from the media, but at the same time they must cooperate with the media.

The main theme in the political cartoon is subject to change according to the news headlines and contents. What is included in the newspaper affects what can be used as the subject of the political cartoon. The agenda in the newspaper affects how cartoonists respond to an event and the priority they accord it (Lai, 2006).

Cartoonists have to work closely with the newspaper editors. Political cartoonist Zunzi put in effort to stay in tune with the topic of newspapers: he works according to the news slant by communicating with the news editors every evening (Cheng, 2017). He would ditch issues that only occupy small corners of the newspaper (even if he is interested in it) and focus on the exclusive news of the newspaper. Political cartoonist Malone found his choice of topics are constrained and more pessimistic. The localisation of news in newspapers had barred him from drawing niche topics, as readers might not understand his cartoon if the topic(s) chosen is “buried in the middle of [the] newspaper” (Lai, 2006).

Mutual trust is crucial between the cartoonist and the media as cartoons in newspapers are hard, if not impossible, to replace. Completely discarding the cartoon column is almost impossible as the size of the column is unique and is thus hard to be replaced by text. Editors can easily edit text or replace text with another piece; but not with cartoons. Cartoonist Zunzi described the political

cartoon as “hard to control” and “high-risk”, “(Editors) cannot turn CY Leung from demonized to handsome (after it is produced)”. Only cartoonists, but not editors, can edit their work according to their own will. If editors have concerns about the cartoon, they can only ask the cartoonist to change it. Zunzi was once requested to avoid mentioning Xi Jinping in his finished cartoon for the Mingpao Monthly. He compromised for once, and later quit the job after he was requested not to use politics as topics. He said: “Whether to include politics in my cartoon is my call, but I cannot accept editors barring my topic selection.”

Even though there are certain constraints when it comes to topic selection, cartoonists are still able to retain some control over their work. Political cartoonists are one-man bands, they work alone and therefore have at least some control over their topic. The topic for video political satire, on the other hand, seems to be determined by the editors (or even the institution). As the product of collective work, unlike cartoons, political satire needs to be approved by more gatekeepers in the newsroom before it could enter the stage of production.

One possible reason could be that the resources needed to produce political satire is larger than a cartoon, and some media just do not have enough resources to produce satire in a large range of topics and therefore have to choose the topic wisely. While Apple Daily pours resources into news events as long as they found them interesting and produce video news based on everyday news, TV Most produces at most one video per day, while Speak Out Hong Kong approximately produce two videos of “One Minute Funny News” weekly.

The requirement of resources per product also means that there are more people involved in production, from collecting data to editing videos. Video political satire in Hong Kong is therefore out of the hands of journalists. It is, after all,

collective work. This point will be further illustrated in the later section “From individual to institutional”.

Another possible reason for the limited choice of subjects is that political cartoons merely represent the stance of individual cartoonists, while video political satire is being absorbed and used as a tool to represent the stance of the media. While tensions do exist between the political cartoonist and the editor, whether similar tensions exist between the editors and individual “journalists” who are producing satire is still unknown.

4.2.2 Political satirists in the West: Whatever they want

The titles of Western political satire is more explicit than the ones in Hong Kong. The political satirists are the star and soul of the show, and the show is named after them, including Jon Stewart of *The Daily Show*, John Oliver of *Last Week Tonight*, and Samantha Bee of *Full Frontal with Samantha Bee*. These star hosts hold responsibility for their comments, and many of them have been sued for defamation, including Jon Stewart, Stephen Colbert, and John Oliver (Kreps, 2018; Maglio, 2018). The responsibility of the lawsuit is both borne by the host and the TV station. But it seems to hold back neither the satirists nor the TV stations. The satirists continue to make critical judgements, and the TV station does not seem to draw the boundary for them. The satirists can still enjoy a high degree of freedom.

The star host of Western political satire produces their work with their unique principles and characteristics. This way of working is usually developed after working in political satire or in the late-night comedy show industry for years, if not decades. The previous experiences allow the political satirists to reproduce and often improve upon the earlier forms of political satire shows. For instance,

John Oliver worked on *The Daily Show* with Jon Stewart for almost a decade before he aired his show on HBO. His show is considered an improved form of the usual model of political satire. These shows are usually very personal, and the host got to choose what to say, who to invite, and what was worthy of investigation.

The freedom of the hosts is perhaps the highest when compared to the political cartoonist and the video satirists of Hong Kong. Even the TV stations that pay these hosts don't necessarily have full control of what these satirists do. These individuals seem to have much more room from institutional constraints. Take John Oliver interviewing Edward Snowden as an example. The host of *Last Week Tonight* had gone to Russia to interview Edward Snowden without telling HBO. HBO had no idea about his trip until the production team got back with the interview tapes. As described by John Oliver: "They were arguably the first people we should have told, but ended up being the last." (Fallon, 2016). Perhaps what really shows the degree of freedom John Oliver enjoys is how HBO took Oliver's advice when it came to how this interview would be presented. John Oliver deemed that the interview wouldn't have been funny if the interview was promoted before the show aired, so he decided "just to spring the interview on people", even if it is the worst way to present it commercially (Framke, 2016). HBO supported his decision.

Journalistic identity does not play a role in the production of Western political satire; even if communication scholars and commentators often regard political satire as a pioneer of journalism, and serves a better fourth estate than the existing media (Fear, Grierson, & Love, 2015; McCarthy, 2015). Here my focus is not to argue on the criteria of journalism, but on how satirists position themselves. This

self-positioning is important. By admitting oneself as a journalist, one usually indicates that he/she will also take up the responsibility and public expectation to be objective and balanced in reporting. Political satirists in the west are reluctant to state that they are journalists. To avoid the burden which come hand in hand with the journalistic identity is probably the reason of their reluctance.

4.2.3 Individual with limited freedom: Video political satire in Hong Kong

According to interviews and the results from content analysis, individual producers of video political satire in Hong Kong regard themselves as representatives of organisations. This is different from political cartoonists (who regard themselves as columnists) and the TV political satirists in the West.

There are also slight differences between Hong Kong media outlets: employees in Apple Daily and Speak Out Hong Kong regard themselves as journalists while those in TV Most position themselves as employees of an advertising company. Thus, the journalistic burden exists in some media outlets but not all, and results in some differences in the products.

The below table shows that Apple Daily mainly consists of satire that represents the whole media. Such political satire with fake by-lines primarily consist of political cartoons from Zunzi and the column from Lee Wai-ling; both exist as forms of the column. According to the interview with Zunzi, he did not know his cartoon was turned into video until his friend told him, which indicates he had little say when it came to video production. All the videos from TV Most has fake by-lines. This might be because TV Most copy the style of “news reporting” from TVB. As for Speak Out Hong Kong, all of the satire does not have individual by-lines. It is because the political satire is regarded as editorial of the media.

According to the interviewees, this part is usually taken up by senior journalists or

even chief editors, as this segment required “critical judgment” and “loads of information must be concentrated in a short period of time”.

Table 2. By-line of the satire

	Apple Daily	TV Most	Speak Out Hong Kong
Have by-line	10	0	0
Does not have a by-line	239	0	23
Fake by-line	1	14	0

Table 2 indicates that political satire in Hong Kong is mostly institutionally produced. Putting the name of the author implies that the author is more independent from the media; and therefore, more responsible for what he/she has written or produced.

Employees of Apple Daily and Speak Out Hong Kong both regard themselves as journalists, while those in TV Most don't.

Employees in Apple Daily positioned themselves as “journalists” or people working in a new form of journalism. The employees often have their political stance but are reluctant to show it when writing the scripts. They have to follow the political stance of the company. As the video editor said, he left his political stance aside while working: “(During the LegCo election) we use editing to make the pan-democrats look good. It is our job. But when I go back home, I work for Edward Leung as a volunteer and urge others to vote for him.”

The employees also could not include personal comments in the video. The senior editors act as gatekeepers and filter out radical or personal comments. To the individual employees, this gatekeeping entails restriction but at the same time protection.

The video editor once made fun of a pro-establishment lawmaker. His video made her look like she was lying in a coffin. One senior editor approved his creativity, yet the chief editor did not. The video editor appreciates the gatekeeping. He said while it might look like restriction, the gatekeeping allows him to have the courage to think out of the box and use more creative ways in video editing:

“[We] have the editors. You can have the confidence to max out when making fun of the politicians, as the editors will correct your work if it is too over.” A journalist also had similar experiences. The police complained her work as “picking on the policeman”, and thus the video was removed from the site.

Therefore in her later work about the Hong Kong police, she included a line of personal comment. Her senior editor deleted this line, “he said it is personal comments. After all, we are journalists”.

According to chief editor Edward Li, Apple Action News is no different from other news media; Apple Daily is more innovative than its competitors. “At the end of the day we are still a journalistic company, and we thus have the responsibility to inform our audience. Our tone is indeed playful and critical, but we had never distorted the facts.....The pro-establishment lawmakers truly behave poorly in the Legislative Council. We only exaggerate those sound-bites, which is not so different from the sound-bite selection process of other media.”

The employees of Speak Out Hong Kong also rely on the editors to correct their work if they have gone too far or are too mild. The bottom line of this media

outlet is similar to the one in Apple Daily. According to the video editor and journalists, the criticism could be fierce as long as it is based on facts. Three employees all believe criticising the pan-democrats is what they should do as a media outlet. The video editor defends the political stance of Speak Out Hong Kong: “Every media [outlet] has a political stance. The true or false of a lot of matters depends on the perspective taken.” But he will not go too far as “journalists”.

The journalist of Speak Out Hong Kong said the one minute funny news would extract the event that could allow the most massive room to “piggyback” (i.e. to make fun of and criticise) the politician, and less complicated topics are usually selected as it is easier for the audience to absorb their perspective.

Contrary to the editors in Apple Daily, the video editor said when it comes to one-minute funny news, the chief editor usually hopes for them to exaggerate specific video editing effects on the pan-democrats or social movement leaders, including slapping their face with emojis or repeating their sound-bites a few times. These techniques are extremely similar to the ones used by Apple Daily.

TV Most had perhaps the most extensive freedom among the three local media outlets. The employees could write what they desire “as long as the boss approves,” and the boss usually approves “as long as the comment makes sense and could attract the audiences”. Unlike the previous two media outlets, they do not have journalistic baggage. Both interviewees positioned their organisation not as journalism but as an advertising company.

One could conclude that while TV Most does not have journalistic burden it has commercial burdens, and this burden could hold the individual back from revealing their political position. Even the boss does so. According to the

employee, talking about politics is not prohibited in the company, “the boss knows about my participation in a political party and they therefore come forward and discuss who they should vote for in the by-election”; but they “will not include too radical political positions in their work”. “Our audience are mostly ‘yellow ribbons’ (from hardcore advocates to mild ones). We will choose our political stance in order to include as many audiences in the spectrum as possible.” Being objective is not part of their agenda; gaining the maximum market share is.

The image of the TV Most’s artist is also carefully managed. An artist will not take up a show or requirement of the advertising client, unless these match the images of that certain artist. The employee of TV Most will change the script—even if the script is provided by a client—if one line does not match their characters’ settings. One artist manager said Tung Fong-shing will do nothing without careful consideration, and only participate in shows with either constructiveness or noise. His actions in recent years, however, do change a little due to the widespread political apathy. As an employee of TV Most puts it: “I think he is less vocal about politics these days. He believes Hong Kong people need more entertainment other than politics. The widespread political apathy has made him entertain the public even more, as people have to live their life happily or unhappily. It is easier this way.”

TV Most seeks to produce their products with careful calculation. After catching public attention with a series of political satire, including video political satire and talk shows, TV Most have rocked the online political news market. They later decreased the political content, and in the summer of 2016, news around 6:30 (六點半左右新聞報導) changed from regular showings to irregular showings.

4.3 Implications of the changing face of political satire

The above concluded with the rise of video political satire and how the production synergy differs between the political cartoon, TV political satire in the West, and video political satire. The real problem is how the new face of political satire provides new implications for the political arena, and what are the reasons behind such changes?

The rise of video is not a sole trend in political satire. It represents the change of preferences of the audience, and social media enterprises like Facebook have also helped intensify this wave by promoting videos over textual images. This indicates the change in reading habits of the audiences.

Two scholars were interviewed so as to conceptualise the implication of the changing face of political satire. According to the political science scholar Benson Wong, the internet had facilitated the rise of video political satire, and allows video political satire to take a more radical stance than the political cartoon.

Political cartoons not only have limited time and space but also restrictions from dissemble platforms, making the political cartoon likely to be milder than video political satire. Wong described political cartoons as having more humorous elements while the video political satire usually contains more severe attacks, or even humiliating the depicted politicians. Political cartoons have more tendency to be funny (which is similar to the Horatian satire) while video political satire are used as tools to attack opponents (which has the tendency of Juvenalian satire).

Although Wong had pointed out that video political satire is used as a delegitimising tool, he said the criticisms were not too radical. Institutions would act as the brake to prevent the political satire from making too radical statements, in order to avoid negative feedback from viewers and being involved in legal

cases. Institutionally-produced political satire is more likely to avoid sensitive topics and work according to audience reactions. The media outlets must attract and obtain enough audience members to survive, and therefore will choose a political stance that could include the maximum number of audience members. Communication scholar Chan Chi Kit has similar views. Institutional-based producers are more likely to be vocal and obtain a critical mass and therefore will hold back from taking a clear political stance that's too radical, so as to prevent the loss of audiences.

Individual-based political satire does have political influences from time to time, but the calling power is not as sustainable as the institutions. Back in Hong Kong in 2003, political cartoonists published multiple popular books to mock the chief executive Tung Chee-Wah at the time, adding oil to the fire and undermining his governance prestige. Individual-based satirists in the West also have similar one-off effects. John Oliver, host of Last Week Tonight, criticised the bill on net neutrality, urging the public to send their opinions to the Federal Communications Commission. On top of urging the public to send their opinions to the commission, he also bought a URL to create a shortcut for the public to send their opinions more easily. 150,000 out of the total 200,000 comments were spurred by John Oliver's comment on net neutrality (Snider & Weise, 2017). The effects are undeniably huge but these call for actions are one-off. Institutional-based political satire, on the other hand, are often being regarded as one of the political actors rather than as a one-off attempt to change society. The launch of TV Most, for instance, was regarded as the "beginning of re-definition of Hong Kong's popular culture" (Ah-Gwo, 2016).

4.4 Summary

This chapter seeks to introduce the characteristics of video political satire in Hong Kong with references to the political cartoon and video political satire in the West. The rise of video political satire echoed with the trend of rising video in the digital era. The video political satire in Hong Kong is manufactured by institutional-based producers. This change from individual-based producer to institutional-based producer represents video political satire as taking a more influential role in the political arena, as media outlets use political satire as a tool to publicise their agendas and jam the ideas from others. The frames and techniques of discourse jamming will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

Chapter 5 FIGHT FOR DISCURSIVE POWER: POLITICAL SATIRE AS A WEAPON

As mentioned in the literature review, media that supports different political camps utilises political satire as a means of legitimising its own political discourse and as a weapon to discredit the other camp. The political camps would frame political issues in a way that they desire; this fight for discursive power is a zero-sum game. These political camps win only by attacking others. The problem is knowing how the political discourse from one camp is being jammed by the other? Using what frames, and why? I will start by reporting the quantitative results on content analysis, then move on to construct the ideological packages embedded in the political satire.

