

DOCTORAL THESIS

Ideologies and practices of public diplomacy media outlets: a critical discourse analysis of China Radio International and Voice of America

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Doctor of Philosophy

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Outlets: A Critical Discourse Analysis of China Radio
International and Voice of America in Africa

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Ideologies and Practices of Public Diplomacy Media Outlets:
A Critical Discourse Analysis of
China Radio International and Voice of America

COOPER Valerie Ann

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Principal Supervisor:
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September 2019

Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis represents my own work which has been done after registration for the degree of PhD at Hong Kong Baptist University, and has not been previously included in a thesis or dissertation submitted to this or any other institution for a degree, diploma or other qualifications.

I have read the University's current research ethics guidelines, and accept responsibility for the conduct of the procedures in accordance with the University's Research Ethics Committee (REC). I have attempted to identify all the risks related to this research that may arise in conducting this research, obtained the relevant ethical and/or safety approval (where applicable), and acknowledged my obligations and the rights of the participants.

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Abstract

Countries around the world are increasingly making use of public diplomacy methods in order to advance their interests and garner favour with foreign publics, with the aim of creating ‘soft power’. One of the most direct methods of doing such is through state-sponsored media outlets, which serve as government mouthpieces with the ability to speak directly to foreign populations. Such practices have recently gained more attention from Western practitioners and academics due to their increased use by countries like Russia and China, and especially in regards to their increasing media presence around the globe. However, this ignores the fact that countries like the United States have been using such outlets since the mid-1900s in openly propagandistic attempts to ‘win hearts and minds’.

In order to understand the practices and ideologies used by such media outlets in their quest to influence foreign publics and create soft power, this research combines a content analysis with a Discourse-Historical Approach to critical discourse studies of two state-sponsored radio programmes, China Radio International and Voice of America, broadcast in March 2016. Of particular interest is the ideology and tactics used to portray countries such as China, the United States, and other countries into which these programmes are broadcast.

The results demonstrate that cultural and media values feature subtly but significantly in these programmes, offering justification for their respective governments’ actions, while also being used to condemn actions of other countries. Furthermore, the results reveal a hierarchical approach to coverage of countries, with many countries being reduced to inactive bystanders in global affairs.

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List of Abbreviations

CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis
CDS: Critical Discourse Studies
CIMA: Center for International Media Assistance
CL: Critical Linguistics
CRI: China Radio International
DAC: Development Assistance Committee
DHA: Discourse-Historical Approach
FOCAC: Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
ODA: Official Development Assistance
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
VOA: Voice of America

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1. Content Analysis Coding Scheme

1. Introduction

1.1. Context

In March 2018, China's three largest state-owned television and radio stations – China Central Television, China Radio International, and China National Radio – officially merged into one broadcasting platform (“China to merge state media broadcasting giants,” 2018). Included within CCTV is the China Global Television Network (CGTN), a group of six international language channels launched by CCTV in 2016.

Although the CGTN article stated that the new platform does not currently have an official English name, some international publications highlighted that the Chinese (中国之声) translates as “Voice of China” – and were likewise quick to point out the comparison with the United States’ international broadcaster “Voice of America” (“China is spending billions on its foreign-language media,” 2018; Feng, 2018).

Yet China is certainly not alone, or even new, in this fight for international media influence. Rawnsley (2015) highlights how the global media environment is no longer dominated solely by the BBC (a British public broadcaster) or CNN (a US private broadcaster); instead, international audiences can choose between the likes of Al-Jazeera (a Qatari state-funded broadcaster), NHK (a Japanese public broadcaster), or Russia Today (a state-funded Russian broadcaster), among others. Furthermore, all of the discussion on China's state-owned “Voice of China” ignores the obvious link to another, much older state-sponsored media outlet, the United States’ “Voice of America”.

There is little question as to why governments would dedicate so much funding to non-domestic news outlets, including in languages which are not spoken in the funding country itself: it is all a question of influence and, subsequently, power. These outlets are understood to be means of public diplomacy, or “the process by which direct relations are pursued with a country's people to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented” (Sharp, 2005, p. 106). Such influence, ideally, can result in soft power, or the ability of those same represented governments to affect

others in order to obtain desired outcomes through attraction, rather than coercion (Nye, 2008, p. 94). In their assessment of the American information strategy, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999) state that information and communication have taken centre stage on issues of global power, to the extent that “information” and “power” are virtually intertwined. “Across many political, economic, and military areas informational “soft power” is taking precedence over traditional, material “hard power.” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1999, p. ix). For governments, media outlets that reach international audiences allow those in power to positively portray their countries with the aim of influencing foreign publics in their favour. As such, soft power is often conceived of as the battle to “win hearts and minds.”

In recent decades, China especially has come under scrutiny for its various public diplomacy practices and perceived attempts at creating soft power, as seen in the articles referenced above. Of particular note is China’s interest in and relationship with the African continent, which has led to accusations of neo-colonialism and support for rogue regimes (Gagliardone, 2014; Li & Ronning, 2013). Yet this preoccupation with China’s growing involvement fails to acknowledge the presence of existing public diplomacy efforts by countless other nations. This includes the United States, which has long engaged in public diplomacy and aid practices on multiple continents – and has usually enjoyed a privileged reputation. Both China and the United States have utilised various media methods to practice public diplomacy through media. Perhaps the longest-running public diplomacy efforts from both countries have been through radio: The United States’ Voice of America started broadcasting in Europe in 1942 (“VOA History,” 2018), while China’s China Radio International began broadcasting overseas in English in 1947 (“Who We Are,” 2017). Both CRI and VOA broadcast in a number of languages – CRI counts more than 60 languages across its media platforms (Xu Zhang, 2011), while VOA broadcasts in more than 40 (“VOA: Mission and Values,” 2018) .

Outlets such as CRI and VOA superficially portray themselves as reliable sources of news journalism, yet are funded by foreign governments. This inevitably raises questions about the motives for and, therefore, credibility of such news outlets. At the core is the question of the boundaries between news journalism and modern-day propaganda.

1.2. Research Objectives

The question of public diplomacy through media – how it is practiced, what practitioners hope to accomplish through it, and how these attempts relate to existing power structures and ideology – is at the heart of this research. In order to address these questions, this research utilises the linguistic content of public diplomacy-oriented media outlets in order to critically assess and understand the aims and ideology of the practices. As such, critical discourse studies was determined to be the best method of analysis, as it interrogates the relationship between language, ideology, and power. Critical discourse studies' approach to ideology is less concerned with the existence of different ideologies and more concerned with the way that those ideologies are utilised by those in power to promote and maintain a certain perspective over others. In the case of this research, the promoted ideologies and methods to be analysed are from the radio outlets China Radio International and Voice of America.

The purpose of this approach is to address the following questions:

1. How do the United States of America and the People's Republic of China differ in their approaches to news in their respective public diplomacy media outlets?
2. What ideologies are present in the public diplomacy media outlets China Radio International and Voice of America?
3. How do China Radio International and Voice of America portray and linguistically refer to their own countries in news coverage?
4. How does China Radio International portray and linguistically refer to the United States, and how does the Voice of America portray and linguistically refer to China in news coverage?
5. How do these public diplomacy media outlets negotiate their responsibilities as journalistic entities and voices of their governments?

Using the Discourse-Historical Approach of critical discourse studies, the research first delves into the complex relationships, including both soft power, hard power, and economic power, that the United States and the People's Republic of China exert on foreign nations, as well as both countries' use of public diplomacy approaches therein. The research then shifts its focus to the critical assessment of content via transcribed

radio broadcasts. This is conducted through two complementary approaches: a quantitative content analysis of the media texts, and an in-depth critical discourse analysis of the texts. For the latter, both a quantitative approach using corpus linguistics and a manual critical discourse analysis are used with the quantitative aspect used to pinpoint patterns that are critically assessed in more detail through the qualitative analysis (Flowerdew & Richardson, 2018).

2. Theoretical Approaches

2.1. Public Diplomacy

In addition to understanding the grand theories of ideology and discourse, it's also crucial to understand the practical context surrounding the existence of these media outlets. These are not traditional news media sources: they exist in the grey area between journalism and public relations, and are simply one facet within the broader concept of public diplomacy. How these outlets use ideology to tread the line between media outlet and foreign propaganda is one of the core interests of this research.

There are two prominent characteristics of research on public diplomacy: 1) it is usually researched in the Western, and especially North American, context, particularly when it comes to looking at the origin and history of and term; and 2) it is most commonly associated with information and communication. Although modern public diplomacy incorporates a number of initiatives and activities, Kelley (2009) states that “no one can dispute the fact that the conduct of public diplomacy includes at its core a communication component”. This section will try to balance the former point by not only including the Chinese perspective on public diplomacy, but also historical and current practices that are equivalent to the Western concept without necessarily employing the name ‘public diplomacy’.

Snow (2009) argues that the United States was actually behind other countries in utilizing culture for diplomatic purposes: The first effort to shape the image of the US on the global stage came with the founding of the Committee on Public Information during World War I. The lead-up to the second World War saw the creation of Voice of America in 1942, which had the aim of countering propaganda from Nazi Germany

(“VOA History,” 2018), and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty followed in 1950, with the aim of broadcasting behind the Iron Curtain during the early years of the Cold War (“RFE/RL History,” 2018). The term ‘public diplomacy’ itself was utilized widely albeit vaguely in reference to such international information and propaganda outlets following World War II, but the term was not officially recognized or defined until 1965 (N. J. Cull, 2009).

That was when American Professor Edmund Gullion established the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy (now the Edward R. Murrow Center for a Digital World), in homage to Murrow’s leadership of the United States Information Agency (“About - The Edward R. Murrow Center for a Digital World,” 2018). At this time, the Center conceptualised public diplomacy as dealing “with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications.” (N. J. Cull, 2009; Kelley, 2009).

Cull (2009) argues that the origin of term public diplomacy was strategic and necessary: “A dozen years into its life, the United States Information Agency needed an alternative to the anodyne term information or malignant term propaganda: a fresh turn of phrase upon which it could build new and benign meanings.” He adds that Gullion himself confessed he preferred the term “propaganda” to explain the work of the USIA, but that the term had – understandably – accumulated negative connotation in the minds of the public (N. J. Cull, 2009). Cull states that a reorganisation in 1978 led to the United States Information Agency becoming fully in control of the country’s international information and communication strategy (N. Cull, 2008). It would remain so until the agency was abolished in 1999, with the services merging into the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (“Records of the United States Information Agency (RG 306),” 2017).

The early 1990s saw the introduction of a new term that would come to be closely linked with public diplomacy: soft power. According to American political scientist Joseph Nye, soft power is “the ability affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment” (2008, p. 94). In his view, then, public diplomacy is simply a tool, “an instrument that governments use to mobilize these resources to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries, rather than merely their governments” (Nye, 2008, p. 95). Debates about the definition, practicality, and measurability of ‘soft power’ rival those of public diplomacy, but for this research it is enough to know that even today many scholars and practitioners consider soft power to be the ultimate goal of public diplomacy.

The turn of the century witnessed one of the most significant shifts in the United States’ public diplomacy approach as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City. Snow (2009) states that the public diplomacy response to the attacks was crisis-driven and self-preservation oriented, rather than with a focus on long-term, research-backed approaches. These approaches included the creation of ventures like the Coalition Information Centers (CICs), the White House Office of Global Communications (OGC), the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI), and the Department of Defense’s Total Information Awareness programme (Nancy Snow, 2009), and were based on the idea that there simply needed to be more information about the United States broadcast to foreign powers. Taylor (2009) states that this time also saw a greater emphasis on the “selling of democracy” in public diplomacy approaches, with the idea that foreign publics needed to understand the benefits of democracy in order to become more Westernized and, consequently, less opposed to Western ideology.

In China, public diplomacy – or its closest equivalent – has had a very different progression than its Western counterpart. The two crucial concepts to aid understanding of Chinese public diplomacy are 1) propaganda (宣传 – to publicise, advertise, propagate) is not seen as negative, and the term is applied to benign activities such as news and advertisements; 2) is that there is no solid distinction between internal propaganda and external propaganda (Y. Wang, 2008). Chinese foreign policy scholar Yiwei Wang (2008, p. 259) declares simply that “public diplomacy is a foreign concept in China”. The theory behind the Chinese perspective will be discussed in more detail

below, but the comparable public diplomacy practices date back to the 1940s, when China Radio International first reached out to English-speaking audiences (“About China Radio International,” 2012). At this time, both the domestic and international media primarily served to broadcast information and policies from Chinese leaders (C. C. Chen, Colapinto, & Luo, 2010; Kurlantzick, 2007). China’s “opening up” and reforms in the early 1980s saw a shift toward more Western-style public diplomacy with the creation of a system of Chinese news spokesmen, including in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs information department, but it wasn’t until 1990 that the Western term ‘public diplomacy’ (公共外交) appeared in Qipeng Zhou’s book *Diplomacy Abroad* (Y. Wang, 2008).

Wang (2008, p. 60) states that, much like in the United States, the 9/11 terrorist attacks also influenced China’s perception of public diplomacy because “ironically, given the widespread criticism of U.S. public diplomacy within the United States and elsewhere, the United States was a major model for Chinese public diplomacy.” This shift saw the creation of the Division for Public Diplomacy in the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in early 2004, although Wang (2008) states that the Division’s concept of public diplomacy was still very domestically-oriented in comparison to the Western notion.

Despite the theoretical disparities between American and Chinese public diplomacy, their goals and practices are surprisingly similar. The goals of Chinese public diplomacy have been summarized as: (1) more strongly publicising the Chinese government’s statements and assertions to the outside world, (2) forming a desirable image of the state, (3) issuing rebuttals to distorted overseas reports about China, (4) improving the international environment surrounding China, and (5) exerting influence on the policy decisions of foreign countries (Y. Wang, 2008; Zhan, 1998). In practice, Chinese public diplomacy uses both media outlets (such as CRI and, more recently, the China Global Television Network, founded in 2016) and people-to-people diplomacy initiatives that promote cultural exchanges (such as Confucius Institutes).

2.1.1. Public Diplomacy: Definitions and theories

While researchers have few difficulties describing the history of public diplomacy, the definition of the term itself presents complications. Kelley (2009) describes the original definition from the Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy as merely “the first in a litany of attempts” to pin down the term, as a “clear definition has beguiled both scholars and practitioners” since the 1960s. This lack of solid definition is what led Taylor (2009) to declare public diplomacy “the most debated topic in the field of international communication”

This research will not attempt another definition, as it is more interested in how public diplomacy activities utilise ideology and language in practice rather than in describing a theoretical possibility. Instead, this section will offer the spectrum of opinions surrounding public diplomacy, so that the research itself can place the target media outlets on that spectrum.

The most common characteristics of public diplomacy according to definitions are the emphasis on the communication of information (specifically US policy), and the building up of relationships through engagement. The former is usually conceived of as a short-term action, whilst the longer is more long-term. In an attempt to find harmony of opinion, scholar Kelley (2009) highlights some common ground amongst public diplomacy scholars and practitioners, which he states are *information*, *influence*, and *engagement*:

- “1. Information: information management and distribution with an emphasis on short-term events or crises;
2. Influence: longer-term persuasion campaigns aiming to effect attitudinal change amongst a target population (sometimes referred to as “moving the needle”); and
3. Engagement: building relationships, also over the long term, to cultivate trust and mutual understanding between peoples (be they groups, organizations, nations, etc.).

What is not explicit in this approach is the use of communication and media in order to distribute that information, create those influential persuasion campaigns, and ultimately build the engagement. Career diplomat Ambassador Christopher Ross (2002, p. 77) similarly highlighted the short-term, information-focused perspective on public diplomacy when he stated: “...public diplomacy is basically a short-term effort

with a simple goal: to articulate U.S. policy clearly in as many media and languages as are necessary to ensure the message is received.” Ross (2002, p. 77) states that this task requires “language-capable, media-savvy, policy-wise, accessible and persuasive” Foreign Service officers, in addition to “ambassadors, the press and information office in U.S. embassies”.

As in Kelley’s definition, Ross believes that this information communication must also be accompanied by engagement and relationship building. He states that the other half of public diplomacy is “the long-term effort to develop an overseas understanding and appreciation of U.S. society,” which he states is overwhelmingly conducted through educational and cultural exchanges (Ross et al., 2002, p. 80). Beyond the United States, British scholars Leonard, Stead and Smewing (2002, p. v) wrote a report on public diplomacy for The Foreign Policy Centre that also broke the term down in its “Three Dimensions”: News Management, Strategic Communications, and Relationship Building. As with Kelley, the first two dimensions focus on strategic information and communication, while the latter focuses on relationship building.

This is the recurring theme when attempting to define and describe public diplomacy: one emphasis is on the strategic communications aspect, while the other is on relationship building. Yet these two purposes are in no way overlapping: the former suggests a unidirectional transfer of information, from a government body to a foreign public, while the other suggests a mutual exchange and relationship that leads to understanding and possibly even respect on both sides. While communication is necessary for such relationship-building purposes, it is certainly not the unidirectional communication that results from mass media that the first dimension emphasises. It’s not surprising that there should be such confusion and debate concerning the definition of public diplomacy when two of its stated dimensions could almost be seen as having contradictory aims.

The question of strategic communication versus relationship building is one of the points of contention among public diplomacy scholars and practitioners. Snow (2009) frames this conflict as the “tender-minded versus tough-minded” approaches to public diplomacy, while Zaharna (2009) describes the division between the “informational framework” and the “relational framework” of public diplomacy.

As Snow (2009) describes it, the tender-minded school favours activities that “foster mutual understanding” between peoples, including through people-to-people and government-sponsored educational and cultural exchanges. Similarly, Zaharna (2009) described the “relational framework” for public diplomacy as one that focuses on identifying and building relationships. In this vein, Zaharna (2009) highlights first-tier initiatives that focus on individuals through exchange programmes and visits; second-tier initiatives that focus on social groupings and communities, such as development aid projects and language institutes; and third-tier initiatives that incorporate policy networking and coalition building. In both the tender-minded school and the relational framework, the emphasis is not simply on sharing the perspective of one nation to many others, but in strengthening positive engagements between two or more partner nations. This approach supports the public diplomacy dimension of building relationships, but with the ultimate end goal being an overall better international environment (Zaharna, 2009). For this reason, Signitzer and Coombs (1992) state that truth and veracity are crucial to this approach, as they create an environment of credibility and mutual trust. It’s also worth pointing out that these approaches go beyond government initiatives, and incorporate public-to-public activities across both private and public sectors.

In contrast, the “tough-minded” school, or the “informational framework” of public diplomacy, is shaped by the first dimension mentioned above: information and influence. According to Zaharna (2009), this approach “is rooted in the view of communication as primarily a linear process of transferring information, often with the goal of persuasion or control.”

This approach is purposefully unidirectional, as the goal is to send information (often pertaining to government policies) to a target audience in order to sway public opinion. This is particularly true for traditional public diplomacy, which focuses on “governments talking to global publics (G2P), and includes those efforts to inform, influence and engage those publics” and thus “emphasizes citizens in asymmetrical one-way efforts to inform and a case for a nation’s position” (Snow, 2009). While there can be dialogue and information-gathering by the government, this is primarily done in order to more effectively deliver a message – as Zaharna (2009) put it, such

exchanges are intended to “promote policies, advance political interests, enhance images, or engage publics to achieve the goals of an individual political sponsor”.

Signitzer and Coombs (1992) go so far as to use the words “persuasion and propaganda” to describe the tough-minded school, noting that “objectivity and truth are considered important tools of persuasion but not extolled as virtues in themselves” – a perspective that will be explored more in the following section. While this perspective might seem more applicable to the era of the United States Information Agency, it is actually still heavily utilized in theory and practice. For example, the United States’ Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs outlines the goals of public diplomacy as:

“The mission of American public diplomacy is to support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and Government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world.” (“Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs,” 2018)

In line with the tough-minded school and the informational framework, the primary goal is to support *US* foreign policy goals and objectives, advance *national* interests, and enhance *national* security – a focus that doesn’t leave much opportunity for mutual goals with other countries. The citizens of the rest of the world are present merely to be informed and influence. As listed above, the stated goals of Chinese public diplomacy are similar domestically-focused. The lone mention of foreign countries is in the final goal of “exerting influence on the policy decisions of foreign countries” (Y. Wang, 2008; Zhan, 1998). These perspectives are a far stretch from the “building relationships for the betterment of the world” rhetoric of the tender-minded school.

The tough-minded approach’s emphasis on informing and influence also marks a worrisome tone for public diplomacy in that it does little to separate the term from its acknowledged predecessor, propaganda. And understandably so: propaganda is the “conscious, methodical and planned decisions to employ techniques of persuasion designed to achieve specific goals *that are intended to benefit those organizing the process*” (P. M. Taylor, 2003, p. 6). There is little question that the informational and

influential techniques of the tough-minded school serve this precise purpose, and the stated public diplomacy goals of both the United States and China highlight this clearly.

The questionable relationship between public diplomacy and propaganda has been a long-running debate within the field (Kelley, 2009). From its very conception, Gullion (Brown, 2003) stated that he actually preferred the term to ‘public diplomacy’, but the term was already a tainted one. Even attempts at distancing the two terms often acknowledges the unavoidable link between the two: Nye (2008, p. 101), for example, states that “good public diplomacy has to go beyond propaganda” – a euphemistic yet undeniable acknowledgement of the term in public diplomacy practices. Kelley (2009) states that the propagandistic techniques of traditional propaganda never truly disappeared, but instead were simply incorporated and re-labelled in new public diplomacy approaches. In his book on strategic public diplomacy and American foreign policy, Manheim (1994, p. 7) states that public diplomacy differs from propaganda because it is “enlightened by half a century of empirical research into human motivation and behaviour” – but as Kelley (2009) is quick to point out, this only suggests that propagandistic means have become more advanced through scientific means and, perhaps, more psychologically effective.

Other scholars do not shy away from public diplomacy’s affiliation with propaganda. Taylor (2003) argues that propaganda is not inherently the evil that it is often made out to be; instead, propaganda is simply a value-neutral tool for accomplishing an end – like any type of marketing. Taylor explains in the introduction to his book that “it is the intention behind the propaganda which demands scrutiny and it is that intention which begs value judgements not the propaganda itself.” Perhaps Gullion himself held this perspective, as he preferred the term propaganda even whilst admitting it had gained a nefarious reputation. As previously mentioned, this perspective is at the core of Chinese public diplomacy. The Chinese term for ‘propaganda’ (宣传) exists on both the domestic (内宣) and international (外宣) level, and describes the advertisement of Chinese achievements and reputation management at home and abroad (Y. Wang, 2008). This is part of the reason for the great overlap between domestic and international news media in China: the *Zhongguo Zhisheng* (中国之声 – roughly, the ‘Voice of China’) that was created in 2018 is a merger of the domestic China Central

Television and China National Radio alongside the international China Global Television Network and China Radio International (“China to merge state media broadcasting giants,” 2018). From this perspective, ‘propaganda’ is merely another form of information broadcasting.

There is a similar debate in the United States concerning the idea of public diplomacy as a form of national public relations. Snow (2009) states that public diplomacy’s roots “are in the persuasion industries or PR, marketing and advertising”, and scholar Seong-Hun Yun (2006) determined that the same effectiveness frameworks applied to public relations are also easily applicable to public diplomacy data. Yet others argue this perspective is precisely the problem with public diplomacy: rather than the mutually engaging, relationship-building, long-term concept that it should be, public diplomacy activities are too often simply “part of a campaign to sell policy initiatives” (Floyd, 2007).

Given the aforementioned definitions of public diplomacy, it seems unavoidable that there should such debates around the strategic communications aspect versus the relationship-building aspect. One dimension of public diplomacy requires the reaching and teaching of foreign publics about policy and culture in a country in order to win their admiration and respect (their “hearts and minds” as the cliché goes), while the other dimension suggests that both sides should engage mutually in order to build relationships. Hypothetically, the former would include activities that educate foreign publics about democracy and its benefits, while the latter would champion activities in which democracy and communism were discussed mutually and in respectable ways. Is it possible for a public diplomacy initiative to accomplish both dimensions – informing and influencing whilst simultaneously giving a voice to the target audience and thereby building relationships? And if an initiative only satisfies the former dimension, should it instead be considered “public relations” or even “propaganda” – or still, simply, public diplomacy? Or on the complete opposite hand, does simply calling an initiative “public diplomacy” make it so?

This research focuses on very specific type of public diplomacy initiative which has existed as long as the term itself in both the United States and China. In his work on American propaganda during the Cold War, Cull (2008) identified five public

diplomacy activities: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, and international broadcasting. The final one, international broadcasting, is the focus of this research on the radio outlets VOA and CRI. Mass media is ideally suited to public diplomacy's aim of informing and influencing due to its ability to be easily accessible to the target audience: foreign publics. Media outlets such as China Radio International and Voice of America advertise and conceive of themselves as journalism outlets, in keeping with their respective countries' news media systems.

As such, it's not surprising that these outlets especially should face debate and accusations of propaganda. The question of where journalism ends and propaganda begins is blurred by the very purpose of public diplomacy broadcasting, which is to positively influence opinions – and, subsequently, policy – in favour of the broadcasting nation. In his comparison of international broadcasting in Russia and China, Rawnsley (2015, p. 274) argues that the “conceptual differentiation between public diplomacy and propaganda is blurred” due to the outlets' content, style, motivation, and especially due to the close relationship between the broadcaster and the state.