5.1 Mapping Video Political Satire in Hong Kong

A total of 287 political satire videos are included in the analysis. Most of the satire is from Apple Daily. The reason behind such imbalance may point to the differences in production mechanism and resources. Apple Daily has the resources to produce more videos than the other two media outlets, as Apple Daily routinises satire as part of their media content, and satire is produced daily. At the same time, video political satire is only used as the editorial in Speak Out Hong Kong and is not produced daily in TV Most. For these two media outlets, satire is not daily routinised, and the topic of the satire is more carefully selected than the satire in Apple Daily. It is thus possible for them to contain more information and criticism in a similar duration. As for the inter-coder reliability, I

have randomly selected 30% of the cases for the second coder. I have used Krippendorff's alpha coefficient to test inter-coder reliability, all variables have alpha higher than 0.7. For media, date and duration, they have a perfect alpha of 1.

Table 3. Overview of cases in the video political satire

	Apple Daily	TV Most	Speak Out Hong Kong
Umbrella Movement	168 (67.2%)	6 (42.86%)	13 (56.52%)
Anti-parallel trading movement	19 (7.6%)	3 (21.43%)	5 (21.74%)
Belt and Road Initiative	38 (15.2%)	4 (28.57%)	1 (4.35%)
Co-location arrangement	25 (10%)	1 (7.14%)	4 (17.39%)
Total	250 (100%)	14 (100%)	23 (100%)

5.2 Stance of media, main character and overall story valance

Political satire is weaponised to fight for discursive power and is used to target people with the opposite stance to the satire producer. The below graphs illustrate the main political stands of the political satire videos in Hong Kong, as well as various opinions related to those stands. A detailed table is in the Appendix.

Different colours are used to represent the differences in stance to that character: 1 refers to very negative and is represented by dark blue; 2 refers to negative mindsets and is represented by light blue; 3 refers to neutral and is represented by green; 4 refers to positive and is represent by yellow; and 5 is very positive and is represented by brown. As showed in the below three graphs, satire usually has an

obvious political stance. Positive stances of political satire are very rare, which also matches the assumption that political satire is used to perform culture jamming, namely, reveal and challenge mainstream opinion.

Most of the satire holds a negative stance. Almost 90% of the satire from Apple Daily is negative. The satire mostly consists of the pro-establishment camp (75%), which includes the Beijing government, Hong Kong government, pro-establishment lawmakers, pro-establishment social movement leaders and ordinary citizens. As for TV Most, the caricature focuses heavily on the pro-establishment camp and is mostly negative; there is only one positive data set. As for Speak Out Hong Kong, the satire mostly has a negative stance and focuses heavily on the pan-democratic camp. The detailed information of the above data is in the appendix 4.




Figure 4. Presented characters in Apple Daily




Figure 5. Presented characters in TV Most




Figure 6. Presented characters in Speak Out Hong Kong

5.3 Ideological packages in video political satire

When it comes to de-legitimising the other political party, some ideological packages are easier to use than others. This could explain why some ideological struggles are more explicit in video political satire while others are not. Not every ideological struggle is related to an ideological package, as the media has the tendency to select the more obvious and prominent points to attack. It is not only easier to present the argument but also easier for the readers to understand. I will therefore combine some ideological conflicts to form ideological packages. The packages on various topics would be constructed by referring to their signature elements. While the ideological packages were constructed using different case studies, I will select the most obvious cases to illustrate my point.

Interestingly, the employees in Speak Out Hong Kong and Apple Daily had similar opinions even though their stances are at the opposite end of the spectrum. They admit that their company is not neutral and has its own stance, but what they did was expose the wrongdoing of politicians, which they see as the right thing to do. The technique of delegitimising politicians is unique to each media outlet and will be discussed in detail below.

5.3.1 Ideological Struggle 1: Hong Kong is not China?

Whether Hong Kong people identify themselves as Hong Kongers or Chinese has long been a controversial issue. As the Chinese have had more contact with Hong Kongers since the establishment of the individual visit scheme in 2004, the conflict and differences between the two surfaced as local Hong Kongers felt that the Chinese are marching into the crowded living areas and affecting their original way of life. The heated debate related to their identification to the national

identity and the mainland-isation of Hong Kong which might have gradually shifted to another topic: Hong Kong independence.

The attempt of linking Hong Kong independence to the Hong Kong identity can be traced back to 2012. The public opinion poll on ethnic identity of Hong Kong people “turned political” (Chung & Tai, 2012). By the end of 2011, the HKUPOP released the result of their poll, reporting that the proportion of citizens who identified themselves as Hong Konger reached a 10-year high, while identification as Chinese sank to a 12-year low. The result triggered a backlash from Chinese officials and mouthpieces. After officials from the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in Hong Kong criticised this survey as “unscientific” and “illogical” (Chung & Tai, 2014), the Chinese government mouthpiece Wen Wei Po followed this line and criticised the survey as having embedded the idea of Hong Kong independence as the questionnaire had “placed the national identity and the local identity on opposite sides”.

The above matter was just the beginning of waves of attempts to link the idea of “Hong Kong independence” or “Hong Kong autonomy” to the identification and the mainland-sation of Hong Kong. I therefore link the debate on Hong Kong independence with the latter two ideological struggles as they are highly correlated. As the results from content analysis showed, the criticism against Hong Kong independence and autonomy are more vocal than the other two.

Table 4. Overview of media's stance: Hong Kong Independence or Autonomy

	Apple Daily	TV Most	Speak Out Hong Kong
Against	1 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	11 (47.83%)

Not against	86 (34.4%)	7 (50%)	0 (0%)
Not included	163 (64.8%)	7 (50%)	12 (52.17%)
Total	250 (100%)	14 (100%)	23 (100%)

Table 5. Overview of media's stance: national or local identity

	Apple Daily	TV Most	Speak Out Hong Kong
National Identity	3 (1.2%)	0 (0%)	2 (8.7%)
Local Identity	67 (26.8%)	2 (14.29%)	0 (0%)
Not included	180 (72%)	12 (85.71%)	21 (91.3%)
Total	250 (100%)	14 (100%)	23 (100%)

Table 6. Overview of media's stance: Nationalisation or Localisation

	Apple Daily	TV Most	Speak Out Hong Kong
Nationalisation	2 (0.8%)	0 (0%)	4 (17.39%)
Localisation	109 (43.6%)	7 (50%)	0 (0%)
Not included	139 (55.6%)	7 (50%)	19 (82.61%)
Total	250 (100%)	14 (100%)	23 (100%)

Compared to the issue of Hong Kong independence, ethnic identity and nationalisation was less likely to be included in satire. Almost half of the political satire showed criticism towards Hong Kong independence, but for ethnic identity and nationalisation, only 2 and 4 out of 23 cases respectively mentioned this issue.

One possible reason for this difference in number could be because Hong Kong independence is a black and white issue, and at the same time is the easiest point for the pro-Beijing camp to criticise the pan-democrats and the social movement leaders. Once a certain politician is labelled as an advocate or leading proponent of Hong Kong independence, he or she would be deemed (at least by the pro-establishment camp) as the traitor who tries to split the states. The politician would then be labelled a monster of Hong Kong independence, and his/her argument can be undermined, disposed or even neglected.

5.3.2 Speak Out Hong Kong: Request on autonomy is the same as independence

This ideological package targets pan-democratic politicians or social movement leaders who take a more liberal stance. These political actors being attacked usually support Hong Kong autonomy, but not many are explicit enough to support independence. Speak Out Hong Kong, however, will categorise all these political actors as advocates of Hong Kong independence, even though not all politicians are supporters of independence.

According to journalist C, Hong Kong independence is a topic that receives special attention in Speak Out Hong Kong. She described the topic as a “fundamental issue”, and thus Speak Out Hong Kong is willing to “go great lengths” to delegitimise the advocates of Hong Kong independence. Speak Out Hong Kong “would take the most radical position to criticise independence” and place the blame on “this problem” solely on the advocates of Hong Kong independence. Hong Kong identity and nationalisation are “milder topics” and Speak Out Hong Kong will point to education or atmosphere in the society as the root of this “misunderstanding”. Video editor L also witnessed the different treatment between ideological struggles. He described Hong Kong independence

as a topic that must be included even if the politicians are not influential: “We will include anything related to Hong Kong independence in the news even if that is only the Student Union putting it on their agenda, like the Chinese University Student Union a few days ago [hung a banner supporting Hong Kong independence].” This topic has an obvious right and wrong and therefore no room for discussion. Hong Kong identity and nationalism on the other hand is a topic where it’s harder to blame the problem entirely on opponents, and therefore less likely to be included in satire. L described these non-black and white topics as “minor options” for political satire and Speak Out Hong Kong would rather publicise the national identity and benefits of nationalisation. This could be because political satire is a useful tool to delegitimise the agenda and jam the message of the political enemy, but not very useful when it comes to promote the framing of oneself.

Video editor L also pointed out that Speak Out Hong Kong will frame the pan-democratic politicians who hold a vague stance to Hong Kong independence as supporters of independence. “We will attack politicians who seem to support Hong Kong independence...and [this] is not limited to those [who] explicitly state they are advocating Hong Kong independence. Supporters of Hong Kong autonomy are also included.” He describes that the media would attack the politicians in this 'firing range', regardless of their true political stance. This finding from the interview matches the finding in the content analysis, where politicians without explicitly stating their stance about Hong Kong independence were attacked.

The advocates of Hong Kong independence are described as traitors. The signature exemplar for this package is the analogy of Hong Kong independence.

Speak Out Hong Kong fiercely criticises the ultimate goal of Hong Kong autonomy as indeed independence and concluded that it is impossible “to communicate with people who have the aim to secession”. The voiceover also used a denunciative tone to describe that there is no room for discussion about Hong Kong independence, “will you negotiate with a businessman who hopes to eat into your family, and take your wife and daughter away from you?” The catchphrases include “Hong Kong autonomy is de facto independence”, and the politicians are described as “Hong Kong independence monsters” who are without integrity. The distaste for Hong Kong independence is also shown in the visual track. When the voiceover is criticising the politicians, the visual track will repeat their micro actions. Video editor L described that the senior editors had special demands when capturing the facial expression of the politicians. The editors had reminded him not to use “pretty faces of the non-establishment camp”. “[The editors] will point out one certain photo is ‘too pretty for the opposition camp’, so we have to replace that photo with uglier photos.” Some beautiful opponents had given L a hard time, “especially Yau Wai-ching, she is a beauty and therefore video editors cannot capture her photos or facial expression randomly...we have to find her ugly expression on purpose.”

This ideological package provides the justification and the “evidence” to attack the politicians and social movement leaders who have a more liberal stance. The core position of this ideological package is the idea that Hong Kong autonomy should be eliminated, similar to the idea of Hong Kong independence. These topics have no room for discussion. Politicians with these stances should also leave Hong Kong. If the idea of Hong Kong independence is not stopped once it appears, then this city will have chaos in the future.

By framing the idea of Hong Kong autonomy and independence as treason, Speak Out Hong Kong had effectively jammed the discourse of the pan-democrats, and suppressed the voice fighting for more Hong Kong autonomy. The goal of the localists and part of the pan-democratic camp is to fight for more autonomy in Hong Kong, but not to overthrow the Beijing government. Yet Speak Out Hong Kong redefined Hong Kong autonomy as an attempt for Hong Kong independence. These two ideas are highly associated and thus both are blocked from discussion. There is no room for discussion when it comes to treason. The discussions for gaining more autonomy (and of course independence) are blocked. Unlike Speak Out Hong Kong, TV Most and Apple Daily avoid explicitly stating their opposition or advocacy to Hong Kong independence. These two media outlets are in a sticky situation when it comes to Hong Kong independence. The opinion to this controversial topic is diverse in the pan-democratic camp, and therefore TV Most and Apple Daily are reluctant to state their stance explicitly. These two media outlets will risk losing some of their audience base if they took a too radical or mild position. They are therefore more willing to shift the focus (and possibly the blame) to mainland China: expressing their concerns about the invasion of Chinese values and culture into Hong Kong are after all less controversial.

5.3.3 TV Most: Local Hong Kong officials should put Hong Kong people first

As shown in the above table, Hong Kong independence and nationalisation might appear to occupy a similar proportion in the discourse of TV Most. The identity of Hong Kongers on the other hand, are less prominent in this topic. The interviewees pointed out that there is a different synergy in these topics. They refused to have an explicit stance of Hong Kong independence, but the topic itself

is unavoidable. They therefore beat around the bush with sarcasm and statements contrary to what they think. TV Most favour the topic of nationalism over Hong Kong identity as the former is easier to explain to the audiences.

Both interviewees from TV Most described TV Most as positioning itself as an “advertising company” working in “commercial logics” and therefore less willing to take an obvious stance when it comes to controversial topics inside the democratic camp, namely, Hong Kong independence. Employee B in the advertising department described that TV Most hopes to take a position that gains the largest support from the non-establishment camp, rather than to displease their existing audience: “TV Most will include as many audiences in the [democratic] spectrum as possible.” He said that the employees and boss in the company are mostly “yellow ribbons”, but have concerns if they take a too radical position in their media products. For instance, one video talking about secondary school students’ stance to Hong Kong independence was removed, as “even the so-called ‘yellow ribbons’ do not like this topic, and thus the ‘localism’ in our videos will be adjusted to the most popular political stance”.

Nationalism, unlike Hong Kong independence, has a much larger base of consensus within the pan-democratic camp. TV Most are therefore more vocal in nationalisation related issues, including the anti-parallel trading issues and the co-location arrangements.

The core position of this frame is that implementation of Chinese policy should take the opinion of Hong Kong people into account. This frame targets the Hong Kong government. It questions the Hong Kong government for blindly following Beijing’s orders to implement controversial Chinese policy, and at the same time neglect the demand from local citizens.

TV Most animated the face of Rimsky Yuen, who is the secretary for justice, on the cartoon character Thomas the Train while answering questions about the co-location arrangement for the high-speed railway in a “press conference”. The choice of this character is not only because it refers to the controversy on the high speed railway, but also because of the sound of the train, which implies Rimsky Yuen is under China’s control (i.e. the sound of the train is “ginggong ginggong” and this sound is similar to “勁共勁共” in Cantonese). Another clue which implies the same point alludes to Yuen’s nickname. TV Most reverses his Chinese name from Yuen Kwok Keung (袁國強) to Keung Kwok Yuen (強國猿). The term Keung Kwok means “Strong China” in Cantonese, and is used to sneer at the assertion and aggressiveness of mainlanders. The nickname of the high-speed railway also represents criticism of the co-location arrangement. It is called “plastic railway (膠鐵)”, which means stupid in Cantonese. Apart from the metaphors and depictions, TV Most also makes use of the “press conference” setting to ask Yuen questions.

TV Most utilised both the questions and the characters who asked the questions to represent the controversy and criticise the decision of the co-location arrangement, including but not limited to the China-Hong Kong struggle on nationalism, rule of law and national identity. Four different sets of questions are “asked” and Yuen “replied” using the same answer. And by repeating it four times as same answers to different questions, TV Most depicted the Hong Kong government’s inability and possible unwillingness to stand up against China for the sake of Hong Kong’s people when it deals with national policies that are controversial.

The most prominent question is perhaps asked by Winnie the Pooh (i.e. the character is deemed similar to Chinese president Xi Jinping, and therefore is being censored in China), who says “can I wear a t-shirt with Winnie the Pooh on it and enter the high-speed railway?” Yuen answered by stating that “the travelers have to follow the local law when they enter the regions that do not belong to Hong Kong”. This answer does not resolve citizens’ worry about undermining the autonomy of Hong Kong from China’s interference.

The original plan of the government was to ease public concerns over the co-location arrangements by holding the press conferences and providing a detailed explanation. By hijacking the form of press conferences and Rimsky Yuen’s sound-bites, TV Most questioned the lame argument of the Hong Kong government, and criticised the decision by stating that the co-location arrangement is not putting Hong Kong first but is blindly following Beijing’s orders. Techniques such as calling Yuen nicknames and implying that Yuen puts Beijing first by keying his head on Thomas the Train, had delegitimised the decision of the Hong Kong government and subsequently blocked their message transmission.