Journalism itself is a broad concept with debatable boundaries. McNair's (1998, p. 4) academic definition of journalism is “any authored text in written, audio or visual form, which claims to be...a truthful statement about, or record of, some hitherto unknown new feature of the actual, social world.” As such, this research does not consider either VOA or CRI to be strictly journalistic entities; instead, in keeping with Cull (2008) and Rawnsley's (2015) concepts of international broadcasting, this research utilises the term “public diplomacy media outlets”. This term acknowledges that CRI and VOA both exist as media outlets, while also linking their missions to the governments that sponsor them.

2.2. Critical Discourse Studies

Whilst the ensuing methodology chapter discusses the practical approach to conduct a critical discourse analysis as part of this research, this section will focus on critical discourse studies as a theoretical approach. In particular, the concepts of language,

ideology, and power will be addressed on their own and in relation to critical discourse studies.

Flowerdew and Richardson (Flowerdew & Richardson, 2018) describe Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) as an interdisciplinary approach to understanding language in use, and how it relates to social processes, social structures and social change. Similarly, Wodak (2001) states that CDS may be defined as a critical linguistic approach “fundamentally concerned with analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power, and control as manifested in language,” using text as the basic unit of communication and study. From the perspective of Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis specifically consists of a set of philosophical premises, theoretical methods, methodological guidelines, and specific technique for linguistic analysis (Norman Fairclough, 1995a; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).

The next several sections will be devoted to unpacking the social implications of CDS. But perhaps the most crucial part to understand about CDS definitions is the consistent use of the term “approach” in various definitions. This emphasis on “approach”, rather than “theory” or “methodology”, denotes an important aspect of critical discourse studies: it is not a singular theory or method, but rather a “shared perspective on doing linguistic, semiotic or discourse analysis” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 131). Meyer (2001) states that CDS contains all of the theoretical levels of sociological and socio-psychological theory (as outlined by R.K. Merton’s 1967 “On Theoretical Sociology”), from general or “grand” social theories which conceptualise relations between social structures and social actions on a large scale, to micro-sociological theories which focus on specific social phenomena. For the purposes of this research, the focus is on CDS as a middle-range theory: it is not trying to describe all aspects of communication on a grand scale, but is focused on social conflict and attempting to detect elements of dominance, difference, and resistance through linguistic manifestations (Norman Fairclough, 2001; Meyer, 2001).

The use of discourse analysis as a theory and methodology to discover ideology is commonly used across a range of social science and humanities research. In fact, Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, p. 4), in their book titled “Discourse Analysis as Theory

and Method”, stress that critical discourse analysis *must* intertwine both theory and methodology in order to be considered discourse analysis at all:

“Although discourse analysis can be applied to all areas of research, it cannot be used with all kinds of theoretical framework. Crucially, it is not to be used as a method of analysis detached from its theoretical and methodological foundations. Each approach to discourse analysis that we present is not just a method for data analysis, but a theoretical and methodological whole – a complete package... In discourse analysis, *theory* and *method* are intertwined and researchers must accept the basic philosophical premises in order to use discourse analysis as their method of empirical study.”

In other words, critical discourse analysis cannot be used simply as a methodology detached from its larger theoretical implications: to do so would be to completely undermine the purpose of relying on discourse as a social construct in the first place. Renowned scholars such as Wodak (2001), van Dijk (1993), and Fairclough (1989) have utilised critical discourse analysis’ theoretical and methodological combination to expose racism against immigrants and minorities in UK media; highlight ethnicism and antisemitism in global discourse; and describing how politicians can use discourse to achieve their ends. Within the realm of Chinese media research, Zhang (2013) used such an approach to analyse Africa Live on CCTV Africa to find that China has shifted from a low-profile approach to a more assertive one in terms of their critique of the current world order. For this research, Zhang (2013, p. 80) states that “discourse analysis is used both as theory and as method...critical analysis of media discourse, understood as an attempt to show systemic links between texts, discourse practices and sociocultural practices (Norman Fairclough, 1995b, p. 16) , allows the investigator to examine the intricate relations between media discourse and its political, social and economic contexts”.

Even limiting this research to mid-range theories, there are still a multitude of approaches to CDS. These heterogeneous approaches are united in basic assumptions and interests surrounding language, power, and ideology. Furthermore, as Flowerdew and Richardson explain above, CDS is not even limited to a particular field of study; instead, it is an interdisciplinary, and potentially even multidisciplinary, approach that can be utilised in myriad ways across academic fields and in combination with various research methodologies. Fairclough (2001) describes this as being in a dialogical relationship with other theories and methods, engaging them in a transdisciplinary way that develops and challenges existing theories and methods. While largely dependent

on social theories, CDS is nevertheless conceived of as a problem-driven approach, in that it is applied to real-world social issues with a potential semiotic or linguistic aspect.

Flowerdew and Richardson's (2018) most recent book explains the shift from the original terms "critical linguistics" and "critical discourse analysis" to the current "critical discourse studies", due to the fact that the term covers such a broad area as to be a field in and of itself. Much of the book is dedicated to introducing the various approaches within critical discourse studies and their applications to various disciplines. As utilised in this research, "critical discourse studies" (CDS) is used to denote the broader theoretical approach, whilst "critical discourse analysis" (CDA) is used more specifically to describe the methodological process of analysis.

Furthermore, this research utilises a particular approach within CDS – the Discourse-Historical Approach – in combination with a variation of a corpus-based methodology of CDA. As these approaches guide this research, they are described in greater detail below and in the methodology chapter, respectively.

But the core characteristics of CDS – the critical analysis, the use of linguistics, and the scrutiny of social structures – is necessarily inherent to any work that holds itself to be of a critical discourse approach. And it is these inherent characteristics that drive this research and challenge the discourse of state-sponsored media outlets and their attempts at soft power. As such, this theory section will highlight each of these concepts on their own and as they relate to CDS. Prior to that, however, the following section will introduce and explain the various iterations of critical discourse studies, in order to better describe how this seemingly disjointed field of study came to be.

2.2.1. The 'critical' of CDS

The various approaches within critical discourse studies have those two terms at their core – "critical" and "discourse". The "critical" aspect refers to Critical Theory, which seeks to critique and challenge existing hierarchies by exposing the social structures and ideologies that oppress certain actors (Held, 1980). In regards to CDS, Wodak (2001) states that 'critical' denotes a distance between the researcher and the data which allows the researcher to see the social and political ideological underpinnings

of the analysed data. The discourse to be analysed does not exist in a vacuum; it was firmly and intentionally created by actors with agendas, and a critical approach aims to uncover those ideologies and challenge their assumptions. Concepts of power and ideology will be discussed in more depth in following sections; for now, the most crucial aspect to note about ‘critical’ is that this broad theoretical approach is grounded in real-world situations and aims to produce ‘enlightenment and emancipation’ by creating awareness of, and possibly even altering, existing social structures conveyed through discourse (Wodak, 2001). To understand this linguistic manifestation of power, we must first understand what CDS authority Wodak considers the cornerstones of critical discourse studies: power and ideology.

Power

Power, in the simplest terms, is the ability to get others to do what you want them to do (Nagel, 1975). From a more academic and nuanced take, Castells (2013, p. 10) defines power as “the relational capacity that enables a social actor to influence asymmetrically the decisions of other social actor(s) in ways that favour the empowered actor’s will, interests or values.” He stresses that power is not simply an attribute, but instead a relationship between two subjects, and the effects that those differences create. Similarly, Weber (1978) describes social power as the probability that one actor within such a relationship will be in a position to carry out its own will above that of the other actor. In both of these cases, one actor is in a position to influence another in order to enact the first actor’s own wishes. By ‘actor’, of course, we mean any individual or groups that are connected in a socially structured relationship. This influence can be manifested not only on an interpersonal scale (one person’s power over another with whom they have some sort of relationship), but also on a grand scale between groups of people. Lukes (1974) asserts that all social structures are based on power relationships that are embedded in institutions and organisations, while Castells (2013) similarly asserts that societal institutions may engage in power relationships that rely on domination, or embedded societal power, over subjects in a society. Power is ubiquitous in any society; however, it is not always obvious.

The question is not simply if power structures exist in relationships, but how that power is created, exerted and maintained – concepts that are central in discussions on

both public diplomacy and soft power. There are a number of theoretical approaches to explaining social power. Castells (2013) argues that common theories of power focus on two main mechanisms of power formation: violence and discourse. The term ‘violence’ is often referred to in other definitions and approaches as ‘coercive power’, which will be used throughout this research. Terminology aside, Castells (2013, p. 13) lists the coercive elements in the process of power construction as: “violence, the threat to resort to it, disciplinary discourses, the threat to enact discipline, the institutionalization of power relationships as reproducible domination, and the legitimation process by which values and rules are accepted by the subjects of reference”. Such power is often associated with military or economic power at the nation-state level, in that it allows one nation-state to exert influence in various ways over other nation-states.

Critical discourse studies also recognises another force within unequal social structures that contributes to the creation and maintenance of power: ideology.

Ideology

If power is not gained through coercion – through threats of violence, hardship, or other forms of forceful manipulation – how then does a group of people exert power and influence over another? According to sociologist Stuart Hall, the answer lies in ideology (Hall, 1986). Instead of forcing or coercing actors to behave in the interests of other groups, it is more effective to simply convince those actors that acting in the best interests of others is natural and commonsensical, perhaps even in the best interest of those being oppressed. This is the underlying concept of ideology.

Flowerdew and Richardson (2018, p. 31) succinctly describe ideologies as sets of beliefs and values belonging to particular social groups. But the implications of these ideologies go much deeper, for both individuals and societies as a whole. Hall describes ideology as not simply ideas, but entire mental frameworks – “the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation - which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works” (Hall, 1986, p. 29). These perspectives and representations are ubiquitous and inherently present in societies. They help to simplify and make sense of issues that might otherwise be cripplingly complex or

difficult to grasp. In fact, one might say the colloquial term for ideology is simply “common sense.” From this perspective, Makus (1990, p. 498) states that ideology produces in its subjects and consumers “a recognition of what is already known, of the taken-for-granted status of reality.” In return for the security of a having a perspective be ‘natural’ and a commonsensical ‘truth’, ideology does not allow for the realisation that it is socially constructed, dependent on a historical condition and specific group, and entirely subjective. Furthermore, this assumption of a specific ideology as a universal truth means that ideologies are largely conveyed and promoted unconsciously. Theories of ideology normally consider most actors working within an ideology to be unassuming subjects, rather than active propagators of a specific ideology. Hall (1986) explains that this is because ideology is the result of discourse and the logic of social processes rather than an intention of the agent. While rhetors have a choice over what they say and how to say it, Makus (1990) argues that these choices are determined within the common sense of the culture, which these rhetors – knowingly or otherwise – exist in. Ideologies are, in essence, hiding everywhere in plain sight, and are responsible for so much of what we do.

The social science theories surrounding ideology, including critical discourse studies, are not concerned so much with the existence of different ideologies, but with the way that those ideologies are utilised by those in power to promote and maintain a certain perspective over others. As will be explained in detail in the following section, this is what links critical discourse studies with the concepts of public diplomacy and soft power. Public diplomacy encompasses the activities and approaches that nations use to develop soft power, with soft power being an ideal result of public diplomacy. In contrast, critical discourse studies aims to understand how the language and ideologies are used by those in power not to put them to use, but in order to bring awareness – and ideally “emancipation” from those powers – to target populations.

According to Hall (1986), theories of ideology “analyze how a particular set of ideas comes to dominate the social thinking of a historical bloc...and thus, helps to unite such a bloc from the inside, and maintain its dominance and leadership over society as a whole.” In short, certain ideologies can have dominant status, which gives them priority over other, potentially conflicting, ideologies. This can be done intentionally or unintentionally, but the end result is that an ideology that is beneficial to a set group

of people is imposed on others, which may not be to their benefit, and may even be to their detriment. In CDS, ideology is viewed as a crucial means of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations, with ideology referring to social forms and processes within which and by means of which symbolic forms, including discourse, circulate in the social world (Wodak, R., Meyer, 2001). For this research, those ideologies are first identified, then analysed in context to determine what methods and practices are used to promote those ideologies by the public diplomacy-oriented outlets of CRI and VOA.

Traditionally, such concepts of power and domination focus on the divisions between social classes within a society. This research, however, takes a different approach: rather than localising them to classes within a particular society, it questions the power and domination of one culture – or nation-state, as it is delimited here – over others, by means of promoting and spreading a particular economic, cultural or political ideology. This notion of the promotion of ideology as a means of “winning hearts and minds” is the basis of what’s been described as “soft power”. This will be discussed in more depth later on, but the crucial thing to understand is that one of the primary means of conveying and promoting ideologies is, of course, discourse.

2.2.2. The Discourse-Historical Approach

Discussions on critical theory and the relationship between language and power are the core of critical discourse studies. However, CDS does not contain a single, unified theory or definition. Prior to delving into more specific theories of CDS, it is therefore necessary to explain which approach to CDS this research will be taking. In light of the historical-political emphasis of this research, this research utilises the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) of critical discourse studies. As one of the most prominent critical approaches within CDS, DHA looks beyond language analysis to a multidimensional incorporation of empirically-based research practices with concrete social applications, with influences from a range of cross-disciplinary social theorists (Reisigl, 2018, p. 49). In Reisigl’s (2018, p. 49) explanation of DHA, he posits it not simply as an approach, but more a method of belief held by practitioners:

“This means that the proponents of the approach are politically engaged and often application-oriented. They make practical claims of emancipation and criticise discursively constituted power abuse, injustice and social discrimination, and they make epistemic claims of revelation or enlightenment. Similar to other critical discourse

analysts, they put emphasis on the practice-related quality of discourses, the context dependence of discourses, and the constructed as well as constructive character of discourses. Like their CDA fellows, they prefer to focus on problem-related “authentic” data and to employ multiple methods of analysis. They share with other CDA scholars that they reject a purely formalist and context-abstract view on language. They pay attention to multi-modal macro as well as micro-phenomena, to intertextual and interdiscursive relationships, as well as to social, historical, political, economic, psychological and other factors relating to the verbal and non-verbal phenomena of communication.”

While still anchored in the logistics of linguistics, DHA uses it as a method for uncovering real-world social phenomena. DHA also sees current social structures as inherently tied to historical issues rather than existing in a vacuum, and seeks to factor those into current research more than other CDS approaches. To be even more precise, this research follows the socio-diagnostic critique, which aims to expose manipulation in and by discourse based on social, historical and political background knowledge (Reisigl, 2018, p. 51). In this context, of course, the discourse is the verbal content of CRI and VOA. As for theory, this branch of CDS especially emphasises the Critical Theory of earlier scholars, such as Adorno and Horkheimer, which sees ideologies masquerading as public interests as actually justifying and perpetuating particular interests and social inequalities; as well as the later theories of Habermas in relation to discourse ethics (Reisigl, 2018, p. 50). Wodak (2001) further outlines 11 of what she considers to be the most important characteristics of the Discourse-Historical Approach, some of which overlap with the broader critical discourse approaches, and some of which are unique to DHA. For the sake of clarity and precision, they are listed here verbatim from her chapter “The Discourse-Historical Approach” (2001, p. 69):

1. The approach is interdisciplinary.
2. Interdisciplinarity is located on several levels: in theory, in the work itself, in teams, and in practice.
3. The approach is problem oriented, not focused on specific linguistic items.
4. The theory as well as the methodology is eclectic; that is theories and methods are integrated which are helpful in understanding and explaining the object under investigation.

5. The study always incorporates fieldwork and ethnography to explore the object under investigation (study from the inside) as a precondition for any further analysis and theorizing.
6. The approach is abductive: a constant movement back and forth between theory and empirical data is necessary.
7. Multiple genres and multiple public spaces are studied, and intertextual and interdiscursive relationships are investigated. Recontextualization is the most important process in connecting these genres as well as topics and arguments (topoi).
8. The historical context is always analysed and integrated into the interpretation of discourses and texts.
9. The categories and tools for the analysis are defined according to all these steps and procedures as well as to the specific problem under investigation.
10. Grand theories serve as a foundation (see above). In the specific analysis, middle range theories serve the analytical aims better.
11. Practice is the target. The results should be made available to experts in different fields and, as a second step, be applied with the goal of changing certain discursive and social practices.

Those points that pertain to methodological aspects of DHA – such as the inclusion of fieldwork and ethnography, and the abductive nature of the process – will be addressed more specifically in relation to this research in the Methodology chapter. For this section, the most important aspects to understand are DHA’s emphasis on the historical context and the problem-orientation (rather than theory-orientation or linguistic-orientation) of the approach. As such, the following sections will explain precisely what is meant in terms of “discourse” and “history” in relation to this Discourse-Historical Approach.

A plethora of books by scholars in various disciplines have debated the concept of *discourse* as it relates to language and communication. For the sake of writer and reader, this great debate will be avoided in favour of the specific approach to discourse used in CDS generally and DHA specifically. One key aspect to understand is that language on its own has no power. As Wodak states, language gains power by the use powerful people make of it; it is merely a tool of communication. As such, CDS is not

interested so much in the use of language or discourse for linguistics' sake, but in how language exists as a social practice, which is used to assert, enforce and even challenge power. From the perspective of Antonio Gramsci (1971), power is exercised and maintained through hegemony, or the dominance of one social group over another, through ideology and discourse. Discourse and language are used by dominant classes to convey their ideologies to oppressed classes, and therefore maintain their power, their attraction, or acceptance through means other than force. As such, the purpose of CDA is to allow researchers to pick apart and discover the type of power that is being conveyed by means of discourse. Flowerdew & Richardson (Flowerdew & Richardson, 2018, p. 10) describe this as CDS aiming to “make the implicit explicit in language use.”

From the perspective of Wodak (2001, p. 66), discourse is understood as a “complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts that manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as ‘texts’, that belong to specific semiotic types, that is genres”. She goes on to define *texts* as “materially durable products of linguistic actions”, and *genres* as the conventionalised use of language associated with a particular activity, as a “socially ratified way of using language in connection with a particular type of social activity, as per Fairclough (1995a, p. 14).

In this definition, it's worth noting that discourse is focused on linguistic acts, thus linking discourse directly to language. However, Flowerdew and Richardson (2018, p. 30) broaden this concept of discourse to include any “specific set of meanings expressed through particular forms and uses.” The latter does not limit discourse specifically to linguistics, but includes semiotics, a term that encompasses all forms of meaning-making, from visual images to tone of voice, of which language use is only one part. Including semiotic devices in the concept of discourse recognises that all aspects of the communicative context contribute to the meaning of a text (Wodak, 2001), including the non-verbal, and especially the visual, aspects.

This is an important point to note about discourse in relation to CDS; however, it is also a point that does not directly apply to this research. As will be discussed in the Methodology chapter, the discourse in question here is almost purely linguistic: the

‘texts’ used in this research are transcribed radio broadcasts, and therefore do not contain certain elements seen in other media outlets. This particular aspect is seen as an advantage of using radio as a medium of study, in that it strips away other culturally-significant media aspects, such as the visual images found in newspapers and television broadcasts, in favour of direct dialogue. But more to the point, this research intentionally limits the discourse analysed to linguistics, in order to have a more singularly objective approach to the linguistics aspects as they relate to broader international relationship themes.

Wodak and Meyer (2001, p. 11) explain three ways in which language is entwined with social power: “language indexes power, expresses power, is involved where there is contention over and a challenge to power.” This is because the production of social knowledge – in fact, all education in general – takes place principally through language and its impact on thinking, conceptualizing, and symbolizing reality (Hall, 1977; Makus, 1990). The ways in which discourse and linguistic practices are utilised to reinforce hegemonic perspectives is numerous; Wodak and Meyer (2001, p. 11) state that “very few linguistic forms have not at some stage been pressed into the service of the expression of power by a process of syntactic or textual metaphor.”

Within the DHA, Reisigl (2018) states that there are five simple questions related to the discursive strategies of nomination, predication, mitigation and intensification, argumentation, and perspectivisation. These questions and a rationale for their inclusion are in the table below, as adapted from Reisigl (2018, p. 52):

| Table 1A. Reisigl’s Discursive Strategies in the DHA | | |
|---|------------------------------|---|
| Questions to approach discursive features | Discursive strategies | Purpose |
| How are persons, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions named and referred to linguistically in the discourse in question? | Nomination | Discursive construction of social actors Discursive construction of objects, phenomena, events |

| | | |
|--|--------------------------------|---|
| | | Discursive construction of processes and actions |
| What characteristics or qualities are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions mentioned in the discourse? | Predication | Discursive characterisation of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes, and actions (e.g., positively or negatively) |
| What arguments are employed in discourse? | Argumentation | Persuading addresses of the validity of specific claims of truth and normative rightness |
| From what perspective are these nominations, attributions, arguments expressed? | Perspectivisation | Positioning the speaker's or writer's point of view and expressing involvement or distance |
| Are the respective utterances articulated overtly, are they intensified or mitigated? | Mitigation and Intensification | Modifying the illocutionary force of utterances in respect to their epistemic or deontic status |

The discursive strategies reflected in this table and their accompanying questions serve as a basic starting point to a larger understanding of how historical factors can influence ideologies and, subsequently, discourses of specific topics.

2.2.3. Critical Discourse Studies and media studies

Critical analysis can be applied to a great number of discourse genres – speeches, advertisements, books, etc. But media especially has been a focus for language and communication scholars in general, and CDS scholars in particular. As Bell (1995, p. 23) explains, there are solid reasons for this link between critical discourse studies and media studies: for one, media outlets provide a rich source of data to be analysed, and that data is usually readily available; two, media usage not only represents people's use of and attitudes about language, but can also influence those attitudes; three, media provide a window into social meanings and stereotypes through language use in a given society; and four, media reflect the formation and expression of culture, politics,

and social life. According to media scholar Sean Phelan (2018), this area of media studies focuses on examining the political, social, economic, and cultural implications of various mediums and their position of authority as “the media”. As previously explained, CDS has an interest in media outlets due to their “manifestly pivotal role as discourse-bearing institutions” (Bell & Garrett, 1998, p. 6), and their role in reproducing or challenging socio-political dominance.

Despite their seemingly aligned objectives, the relationship between CDS and media studies is far from linear or complementary. In his chapter explaining the link between media studies and CDS, Phelan (2018) avoids using the, as he describes, “capitalised identity embodied in the acronym” CDA, arguing that the use of this term refers to a very specific and distinct method of interrogating texts. While this “institutionalised” CDS approach is ideal for assisting in understanding, Phelan argues that he prefers the lowercase “critical discourse analysis” to allow for more theoretical and methodological openness. While he does not envision media studies and CDS as two unconnected circles of a Venn diagram, he also argues that media scholars have utilised various methods of critical discourse analyses before CDS became a distinct field. He is not alone among media scholars in this opinion; as he points out, the terms “critical discourse studies” and “critical discourse analysis” are noticeably absent from media scholar Chouliaraki’s 2012 book on humanitarian communication, despite the use of such an approach in the research.

With this in mind, the following section briefly explores the history of the relationship between media studies and the capitalised ‘CDS’, and critiques by media studies scholars against critical discourse studies.

The predecessor to CDS, Critical Linguistics (CL), developed in the 1970s with scholars at the University of East Anglia, based on a combination of critical approaches from existing social theorists and applied linguistics (Hart & Lukes, 2007). This approach provided the foundations of language analysis in journalistic material, with its focus on both linguistic characteristics and ideology (Kelsey, 2018). In particular, one of the seminal critical linguistics books, *Language and Control* (Roger Fowler, Hodge, Kress, & Trew, 1979) saw the publication of Trew’s book chapter ‘*What the papers say*’: *Linguistic variation and ideological difference*. In this chapter,

Trew (1979) interrogates news stories' use of linguistic devices such as nominalisation and passivisation in news articles. These two linguistic variations, uniquely analysed at this time in their promotion of a specific ideology, are now common points of analysis in CDS research.

Linguistic scholar van Dijk was at the forefront of the next major movement in critical analysis of journalistic discourse. His work *Racism and the Press* (van Dijk, 1991) not only expanded the subject of the analysis to include broader textual items – like headlines and sources – and non-textual items – like news schemata and argumentation – but his research also delved into the larger social framework of news production. His interdisciplinary socio-cognitive approach includes interrogations on structural processes in news production and the reproduction of public beliefs and biases in both the production and consumption of news. His methodology also proved innovative for the time in its combination of both quantitative approaches through content analysis and qualitative approaches through critical discourse analysis. The emphasis on researching subjects beyond the text proved to be an important shift in journalistic analyses. Media scholars began to shift their focus beyond purely textual analyses and onto both the processes of production from the practitioners' perspective, and the process of consumption from the audience's perspective.

A number of scholars since van Dijk have expanded the use of critical discourse approaches in media texts, from Fairclough's broader inclusion of contexts alongside texts in *Media Discourse* (1995b), to Kress and van Leeuwen's (1996) emphasis on analysis of visual design and images in media. Since the early 1990s, Bell and Garrett (1998) state that critical discourse analysis has factored into the majority of research on media discourse, arguably holding an almost hegemonic position in the field of media discourse and media studies.