5.3.4 Apple Daily: Chinese officials should stop bringing Chinese culture to Hong Kong

According to the quantitative analysis, Apple Daily emphasises nationalisation, followed by Hong Kong independence and the national identity. Video editor E had described the latter two issues as “hard to state the stance explicitly” as these two struggles are similar. These two issues are handled with similar methods: journalists will not have an obvious stance on these issues but will “allow the interviewees to tell their story directly”. He describes Hong Kong independence

as “very politically sensitive” and has to be handled with care. The media would be condemned “if it showed merely a slight tendency to favour one certain stance”. Whether to support national identity or Hong Kong identity is also controversial and therefore Apple Daily will take a more ambiguous stance to these issues. The support of localisation over nationalisation on the other hand, has a larger base of advocates than Hong Kong independence and is therefore represented differently. The video editor said the wrongdoing of the Chinese will be reported sensationally so as to underscore the invasion of Chinese culture into Hong Kong.

Compared to the previous package, this package puts more emphasis on the Chinese officials. Apple Daily assumes the implementation of Chinese policy in Hong Kong would open a door for the inferior Chinese culture to march into the city. The core issue here is Chinese officials (and the policy which comes with it) seem to have a privileged position compared to the existing system of Hong Kong. The long-existing rules must give way to Beijing. This package provides the justification for preserving the local culture and well-established system in Hong Kong. The efficient system of Hong Kong should not be amended for the sake of Beijing’s convenience. In other words, the Hong Kong government and police ingratiate themselves with Chinese officials, and therefore neglect the wellbeing and livelihood of its citizens.

This package depicted the privilege enjoyed by the mainland officials as an example of mainland-isation. The normal life of ordinary citizens was forced to give way to the officials, which is not usually the case in Hong Kong but a normality in China. The signature exemplars are the unnecessary tight security measures used during Zhang Dejiang’s visit to Hong Kong in May 2016, which

affected the normal life of the citizens. He is the chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, and visited Hong Kong for the seminal summit on the "Belt and Road" initiative. Tight security for his visit was ensured by the substantial amount of police used, the tremendous amount of road blocking, and hundreds of huge plastic barriers. The security measures hit hard on the normal life of the citizens: restaurants did not have one customer for the whole afternoon, and several people had to be late for work.

Apple Daily questions the importance of Zhang Dejiang by either stating his title in a sarcastic tone, calling Zhang nicknames, or quoting sound-bites from citizens (who were usually disrupted by Zhang's visit). Zhang was referred to as Daren (大人), Zhang Chief Chairperson (張大委員長), Daguan (大官), and these titles often contrasted with the status of citizens, who are portrayed as ants(蟻民).

These nicknames had implied Zhang's status as very high and therefore the government is willing to sacrifice the need of ordinary citizens. Apple Daily hopes to point out Zhang's status is not superior enough for disrupting the ordinary life of the citizens. The core position in this frame is to point out that Zhang is not as important as the government believe, and even if he is important, the effect on ordinary citizens should be limited. The security measures used are unnecessary. Another clue of the disdain against the privilege enjoyed by Zhang is in the nickname given to the police. The voice over of Apple Daily described the police as the "public security defense force" and bold the phrase "public security" in the subtitle. This implies that the police are working similarly as the public security in China.

The objective of Zhang Dejiang’s visit to Hong Kong was to publicise the benefits of the co-location arrangement. Hong Kong was designed to work as part of the national plan, and Zhang’s visit raised the curtains of such a plan. This move of nationalisation was perceived as a precious opportunity from Beijing. Apple Daily, however, painted a picture of how the original way of life will be affected due to the “nationalisation of the city”. Here “the nationalisation of the city” could be understood as how the local authorities, including Hong Kong government and police, sacrificed the livelihood of the citizens so as to give the Chinese official a good experience of the city. By placing the focus on the sacrifice of the citizens, Apple Daily does not put great emphasis on the co-location arrangement, but rather in Beijing’s flaws and the inaction of Hong Kong’s government during the promotion of the co-location arrangement. This move by Apple Daily jammed the promotion of the co-location arrangement and at the same time implied that nationalism is detrimental to Hong Kong. Hong Kong is a city that values equality over authority, and any deemed “obstacle to work is sinful (阻人搵食, 罪大惡極)”. Yet Zhang’s visit showed he might have unreasonable privilege as the Hong Kong government blocked citizens from going to work because of Zhang’s visit.

5.4 Ideological Struggle 2: Definition of “de-politicisation”

Table 7. Overview of media's stance: Stance to de-politicalisation

	Apple Daily	TV Most	Speak Out Hong Kong
Narrow definition	4 (1.6%)	0 (0%)	8 (34.78%)

Wide definition	51 (20.4%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Not included	195 (77.6%)	14 (100%)	15 (65.22%)
Total	250 (100%)	14 (100%)	23 (100%)

Participation in politics is perceived as troublesome and time-wasting in Hong Kong’s political culture. The culture of politicisation is rooted in the “economy first” mindset, which values efficiency and convenience over the due procedures in LegCo. Political discussions will slow down the process and are therefore discouraged. To assure continuous economic opportunity, it is also essential to maintain a stable political environment. This perspective could be understood as the compound of three types of discourse: the pursuit of prosperity and stability, the troublemakers, and the active segregation from politics. Each discourse could be linked to frames observed in society. I will start with the framing from Speak Out Hong Kong, as its frame followed the long-lying narrow definition of what is politics and who could participate in politics. The framing of Apple Daily and TV Most in this issue is less obvious. According to their employees, this is because it is hard to refute the deep-rooted opinions on “politicisation”. Political satire is not the right tool to refute the accusations from the opposite political camp; it is used to criticise the opposite political camp instead. It is easier to use other tools and other topics to criticise the pro-establishment camp.

5.4.1 Speak Out Hong Kong: Troublemakers

This package follows the official frame, which legitimises efficiency of policy implementation over the time-consuming procedure in LegCo or/and the obstructive social movement to the policy implementation leaders. The signature exemplars include the stories of how politicians or social movement leaders

intentionally obstruct the implementation of Chinese policy by unnecessary objections, such as consultation or filibustering, hindering the breadwinners from working and obstructing the due efficient process of governance. Chinese policies in this frame are assumed as good deals that will benefit Hong Kong.

Speak Out Hong Kong uses an accusatory tone to criticise the pan-democrats. The word “playing” often appears in the discourse of troublemakers (including playing with the rules of LegCo, or deliberately destroying the co-location arrangement (玩殘一地兩檢)). These phrases are bold and accompanied with finger-pointing emojis. The catchphrases used to describe the pan-democrats includes “political shysters”, “playing games”, “oppose out of no reason” and they were depicted as irrational people who are stirring up chaos and trying to catch their political interest in muddy waters.

Then what frame does Speak Out Hong Kong suggest? The core issue is the pan-democrats are unwilling to cooperate with the government to benefit the whole society. They instead create chaos in the These troublemakers should therefore put the livelihood of the people first, pass the bill and cooperate with the government. If they can’t do so, Speak Out Hong Kong suggests that they should get out of Hong Kong.

The consequences of politicising implementation of policy is to sacrifice the interest of society over personal interest, and procrastination is a waste of time and resources. Speak Out Hong Kong often visualises the consequences.

According to the video editor L, they will employ the metaphor from the pro-Beijing lawmakers: “For example we will ask ‘how many cans of spiced ham had been wasted’ in the video...in order to illustrate our point and therefore the audience could easily understand the consequences of such obstruction...the loss

of economic interest is easy to explain and is what touches Hong Kong people the most.”

The conceptualisation of this frame will be discussed together with the below package.

5.4.2 Speak Out Hong Kong: Stop politicising the campus and youngsters

Similar to the previous package, politics is perceived as negative. Thus participation in politics is discouraged. This package shifts the focus from the politicians and social movement leaders to the students in the social movements. While the former two types of characters are framed to be troublesome with evil intentions to stir up chaos in the city when participating in politics, ordinary students are often framed to be innocent. One possible reason for this difference is that politicians could benefit from participation in politics (secure a seat in LegCo) while the students do not. According to interviewee L, politicians could easily be associated with direct interest, usually by securing a seat in the by-election, but not students. The fact that students cannot enjoy direct monetary returns from political participation prevents the students from being subject to the same defamation as politicians. The framing of student activists is another story. This frame includes two types of students and youngsters: those who are willing to take the lead in politics and those that don't. In this frame, schools are assumed to be politics-free and the responsibility of the students is to learn instead of participating in political issues. Any attempt to include student participation in political movements is considered as an invasion of politics in schools. Students are innocent and should not be “contaminated” by politics. This innocence is contrary to the framing of student activists.

Speak Out Hong Kong will criticise the politicians who encourage students to participate in politics as “pushing the students to death”, and their initiative on democracy had destroyed the future of convicted youngsters. The student activists are often treated as black sheep in that they are alienated from their fellow students.

Only those who stand out will be attacked. The attempt of student activist Joshua Wong who tried to include secondary school students in the class boycott was described as “mischievous” as he tried to “drag the secondary school kids” with him. The knowledge level of the student activists was also challenged because “[if they could not answer the question correctly]...they should have done their homework before trying to take the lead in social movements”. Speak Out Hong Kong later concluded the video by stating that the mission of the students should be studying instead of participating in politics.

These catchphrases and depictions indicate a core position that ordinary students should stay out of politics. The core position of this frame is that the students should not participate in politics as it is troublesome, and should focus on their studies. Within this package, students are described as passive actors, who are easily manipulated, do not have their free will and are therefore deceived and somehow contaminated by participating in politics.

When the word “politicisation” is used by the pro-establishment camp, it in fact acts as a criticism to attack the pan-democratic camp. Under this definition, “politicisation from the pan-democrats” could be understood as the obstacle to effective governance (Wong, 2015). The pan-democratic camp have tried to redefine the term “politicisation” in these few years, often by stating that LegCo is part of politics and lawmakers have the responsibility to have reasonable political

discussions. Students' increasing involvement in politics is deemed as selfless care about society instead of causing trouble and stirring up chaos; students are often represented as selfless when they participate in politics. These redefinitions, however, are heavily under fire when compared to the frames of Speak Out Hong Kong. Speak Out Hong Kong had followed the conventional definition of politicisation, and painted a negative picture about politics. Even the "halo for being a student" was jammed, as Speak Out Hong Kong asserted that students should put studying as their priority. This negative image of politics had jammed the redefinition of "politicisation", and subsequently stigmatised participation in politics.

Apple Daily and TV Most encourage political participation; but their stances are not usually represented in political satire. Both companies encourage political participation, usually by focusing on the importance of doing so.

5.5 Ideological Struggle 3: Stance to radical means in protests

Table 8. Overview of media's stance: Radical means in Protests

	Apple Daily	TV Most	Speak Out Hong Kong
Against radical means entirely	9 (3.6%)	0 (0%)	11 (47.83%)
Willing to look into the reason for using radical means or even support the usage of radical means	84 (33.6%)	7 (50%)	0 (0%)

Not included	157 (62.8%)	7 (50%)	12 (52.17%)
Total	250 (100%)	14 (100%)	23 (100%)

While Hong Kong people are more willing to accept radical or even violent means in recent years, the acceptance of radical means is not spontaneous and thus needs justification.

About 33.6% of Apple Daily's reports support the theme of justifying or even explicitly supporting radical means. Apple Daily would not avoid reporting the disruption of a radical protest, but will justify the disruption of the social movement often by making fun or emphasising the disgraceful performance of the pro-Beijing camp. One employee of Apple Daily described this as a "small curse but great help" when the advocates of the social movement could not ignore the elephant in the room. Apple Daily admits that the social movement does bring harm to society, but at the same time pointed out that it is worthy to accept the consequences for the greater good in the future. The consequences, however, must be limited and well explained by the social movement leaders. For instance, Apple Daily emphasises the greater democratic picture over the temporary inconvenience when it reports Occupy Central, yet mostly uses objective reporting when it comes to the more violent protests on parallel trading.

TV Most uses a different method in justifying the usage of radical means. They use irony to tell their own story. They expose the double standard, wrongdoing, and absurdity of the pro-establishment camp and the police by pretending to support them.

On the other hand, half of Speak Out Hong Kong's videos criticise the use of radical means. Similar to the Hong Kong independence frame, this point is

obvious and thus easier to use as a tool for attack and to express to an audience. Politicians are labelled as “monsters of violence” and as sinners and therefore what they did was wrong and—according to the employee—would be easily spotted by the audiences.

5.5.1 TV Most: Yes radical means are used---but with a good reason

TV Most and Apple Daily use similar packages when it comes to reporting radical means by pan-democratic social movement participants. As stated above, when it comes to the usage of radical means in the social movement, these two media platforms tend to admit the flaws of such means but at the same time express their sympathy and understanding of protesters and would explain the reasons behind such actions.

If the radical means are used by those in the pro-Beijing camp, Apple Daily and TV Most will both adapt political satire to point out their flaws. This frame will be explained in detail in the rule by law section as a double standard.

TV Most’s iconic artist Tung Fong-sing’s (東方昇) character is designed as a nonsensical patriotic journalist that will “support” the pro-establishment camp argument even if it makes no sense. One prominent example is perhaps how they depicted their support of the Umbrella movement using metaphor. The universal suffrage demanded by Occupy Central is the real bag whereas the political reform provided by the government is counterfeit. In one clip that “supports” the 2015 political reform, Tung Fong-sing interviewed passers-by and asked them whether they hope to buy the real bag or the counterfeit from the “popular” brand with “international standards” called “Poschuen (普選 universal suffrage in Cantonese)”. While the interviewees all agree that the real “Poschuen” is what

they will choose instead of the counterfeit, Tung Fong-sing ends the interview by concluding that these interviewees are “chavvy adults” as the real Poschuen is not worth it from his point of view, even if the supporters have waited for three decades.

Tong Fong-sing might sound unsupportive of Occupy Central by saying that “the counterfeit is also satisfying” and the “real Poshuen is not that valuable”, yet he is indeed pointing out the absurdity of government discourses. By pointing out that the public had waited over three decades for universal suffrage, and the root cause of Occupy Central is that the public could not get what they were promised, the government is blamed. TV Most ends the video when the anchor leaves carrying a bag with a “I want universal suffrage” slogan, which indicates the core position is supportive to the use of radical means.

The conceptualisation of this frame will be discussed with the below frame.

5.5.2 TV Most: Police handle the protesters forcefully

It is perhaps best to start my explanation on this frame by the fake news report of TV Most. This report contains several framing devices, including metaphors, catchphrases, exemplars and visual imagery. The title of the report mimicked the discovery of a mass-destructive weapon, which is a woman’s breast, as the goal was to criticise the three month sentence of female protester Ng Lai-ying. Ng was convicted of assaulting a police officer with her breast in the anti-parallel trading protest (HKFP, 2015). This report shifts the focus from the protesters to the police and court, and questions whether the protesters were as radical as they sounded, and whether there was excessive use of force during the arrest of protesters.

The first part of the report described how Ng was arrested. The differences between the signifier and the signified could be observed through the discord

between the voiceover and the video showed. In the voiceover, Ng was depicted as “the muscular female mob member” who used her breast “as an innovative weapon of mass destruction” to furiously attack and injure a police officer. Yet in the footage, her hands were tied and she was bleeding from her nose. While the voiceover describes the police as “gently detaining the muscular protester (i.e. Ng)”, the video shows the protester being detained by a few policemen who are taller than her, and she was not capable of fighting back. This part questions whether the protesters were as radical and violent as the police said.