When it comes to critical discourse approaches in media studies, Phelan (2018, p. 288) argues that there are three distinct levels of media analyses that can be discerned in scholarly research: the linguistic level, which emphasises the structural conventions of media texts and language, such as semantic and grammatical properties; the interdiscursive level, which explores how representations, identity and social constructions are negotiated in media spaces; and the sociological level, which focuses

on the media discourses in relation to socially constructed phenomena. More recently, these same theories and approaches have been applied to digital forms of journalism. Whereas spatial placement (size of headlines, page placement, etc.) within the physical document of a newspaper or magazine are areas of interrogation for traditional media, more dynamic multi-modal methods of analysis are being developed to incorporate modern online news texts (Kelsey, 2018).

Despite the obvious overlap between CDS and media studies, many media scholars are hesitant about linking the two together too closely. In particular, Greg Philo of the Glasgow University Media Group has criticised stand-alone, qualitative textual analyses of media texts on the basis that they fail to integrate research on the social structures which can explain ideologies (Philo, 2007). He argues that text-based analyses are limited in what they are able to discover and questions the validity of ideological findings that depend wholly on text as the object of interrogation. In this, Philo argues that media studies cannot limit itself to critical discourse approaches, because journalism as an authoritative social construction in our society warrants an investigation that goes beyond the language utilised.

While acknowledging these limitations to critical discourse studies, this research takes the perspective of Fürsich (2009, p. 238), who argues that media texts represent “a distinctive discursive moment between encoding and decoding that justifies special scholarly engagement” due to its potential as a site of ideological negotiation and its existence as a mediated reality. While large-scale projects such as those by the Glasgow University Media Group, which incorporate research on production, content, and reception, can certainly have impressive contributions to social research, this does not negate the value of critically interrogating texts on their own. Fürsich (2009) argues for the validity of textual analyses in media on the following grounds: one, textual analyses do not promise the single, correct interpretation of a text or even every conceivable interpretation a text may contain, but instead function as an argumentative activity, proposing and providing evidence for possible interpretations; two, textual analyses allow for negotiations that are beyond the producers’ or consumers’ intentions or interpretations, respectively, by taking the text as an entity on its own; three, textual analyses allow for discovery of narratives, myths or rituals beyond what the producers or consumers would be able to recognise, providing anthropological

insights; four, textual analyses are not limited to just text, and can challenge the larger questions of which perspectives and worldviews are encouraged and which are excluded; and five, as Fiske (1987) described it, texts themselves are important not because they reproduce reality, but because they reproduce the dominant sense of reality – a sort of mediated reality. Of course, no single, isolated text should be seen as sufficient content for true critical discourse research, but that is not what CDS argues for. As Fürsich (2009, p. 246) states:

“Since media are such significant institutions for creating meaning in our societies one of the central tasks of media scholars should be to analyze and interpret what spectrum of reality media allows for. More specifically, since journalism has had such a privileged position as central institution for establishing what is to be considered as objective or true and even common sense, it is important for journalism scholars to analyse which spectrum of facts is permitted by this mediated reality and what is silenced. As textual analysts we can elucidate the scope and spectrum of the mediated reality in our heads at a given point of time and its relationship to ideology and social change.”

Furthermore, the aforementioned variety of approaches and structured methodologies of CDA – such as the inclusion of historical context or the use of corpus-based CDS software – safeguard against the potentially biased or misleading textual interpretations that Philo (2007) was concerned with. In short, textual analyses need not be accompanied by production- or consumption-based research in order to produce valid and significant findings.

While arguing that the linguistic nature of CDS is not an inherent limitation of the approach, this research still incorporates aspects beyond the discourse into the analysis. As is explained in the Methodology chapter, the content analysis serves as a guidepost for distinguishing quantitative factors including but not limited to language use. Furthermore, utilising the aforementioned Discourse-Historical Approach allows for the inclusion of much-needed context to provide a better understanding of the ideological factors at play in these state-sponsored media broadcasts.

3. Research Background

3.1. International Media Approaches: China and the USA

This research seeks to understand the ideologies present in state-sponsored media outlets from the United States and China in relation to each other and to the continents on which they broadcast. As this research utilises the Discourse-Historical Approach to CDA, it is crucial to understand the larger context and relationships between these entities. Therefore, this section tackles the following: first, it describes China and the United States' approaches to foreign countries and their media; second, it analyses the media ideologies present in the United States and China in relation to others around the world; and fourth, it introduces the subjects of this research, the state-sponsored media outlets *Voice of America* and *China Radio International*.

Western rhetoric considers China to be an emerging superpower, or country with the capacity to project power and influence anywhere in the world, through economic, military, and soft power (Champion & Leung, 2018). The 'emerging' factor refers to China's growing economy, population, and military spending, as well as its international endeavours. Large-scale, far-reaching projects like President Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative seek to "leverage China's economic power to build a network of new institutions, inspired by new ideas, to pursue new projects that will knit Eurasia, the South Pacific, and Eastern Africa into a tight network of economic, cultural, political, and strategic relations" (Callahan, 2016, p. 3). While China is well on its way to becoming a regional powerhouse, its ambitions do not appear to stop there. The country's involvement and influence have continued to expand around the globe in the past few decades. Particular attention is paid to regions such as Latin America and Africa, which do not necessarily adhere to the Western ideology of Europe or North America.

Of course, the stellar rise of China and its economy have not gone unnoticed by other global powers, especially from DAC countries concerned that the country's involvement will hinder their own global status and influence. Moreover, China's ideological approach to involvement in foreign nations is usual different, and often in contrast, to those of Western global powers. As stressed by Premier Zhou Enlai, China's involvement has long been framed as focused on mutual benefit and

cooperation through economic exchanges, in contrast to the DAC model of monetary aid and conditional interventions (Gagliardone, 2014). In this way, the Chinese model most often seeks to support existing governments in partner nations through trade and exchanges, rather than the Western donor-recipient relationship (Strange et al., 2013). In Latin America, for example, China's involvement can be seen in the proliferation of China-oriented business programmes and trade fairs, alongside service companies geared to help Latin American producers tap into the Chinese market; on the cultural side of things, there is also the spread of Chinese-language institutes and university courses across Latin America (Ellis, 2009). On the African continent, China spent US\$6 million to refurbish the government-owned Liberian Broadcasting Corporation, yet it did so in exchange for the right to broadcast Chinese and English-language programmes on public television (Myers, 2009). While DAC countries often have stipulations, or conditionalities, tied to their aid donations, this is largely absent in the Chinese approach. Instead, Chinese involvement in African nations' development is usually in the form of commercial exchanges, such as the agreed-upon use of Chinese companies or materials for African infrastructure projects (Myers, 2009). Though China appears disinterested in the internal political affairs of partner nations, it does not have ties or diplomatic relations with any nations that recognise Taiwan (Strange et al., 2013).

This apparent aversion to becoming politically involved in foreign nations has gained China a fair amount of criticism from the West, partially due to the suggestion that the country prefers to work with 'rogue states' (Fish, 2010; Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small, 2008). China also invests in countries with relatively anti-US foreign policy approaches, such as Venezuela and Ecuador, despite cautioning from the West. However, scholarly research has shown preference for anti-West or 'rogue states' does not actually exist; instead, China appears to be largely indiscriminate with its support, aside from countries that openly recognise Taiwanese autonomy. Dreher, Fuchs and Nunnenkamp (2013) found that democracies are just as likely to receive Chinese support as authoritarian regimes, and a report by Strange et al. (2013) state that Chinese partnerships with African countries is spread more or less equally across the continent regardless of political leanings.

While understanding the broader context of diplomatic approaches is crucial, the core of this research is foreign media approaches. As part of their diplomatic practices, both China and the United States engage in media interventions and support as part of their public diplomacy initiatives, especially in low-income countries. As China's interest and investment in the media systems of various countries has increased, there has been concern and even condemnation from Western countries involved in media development. A Reporters Without Borders' representative went so far as to call China's media involvement "toxic for democracy" and insist that its interventions should be watched closely ("China 'toxic for Africa freedom,'" 2008). This perspective undeniably comes from Western notions of what constitutes "good" journalism: a free press, a government watchdog, an independent and usually privately financed media outlet. Such criteria are used as a barometer when ranking world media systems in the way that organisations like Reporters Without Borders and Freedom House do ("Detailed Methodology," 2018; "Freedom of the Press 2017 Methodology," 2018). As such, this singular perspective of quality journalism could potentially negate the legitimacy of all other forms of media. Such a perspective, and its relation to journalistic ideologies, will be discussed in more detail below. First, it is essential to understand precisely what kinds of media activities both China and the United States are exporting to other countries.

Media assistance from China in the form of loans or trade usually supports existing systems and governments, and the largest investments are to telecommunications infrastructure. This is seen in the building of satellite receivers, towers, transmitters, generators, and antennae in countries such as Guinea, Nigeria, Kenya, and Zambia on the African continent (Myers, 2009), and in the launch of Venezuelan telecommunication satellites on Chinese spacecraft (Quinones, 2012). Beyond infrastructure, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Beijing Action Plan has also emphasised journalism training for African media practitioners. The three FOCAC workshops that have been held since 2009 have resulted in the training of 42 journalists from 23 African countries, and covered topics such as "China-Africa relations and China's African policy, China's experience and achievements on economic reform and national development, and China's journalistic view and the operation of the Chinese press" ("The 3rd Workshop for African Journalists Held in Beijing," 2013).

China understands how news can be harnessed by a government in order to promote its agenda. This approach extends to their foreign broadcasting as well. Since the end of the Cold War, Aoyama (2004) noted, China has moved from strict propaganda to a more nuanced public relations strategy when it comes to public diplomacy, going so far as to change the name of the Propaganda Department to the Publicity Department. A 2018 article in *The Diplomat* by a Freedom House research analyst describes five trends in China's approach to global media as 1) a more aggressive approach to foreign media influence, 2) increased influence through media ownership and infrastructure; 3) innovation in a changing technological environment; 4) involvement in politics and public debate abroad, and 5) recasting foreign media markets in China's image (Cook, 2018). China has taken a more active role in facilitating forums and exchanges in the journalism industry since the turn of the century. In 2018, the government-affiliated All-China Journalists' Association sponsored a journalists' forum focused on China's Belt and Road Initiative for media representatives from more than 47 countries (Cook, 2018). On the African front, Beijing has explicitly outlined media cooperation between China and the African continent with the African Policy document which states that: "China wishes to encourage multi-tiered and multi-formed exchanges and cooperation between the media on both sides, so as to enhance mutual understanding and enable objective and balanced media coverage of each other. It will facilitate the communication and contacts between relevant government departments for the purpose of sharing experiences on ways to handle the relations with media both domestic and foreign, and guiding and facilitating media exchanges" (Wu, 2014; Zhu, 2006). Such exchanges are not limited to developing countries, however: in Australia, the Australia China Relations Institute organises tours that send high-profile Australian journalists on all-expense paid tours to China which result in articles that "accord remarkably closely with Beijing's strategic priorities", according to *The Guardian* (2018).

It seems that the West's frustration is not with China pushing its own agenda so much as China's failure to support the Western agenda. For example, BBC coverage of Reporters Without Border's analysis of China states that the Asian superpower "gave aid without asking for political reforms in return," which thereby "made it difficult for Western countries to assert pressure" ("China 'toxic for Africa freedom,'" 2008). By

not attaching conditionalities to their media assistance, China is viewed in the West as undermining the West's efforts to achieve the political reforms they seek.

But China's media involvement isn't lacking in ideology; its principles are simply different from those of most Western powers. In keeping with their stance on supporting existing regimes, China's media support primarily focuses on state media actors, even to the detriment of non-state media. In Laos, China signed an agreement to upgrade the country's national television channel in order to "raise the production quality of Lao National Television's TV programs and provide technical support for better cultural communication between China and Laos" (X. Wang, 2018). Likewise, in Zimbabwe, China supported President Robert Mugabe by providing jamming devices to be used against independent radio stations during an election year (Kurlantzick, 2007). Aside from this support for existing governments, however, "Chinese assistance in the media and telecommunications sectors indicates this approach has been consistent in the policy realm, where...Chinese authorities have exercised little or no pressure to promote reforms or shape the regulatory environment" (Gagliardone, 2014, p. 6).

Beyond support to existing media structures within a country, China has also been expanding its own media presence across the globe. Media outlets such as CCTV, Xinhua, and China Radio International have expanded as a way to both promote Chinese media values – such as positivity and support for the government (Xiaoling Zhang, 2013) – in addition to Chinese culture as a whole (Gagliardone, 2014). Beyond this, *The Guardian* reports that at least 30 foreign newspapers – including such names as *The New York Times*, *the Wall Street Journal*, *the Washington Post*, and *The Telegraph* in the UK – carry Chinese government-supported inserts called *China Watch* that "take a didactic, old-school approach to propaganda" (Lim & Bergin, 2018). Wu (2014) states that this emergence is partly due to the realisation that the China narrative was being told through the lens of other foreign media outlets, who do not always strive to portray a fair depiction of China. For example, *China Daily* stated that China is often portrayed in foreign media as "grabbing land, extracting resources and neo-colonialism in Africa" (W. Chen, 2013).

Scholars have found that China's public diplomacy efforts have a very specific target audience in a country's elite (Kurlantzick, 2007; Wu, 2014). For CCTV, the cost of subscription to cable and satellite providers means viewers would most likely be from upper-income households, while China Daily's Africa edition is specifically targeted at embassies, think tanks, universities, financial institutions, and international organisations (Wu, 2014). This emphasis on elite audiences is also suggested as the reason for China's expansion in places such as Nairobi, Kenya, where the media outlets exist alongside the head offices of other global media players and institutions (Wu, 2014). However, there are no definite numbers on the amount of funding that China puts into these media outlets, as such information is not made public by the Chinese government (Strange et al., 2013).

The United States' government has had quite a different approach to foreign affairs in general and international media support in particular. Rather than mutually beneficial trade agreements, the relationship between the United States and non-Western countries has usually been described as donor-to-recipient, through aid and development support (Ruttan, 1996). This approach is largely shared by other member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (Cooper, 2017). As a DAC member country, the United States government works through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and with numerous multilateral organisations as well as non-governmental organisations to carry out its development work (Ruttan, 1996). The 30 DAC member countries, primarily located in North America and Europe, adhere to a mandate to "provide analysis, guidance and good practice to assist its Members and the expanded donor community to enhance the quality and effectiveness of development assistance, particularly regarding pro-poor economic growth and poverty reduction", and to "promote perspectives on global public goods and policy coherence for development in coordination with other policy communities in OECD", among other charges ("The Development Assistance Committee's Mandate," 2018). In stark contrast to China, DAC countries work within the confines of conditionality, or the use of economic or political requirements that must be met in order for recipient countries to access aid (Killick, 1998).

The concept of international development as it is currently practiced by DAC countries, including the United States, is usually credited as starting with the Marshall Plan, the economic stimulus used to boost war-damaged European countries following World War II (Ruttan, 1996). From there, it spread beyond reconstructing Europe to aiding a number of post-colonial, former Soviet bloc and ‘developing’ countries around the globe, including many in sub-Saharan Africa (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004). In 1961, the different government agencies overseeing economic aid to foreign entities were united under the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) with the Foreign Assistance Act (USAID, 2018).

Media involvement from the United States takes a largely contrasting approach to China’s support via government institutions. In keeping with its emphasis on good governance and democracy, media support from the US, as with most DAC countries, focuses on building up independent media with the goal of holding governments and corporations accountable for their actions (Myers, 2014). As such, international development support from DAC countries is often divided up into three primary categories: communication for development, which promotes or facilitates development goals; media development, which includes projects or programs intended to strengthen the quality, sustainability, plurality, and/or independence of the news media; and media infrastructure, which, similarly to the Chinese approach, aims to enhance the infrastructure, equipment, and other physical needs of media outlets (Scott, 2014). In their report on official development assistance (ODA) funding to media, Cauhape-Cazaux and Kalathil (2015) also include public diplomacy as a fourth category, which will be addressed below. That report, coordinated by the OECD and CIMA in the United States, contains a very telling breakdown of media funding from DAC countries. Through USAID funding to a number of local and international NGOs and multilateral organisations, the United States spent more than USD \$85 million on media assistance in 2012 (Cauhapé-Cazaux & Kalathil, 2015, p. 9), the second-highest in the world after Germany. The majority of ODA from DAC countries went to Asia (roughly 24%), South America (6%), the Middle East (4%), and Africa (4%) (Cauhapé-Cazaux & Kalathil, 2015, p. 12). These assistance numbers include communications for development, media development, media infrastructure (including loans), and public diplomacy. An interesting assertion of the report is that 100% of ODA media support to Latin America came in the form of public diplomacy,

but the report does not elaborate on this situation other than highlighting that much of the media assistance to the region was focused on “democratization efforts” (Cauhapé-Cazaux & Kalathil, 2015, p. 3).

The United States is very open about the promotion of its media values in its development work. With the exception of Japan, the majority of DAC media projects focus on capacity building, typically through trainings (Scott, 2014). Though the expressed goals often focus on skills transference, a content analysis of project documents in South Sudan found a heavier emphasis on democracy and good governance than on capacity building (Cooper, 2016). This suggests that even when media development is conceived of as ‘media support for media’s sake,’ the agenda is actually more focused on promoting development and democracy. Similarly, Myers (2009) documented a long list of DAC countries that justify their media assistance by citing governance goals.

In contrast to Chinese goals, DAC countries and the United States have a marked preference for independent media, even (and perhaps especially) at the expense of government-sponsored media. A report by CIMA in the US (Myers, 2014) states that “in some cases, direct support was given by donors to overtly political, opposition newspapers specifically to nudge the democratization process along.” In another telling example, a report titled “The Media Missionaries” (Hume, 2004, p. 6) describes a media intervention ‘success’ in Serbia in which “independent media...sustained to a great extent by Western aid, contributed to the toppling of Slobodan Milosevic.” There is no mention in these reports of the quality of the papers’ content or how the newspapers fared once they had done their democratic duty, suggesting a preference for harnessing the power of the media for political ends rather than promoting quality journalism. In summary, it seems that China is more concerned with garnering the favour of existing politicians in target countries through its support to the media, while the United States would rather use their public diplomacy resources to help the government of their choice get into power. This has also resulted in accusations that Western donors disregard local context in favour of tick-box development (Berger, 2010), while China “seems to have adapted to the requests of its local partners...offering greater space for manoeuvre to actors trying to fend off Western conditionalities and put forward their own agenda” (Gagliardone, 2014, p. 12).

3.1.1. Public Diplomacy in the media aid agenda

Beyond these media assistance aims, there are also lingering questions of public diplomacy. Statistics on media assistance funding from the United States claim that the government spent more than 90 percent on ‘media development’ and nothing on public diplomacy (Cauhapé-Cazaux & Kalathil, 2015). However, scholars such as Pamment (2015) have pointed out that the line between what constitutes international development versus public diplomacy is practically non-existent, resulting in huge overlaps between the two. In the report to the US House of Representatives titled “Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Director for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World,” Djerejian (2003) identifies two primary arms of US public diplomacy: the US State Department and USAID. The report states that “AID’s programs, in the words of one of its top officials, are ‘American values in action’” (Djerejian, 2003, p. 66). Undoubtedly, the ability to shape a country’s media system through development support is a prime opportunity to spread American values, while simultaneously fostering goodwill from aid recipients.

However, public diplomacy through media outlets is occasionally practiced with slightly different goals than other forms of public diplomacy. While branding is important for large infrastructure projects or other development support, media outlets have the potential to gain more influence when not openly associated with the country of origin. In his paper “Media Influence, Ontological Transformation, and Social Change”, Pamment (2015, p. 7) explains that public diplomacy was initially conceived of in the 1960s as “purposive political and cultural influence over ‘neutral’ media and the developing society” – in short, a form of government-initiated propaganda. As such, both VOA and CRI have affiliated radio outlets that do not necessarily identify their origins. China Radio International has radio stations within the United States itself that have been accused of failing to make their Chinese government affiliations known (Qing & Shiffman, 2015), and the Broadcasting Board of Directors, which oversees Voice of America, chose to drop the VOA affiliation in favour of ‘Radio Sawa’ (‘sawa’ meaning ‘togetherness’ in Arabic) in order to downplay the American affiliation in certain countries (El-Nawawy, 2006). When the development goals of education and independence are in conflict with the public diplomacy goals of

supporting a foreign country's agenda, there is little question about which will ultimately win out.

3.2. Global media ideologies

Much of the contention between the two nations' media involvement in foreign countries can be ascribed to their own divergent theories surrounding media. There is no universal, definitive ideal of what constitutes the paragon of objective journalism, nor is objectivity a universal goal of journalism. Researchers often adopt a comparative descriptive model in order to categorise various aspects of media. Though it might appear simplistic, Chan and Lee (2017) argue that such comparative approaches to media have many epistemological and methodological advantages. One such advantage is that comparative research challenges normative assumptions or approaches by putting the subjects of analysis on an equal playing field instead of assuming a singular approach. Furthermore, and what is most crucial to this research, Chan and Lee (2017, p. 1) state that comparative approaches enable researchers "to more readily identify the influence of social, political, and cultural contexts in shaping media and communication phenomenon."

While the use of comparative media studies is more clearly defined than ever (Chan & Lee, 2017; Esser & Hanitzsch, 2012), it is certainly not a new approach. One of the earliest global comparisons of media systems commonly referenced in media studies is Siebert, Peterson and Schramm's *Four Theories of the Press* (1963). Their approach posits that the political and societal structures of a country shape the press, and there are four broad categories that describe most countries' press systems: Authoritarian, Soviet Communist, Libertarian, and Social Responsibility. Under the Authoritarian Theory, the press exists to support and advance the policies of the government in power so that the government, in turn, can achieve its objectives. In the Soviet Communist approach, the government must be the possessor of information as well as the gatekeeper in determining what information is allowed to pass to citizens – thus, the need for censorship of undesirable information. As such, the press is viewed exclusively as a tool of the government.

Siebert, Peterson and Schramm's concept of a Libertarian press system hinges on an individual's autonomy in receiving and processing information, based on the assumption that rational individuals can determine the "truth" in an environment of free communication. In this system, the press ideally is entirely independent of government oversight and interference. However, there are arguments that in a capitalistic society, economic factors can lead to other influences and subsequent biases in the media. The final theory is Social Responsibility, which conceptualises a media system that is economically strong enough to remain free from both public influence from the government and private influence from advertisers and investors' interests. This theory also sees the press as a government "watchdog" in addition to serving the public's needs and interests.

The United States has, for the most part, operated under the Libertarian Theory since the country's founding in 1776 (Siebert et al., 1963). While freedom from government interference is enshrined in the law, financial dependence on advertisers and other sources of funding have led to concerns about freedom from other influences in the case of privatised media outlets.

At the time of publication of *Four Theories of the Press*, China, under Mao Zedong's leadership, could best be described through the Soviet Communist Theory. However, numerous scholars have argued that the four theories simply aren't applicable beyond the West (B. Winfield, Mizuno, & Beaudoin, 2000; Yin, 2008). Specifically, Winfield et al. (2000) argued that many attempts to categorise and compare media systems by Western academics fail to consider the diverse cultures, philosophies, and traditions that shape Chinese mass media.

Other attempts at categorisation of media systems include Hallin and Mancini's (2004) analysis of media in Western democracies. In *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*, the authors analyse 18 democratic countries based on four media dimensions: structure of media markets, political parallelism, professionalisation of journalism and the role of the state. From these criteria, they developed the categories of the Polarized Pluralist Model, characterised by strong state intervention and weak professionalisation; the Democratic Corporatist Model, characterised by a strong presence of public-service broadcasting and strong

professionalism; and the Liberal Model, which is primarily market-dominated with high self-regulation of the press. The United States fits the final model, with its dependence on privatised media and strong sense of professionalism. Hallin and Mancini's approach, however, is inherently limited by its exclusive focus on Western democracies.

With the aim of creating a less normative and more globally-minded media comparison system, Hanitzsch (2011) included countries from every continent in his study of journalistic milieus. His research, based on surveys of journalists from 18 countries, identified four journalistic perspectives: populist disseminators, detached watchdogs, critical change agents and opportunist facilitators. The USA, alongside Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Australia, are primarily associated with the "detached watchdog" milieu, characterised by "non-involvement, detachment and a perception of journalism as the Fourth Estate" (2011, p. 486). In contrast, China, as well as the only African country in the sample, Uganda, both fit into Hanitzsch's milieu of the "opportunist facilitator" – "essentially a developmentalist approach to journalism, with journalists seeing themselves more in a constructive role as conveyors, 'partners' or even supporters of executive powers" (Hanitzsch, 2011, p. 488).

In Hanitzsch's work, the opportunist facilitator milieu results in what he considers a relatively weak power distance, as seen in the media's willingness to focus on positive portrayals of politics and business (2011). Hanitzsch explains that journalists in this milieu see themselves "as constructive partners of the government in the process of economic development and political transformation" (Hanitzsch, 2011, p. 486), in stark contrast to the detached watchdog of many Western nations. Countries with opportunist facilitator media systems, such as China, consider media as much more of a government public relations tool than as an accountability tool. In another work, Hanitzsch (2007, p. 375) points out that in this journalistic perspective "the responsibility of the media is often linked to the preservation of social harmony and respect for leadership, and it urges the media to restrain from coverage that could potentially disrupt social order."