The second part of the report further illustrates the criticism of the over-use of force. The satirist reported the one invention that could neutralise an attack from a female mobster, and the results are significant.

The consequences of over-use of force could be glanced at in the beginning and at the end of the video. The anchor used an absurd tone throughout the video. He started by stating that the conviction of Ng represented that justice had been done in Hong Kong, and manifested the prestige of policemen. The anchor concluded by wishing that the new weapon could help the police tackle the mob who were trying to stir up chaos in Hong Kong, and maintain Hong Kong’s peace, prosperity and stability. He also warned that female mobsters should not bring their breasts onto the street as they could be punished by unlawful punishments.

The consequences embedded in this line is that the protesters are not mobsters and the police should not treat them as mobsters. If the police continue to do so, it will put the dignity and respect for the police at risk, and that is useless to maintain justice in Hong Kong.

In the above two frames, TV Most had pretended to be a huge supporter of the government and police. The discourse and actions of the government and the

police do make some sense, at least to citizens with neutral stances. TV Most made use of irrational logic to make a point (Davis, 1993), by pushing the initial reasonable discourse to an unreasonable position. The Hong Kong government painted political reform as the starting point of a series of reforms, while the police emphasised the necessity to use violent means in order to control the social movement. These discourses are no longer reasonable after TV Most distorted them. The political reform is counterfeit, but the citizens who had waited for decades for democracy should accept the reform as the real universal suffrage but it is not that precious. The breasts of female protesters are destructive weapons that could harm policemen. By using this irrational logic and subsequently painting a picture of nonsense, TV Most had jammed the discourse of both the government and the police.

5.5.3 Apple Daily: Shift focus to the opponents of radical means

Apple Daily does not directly seek to refute criticism of the use of radical means in political satire. They voice out their support for the movement indirectly in political satire. The direct support for radical means would usually be represented in the non-satirical video, and often presents their arguments in sensational and touching tones. According to journalist M and the video editor E, Apple Daily must report the consequences of radical actions, but they would choose to focus on the reasons behind the use of radical means. The violence of radical means and those who adopt these means also matters. According to the interviewees, the media are more likely to express their empathy to radical means adopted by the pan-democrats (i.e. Umbrella Movement), while reluctant to add much opinion and express an obvious stance if the radical means are used by localists (i.e. anti-parallel trading protests). In video political satire, Apple Daily heavily criticises

the legitimacy of opponents against both the Umbrella movement and the anti-parallel trading movement. According to the Chief Editor Edward Li, Apple Daily has a mission to point out the wrongdoings of politicians, and the media will pay special effort to delegitimising the buffoons in the pro-establishment camp.

5.5.4 Speak Out Hong Kong: Violence is wrong. Period.

The following two packages may be understood as framing the social movement at different points in time. While they are categorised into the category of use of radical means, their core position and core frame are similar, and part of their root cause could be related to politicisation. The core issue is how opponents should voice out their concerns and that opponents should use “constructive means”, namely, compromise, and use peaceful, rational and non-violent means to communicate with the government, instead of using violent means, blocking the road and obstructing the normal life of other citizens. The protests of the pro-Beijing camp had been set to be the model case. The government supporters are willing to compromise with the police in terms of routes taken.

I shall start by explaining the frame of Speak Out Hong Kong if no radical means had been used (yet).

Not yet happened: Social Movement leaders cannot control its participants

This package challenges whether social movement leaders can control their advocates and keep the social movement peaceful. The blame is on the leaders if the protesters go for violent means, and the participants are out of control before the movement begins. The examples of this highlight the miscommunication between the Occupy Central leaders and their helpers. The helpers used an inappropriate metaphor to publicise why political reform initiated by the government is not acceptable.

Another example is that not all of the participants are willing to dance inside the boundaries set by the leaders. The Occupy Central Movement was initially designed for adults who could take the risk to sacrifice. Joshua Wong was under 18 years old at the time but still insisted on participating. The catchphrases like “can Occupy Central be peaceful? It is sometimes naïve indeed” had depicted a picture of the social leaders being incapable of controlling all its participants.

Already happened: Violence is obstructing the normal life of ordinary citizens

This package showed absolute distaste for the violent and irrational protesters, and the leaders are framed irresponsible as they failed to control the participants. The signature exemplar is the footage of a police officer being attacked on the head and hospitalised, and stories of protesters barking up a wrong tree by insulting the wrong kid and her mum. The lesson in the case is that the protesters “turned the shopping mall into a battlefield”. “Mob” is the expression used to describe the protesters.

The consequences for these two frames are also similar. It is suggested that the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong would be destroyed if the protesters continued to use radical and violent means. This package contains a range of equally important positions in terms of judging violent means. Speak Out Hong Kong described the protesters as a mob, described the social movement leaders as irresponsible, the Hong Kong government had spent effort on tackling the existing problem, and the police did not tolerate the violent behaviour. The blame is on the protesters, and the government do not have responsibility. Speak out Hong Kong jammed the discourse of the protesters by focusing on the (possible) violent behaviour of the protesters, and blocked the reason for using such means.

5.6 Ideological Struggle 4: One country, Two systems

Table 9. Overview of media's stance: One Country, Two Systems

	Apple Daily	TV Most	Speak Out Hong Kong
Value one country over two systems	5 (2%)	1 (7.14%)	5 (21.74%)
Value the uniqueness of two systems under one country	81 (32.4%)	5 (35.71%)	0 (0%)
Not included	164 (65.6%)	8 (57.14%)	18 (78.26%)
Total	250 (100%)	14 (100%)	23 (100%)

This struggle is mainly used in the conflict of the co-location arrangement, but does not play a significant role in political satire. A majority of interviewees agreed that this commonly believed concept is hard to explain to the audience, thus it will not be mentioned specifically in video political satire. Only Apple Daily paid specific concern when criticising the co-location arrangement as jeopardisation to one country, two systems.

5.6.1 Apple Daily: One country, two systems ensure the uniqueness of Hong Kong

The co-location arrangement is being depicted as an attempt to open the backdoor to the Basic Law, thus allowing more future interference in Hong Kong's affairs. The signature exemplars are used to emphasise the differences between China and Hong Kong, which includes the differences in legal systems, access to banned websites in China, and that Chinese Public Security can carry guns in the West-

Kowloon station. The co-location arrangement is being described as “Fake Settlement, Real Cede Territory (假租界真割地)”, and “Cede Territory co-location”. These phrases are often presented in sarcastic tones alongside an incarnadined effect on the visual elements. Red represented China and the incarnadined effect represented China as having an increasing influence in Hong Kong.

The core position in this package is that the Hong Kong government should stand up to maintain this boundary, and even if the co-location arrangement is convenient, this boundary should not be given up. The consequences are that this arrangement will very likely open the backdoor for Chinese law to be enforced in Hong Kong, and therefore Hong Kong might start to lose its uniqueness.

The Beijing and Hong Kong government have spent great efforts in publicising the necessity of the co-location arrangement. This arrangement is necessary for an efficient high-speed railway despite the controversy over this policy. Apple Daily has framed the goal of the co-location arrangement as the beginning of Beijing’s power marching into Hong Kong. This has thus jammed the discourse of the Hong Kong and Beijing government.

5.7 Struggle 5: Definition of the “rule of law”

Table 10. Overview of media's stance: Rule by Law or Rule of Law

	Apple Daily	TV Most	Speak Out Hong Kong
Law should not be challenged	2 (0.8%)	0 (0%)	11 (47.83%)

Law could be challenged with the aim to achieve justice	68 (27.2%)	7 (50%)	0 (0%)
Not included	180 (72%)	7 (50%)	12 (52.17%)
Total	250 (100%)	14 (100%)	23 (100%)

This ideological struggle is mainly used in the discourse of the Umbrella Movement. While Speak Out Hong Kong uses this frame to delegitimise the Umbrella Movement (and the leader Benny Tai), Apple Daily and TV Most attack the government, police, and the anti-Umbrella movement leaders.

Two definitions to rule of law could be identified in the Occupy Central disputes (Yuen, 2015). To the critics of the movement, their version of “rule of law” seems to be in line with “rule by law”, namely, law must be obeyed at all times, and the rule of law would be undermined if there are any illegal actions. The designer of the law (i.e. the PRC) cannot be challenged. To the advocates of the movement, rule of law should not be understood as mere obedience to the law, but to consider the objective of following the law. Benny Tai argues that the ultimate goal of rule of law is to ensure justice and achieve a check on power in society. This tendency could be observed in the discourse put forward in the government-student meeting during the Occupy Movement. Liu (2015) pointed out that government officials have the intention to strengthen their loyalty to China to underscore their close ideological identification; while the student leaders’ understanding of rule of law is rooted in a Western, common law tradition, which highlights individual freedom from government interference. The HKSAR government appealed to the

Chinese authority and continues to state that the stable and long-term development of Hong Kong would be secured by the Basic Law under the “one country” regime; while the student leaders more or less choose not to include the national legislation procedure into their discourse. In other words, the HKSAR government emphasises the legality of the existing legal system, while the student leaders were questioning the due meaning behind the existing system, and criticised the government for using “rule of law” as an excuse.

For Speak Out Hong Kong, this frame is similar to the stance on Hong Kong independence and usage of radical means. The right and wrong in this ideological package is obvious. There is no room for discussion on who to blame.

5.7.1 Speak Out Hong Kong: Rule of law refers to strictly following the law;

whoever breaks the law should be punished!

Speak Out Hong Kong understands the concept of “rule of law” as “rule by law”, which means following the law itself as the ultimate goal. The rule of law is upheld by not violating the law. The core position of this frame is that violation of the law is discouraged regardless of the noble political reasons behind it; and whoever breaks the law shall be punished severely. This frame is used particularly to attack politicians or social movement leaders from the non-establishment camp. The signature exemplar for this package is what Benny Tai did. He was depicted as the devastator of the rule of law in Hong Kong as he launched and led the “illegal Occupy Central” movement. He however did not receive punishments. “Do not respect the rule of law” and thus “despicable” are signature expressions. The consequences for Benny Tai not paying for what he did is that the rule of law will be undermined, and will cause a rift in society. The concept of civil disobedience put forward by Benny Tai is innovative but reasonable. Speak Out

Hong Kong, however, merely report his propositions as illegal, and thus jammed the rest of his argument.

According to the video editor of Speak Out Hong Kong, this frame is similar to the stance on Hong Kong independence and usage of radical means. The right and wrong in this ideological package is obvious. There is no room for discussion as those who break the law are wrong. When the policy itself has the possibility to violate the law, such as the co-location arrangement, Speak Out Hong Kong will shift the focus towards the pan-democratic politicians. The video editor admitted that the co-location arrangement is “unconstitutional and could have violated the Basic Law”, but they avoid covering the legal part. They focus on questioning the qualifications of the critics, and censure the opposition to government policy as having a political agenda.

5.7.2 Apple Daily: Political problems should be dealt with by political means

The previous package from Speak Out Hong Kong could be understood as justifying tackling political problems by using legal means. However, this package from Apple Daily could be understood as justifying tackling political problems with political means, which at the same time deliberately under-reports or even ignores the legal means.

Apple Daily’s report mainly focuses on the government’s inaction during the Umbrella Movement. The signature exemplar used is CY Leung’s refusal to meet with student leaders and discuss the process of universal suffrage. The nicknames, or catchphrases, initially started with “the missing person”, then to “the wanted person” then finally to “the huddled Chief executive”. Acidic tones are used and CY Leung’s head was photoshopped on a turtle to represent “the huddled Chief executive”. The depiction includes multiple attempts to force the government to

negotiate with the students, which include protests at the Government House, and CY Leung's exchange with 4000 secondary school students without notifying the press. The same "inaction" frame could be found in the description of other government officials: the Director of the Correctional Service Department and the Chief Superintendent of the Police Public Relations Branch are described as "recorders". They repeat similar answers when commenting on the Umbrella Movement.

The core issue is that the Hong Kong government is unwilling to tackle the political problem in a political way, which is, to meet the demands of the Hong Kong people. This frame emphasises the inaction of the government and the noble end of the protesters. It suggests that instead of judging the illegal (but acceptable) means, the readers should focus on the government's unwillingness to tackle the problem. The consequences of not listening to the people's opinion is that the government would jeopardise its prestige and make it hard to govern.

The Umbrella Movement is developed from a planned civil disobedience movement. It is by nature illegal. Apple Daily does not cover the illegal part in detail but instead points the finger to the Hong Kong government's inaction. This therefore jammed the criticisms of the pro-establishment camp, and shifted the focus towards the inability of Hong Kong's government to solve the conflict over political reform.

5.7.3 TV Most: Selective enforcement of law

TV Most continues to voice out their own opinion by making videos that are contrary to what they think. Take the video made for the second anniversary of the Umbrella Movement as an example. TV Most mimicked CCTV's way of reporting. CCTV is the official mouthpiece of China. The anchor used an

authentic Beijing Mandarin accent to report. The whole story was to praise the efforts of the police and the Chief Executive CY Leung in dealing with the Umbrella Movement. The police are willing to cooperate with “patriots and triads” to clear up the occupied areas of the Umbrella Movement. The Umbrella Movement is depicted as an “illegal occupying movement started by chavs”. The word “police” is replaced by “Hong Kong Public Security”, which implies the police in Hong Kong are working similarly to the notorious public security in China. The signature exemplars are two convicted cases of misuse of violence by the policemen. These two cases are described as a sacrifice, as “the policemen are willing to take the legal risk in order to make Hong Kong more peaceful”. While the voiceover stated that the techniques used by police are “mild” and “restrained”, the visual part of the video emphasised that the police were using more radical means to control the protesters.

What is the frame being suggested in this sarcasm? The core issue is the double standard used by the police, and they seem to suffer few consequences for their wrongdoing. Police are the enforcers of the law, and therefore should not allow the violent means used by triads and patriots against peaceful protesters. The root cause of such problems are blamed on the double standard used by the police when enforcing the law. The consequences are that the long-standing system of the rule of law in Hong Kong will be gradually replaced by the concept of “rule by law” in China, thereby turning Hong Kong into an ordinary Chinese city. This implied consequence could be found at the end of the video: the anchor suggested the thinking of Mao will be “carried forward” in Hong Kong under the wise leadership of CY Leung.

Police are the law enforcement agency, but their heavy-handed use of force has been criticised (especially in the peaceful protests i.e. protesters do not have the intention to attack the police). The police have been legitimising their use of force, which is arguably unnecessarily heavy-handed towards the social movements. The Commissioner of the Police framed these actions as “mild”, “restrained” and “lawful”. TV Most jammed this discourse with irrational logic. The discourse of the police collapsed when the voiceover said “mild” and “restrained”, while the visual part in the video showed the use of violence.

5.8 Summary

The above ideological struggles presented in political satire show that political satire is a tool to jam the discourse of the opposite political camp. The discourse between the pro-establishment camp and the pan-democratic camp enables criticism of each other directly. The video political satire from media outlets with opposing political stances do not have such tendencies. Video political satire has the tendency to only target audiences that have similar political stances.

Chapter 6 VIDEO POLITICAL SATIRE AS A POLITICAL TOOL FOR DISCOURSE JAMMING

Hong Kong media has utilised video political satire as their way of reporting in recent years. The rise of video political satire in post-handover Hong Kong has been amplified by the success of the internet, amplified political polarisation, and rising political dissatisfaction (especially from youngsters) in society.