It's worth noting that many of the attempts at categorisation of press systems assumes a normative approach that favours Western media values. Furthermore, most of these

attempts assume a homogenous “mainstream media” within a country, ignoring the various divisions that exist not only culturally across a nation but even within the journalism field itself. However, these perspectives are helpful when understood as an attempt to describe the values and cultural perspectives that shape diverse media systems around the world.

These values and cultural differences can have numerous impacts on media products. One aspect commonly addressed in media studies is the concept of framing, or selecting certain aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient, or prominent (Entman, 1991). Framing research attempts to understand how one particular worldview or ideology is delivered to an audience through repetition of certain words, phrases or narratives in news stories to the extent that such a perspective can eventually become widespread or seem to be common sense (Entman, 1991).

Despite these differences, however, there is also research revealing how similar international news coverage has become when it comes to certain topics. Television coverage of presidential elections in Greece, the US and China in 2012 was found to be surprisingly similar among the domestic media of five nations (Curran et al, 2015). While there were expected differences in framing and amount of coverage, on the whole the coverage was described as journalists from different nations working “from the same recipe book” (Curran, 2015, p. 125). The researchers attributed these similarities to “the interplay of power in the which the privileged access of governments to the media, the hegemony of market liberal thought, the dominance of a small number of news agencies, and the legacy of the Cold War” (Curran et al, 2015, p. 131). This interaction between national ideology and international media integration will be addressed in this research.

3.2.1. Media in the People’s Republic of China

Dominant ideology in China is often attributed to the influence of Confucian principles, which emphasise social stability, family values, obedience and moral discipline above all else (Hu, 2007). China’s journalism ideology is largely tied up in its dominant and elite ideology due to the perceived nature of the press under communism. In fact, the media’s role as a representative of the government has been

a cornerstone since before the official founding of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), created in 1921, adhered to the media philosophies of Marxist theory, which views the press as an ideological state apparatus that reflects the regime's stance on ideological issues (Donald, Keane, & Yin, 2002). From this perspective, control of the media was crucial to communicating the ideas and values of the Communist Party and socialist ideology in order to promote their revolutionary objectives (Xiaoling Zhang, 2011). According to Zhao (1998), the Party had three principles for journalism: one, the news media must accept the Party's guiding ideology as their own; two, the media must propagate the Party's programmes, policies and directives; and three, the media must accept the Party's leadership and the Party's organisational and press policies. China Radio International and Red China New Press (which later became Xinhua News Agency) were created during this time and under these policies in order to broadcast this ideology and mobilise people for the cause. It can be argued that it was partly the media, promoting the party's ideology to the public, that enabled the creation of the People's Republic of China in 1949 (Xiaoling Zhang, 2011).

By the end of the following year, the Party gained control of all of the previously privately-owned media outlets, including roughly 400 newspapers and 40 radio stations. Those outlets continued to espouse the ideals of the Communist Party, and became the Party's "loyal eyes, ears, and tongue" (Chang, 1989, p. 163). Within a decade, it would also come to play an infamous role in the Great Leap Forward by exaggerating the rate of production and concealing the famine plaguing the country, in an effort to jumpstart industrialisation above all else (Xiaoling Zhang, 2011).

Zhang (2011, p. 36) states that during the Cultural Revolution the press was used "as an instrument for extreme political indoctrination and persecution," in order to promote the "personal cultism of Mao Zedong". It was a purely top-down approach, meant to relay orders and ideas hierarchically from the central government to the masses. By the end of this period, the state-run media had lost much of its credibility (Xiaoling Zhang, 2011).

Under Deng Xiaoping, the media gained existence beyond the Party mandate. The most significant changes came in 1992, as China shifted from strict Marxism to more

of a market economy, a transformation which extended to media outlets (Xiaoling Zhang, 2011). Though it was still under tight control, the press was able to inform the audience about issues beyond those supporting the party, as well as provide entertainment and advertisements in order to generate the revenue now needed to support their existence (Chu, 1994). However, Zhao (1997) argues that this led to a more propagandistic model of journalism in the country, as the Party's influence on the press led to a "more subtle and less didactic" ideology. The new millennium saw further media liberalisation, as China's entry into the World Trade Organisation forced the country to open up to foreign media investment (Betty Winfield & Peng, 2005). The current media system in China is divided into three types: official mainstream media, which is directly owned by the government and is a dominant force in Chinese media; outer circle media outlets, which are traditionally affiliated with the central government but not official state media outlets; and fringe media, which were founded following the move to a more commercialised media system, and which enjoy more autonomy than mainstream or outer circle media (Betty Winfield & Peng, 2005).

Within these divisions, Zhang and Fleming (2005, p. 322) highlight three primary characteristics of the Chinese press since the introduction of marketisation: first, the media no longer serves exclusively as the Party's mouthpiece, but have been transformed to a "multicultural media industry with multiple functions such as providing news, information, knowledge, entertainment, voicing public opinion, and criticizing the government's wrongdoing"; secondly, the Party utilises media as a form of "development journalism", which focuses on educational and development goals, in addition to promoting the Party's political ideology; finally, media control has been mildly relaxed, due to a change in the strategy and the extent to which media is controlled. However, research on modern Chinese media shows that all media outlets must contend with the balancing act between state and economic pressures.

Perhaps the most unique characteristic of modern Chinese media is the question of ownership and, subsequently, influence. Media outlets are expected to compete and make profit in the market, but at the same time, use those profits to implement the will of the Party (Hu, 2007). Zhang and Fleming (E. Zhang & Fleming, 2005, p. 337) list the media's roles as "preeminently political propaganda machines, then they are

competitors in the media marketplace and lastly they are the provider of a public service.”

As all press is no longer directly overseen by the government, the government imposes its will on the press through a variety of alternate means. For one, media regulation agencies oversee the licensing of all media businesses, which must profess support to Party ideology. Furthermore, journalists are required to undergo pre-job training and must pass tests to receive a certification to practice journalism (Betty Winfield & Peng, 2005), all of which is overseen at the government level. Finally, directives and circulars from the government can explicitly provide rules for media coverage, and address perceived infractions committed by media outlets (E. Zhang & Fleming, 2005).

However, such difficulties are not an issue within China’s vast state-run media industry, as these outlets are directly in the domain of the Chinese Communist Party. China Radio International is included in this, as it is considered one of China’s “external propaganda” outlets, alongside *China Daily* and *China Today* (Shambaugh, 2007). According to Shambaugh (2007, p. 48), the goals of such external propaganda are 1) to tell China’s story to the world, publicize Chinese government policies and perspectives, and promote Chinese culture abroad; 2) to counter what is perceived to be hostile foreign propaganda; 3) to counter Taiwan independence proclivities and to promote unification; and 4) to propagate China’s foreign policy. Tsai (2017) argues that China’s external propaganda has also incorporated Western theories and approaches related to public diplomacy in order to more effectively reach foreign audiences. This includes adopting reporting methods used in Western countries and using the China Intercontinental Press (disputably a private publication) to spread articles. While media represents just one aspect of the Chinese Communist Party’s external propaganda efforts, it is nevertheless considered an important tool of China’s foreign policy.

Beyond the question of internal and external media, however, is the core question of ideology and how it is manifested overall in Chinese media products. One finding is that Chinese media often focuses on positive, solution-driven narratives in news stories. In their analysis of Chinese media coverage of the 4th United Nations

Conference on Women, Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998, p. 147) found that the “emphasis on reaching solutions to critical problems was exemplified in part by the general downplaying of conflict, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in the Chinese coverage.” The same research found that, despite assumptions of explicit promotion of communist ideology in the media, coverage in China Daily contained relatively little praise for China. Similarly, Zhang (2014) argues that the Chinese media approach can be considered “constructive journalism”, which focuses on positive solutions to the problems or issues covered in news stories. Zhang (2014) argues that CCTV Africa uses this constructive journalism in order to counter negative Western coverage of the continent and allow Africans to present their own stories.

For this research, the interest is not so much on China’s domestic media as it is China’s foreign media. Bondiguel and Kellner (2009, p. 30) quote Politburo member Li Changchun on the 50th anniversary of Chinese Central Television (CCTV): “In this modern era, whichever nation has advanced means of communication and powerful communication capability, it is that nation whose culture and values can spread more widely, and who can more effectively influence the world.” This perspective is practiced in earnest by the Chinese government. In an article simply titled “China is spending billions on its foreign language media” (“China is spending billions on its foreign-language media,” 2018), The Economist outlines how the China Global Television Network (CGTN) is challenging corporations such as CNN and BBC abroad, by increasing its presence and media output in countries around the world. In many cases, that push for international influence has paid off: The Economist article cites a 2016 survey of youth in 18 African countries who watched CGTN programmes, and found that 63% liked the channel, and more than half agreed with its “ideological agenda”.

Alvaro (2015) argues that use of the English language is especially powerful for Chinese media. He states that the use of the ‘coloniser’s language’ is an ideologically loaded weapon against countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States, where one can see “China’s state-controlled media sending English back to the colonisers, heavily laden with its own brand of covert ideology harbouring a Sinocentric worldview” (Alvaro, 2015, p. 262). This is done through what Ji (2012) has termed China’s ‘linguistic engineering’, or attempts to affect attitudes and beliefs

through the manipulation of language. This includes what Brady (2008) describes as fixed formulations of words (*tifa*, 提法) which are used to euphemistically label government projects and policies. Such terms are translated and utilised in English-language media as well, as seen in phrases such as “stability preservation” (维稳) and “social construction” (社会建设) (Qian, 2012).

3.2.2. Media in the United States of America

In 1791, 15 years after the founding of the United States of America, the country’s Constitution was amended to include the following: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or *abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press*; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” (*emphasis added*) (“US Constitution: First Amendment,” 2018). Though of course this support for an uninhibited press comes with stipulations and various interpretations, the intent is clear: the new government of the United States preferred a free and liberal press beyond the reach of government control. This concept was based on the philosophy of liberalism, as championed by British philosophers such as John Stuart Mill and John Locke (Terchek & Conte, 2001). The resulting press system in the United States is predominantly privately owned with government funding for broadcasters such as PBS (Public Broadcasting Service), NPR (National Public Radio) and, of course, VOA.

There is a wealth of academic research and theoretical approaches grounded in US-centric media models. In Siebert, Peterson and Schramm’s *Four Theories of the Press* (1963), the United States press fits the Libertarian Model. In this model, the press is largely protected from interferences by governing bodies, with the objective of seeking ‘truth’ through a pluralism of sources (Siebert et al., 1963). This model also accounts for “the theory of objective reporting” in the Anglo-American press tradition, which idealises non-partisan, fact-based reporting in order to function as a reliable source of information (1963, p. 60).

In Hallin and Mancini’s *Comparing Media Systems* (2004), which is based on media and political dimensions in Western democratic countries, the United States is categorised in the North Atlantic/Liberal model. The most distinctive characteristic of

this model is the “early and strong development of commercial newspapers”, along with a strong professionalisation of the industry, and a market-dominated system (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 202). Most recently, Hanitzsch and his team of researchers developed an approach for categorising media based on journalists’ perceptions of their function in a society. In this approach, journalists in the United States sided heavily with the “detached watchdog” milieu, which perceives of their role as critical and sceptical challengers of government and corporate elites. Journalists in this milieu are “least likely to advocate for social change, influence public opinion and set the political agenda” and “most opposed to the idea that they should support official policies in order to bring about prosperity and development” (Hanitzsch, 2011, p. 485).

Overall, media ideology in the United States – as in many Western nations – stresses the value of a free press as essential to creating an informed citizenry and is therefore considered essential to democracy. As was elaborated in previous sections, this belief in the ability of the press to power democracies shapes the United States’ approach to foreign development generally and media support specifically.

Of course, this preference for a “free”, “independent”, and “objective” press is a hypothetical ideal. In practice, US media and its coverage are shaped by the same cultural, ideological, and political influences that shape so much of the world’s media. Such biases not only manifest themselves in domestic reporting, where highly partisan media is increasingly becoming the norm, but also in international reporting. As US media has an influential reach beyond the country, a significant body of research has been dedicated to analysing US media’s coverage of the world beyond its borders.

One of the major ideologies identified in US coverage of China is that of the superiority of a capitalist economic system (like that of the US) over a communist system (like that of China). Kobland, Du and Kwan (1992) identified the predominant frame in coverage of China as “anti-communism” in their research comparing coverage of student demonstrations in South Korea in 1980 with similar demonstrations in China in 1989. They found that while government intervention in South Korea was framed as a legitimate response to a “rebellious insurrection”, government intervention in China was framed as “cruelly repressive” (1992, p. 72) –

arguably, because the students were protesting against the communism that the US disparages.