The theoretical foundation of this study builds on a modified version of Hallin's sphere to account for the ideological struggles which are present in Hong Kong's video political satire. Video political satire is examined as the political weapon to fight for discursive power in the sphere of legitimate controversy. This study focuses on how respective media outlets that support the pan-democratic and pro-establishment camps use political satire as a weapon to compete over discursive power in post-handover Hong Kong. In order to provide a more comprehensive picture, this study employed four policy cases to investigate their representation in political satire. These cases are all followed by protest and can be categorised into two dimensions: the action and inaction of the Hong Kong government. Six existing ideological struggles between China and Hong Kong are used as analytical tools to construct and analyse the ideological packages embedded in political satire, including the identity crisis of Hong Kong people, the conflict over either nationalisation or localisation, de-politicisation, whether radical forces in the social movements are acceptable, whether "one country" or "two systems" should take priority, and the definition of rule of law.

This study has archived three research objectives: 1) unveiling the changing face of political satire in the digital era (from the printed political cartoon to video political satire); 2) Identifying the differences in production synergy when the producer changes from being individual-based to institutional based; and 3) challenging the assumptions of contemporary political satire literature, namely, that political satire is subversive. And uncovering the ideological packages of the political camps.

6.1 The changing face of political satire

The digital age has led to the changing face of political satire.

This study does not suppose that video political satire is a replacement for the political cartoon, but illustrates its characteristics with references to the political cartoon. Printed political cartoons are static and are produced by individual cartoonists, who have only frames in the printed newspaper to express their opinions while factual information is usually not included. Video political satire on the other hand, allows more room for visual and audio varieties due to the change in disseminate platforms. Video political satire is calculated in minutes, and therefore can include more factual information. Political cartoons can only use drawings to delegitimise politicians, but video political satire has a wider variety of techniques, including using emojis, colour filters on the screen (for example, Apple Daily often uses the red filter to manifest the increasing influence of China in Hong Kong), and repetitive sound-bites. Video political satire also has higher spreadability as it is disseminated on social media.

Video political satire is more popular than the political cartoon. Youngsters in Hong Kong prefer moving images over static images. The popularity of Apple

Daily and TV Most may be heavily related to their successful usage of video political satire. Apple Daily was the forerunner and marched into the online world by adopting the form of satire to report news in 2008. TV Most has challenged the monopoly of Apple Daily by producing different forms of video political satire. Speak Out Hong Kong is believed to have adopted the form of Apple Daily to produce video political satire.

6.1.1 From individual-based producer to institutional-based producer

Perhaps the most important characteristics of video political satire in Hong Kong lies in production synergy. Unlike the political cartoon and TV political satire in the West, video political satire in Hong Kong is produced by institutional-based producers instead of individual-based producers. This study aims to link political satire in Hong Kong to the wider scope of Western political research. This changing production synergy can be understood by two factors: individual freedom and the journalistic identity of the media.

In terms of individual freedom, Western political satirists enjoy the most individual freedom, followed by political cartoonists, and then the political satirists in Hong Kong. Western political satirists need not compromise with TV stations as they are the stars of the shows; the political cartoonist has to work with editors on cartoon topics but works as an individual columnist to express his/her opinions; and the video political satirists in Hong Kong have to suppress their own stance and adapt to the stance of the media outlet.

In terms of journalistic identity, both political satirists in the West and political cartoonists do not consider themselves as journalists. Apple Daily and Speak Out Hong Kong position themselves as journalists while TV Most positions itself as an advertising company. It is important to include journalistic identity as political

satire is adopted by Hong Kong media platforms as a tool for reporting. The (relative) objectivity and the room for creative manifestation of political satire depends on whether this self-positioning as a journalist exists in the post-handover era.

This change from individual-based producer to institutional-based producer highlights the increasing importance of political satire as a political weapon in Hong Kong. This phenomenon is highly related to the political environment in Hong Kong. Hong Kong is gradually becoming more politically polarised in post-handover years. The same tendency can be found in the media. The media has started to adopt political satire as a way to publicise their own agenda. Media outlets that take differing stances utilise political satire to frame political issues in a way that favours one political camp over another, and thus jams the ideas of opposing political camps. Political satire thus acts as a weapon in the political struggle between Mainland China and Hong Kong.

6.2 Political satire as a weapon: the embedded ideological package

Below is a brief summary of the different ideological packages used by various media outlets. Not every ideological struggle identified is included in political satire. A media platform has the tendency to select the ideological struggle that is favourable to its own stance and easier to illustrate with its own points. Some ideological struggles are included in video political satire but might not be obvious. This study only includes the most explicit ideological packages found.

6.2.1 Ideological struggle 1: Hong Kong is not China?

Three highly related ideological struggles are linked together in this struggle, such as the stance to Hong Kong independence, the Hong Kong identity crisis, and

nationalisation or localisation. All three media outlets have included this ideological struggle in their discourse. Speak Out Hong Kong framed any attempts to fight for Hong Kong autonomy as Hong Kong independence. The fight for Hong Kong autonomy is acceptable under the “one country, two systems” principle, but the fight for Hong Kong independence is treason. By pushing autonomy to the level of independence, Speak Out Hong Kong has therefore eliminated the possibility for political discussion about Hong Kong’s autonomy.

TV Most and Apple Daily have avoided stating their stance on Hong Kong independence and autonomy. These two media platforms stress the importance of localisation instead. TV Most framed Hong Kong’s government as weak and unwilling to stand up to Beijing’s decisions on Hong Kong. This frame aimed to criticise Hong Kong’s government and has not put Hong Kong people as the priority. Hong Kong’s government has instead compromised and catered to Beijing’s decisions. The explanation from the government, which tries to ease public concern over Chinese policy, was jammed. Apple Daily follows a similar line, but their main focus lies on Chinese officials. Apple Daily painted a picture about the unreasonable privileges enjoyed by Chinese officials, which implies that Hong Kong people would become second class citizens if Hong Kong follows nationalisation. The core values including equality would be jeopardised. This frame has jammed the Chinese government’s discourse about the gain of Hong Kong as part of the nationalisation plan, by emphasising the cons of nationalisation.

6.2.2 Ideological struggle 2: Definition of “de-politicisation”

Speak Out Hong Kong used this ideological struggle heavily. One possible reason for this is that Hong Kong is a city that has long believed in the importance of an effective and steady economic environment. Political participation is usually, if not always, an obstacle to effectiveness and thus could result in economic harm. This long-held belief is hard to challenge even after political participation in recent years is no longer deemed as negative as in the past.

Speak Out Hong Kong has used two similar frames to target three types of people: pan-democratic LegCo members, student activists, and students. The LegCo members were depicted as troublemakers who intentionally obstruct implementation of Chinese policy for their own interests. The student activists were depicted as the contamination of the initial politics-free campus and they were alienated from their fellow schoolmates. The aim of these two frames is to discredit political participation and it jammed the redefinition of a less stigmatised definition of political participation (which is put forward by the pan-democrats).

6.2.3 Ideological Struggle 3: Stance to radical means in protests

TV Most and Speak Out Hong Kong have used this ideological struggle to make a point. TV Most has helped the protesters explain the use of radical means by focusing on the noble motives of protesters in the fight for true democracy, and also by focusing on the police's overuse of violence when handling protests that include radical means. Such representation illustrated the unreasonable parts of government and police discourse. The Hong Kong government had put forward an unsatisfactory plan of political reform, and the police described the necessity for the use of violence.

Speak Out Hong Kong, on the other hand, adopted the opposite frame to illustrate their point. The pan-democrats often justify the use of some radical means (i.e.

civil disobedience) for noble reasons, and Speak Out Hong Kong jammed their discourse simply by emphasising the negative consequences of violent means.

6.2.4 Ideological Struggle 4: One country, Two systems

Only Apple Daily covered this ideological struggle explicitly. Apple Daily has depicted the co-location arrangement as the opening of a backdoor for enforcement of Chinese Law in Hong Kong. This representation of the co-location arrangement had jammed the presumed benefits of such an arrangement, which are being underscored by the government.

6.2.5 Struggle 5: Definition of the “rule of law”

All three media outlets have included this ideological struggle. The arguments between the media platforms that support the pan-democratic and pro-establishment camps may seem similar at first glance, but this is not the case. Speak Out Hong Kong defines the rule of law as obedience to the law, regardless of any reasons for violating the law. Violation of the law is seen as the same as “not respecting the rule of law”. This thus jammed the political discourse concerning civil disobedience.

Apple Daily and TV Most use almost opposite discourses. These two media platforms avoid arguing about what is legal and what is illegal. They instead place their focus on the government and the police, and therefore shift the blame of illegal actions to these parties. Apple Daily has depicted the Hong Kong government as unwilling to solve the political problem, and the citizens have no choice but to participate in civil disobedience. This frame thus jammed the criticism related to illegal civil disobedience. TV Most adopted a similar strategy. They put great emphasis on the double standard of the police’s enforcement of

law. Police were depicted as taking action against peaceful protesters but not taking action when peaceful protesters were attacked by triads. This double standard had jammed the legitimacy of the police as a law enforcer. The discourse of the police, who described their actions as “mild”, “restrained” and “lawful”, was also subsequently jammed.

6.3 Theoretical contribution

I have argued that media outlets will utilise political satire as a tool to jam the discourse of opposing political camp. The result of this study indicates that media outlets will utilise political satire as a tool to jam the discourse of the opposite political camp. Media outlets with a particular political bent produce video political satire that targets the weakest spot of the opposite camp’s discourse, and avoid covering points that could delegitimise political actors from the same camp. This study proposed a new concept called discourse jamming, which is developed using cultural jamming as its foundation. Culture jamming describes how mainstream values in society are jammed by political satire produced by a subversive force; and political satire in this sense works as an “eye-opener” to give citizens new ideas. This thus produce a subversive version of the dominant political brand. Political satire in this sense works as the sarcastic criticism that examine, evaluate and criticise the current political situation, and disrupt the message transmission from the authority to the public. This type of laughter “clear the ground for an absolutely free investigation (p. 23)” for the current situation (Bakhtin, 1981).

Discourse jamming on the other hand do not assume the existence of mainstream values. It allows more room for multiple realities, where these alternative

universes each have their own proposed values. Unlike culture jamming, discourse jamming argues that political satire could be utilised by advocates of both subversive force and the authority. This argument is supported by the case in Hong Kong, where the pro-Beijing and the pan-democratic camp attack each other using political satire. Discourse jamming argues that political satire may also be utilised by the pro-establishment camp as well. The frames presented in the media that support the opposite political camp are placed elsewhere. These attacks do not seek to communicate or refute the criticism of others but merely to attack the opposite camp. These two lines of video political satire work separately and target different audiences. The room for discussion is closed. The increasing popularity of political satire reflects intensifying political polarisation.

From existing literature, political satire works ideally as an eye-opener to citizens by jamming the mainstream discourse. Discourse jamming is less ideal and more pessimistic: political satire targets audiences who are already on the same side as the media platform. Political satire in this sense does not work as an eye-opener. It instead works as a (unintentional) tool that polarises society while two political camps fight for discursive power.

6.4 Implications for future research

Political satire in non-democratic societies deserves further attention.

Contemporary literature about political satire largely focuses on political satire in the Western context, especially in the United States. The democratic nature of America has helped the development of political satire, but at the same time limited imagination about the nature of political satire. The case of Hong Kong proves that political satire can be used by pro-establishment forces in the fight for

discursive power, in a semi-democratic context. This phenomenon indicates that political satire is merely a tool to delegitimise political opponents, and its subversive nature is merely a myth and coincidental as the pro-establishment camp utilises it to block the messages of the pan-democrats.

One emerging field of social movements looks into governments' adapted counter-movement strategy. The main theme in this stream of research is to investigate how governments respond to social movements innovatively, instead of just using conventional strategies such as repression and concession (Yuen & Cheng, 2017). Future research in political satire may also follow this line of thought. Political satire has been linked to activism scholarship, and is often deemed to provide a counter-discourse in society. The scholarship that focuses on how political satire may secure existing discourses is however underdeveloped. This possible direction has the potential to become more important in the future as the pro-establishment camp utilises various innovative ways to gain support.

6.5 Limitations

Limitations of this study includes an imbalanced data set. Majority of the data comes from Apple Daily (87%), whereas Speak Out Hong Kong and TV Most only made up 13% of the whole data set. This imbalance is inevitable due to differing scales and working models of the three media organisations. Apple Daily adopted video political satire as part of its everyday reporting, Speak Out Hong Kong produces video political satire twice a week, while TV Most produces video political satire irregularly. This study compromised on such imperfection by placing more emphasis on frame analysis and interview data.

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APPENDIX 1 CODEBOOK

Column	Item	Code	
Basic Information			
1-3	1	Case Number 001-999	
4	2	Media Organization 1 Apple Daily 2 TV Most 3 Speak Out Hong Kong	
5	3	Issue related 1 Umbrella Movement 2 Hong Kong Civic Unrest 3 One Belt One Road 4 Co-location arrangement	
6	4	Year 1 2014 2 2015 3 2016 4 2017 5 2018	E.g. 2017 11 19
7-8	5	Month 1 January 2 February 3 March 4 April 5 May 6 June 7 July 8 August 9 September 10 October 11 November 12 December	
9-10	6	Date 01-31	
11	7	Is it satire? 1 not satire 2 satire	Only apply to Apple Daily
Information about the Video			
	Item	Code	

12	8	Duration	
13	9	Byline 1 Without byline 2 With byline	
14	10	Demonization of the ordinary news clips to make a point 1 None 2 Used for 1-2 times 3 Used for a few times 4 Used extensively	
15	11	Use of emoji 1 None 2 Used for 1-2 times 3 Used for a few times 4 Used extensively	
16	12	Include non-fact based, fiction clips 1 None 2 Used for 1-2 times 3 Used for a few times 4 Used extensively	
17	13	Main character in the video 1 Beijing government officials 2 Hong Kong government officials 3 Hong Kong pro-establishment LegCo members 4 Hong Kong pro-establishment social movement leaders 5 Hong Kong pro-establishment ordinary citizens 6 Hong Kong non-establishment LegCo members 7 Hong Kong non-establishment social movement leaders 8 Hong Kong non-establishment ordinary citizens 9 Localists	

		10 Police	
18	14	Overall Story Valence (treating the character) 1 Very Negative 2 Negative 3 Neutral 4 Positive 5 Very Positive	
News content			
23	17	Emphasize on government action or non-action 1 Action 2 Inaction 99 Not Applicable	
24	18	Positive or negative about the Chinese government 1 Positive 2 Negative 99 Not Applicable	
25	19	Positive or negative about the Hong Kong government 1 Positive 2 Negative 99 Not Applicable	
26	20	Positive or negative about the establishment camp 1 Positive 2 Negative 99 Not Applicable	
27	21	Positive or negative about the democrats 1 Positive 2 Negative 99 Not Applicable	
28	22	Positive or negative about the idea of Hong Kong independence or autonomy 1 Positive 2 Negative	

		99 Not Applicable	
29	23	Stance in the Hong Kong identity crisis 1 Tend to emphasize national identity 2 Tend to emphasize local identity 99 Not Applicable	
30	24	Stance in Nationalization/decolonization and localization 1 Tend to emphasize the need of nationalization/decolonization 2 Tend to emphasize the need of localization 99 Not Applicable	
31	25	Stance to Depoliticization 1 Depoliticization is positive, i.e. tend to have a narrow definition of politics (limited to democratization) 2 Depoliticization is Negative, i.e. define politics more than 99 Not Applicable	
32	26	Stance to radical means in the protest 1 Positive 2 Negative 99 Not Applicable	
33	27	Stance to “One country, two systems” 1 Emphasize One country 2 Emphasize Two systems 99 Not Applicable	
34	28	Stance to Rule of Law 1 Emphasize the authority of Beijing and the existing system 2 Emphasize the end of the legal system	

		99 Not Applicable	
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APPENDIX 2 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Interview questions for employees of Speak Out Hong Kong

Ice-breaking

1. What do your work include?
2. What are your working procedures?
3. How many departments are in the company?

Individual → Team

4. Will editors change the content of the script/video after the production? If so, what will be modified? How much content will be changed? Why?
5. Do you think your script/video match the dominant public opinion? Will you consider the public opinion when you decide what to include in the video?
6. How far can you go when mockig politicians? Did your boss give you a clear instructions/boundaries?

Why political satire? (Main questions)

7. Why choose political satire at the first place?
8. Is political satire more influential and powerful on social media? What are their strength and weakness when comparing to conventional news?
9. Do Hong Kong people prefer political satire over conventional news? Is it because the former is easier to understand?
10. What topic will you choose when you produce political satire? What angle will be used?
11. What methods (especially in video and text) will you use when you deliver your opposition to the pan-democrats?
12. How and why you decide to work in such a method? Have the method you used change over time?

More specific on “One Minute Funny News”

13. Are there one specific person responsible for “One Minute Funny News” ?
14. “One Minute funny news” are only produced twice a week. How do you decide its topic?
15. How do you decide the topic/angle/method of writing?
16. Do you prefer criticize the pan-democrats themselves or their stance in certain topics?
17. What are the criteria of a well-written “One Minute Funny News” ?

Opinion on ideological struggles

How do you respond to the challenge of the pan-democrats on these issues?

18. Hong Kong independence/self-determination
19. Chinese identity vs Hong Kong identity
20. Nationalisation vs localization
21. Depoliticization
22. Radical means used in protests
23. One Country Two System
24. Rule by Law vs Rule of Law

Basic Information of the interviewee

25. How long have you worked for the company? (Possible follow up question: Are there policy change?)
26. Please pick one as your political stance (Hong Kong independence/ localism or self-determination/ pan-democrats/ Neutral/ Pro-establishment)

Interview questions for employees of Apple Daily

Ice-breaking

1. What do your work include?
2. What are your working procedures?
3. How many departments are in the company?

Individual → Team

4. Will editors change the content of the script/video after the production? If so, what will be modified? How much content will be changed? Why?
5. How far can you go when mockig politicians? Did your boss give you a clear instructions/boundaries?
6. Do you think your script/video match the dominant public opinion? Will you consider the public opinion when you decide what to include in the video?
7. (To journalists) Do you think your video, after the video edition, is different from your original design?
8. (To video editors) will you add in your own idea when you think of some? (For example: The movie clip from Stephen Chow)

Why political satire? (Main questions)

9. Why choose political satire at the first place?
10. Is political satire more influential and powerful on social media? What are their strength and weakness when comparing to conventional news?
11. Do Hong Kong people prefer political satire over conventional news? Is ti because the former is easier to understand?
12. What topic will you choose when you produce political satire? What angle will be used?
13. What methods (especially in video and text) will you use when you deliver your opposition to the pan-democrats?

More specific on Political News

14. How do you decide the topic of political news?
15. What do you consider when you decide whether to make fun of politician?
16. How do you decide the topic/angle/method of writing? Why? Do you take reference from other media?
17. When you can criticize one politician, what angle will you choose? Does it comes to the writer of the script or the whole group? Will it be take up by senior colleagues or even the editors themselves?
18. The amount of user generated political satire increased over the years, have you change how you write your script in the first place?

19. Do you prefer criticize the pan-democrats themselves or their stance in certain topics?
20. In your opinion, what is a well written political story? (Care about the visuals?)

Opinion on ideological struggles

How do you respond to the challenge of the pan-democrats on these issues?

21. Hong Kong independence/self-determination
22. Chinese identity vs Hong Kong identity
23. Nationalisation vs localization
24. Depoliticization
25. Radical means used in protests
26. One Country Two System
27. Rule by Law vs Rule of Law

Basic Information of the interviewee

28. How long have you worked for the company? (Possible follow up question: Are there policy change?)
29. Please pick one as your political stance (Hong Kong independence/ localism or self-determination/ pan-democrats/ Neutral/ Pro-establishment)

Interview questions for employees of TV Most

Ice-breaking

1. What do your work include?
2. What are your working procedures?
3. How many departments are in the company?

Individual → Team

4. Will editors change the content of the script/video after the production? If so, what will be modified? How much content will be changed? Why?
5. How far can you go when mockig politicians? Did your boss give you a clear instructions/boundaries?
6. Do you think your script/video match the dominant public opinion? Will you consider the public opinion when you decide what to include in the video?
7. (To journalists) Do you think your video, after the video edition, is different from your original design?
8. (To video editors) will you add in your own idea when you think of some? (For example: The movie clip from Stephen Chow)

Why political satire? (Main questions)

9. Why choose political satire at the first place?
10. Is political satire more influential and powerful on social media? What are their strength and weakness when comparing to conventional news?
11. Do Hong Kong people prefer political satire over conventional news? Is it because the former is easier to understand?
12. How and why you decide to work in such a method? Have the method you used change over time?

More specific on Political News

13. How do you decide the topic of political news?
14. What do you consider when you decide whether to make fun of politician? Do you prefer criticize the politicians themselves or their stance in certain topics?
15. How do you decide the topic/angle/method of writing?
16. What are the criteria of a well-written/well-produced video?

Opinion on ideological struggles

How do you respond to the challenge of the pan-democrats on these issues?

17. Hong Kong independence/self-determination

18. Chinese identity vs Hong Kong identity
19. Nationalisation vs localization
20. Depoliticization
21. Radical means used in protests
22. One Country Two System
23. Rule by Law vs Rule of Law

Basic Information of the interviewee

24. How long have you worked for the company? (Possible follow up question:
Are there policy change?)
25. Please pick one as your political stance (Hong Kong independence/ localism
or self-determination/ pan-democrats/ Neutral/ Pro-establishment)

Interview questions for political cartoonists

Ice-breaking

1. What are your working procedures?

(Possible answer: think of the topic → the topic approved → production → delivery)

Individual → Team

2. How to choose the topic and its point of view? How do you decide the method to draw the cartoon?
3. Are there any topic forbidden?
4. Will anyone wish to change the content of the script/video after the production? If so, what will be modified? How much content will be changed? Why?
5. How far can you go when mocking politicians? Did the editors give you a clear instructions/boundaries?
6. Do you think your cartoon match the dominant public opinion? Will you consider the public opinion when you decide what to include in the video?
7. Some media has turned the political cartoon into video. Does the product fit your expectation?

Why political satire? (Main questions)

8. Is political cartoon more influential and powerful on social media? What are their strength and weakness when comparing to conventional news?
9. Comparing political cartoon to the political satire, what are the strength and weakness of the political cartoon?
10. Do Hong Kong people prefer political satire over conventional news? Is it because the former is easier to understand?
11. What do you consider when you decide whether to make fun of politician? Do you prefer criticize the politicians themselves or their stance in certain topics? What methods will you use when you deliver your oppositions?
12. What are the criteria of a good political cartoon?

Opinion on ideological struggles

How do you respond to the challenge of the pan-democrats on these issues?

13. Hong Kong independence/self-determination
14. Chinese identity vs Hong Kong identity
15. Nationalisation vs localization
16. Depoliticization
17. Radical means used in protests

18. One Country Two System
19. Rule by Law vs Rule of Law

Basic Information of the interviewee

20. How long have you worked for the company? (Possible follow up question: Are there policy change?)
21. Please pick one as your political stance (Hong Kong independence/ localism or self-determination/ pan-democrats/ Neutral/ Pro-establishment)

訪問問題（港人講地記者）

Aim: To uncover how journalists work as team(s) to produce political satire in Hong Kong, and whether the content of satire would change when produced by groups (instead of individuals) ;

Why pro-establishment camp chooses to adopt political satire in their reporting?

工作流程（ice breaker）

1. 你的工作範圍包括甚麼？
2. 平常的工作流程是如何的呢？
3. 工作主要由多少個部門負責？

個人團隊

4. 在記者寫完稿／剪片完成後，採主／高級記者會不會修改內容？如有，會改多少？改的原因是？
5. 你認為你工作上需要寫的文字／剪的片，和社會上的主流意見是否一致？你在工作時（寫稿／剪片）會否考慮這些因素，去決定影片內容？
6. 嘲笑政治人物，可以去到幾盡？上司有沒有給你一個清晰界線／指引？

Why political satire?

7. 當初為何使用一個較新穎的，惡搞方式報新聞？
8. 尤其在社交媒體上，這種方式是否比較有影響力／？比正統新聞資訊強／弱的地方是？
9. 香港人是否更喜歡這一類帶有嘲諷意味的資訊？是不是因為更容易入口？
10. 平時做新聞時會選擇甚麼題目？開甚麼角度？
11. 如何使用惡搞的方式去告訴大家反對派的觀點／取態中，錯誤／有待商榷的地方？手法／文字上會點做？
12. 寫稿／剪片／VO的方式是如何定的呢？為何這樣制定？這些製作影片的方式有沒有參考其他媒體，又有沒有經過甚麼變化？（近年港人講地開始有攝影記者外出跑新聞／拍片，素材多了，有沒有因此改變？）

More specific on 笑聞一分鐘

13. 笑聞一分鐘的欄目是由主要一個人負責，還是不同記者輪流負責？

14. 每天新聞繁多，而笑聞一分鐘只是一星期做約一次到兩次，如何決定笑聞一分鐘的題目(in other words 在有限的資源中，會揀煲大啲咩；惡搞的 strategy 是甚麼)？
15. 笑聞一分鐘的題目／角度／寫法是如何構思出來的？
16. 不認同反對派在某個議題上的取態，你地會偏向批評人還是議題？定係佢個人本身都有問題？
17. 對你而言，笑聞一分鐘怎樣才算寫得好？

對不同中港矛盾議題的取態，面對反對派的挑戰

18. 香港獨立
19. 中國人身分認同 vs 香港人身分認同
20. 中國化 vs 本地化
21. 去政治化
22. 示威中使用激進方式
23. 一國兩制
24. Rule by law vs rule of law

受訪者個人基本資料

25. 你在公司工作了多長時間？（possible follow up:公司的政策有沒有改變？）
26. 你的政治立場是偏向？（港獨／本土＋自決／泛民／中立／建制）

訪問問題（蘋果動新聞）

Aim: To uncover how journalists work as team(s) to produce political satire in Hong Kong, and whether the content of satire would change when produced by groups (instead of individuals)

工作流程

1. 你的工作範圍包括甚麼？
2. 平常的工作流程是如何的呢？
3. 工作主要由多少個部門負責？

個人至團隊

4. 在記者寫完稿／剪片完成後，採主／高級記者會不會修改內容？如有，會改多少？改的原因是？
5. 嘲笑政治人物，可以去到幾盡？上司有沒有給你一個清晰界線／指引？
6. 你認為你工作上需要寫的文字／剪的片，和社會上的主流意見是否一致？你在工作時（寫稿／剪片）會否考慮這些因素，去決定影片內容？
7. （問記者）會唔會覺得出泥的成品和你想像中的有一段距離？
8. （問剪片）你有時見到得意的稿會唔會加自己野上去？（例如：周星馳的電影片）

Why political satire?

9. 當初為何使用一個較新穎的，惡搞方式報新聞？
10. 尤其在社交媒體上，這種方式是否比較有影響力／？比正統新聞資訊強／弱的地方是？
11. 香港人是否更喜歡這一類帶有嘲諷意味的資訊？是不是因為更容易入口？
12. 平時做新聞時會選擇甚麼題目？開甚麼角度？
13. 如何使用惡搞的方式去告訴大家政府的觀點／取態中，錯誤／有待商榷的地方？手法／文字上會點做？

政治新聞

14. 政治新聞的題目如何訂出來？
15. 如何決定會不會嘲笑一個政治人物？
16. 寫稿／剪片／VO的方式是如何定的呢？為何這樣制定？這些製作影片的方式有沒有參考其他媒體，又有沒有經過甚麼變化？

17. " 可以做佢／有位入佢 " 的新聞，個 angle 係點開？係交比寫稿的人定，還是全組傾左再定？（會唔會有新聞由採主或較資深的同事 take up？）
18. 近年網上的惡搞多了，有沒有因此改變動新聞的做法？
19. 不認同政府在某個議題上的取態，你地會偏向批評人還是議題？定係佢個人本身都有問題？
20. 對你而言，一隻政治故怎樣才算寫得好？（係咪又係要有畫面？）

公司和個人，對不同中港矛盾議題的取態？

21. 香港獨立
22. 中國人身分認同 vs 香港人身分認同
23. 中國化 vs 本地化
24. 去政治化
25. 示威中使用激進方式
26. 一國兩制
27. Rule by law vs rule of law

受訪者個人基本資料

28. 你在公司工作了多長時間？（possible follow up:公司的政策有沒有改變？）
29. 你的政治立場是偏向？（港獨／本土 + 自決／泛民／中立／建制）

訪問問題（毛記電視）

Aim: To uncover how journalists work as team(s) to produce political satire in Hong Kong, and whether the content of satire would change when produced by groups (instead of individuals)

工作流程

1. 你的工作範圍包括甚麼？
2. 平常的工作流程是如何的呢？
3. 工作主要由多少個部門負責？

個人至團隊

4. 在記者寫完稿／剪片完成後，採主／高級記者會不會修改內容？如有，會改多少？改的原因是？
5. 嘲笑政治人物，可以去到幾盡？公司有沒有一個清晰界線／指引？
6. 你認為你工作上需要寫的文字／剪的片，和社會上的主流意見是否一致？你在工作時（寫稿／剪片）會否考慮這些因素，去決定影片內容？
7. （問記者）會唔會覺得出來的成品和你想像中的有一段距離？
8. （問剪片）你有時見到得意的稿會唔會加自己野上去？（例如：周星馳的電影片）

Why political satire?

9. 當初為何使用一個較新穎的，惡搞方式去表達自己的看法？
10. 尤其在社交媒體上，這種方式是否比較有影響力／？比正統新聞資訊強／弱的地方是？
11. 香港人是否更喜歡這一類帶有嘲諷意味的資訊？是不是因為更容易入口？
12. 如何使用惡搞的方式去告訴大家政府的觀點／取態中，錯誤／有待商榷的地方？手法／文字上會點做？

政治新聞

13. 毛記電視的橋係點度出嚟？最終用咩橋係邊個訂？
14. 如何決定會不會嘲笑一個政治人物？會傾向取笑政治人物的個人，還是他的
15. 寫稿／剪片／VO的方式是如何定的呢？為何這樣制定？這些製作影片的方式有沒有參考其他媒體，又有沒有經過甚麼變化？
16. 對你而言，一隻做得好的惡搞片是怎樣的？

公司和個人，對不同中港矛盾議題的取態？

17. 香港獨立
18. 中國人身分認同 vs 香港人身分認同
19. 中國化 vs 本地化
20. 去政治化
21. 示威中使用激進方式
22. 一國兩制
23. Rule by law vs rule of law

受訪者個人基本資料

24. 你在公司工作了多長時間？（possible follow up:公司的政策有沒有改變？）
25. 你的政治立場是偏向？（港獨／本土 + 自決／泛民／中立／建制）

訪問問題（政治漫畫家）

Aim: To uncover how political cartoonists work as an independent individual in the media the topic

工作流程

1. 平常的工作流程是如何的呢？
（預期答案：度橋至採主／編輯同意，開始畫，交稿）

個人至團隊

2. 如何選擇題目和角度？政治漫畫的畫法又是如何？
3. 有沒有不能畫的題目？
4. 在畫完後，會不會有人希望修改內容？如有，會改多少？改的原因是？
5. 嘲笑政治人物，可以去到幾盡？報社有沒有給你一個清晰界線／指引？
6. 你認為你的漫畫，和社會上的主流意見是否一致？你在工作時會否考慮這些因素，去決定影片內容？（因為不是立場的人可能看不明白政治漫畫的一些元素）
7. 曾經有報線紙把政治漫畫弄成影片和配音，會否覺得成品和你想像中的有一段距離？

Why political cartoon?

8. 在社交媒體上，政治漫畫是不是比較有影響力？比正統新聞資訊強／弱的地方是？
9. 如拿政治漫畫和網上受歡迎的政治影片作比較，政治漫畫比它們強／弱的地方是？
10. 香港人是否更喜歡這一類帶有嘲諷意味的資訊？是不是因為更容易入口？
11. 如何決定會不會嘲笑一個政治人物？例如不認同政府在某個議題上的取態，你地會偏向批評人還是議題？定係佢個人本身都有問題？你會用甚麼方法去表達不滿？
12. 對你而言，好的政治漫畫是如何的呢？怎樣才算是好？

公司和個人，對不同中港矛盾議題的取態？

13. 香港獨立

14. 中國人身分認同 vs 香港人身分認同
15. 中國化 vs 本地化
16. 去政治化
17. 示威中使用激進方式
18. 一國兩制
19. Rule by law vs rule of law

受訪者個人基本資料

20. 你在畫政治漫畫畫了多長時間？（possible follow up:報社的政策有沒有改變？）
21. 你的政治立場是偏向？（港獨／本土 + 自決／泛民／中立／建制）

APPENDIX 3 SELECTED TIME FRAME

Below are the selected key dates of the events. Political satire produced in a three week period around each date is chosen (before one week and after two weeks of the following date).

NPC's decision on Hong Kong's Electoral Reform

- 2014 August 17 Anti-Occupy Central Protest
- 2014 August 31 The announcement of NPC's decision
- 2014 September 22 The start of class boycott
- 2014 September 28 The start of Occupy Central
- 2015 June 18 The rejection of political reform package in Hong Kong
- 2015 September 28 First Anniversary of Umbrella Movement
- 2016 September 28 Second Anniversary of Umbrella Movement

Multiple-Entry Permit Plan of Mainlanders

- 2015 February 8 Reclaim Tuen Mun
- 2015 February 15 Reclaim Sha Tin
- 2015 March 1 Reclaim Yuen Long
- 2015 July 31 Controversial conviction of Ng Lai-Ying on assaulting police with her breast

Belt and Road initiative in Hong Kong

- 2016 January 13 CY Leung's Policy Address
- 2016 May 17 Zhang Dejiang visit Hong Kong for Belt and Road Summit

Co-location arrangement

- 2017 July 26 Hong Kong government revealed the details of the co-location plan for high-speed railway
- 2017 December 27 Beijing's decision on joint check point plan
- 2018 January 1 Protest against the Co-location arrangement

APPENDIX 4 STANCE TO DIFFERENT CHARACTERS

Below tables show the detailed stance to the characters presented in the political satire.

Apple Daily

	1	2	3	4	5
Chinese Government	33	58	0	2	0
Hong Kong Government	34	7	0	0	0
Pro-establishment LegCo members	7	1	1	0	0
Pro-establishment Social Movement leaders	21	5	0	0	0
Pro-establishment Ordinary Citizens	16	3	0	0	0
Pan-democratic LegCo members	0	1	0	5	0
Pan-democratic Social Movement leaders	2	0	0	2	1
Pan-democratic Ordinary Citizens	2	0	1	3	1
Localist	4	1	2	1	0
Police	19	2	1	0	2
Others	5	2	2	2	1
Total	143	80	7	15	5

TV Most

	1	2	3	4	5
Chinese Government	2	0	0	0	0
Hong Kong Government	2	1	0	0	0
Pro-establishment LegCo members	0	0	0	0	0
Pro-establishment Social Movement leaders	0	0	0	0	0
Pro-establishment Ordinary Citizens	0	0	0	0	0
Pan-democratic LegCo members	0	0	0	0	0
Pan-democratic Social Movement leaders	0	0	0	0	0
Pan-democratic Ordinary Citizens	2	0	0	0	0

Localist	0	0	0	0	0
Police	2	2	0	0	0
Others	0	2	1	0	0
Total	8	5	1	0	0

Speak Out Hong Kong

	1	2	3	4	5
Chinese Government	0	0	0	0	0
Hong Kong Government	0	0	0	0	1
Pro-establishment LegCo members	0	0	0	0	0
Pro-establishment Social Movement leaders	0	0	0	0	1
Pro-establishment Ordinary Citizens	0	0	0	0	0
Pan-democratic LegCo members	5	2	0	0	0
Pan-democratic Social Movement leaders	8	1	0	0	0
Pan-democratic Ordinary Citizens	0	0	0	0	0
Localist	5	0	0	0	0
Police	0	0	0	0	0
Others	0	0	0	0	0
Total	18	3	0	0	2

APPENDIX 5 LIST OF VIDEOS EXAMINED

Apple Daily

		Issue related	Year	Month	Date
1	推硬高鐵一地兩檢 林鄭有嘢拆唔掂？	4	4	7	9
2	高鐵車廂內叫平反六四得唔得？鼠芬：過了關再做	4	4	7	21
3	壯男陪奶媽高鐵站視察 湯家驊：怕就唔好搭	4	4	7	22
4	一地兩檢殺到 西九「租界」公安陀槍！	4	4	7	24
5	高鐵假租界·真割地 1/4 西九站變大陸租界	4	4	7	25
6	高鐵返大陸上 fb 點計法？局長：有啲翻牆係合法	4	4	7	26
7	【一地兩檢】再佔中短租中環界大陸？珠姐話無伏	4	4	7	27
8	忌廉哥出 PO 反一地兩檢 畀藍絲圍插想點？	4	4	7	28
9	【一地兩檢】打到斷骨都無刑責 強國法律夠驚嚇！	4	4	7	29
10	莊偉忠爆鬧割地兩檢 鼠王芬：第 20 條係加持	4	4	7	30
11	高鐵快過飛機嗎？政府三跑文件自打嘴巴	4	4	8	1
12	建制議員去高鐵車廠 邊個令攝記笑得瘋狂？	4	4	8	2
13	零公眾諮詢想強行過關 搭高鐵去歐洲咁好玩？	4	4	8	3
14	【一地兩檢】點釋除外界疑慮 關過夜搵骨咩事？	4	4	8	5
15	【一地兩檢】陳帆萬能 key 讚國家照顧無微不至	4	4	8	5
16	高鐵方便通全國 蝕錢靠補貼隨時禍國	4	4	8	6
17	一地兩檢繼續硬闖立會 建制搞關注組繼續吹	4	4	8	8
18	人大「傾」一地兩檢？廢除基本法就搞掂	4	4	12	22
19	【割地兩檢】西九站唔同深圳灣 高鐵疑團一片睇晒！	4	4	12	26
20	割地兩檢人大講晒 一言喪港 兩制拜拜！	4	4	12	27
21	擺明割地一國兩制都無損？梁愛詩：你情我願	4	4	12	30
22	口罩男你好「型」呀！單拖拆元旦遊行大台 banner	4	5	1	1
23	收工男作反！狠批袁國強似姑息養奸	4	5	1	1
24	元旦反一地兩檢 萬人怒吼林鄭賣港	4	5	1	1
25	【割地兩檢】自關後首次開會 呈請書要過難十倍	4	5	1	10
26	2016 施政報告 #多謝一帶一路？	3	3	1	13
27	【施政報告】究竟咩係「一帶一路」？	3	3	1	13
28	京官來港大龍鳳 地盤停工納稅人找數？	3	3	5	13
29	警隊為京官反轉香港！記者准影唔准講	3	3	5	15
30	涉買「無人機」搞張德江 曾 X 成係邊鬼個？	3	3	5	15
31	【張德江訪港】灣仔變移動迷宮「張德江」膠水馬穿窿	3	3	5	16

32	【張德江訪港】泛民見張德江 叫CY下台爽！	3	3	5	16
33	【張德江訪港】男童尖嘴周街屙屎 網民：熱烈歡迎「張得肛」	3	3	5	16
34	【張德江訪港】酒店十步一保安 記者影相即刻擋	3	3	5	16
35	【張德江訪港】灣仔封路迎委員長 塞車擾民我至強	3	3	5	16
36	【張德江訪港】保安區上埋獅子山？阿sir通宵享受蠓患	3	3	1	16
37	【張德江訪港】超誇張佈防 咁驚就咪鬼訪港	3	3	5	17
38	【張德江訪港】邊個曳豬掛直幡？村民玩轉畢架山	3	3	5	17
39	【張德江訪港】飛釘迎接張德江 大叔撐場涉犯法	3	3	5	17
40	【張德江訪港】Banner拆極都有 車隊撞正冇得走	3	3	5	17
41	【張德江訪港】抗沙士當功績「墳場」都顯靈	3	3	5	17
42	【張德江訪港】眾志示威被搵低 拎住白紙都話危？	3	3	5	17
43	【張德江訪港】嚟香港要看聽講 咁點解乜都要擋？	3	3	5	17
44	【張德江訪港】擾民三天豪華團 玩到市民叻叻轉	3	3	5	17
45	【張德江訪港】龍蝦媽半生熟 look 迎賓 飛虎隊護送大人	3	3	5	17
46	【張德江訪港】梁特點解夾腳坐？FBI讀心術分析到啲	3	3	5	17
47	【張德江訪港】返工放工都封路 市民：仲衰過估中	3	3	5	18
48	【張德江訪港】張德江玩電筒玩到忘晒形 仲話維護世界和平	3	3	5	18
49	【張德江訪港】網民瘋狂惡搞龍蝦媽 張德江紅過黎明喇	3	3	5	18
50	【張德江訪港】走訪有人安達邨 真普選Banner再現	3	3	5	18
51	【張德江訪港】首談港獨「本土為名 分裂為實」	3	3	5	18
52	【張德江訪港】委員長挺梁出晒面 邊個放風踩「薯片」？	3	3	5	18
53	【張德江訪港】擺正牌逆線行車 入科學園睇啲咩？	3	3	5	18
54	【張德江訪港】香港眾志東隧突擊 小市民咩事咁氣激	3	3	5	19
55	【張德江訪港】去老人院見黃 Banner 去埋安達臣好走喇	3	3	5	19
56	【張德江訪港】警察疑「問候」人事主：無錄音應該被溶咗	3	3	5	19
57	【張德江訪港】張咩江送大禮之 餐廳近乎零生意	3	3	5	19

58	【張德江訪港】警察扮 Cute 感謝市民 關公災難又出現	3	3	5	19
59	【張德江訪港】臨別贈言 棄一國兩制港必爛無疑	3	3	5	19
60	【張德江訪港】傳被大粒墨訓示 薯片：有啲咁嘅事？	3	3	5	19
61	張德江最後一天 癱瘓香港東邊	3	3	5	19
62	【江湖滾熱辣】一帶一路交歡團	3	3	5	25
63	CY 自稱「梁 uncle」硬 sell 一帶一路係「港人新引擎」	3	3	5	28
64	警噴椒拉 5 人 逾 200 人反水貨客爆衝突	2	2	2	15
65	水貨問題政府不理 學者：市民不滿到臨界點	2	2	2	15
66	水貨客放假未開市 強國恩客轉搶狗糧	2	2	2	23
67	水貨客搞貴元朗嘢食 梁福元：返屋企煮囉	2	2	2	24
68	反水客元朗大混戰 黑衣少女流第一滴血	2	2	3	1
69	村屋混戰打鑊甘 鄉公所變指揮中心？	2	2	3	1
70	收緊旅客阿爺唔肯 廿蚊入境稅得唔得	2	2	3	3
71	民建聯議員嚴打水貨？媽 好難捉摸	2	2	3	3
72	偲媽 BB 又出動 搵一哥伸冤？！	2	2	3	3
73	光復行動係港獨 城邦論講吓都唔畀？	2	2	3	6
74	收緊自由行 CY 要顧深圳？水貨客蒲頭滋擾居民	2	2	3	6
75	網民自發「遊覽上水」水貨客豎紙皮標語迎戰	2	2	3	7
76	收緊自由行 粵官：來港購物不應大驚小怪	2	2	3	8
77	《香港不值得去》潮文 作者係大陸人！	2	2	3	8
78	反水貨客大火 究竟點收科？	2	2	3	9
79	禮賓府拖篋都唔畀 口講包容真嘅氣	2	2	3	12
80	五年狂升三倍 上水舖租勁過尖沙嘴	2	2	3	16
81	戴「我不購物」錦帶過境 內地團寸港人打水貨客	2	2	3	16
82	有片證警察推跌胸襲女 求情望輕判	2	2	7	29
83	淨心又復出為乜親中機器大晒冷	1	1	8	10
84	人大月底定政改叫你袋住先無諗住改	1	1	8	11
85	泛民見海綿蛋糕「袋住先」？ Say No	1	1	8	12
86	焰之鍊金術師外傳 薑蓉上校反佔中	1	1	8	12
87	中共普選要零風險？咁就佔中見	1	1	8	13
88	警察禁薑蓉獻花鄉紳位位\$100 飲茶？	1	1	8	14
89	白鴿 VS 海綿蛋糕 返大陸攤牌有冇料到？	1	1	8	15
90	動感偲媽跳飛機 自己友寸：嘩跳唔起	1	1	8	15
91	薑蓉遊行駛過千萬 名校教師吹雞要學生行	1	1	8	16
92	普選要顧國家安全？法官愛國有咩根源	1	1	8	16
93	反佔中遊行為乜威逼利誘奇形古怪都得？	1	1	8	17
94	臥底故事之收錢愛國	1	1	8	17
95	遊行團熱情拉記者咁飯 包起酒樓食免費餐	1	1	8	17

96	A 餐雞蛋掙 madam 垃圾佔中有可能	1	1	8	17
97	肉腿偲媽 VS 長棍淨心 邊個最誘人?	1	1	8	17
98	寫 blog 寸中年搞社運薯片叔叔最安份	1	1	8	17
99	奶媽伴曉明見泛民政改未有決定	1	1	8	18
100	派錢係電視台屈? 賴移花接木都得	1	1	8	18
101	蛇頭數已走要搵薑蓉拎返幾舊?	1	1	8	18
102	反反佔中擊中示威牌阿 sir 即落孖葉	1	1	8	18
103	派錢團體要告蘋果無錢收點收科?	1	1	8	19
104	長毛因乜輸啤酒? 泛民休想選特首	1	1	8	21
105	政改報告偏頗到暈李柱銘要司法覆核	1	1	8	21
106	【共新聞】跟薑蓉大遊行派錢俾先人	1	1	8	21
107	遠望高登爭普選劉華都嚟走番轉?	1	1	8	24
108	人大落閘日 8.31 啟動佔中	1	1	8	26
109	開學即罷課去完 Ocamp 醒啦喎	1	1	8	27
110	一人一票真普選阿爺落閘玩完	1	1	8	27
111	想呢我哋「袋住先」返去練好英文先	1	1	8	28
112	831 啟動佔中戴耀廷為普選剃光頭	1	1	8	28
113	偲媽頭髮亂了肥佬繼續工作係首要	1	1	8	29
114	泛民係恐怖份子? 佔中啟動聽日添馬公園見	1	1	8	29
115	中共反口真普選無望今晚政總發聲	1	1	8	30
116	一條罇都唔留卿姐嬲到作嘔	1	1	8	31
117	千人追擊李飛創意佔中問你死未	1	1	8	31
118	膠官行會黑晒面普選大進步? 咪講笑	1	1	8	31
119	689 撐周融「個人身份」簽名反佔中	1	1	8	16
120	京官洗牌疊中央至係最大民主派?!	1	1	9	1
121	騎呢舞撐篩選裸體男抗騙局	1	1	9	1
122	佔中三子做削髮維尼罷課? 中學生都嚟	1	1	9	2
123	人大方案係靚女海綿蛋糕可能想咀	1	1	9	3
124	每日一鳩鳴香港精神病院	1	1	9	3
125	薑蓉又嚟料學聯被屈後台有料	1	1	9	5
126	邊位同學罷課佔中篤佢出嚟無陰功	1	1	9	8
127	老周熱線打唔通篤爆謬論有之鋒	1	1	9	9
128	哈利波特去罷課? 熱線唔通點舉報喎	1	1	9	9
129	罷課咁大件事毛主席係「聖戰份子」	1	1	9	12
130	紅衛兵係中學生中共護法講乜都唔?	1	1	9	13
131	要犧牲揀退學罷課變紅衛兵咁惡?	1	1	9	15
132	只准局長維穩不准百姓「去飲」	1	1	9	18
133	趙子龍獻出自己糧食 TKO 官中好驚黃色	1	1	9	21
134	入境處又玩嘢佔中旅客唔准入境?	1	1	9	21
135	寸王又有偉論撐篩選有家純	1	1	9	22
136	上主感召反佔中? 一國兩制搵鬼信	1	1	9	23
137	狙擊勁共號學生最後通牒殺到	1	1	9	23

138	【壹鍾】CY 懶理學聯發最後通牒	1	1	9	23
139	通緝 689 今晚禮賓府圍過夠	1	1	9	24
140	200 糾察防警「送客」去飲預埋黃宏發	1	1	9	24
141	偲媽 BB 巧溫柔去添馬聽書唔走	1	1	9	25
142	千人圍禮賓府通宵緝拿 CY	1	1	9	25
143	騎呢維穩騷阿伯犯法煙狂煲	1	1	9	26
144	CY 堅呃人出防暴隊？中晒！	1	1	9	27
145	689 死不悔改港人惟有搬奧巴馬上枱	1	1	9	28
146	親征捉蟲咁鬼型遍地開花全靠禿鷹	1	1	9	28
147	倒掛國旗要致敬 煙花取消齊飲勝	1	1	9	29
148	阿 Sir 最驚保鮮紙 爛傘變攞你命三千	1	1	9	29
149	談判專家不爛舌 勸你解放條「鋼」線	1	1	9	29
150	張融找數請移民 葉劉歪理嚇死人	1	1	9	29
151	紅隧塞 5 個鐘你都信？超夢夢都會出動	1	1	9	30
152	689 賴死唔走鍵盤戰士係普選特首	1	1	9	30
153	阿 Sir 真係龍咁威唔想開槍扯錯旗	1	1	9	30
154	CY 今日不下台 行動即升級	1	1	10	1
155	曉明大哥藐視佔中 黑白奶媽係無間道	1	1	10	1
156	銅記捉西瓜 收工男踩場敗走	1	1	10	1
157	催淚彈隨時斷貨 禿鷹勞軍：你哋冇做錯	1	1	10	1
158	升旗禮衝唔衝 村民點諗你懂唔懂？	1	1	10	1
159	【和平佔中】佔中阻交通？謠言止於實測	1	1	10	2
160	劍拔弩張的一晚派林鄭對話 學生堅守	1	1	10	2
161	警方疑用奸計運軍火 示威者：點解講大話	1	1	10	2
162	亂掙「無害」催淚彈？阿 sir 不如吸兩啖	1	1	10	2
163	央視罕有播 CY 講話 葉劉拆彈抽水到爆	1	1	10	2
164	反佔中兵團出動 保鄉衛族咁嚴重？	1	1	10	2
165	粗口男單挑旺角 生鏽刀現銅鑼灣	1	1	10	2
166	【雨傘革命】警察蝦碌鉅獻《慌失失奇兵》	1	1	10	3
167	【雨傘革命】雨傘天氣報告 路邊抹黑指數高	1	1	10	3
168	【雨傘革命】最強武器助陣 雨傘踢走摺櫈	1	1	10	3
169	自己 MK 自己救 反佔中遮骨敲爆頭	1	1	10	3
170	【極醜惡】警懶理黑幫吹雞 300 蚊拆鐵馬	1	1	10	3
171	銅鑼灣變罪惡城 非禮打人隻手遮天	1	1	10	3
172	返唔到政總員工喪喊 忽然關閉有古怪？	1	1	10	3
173	戴耀廷諗退場 彈劾 CY 仍照常	1	1	10	3
174	央視首播佔中畫面 衝突示威乜都唔見	1	1	10	3
175	金鐘警察果斷執法？見記者學生照打！	1	1	10	3
176	爆缸男被打變疑犯 警黑合作真係盞	1	1	10	3
177	你有你佔中 佢有佢鳩鳴	1	1	10	3
178	出面反佔中 向太：學生惡過黑社會 另一題：人地做唔到生意	1	1	10	4

179	呢頭拉完個頭放 暴徒無限復活	1	1	10	4
180	龍咁威搭地鐵 4 個站要 1 粒鐘仲狡辯	1	1	10	4
181	和平非禮要包容 乞求偲媽絕食反暴	1	1	10	4
182	酒店職員被罰跪地 阿 sir：我情緒好高漲	1	1	10	4
183	重啟談判未有期 葉劉可能選特首	1	1	10	4
184	地踏旺角撤唔撤 村民死守唔怯	1	1	10	5
185	旺角黑夜亂到極 警察：係我放人點呀	1	1	10	5
186	來港生果刀切榴槤咁勁？難怪訪港客再升	1	1	10	5
187	警察屈職員打人：我同你玩到盡	1	1	10	5
188	【雨傘革命】想知邊個派錢搞事 搵支煙就知	1	1	10	6
189	反佔 MK 係上海仔吹雞？日收千萬維穩費	1	1	10	6
190	泛民三路進擊 癱瘓議會咪話佢激	1	1	10	6
191	攞大牌唔係非禮 喜記老闆告蘋果	1	1	10	6
192	辭職輔警撐佔中 Joe Yeung 遭殃了	1	1	10	6
193	禿鷹下令放催淚彈 一國一制 CY 想玩	1	1	10	6
194	民主 AV 獻中華 專家話：小心有反效果	1	1	10	7
195	搵禿鷹祭旗化僵局 政改談判已成局	1	1	10	7
196	保皇黨齊龜縮 騎劫立會避查亂局	1	1	10	7
197	火爆 Sir 被起底 推人 爆粗 作狀開槍	1	1	10	7
198	【又敗走】偲媽 BB 又挑機 遇上英雄救美？	1	1	10	7
199	爆黃之鋒地址 美聯經紀急急撲火	1	1	10	7
200	【今日佢最紅】《四點鐘許 Sir》高登仔力捧	1	1	10	9
201	關公坐鎮旺角佔領區 麥玲玲話呢個壇合格	1	1	10	9
202	警界天師話你知 拜錯關公隨時鬼上身	1	1	10	9
203	特權法查佔中 保皇黨霸皇硬上弓	1	1	10	9
204	幼稚園復課又遲到 家長唔怕 撐佔中	1	1	10	9
205	群魔出動營造白色恐怖 查佔中幫國安收情報？	1	1	10	10
206	建制派夜會 CY 京官密密搜集情報	1	1	10	10
207	許 Sir 去咗邊？動記者幫你問江 Sir	1	1	10	10
208	俊和撤大學獎學金 原來得兩萬蚊	1	1	10	11
209	又賴外國勢力 博懵想廿三條翻生？	1	1	10	11
210	榴槤哥冇帶刀仔 仲讚 CY 係好仔	1	1	10	12
211	火影私煙無忘初衷 靚女做地盤工	1	1	10	12
212	吹雞踩學聯場 陳雲龜縮在網上	1	1	10	12
213	「黃金交叉」出現了 田少被迫數投反對票	1	1	6	11
214	指盧峯《蘋論》冇根據 特首辦去信威嚇《蘋果》	1	1	6	11
215	立法會「戒嚴」七大招 建制派好驚市民咩？	1	1	6	12
216	一億買長毛一票 田少：財團擦鞋	1	1	6	13
217	長毛虛構一億價 CY 話佢「造假」？	1	1	6	14
218	一億買票？第二世唔夠用嗎	1	1	6	14
219	撐政改學生要打格子 文匯報真叻仔	1	1	6	15

220	CY：咪將違法行為合理化 網民：七警點計呀	1	1	6	16
221	民調龍門亂咁搬 粗口大狀驚天發現？	1	1	6	16
222	政改今對決 警緊急進駐立法會	1	1	6	16
223	【江湖滾熱辣】一軟一硬兩京官 8.31 龍門任佢哋搬	1	1	6	16
224	秣把人咩來頭 撐政改靜心 BB 都蒲頭	1	1	6	17
225	周融：民主黑暗一天 仲話票債票償？	1	1	6	18
226	建制派玩離場 政改 8 比 28 遭高票否決	1	1	6	18
227	等一個人發叔 建制派有票真係唔投	1	1	6	18
228	建制派癡爆實錄 出走陰謀大剖析	1	1	6	18
229	【一曲訴心聲】投唔到票 葉劉哭了	1	1	6	19
230	建制互插求自保 到底邊個最離譜？	1	1	6	19
231	創科局突讓路 因為政改鑊要補？	1	1	6	19
232	今次到爛姐眼濕濕 葉劉茅頭向林健鋒	1	1	6	19
233	【江湖滾熱辣】建制派要特訓至得！	1	1	6	21
234	「等埋發叔」一鑊泡 琮子斗膽叫中央反思？	1	1	6	21
235	【等埋發叔】田家大佬寸細佬 句句有骨夾風騷	1	1	6	22
236	【李八方 online】多謝泛民反對政改 偲媽 bb 大搞感謝祭	1	1	6	22
237	【WhatsApp 洩密】大主席詭辯實錄 建制要「捉鬼」？	1	1	6	25
238	What 腥紀錄曝光 全城圍插曾主席吹黑哨	1	1	6	25
239	邊個係爆料內鬼 大家齊齊捉二五仔	1	1	6	25
240	【李八方 online】樹根「種」自己 潛力圖至真	1	1	6	26
241	內鬼已鎖定 超人 亮星 定另有內情？	1	1	6	26
242	一個鞠躬一個被逼鞠躬 建制派喎	1	1	6	28
243	Tree 根篤灰 洩密鬼係「短褲仔」？	1	1	6	30
244	高鐵超支好離譜 未賴佔中咪算好	1	1	6	30
245	高官唔識唱國歌？一日最衰係泛民喎	1	1	7	1
246	恥笑建制勁甩轆 扮鬼扮馬無限 loop	1	1	7	1
247	曾主席死唔道歉 自嘲人蠢無藥醫	1	1	7	2
248	【江湖滾熱辣】雨傘一周年 再聚	1	2	9	22
249	【江湖滾熱辣】都係一周年	1	2	9	27
250	藍絲遊行反佔中 阿 man 唱歌勁過娃娃舜	1	2	9	28

TV Most

		Issue related	Year	Month	Date
1	《特備節目》28/9 毛记央视新闻联播.mp4	1	3	9	28
2	《六點半左右新聞報道》225 我要真 Poschuen	1	2	5	22
3	《六點半左右新聞報道》19/5 新 JING CHA 故事	1	2	5	19

4	《犬時代》第5集 遲到風雲 (有#UM)	1	2	5	27
5	《六點半左右新聞報道》 23_7 朱經緯警員，一路好走！	1	2	7	23
6	《六點半左右新聞報道》 6/10 許 sir 許 sir 趣致的臉~書	1	2	10	6
7	《六點半左右新聞報道》 31/7 不誠實使用胸部	2	2	7	31
8	《六點半左右新聞報道》 05/06 來生不做水貨牛	2	2	6	5
9	《勁曲金曲》 王宗堯 Sir《胸迫人》	2	2	8	10
10	《六點半左右新聞報道》 13/ 1 2016 撕正報告.mp4	3	3	1	13
11	《六點半左右新聞報道》 14/1 特首知知知.mp4	3	3	1	14
12	《六點半左右新聞報道》 17/5 框演江鍾張德江.mp4	3	3	5	17
13	《六點半左右新聞報道》 18/5 一帶一路朗讀友誼賽.mp4	3	3	5	18
14	《特備節目》 27/7 強國猿小火車有問有答	4	4	7	27

Speak Out Hong Kong

		Issue related	Year	Month	Date
1	【短片】【笑聞一分鐘】瘋狂抹黑「一地兩檢」戴耀廷你先係破壞法治元兇	4	4	7	28
2	【笑聞一分鐘】提「公眾諮詢」玩拖延 非建制誓要整死一地兩檢？	4	4	8	2
3	【短片】【笑聞一分鐘】陳文敏瘋狂唱衰一地兩檢 擺明係政治炒作？	4	4	8	6
4	【短片】【笑聞一分鐘】反一地兩檢無人撐戴耀廷厚面皮「賴地硬」？	4	4	10	27
5	【短片】【笑聞一分鐘】狂煲特首齋講「一帶一路」毒果嚴重斷章取義？	3	3	1	13
6	【笑聞一分鐘】鬧水貨客變成搵警察 搵手都話暴力無鬼用？	2	2	2	9
7	【笑聞一分鐘】熱血 SAY SORRY 居然係嫌「光復行動」唔夠激？	2	2	3	3
8	【笑聞一分鐘】反水貨變成瘋狂打人 支持者轉軚鬧爆滋事者	2	2	3	9
9	【笑聞一分鐘】沒有最膠、只有更膠 黃台仰謬論歪理上晒腦？	2	2	3	11
10	【笑聞一分鐘】殺人都唔阻止 黃台仰 ISIS 上身？	2	2	3	12
11	【笑聞一分鐘】「袋住先」變「食住先」人哥使咩驚到唔敢講？	1	1	8	13
12	【笑聞一分鐘】拉倒政改責任嚟邊度？死抱公民提名扭扭擰擰係禍首	1	1	8	14
13	【笑聞一分鐘】泛民遊行「好」事多磨「反佔中」聯盟合作得多？	1	1	8	15
14	【笑聞一分鐘】傑哥袋住先就得 市民袋住先就唔得？	1	1	9	2

15	【笑聞一分鐘】學民霸權 唔畀學生「袋住先」？	1	1	9	3
16	【笑聞一分鐘】假期搞佔中 大學生不爽要攞大佢？	1	1	9	15
17	【笑聞一分鐘】你唔佔中我罷課 黃之鋒玩至激？	1	1	9	16
18	【笑聞一分鐘】你「佔中」我匿埋 毛孟靜好無良？	1	1	9	17
19	【笑聞一分鐘】傳單講「便便」 佔中三子好NAIVE？	1	1	9	24
20	【短片】【笑聞一分鐘】為反對政改咩都夠膽 喻 張超雄邏輯超錯？	1	2	6	12
21	【短片】【笑聞一分鐘】賴佔中失敗係社會嘅錯 何秀蘭岑敖暉鬥縮骨？	1	2	9	29
22	【短片】【笑聞一分鐘】佔中兩年話「感覺無咩」 戴耀廷係亂局禍根仲講風	1	3	9	28
23	【短片】【笑聞一分鐘】佔中三子再爆歪理 送年青人坐監係「成長」？	1	4	9	28

CURRICULUM VITAE

Academic qualifications of the thesis author, Ms. LAU Hiu Ming:

- Receive the degree of Bachelor of Business Journalism (Honours) from Hang Seng Management College.

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