More recently, in their analysis of US and Chinese news coverage of the Fourth United Nations Conference on Women, Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998) found that anti-communist criticisms of China constituted 34% of the themes coded, which included the previously identified themes of oppression and deceitfulness. One outlet in particular blatantly accused China of making “clumsy efforts to silence the women in Beijing and to wall off its own people from conference activities” as a reflection “of a repressive dictatorship that should make any American wary,” (1998, p. 145), unabashedly juxtaposing the supposedly inferior political system of China with the obviously superior American way.

The anti-communist language and perspective are not exclusively reserved for China, however. Entman (1991) compared US media coverage of two similar incidents of passenger planes accidentally being shot down by military entities and found drastically different framing approaches. The primary difference between the two incidents were the perpetrators: when it was the Soviet Union downing a Korean passenger plane, the frame focused on the “moral bankruptcy and guilt of the perpetrating nation”; however, when it was the United States downing an Iranian passenger plane, the framing took the focus off the guilt factor and onto the complexity of operating advanced military technology.

Beyond these communist countries, the anti-communist perspective has occurred even in US media’s coverage of the African continent. Tanzania scholar F.I. Masha analysed coverage of two US media outlets in the 1960s and found that:

“American correspondents interpret...most occurrences through the haunting ghost of Communism. Instead of reporting events within the normal limits of journalistic error and style, they indulge in interpretive reporting through a mind apparently deliberately noticing cold-war intent in all foreign events. For them, an event is either pro-communist or pro-west – pro-west being identical with pro-American ... In this role of self-appointed international anti-communist agents, the reporters sometimes involve themselves in matters beyond professional journalism. Moreover, this frivolous pre-occupation with anticommunism usually leads to gross omissions or slanting of news – the sum total of which builds incorrect, unbalanced, and sometimes damaging articles.” (Masha, 1970, p. 22)

It's not surprising that the United States viewed African nations as such during the Cold War. This was the era that produced the term "third world" – a term that is still stubbornly ubiquitous in media today, and that refers to the overly simplistic division of the planet into "first world" capitalist countries, "second world" communist countries, and "third world" everything else (Solarz, 2012). African nations, many of which were moving towards and achieving independence from their colonisers at the time, fell into this final category. This biased tendency of US media outlets was pronounced enough to draw the attention of Mozambique's Minister of Information Jose Luis Cabaco, who spoke of "the way in which Southern Africa problems are packaged as aspects of the Cold War, as being problems arising and mainly related to the East-West confrontation" (Cabaco, 1984) at a conference in Washington, D.C.

In order to academically understand these biases and their perpetuation in media, Kenney (1994) used Shoemaker and Reese's (1991) hierarchy of influences model to analyse potential barriers to objective reporting on multiple levels. His explanations range from the individual level, based on white journalists' racial attitudes, to economic factors pertaining to a lack of international media bureaus and local journalists. This last point has been cited by multiple scholars in relation to poor coverage of foreign nations in general. Terrell (1989) references 'parachute journalism', where journalists fly in to a foreign country, write the requested story, and fly back out, without time to even overcome jetlag, let alone develop a necessarily complex understanding of the countries or situations they are covering.

3.3. China Radio International & Voice of America

Academic scholars and public diplomacy practitioners often research government media outlets such as VOA and CRI based on their audience perception and impacts. As these outlets are government-funded entities intended to achieve government-created goals, it's crucial for stakeholders to know how much return they get on their investment. Audience perception is the most common measure of effectiveness for these government-sponsored radio outlets, and as with any international approach, context determines much of that perception. For example, Rampal and Adams (1990) found that some Asian audiences found VOA and the BBC World Service to be

credible news sources, while El-Nawawy's (2006) analysis of audiences in Middle Eastern countries did not perceive of Radio Sawa (a product of the Broadcasting Board of Governors along with VOA) as a credible source.

This research is not concerned with audience perception or credibility, but with the ideologies and language used by the outlets to achieve their mission of "winning hearts and minds". It does so through a comparative approach in order to highlight divisions between the two outlets and offer potential explanations for these divisions. However, it is still crucial to understand the existing academic literature surrounding CRI and VOA.

3.3.1. China Radio International

Research concerning China Radio International often includes it as one component of China's larger public diplomacy and soft power push, which includes Confucius Institutes and the proliferation of other major media outlets like CCTV and Xinhua (Hooghe, 2005; Kurlantzick, 2007). Other research focuses on CRI as a historical component of Chinese media policy overall. The outlet's beginnings predate the Communist Party itself, as overseas broadcasts began during the War of Resistance against Japan in 1941 ("About China Radio International," 2012). It first reached English audiences in 1947, but originally was simply a mouthpiece to broadcast information from Chinese leaders (C. C. Chen et al., 2010; Kurlantzick, 2007). Since this time, it has grown to the point of broadcasting in more than 60 languages with more than 100 international FM radio partners across Asia, Africa, North America, Europe, and Oceania (C. C. Chen et al., 2010; Qing & Shiffman, 2015). Its stated mission is to "introduce China to the rest of the world, introduce the world to China, report global affairs to the world, and promote understanding and friendship between the Chinese and peoples from other countries" ("Who We Are," 2017).

Rawnsley (2015, p. 274) states that a defining feature of China's public diplomacy media outlets is its motivation: "The Chinese have an abiding faith in the ability of international broadcasting to shape the global conversation about China, and an unshakeable belief that the Chinese must explain themselves and their behaviour to an international audience that allegedly misunderstands them. Hence public diplomacy activities are designed around the principle 'To know us is to love us'". Specifically,

CRI's primary focus is to deliver political, economic, sport, and cultural information about China (C. C. Chen et al., 2010). It also strictly adheres to Beijing's stance and agenda on sensitive issues, such as China's claims to Taiwan and the South China Sea. Similarly, Qing and Shiffman (2015) stated that during the pro-democracy Hong Kong Umbrella Movement in 2015, a CRI-linked radio station in the United States presented the mainland government's point of view, with no explanation of the reason for the protests, and assured listeners that the protests eventually "failed without the support of the people in Hong Kong".

CRI's media strategy is often summarised in the Chinese idiom of "borrowing ships to go overseas," (借船跨海) or using existing media structures to broadcast Beijing's message to the world (C. C. Chen et al., 2010; Qing & Shiffman, 2015). As part of China's public diplomacy approach, some involved with China Radio International have compared their mission to that of the US's Voice of America or the UK's BBC World Service (Qing & Shiffman, 2015). However, Chen, Colapinto and Luo (2010) found that CRI often does not enjoy the same perceived credibility and recognition overseas as its Western radio counterparts. Similarly, Zhang (2014) argues that Chinese media outlets in foreign countries continue to be undermined by suspicion on the part of listeners, possibly due to broadcast scepticism from Western media outlets. Despite this, CRI continues to grow and expand its online and broadcast presence, even as competitors such as VOA are cutting back on their expenses and reach (Nye, 2008). Rawnsley (2015, p. 281) attributes this lack of credibility partly to the longstanding disparity between media aimed at domestic audiences within China, and media aimed at foreign audiences outside of China (*duinei xuanchuan* and *duwai xuanchuan*, respectively): "What is said in the news on CCTV-1 in Chinese for Chinese audiences must be consistent with the programming in English on CCTV-N and with Twitter feeds for CCTV-America and the People's Daily; and the credibility of the message can be damaged in an instant by film and photographs taken by witnesses or 'citizen journalist' on a mobile telephone, uploaded to the internet and distributed around the world in seconds, even as the recorded event is unfolding."

3.3.2. Voice of America

Similarly to CRI, Voice of America (VOA) emerged in 1942 in order to reach populations in closed and war-torn societies during the Second World War (“VOA History,” 2018). The VOA Charter, signed into law in 1976, established the entity as a “consistently reliable and authoritative source of news,” which would be “accurate, objective and comprehensive” (“VOA History,” 2018). In keeping with its public diplomacy mission, it aimed to “represent America,” and “present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively” (“VOA History,” 2018).

VOA is just one branch of public diplomacy overseen by the Broadcasting Board of Governors, a government agency which began its existence as the United States Information Agency (“Broadcasting Board of Governors: Who We Are,” 2018). Other broadcasters, all with similar public diplomacy goals, include Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia and Radio Sawa, the Arabic-language station (“Broadcasting Board of Governors: Who We Are,” 2018). Altogether, BBG outlets broadcast in more than 60 languages around the world, and claim to have more than 226 million listeners (“Broadcasting Board of Governors: Who We Are,” 2018). Interestingly, VOA was kept out of reach of American listeners until 2013, due to the Smith-Mundt Act, which aimed to protect American citizens from taxpayer-funded government propaganda (Hudson, 2013). Part of the reason for this opening to American citizens was the BBG’s efforts to reach diaspora communities within the United States that might not be reached through programming in English (Hudson, 2013). This is what makes VOA interesting for this research: in a country that prides itself on the First Amendment and a free, independent press, this radio outlet bears an uncanny resemblance to the state-sponsored propaganda practiced in countries such as Russia and China. In his book on China’s soft power charm, Kurlantzick (2007, p. 183) claims that US public diplomacy faltered under the Bush administration, when “an increasingly partisan board of governors...prodded Voice of America, long the flagship of US broadcasting abroad, to become less impartial.” In contrast to China’s move from strict propaganda to a more nuanced public relations policy, the US seems to have made the opposite shift from a self-professed objective news source to a taxpayer-funded international propaganda machine.

Scholarly research on VOA has often focused on its objectivity and credibility – both understandable concerns given the nature of its existence. In his analysis of the “voices of America”, Uttaro (1982) found that VOA itself was *less* propagandistic than its cousins Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), despite the fact that VOA was more directly overseen by the US government. However, that is certainly not saying that VOA is propaganda-free. Uttaro notes that while most presidents have promised editorial independence for VOA, “none have been able to refrain from exerting pressure on its newswriters to tone down material that might damage or embarrass the administration” (Uttaro, 1982, p. 115). In the case of RFE, which was directed at the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, Uttaro (1982, p. 110) argues that they resorted to using “the very methods of persuasion that its broadcasts purport to combat.”

Similarly, Ungar argues that VOA has long struggled with juggling its supposed autonomy with its mission for the United States government. Writing 20 years after Uttaro, Ungar (2005, p. 7) states that “political interference in programming decisions, thought to be a thing of the past, has returned.” Specifically, he highlighted the Congressionally mandated editorials expressing the official views of the US government made in each broadcast that “now blend into or trump objective news reports” (Ungar, 2005, p. 7).

On the credibility side of the spectrum, one study from 1990 compared VOA to the BBC based on criteria such as the quality of sources, selection and relevance of news items, accuracy and balance in news items, and use of propaganda techniques including ideologically loaded language (Rampal & Adams, 1990). While the research found no statistically significant difference in the credibility of the two outlets based on the criteria, the research did not include any audience perception components to gauge if that perceived credibility was shared with potential listeners. Much more recently, an audience-centred approach was used to research perceptions of the US by listeners of Radio Sawa, another public diplomacy media outlet overseen by the Broadcasting Board of Governors alongside VOA (El-Nawawy, 2006). One finding of the study was that frequently listening to Radio Sawa did not have a significant impact on the audience’s perception of US foreign policy. This is possibly due to the fact that “most respondents in this study’s sample reported listening more frequently to Radio

Sawa's music, not its news" (El-Nawawy, 2006, p. 200). Perhaps the most significant finding, however, was that foreign audience perceptions of the source impacted perceived credibility – in short, "receivers' awareness of a source's intention to persuade others in a way that would benefit him, would negatively affect the source's credibility" (El-Nawawy, 2006, p. 200).

While it is important to understand how these public diplomacy media outlets are perceived of by the audience, this research focuses not on the audiences receiving the messages, but the messages being sent. In this case, there is little to no research focusing on how VOA portrays the country that it is intended to promote, or the countries in which it is being broadcast.

4. Methodology

This research adheres to the notion of multiple methods of inquiry which supplement one another. Based on the theories of power, discourse, and ideologies outlined in the previous section, this research is divided into two complementary approaches: a quantitative content analysis of the media texts, and an in-depth critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the texts. In the case of the latter, both a quantitative approach to CDA through corpus-linguistic CDA and a manual CDA were conducted, with the quantitative aspect used to pinpoint patterns that were critically assessed in more detail through the qualitative analysis (Flowerdew & Richardson, 2018).

The previous chapter introduced the concepts of content analysis and critical discourse analysis in media through existing literature. This research is concerned with the ideologies present in state-sponsored media outlets, and how the states behind those outlets propagate those ideologies through media. Therefore, this section describes in detail how this research selected, collected, and analysed the necessary data, using theoretically-grounded social science methods.

4.1. Content Analysis


Social science research utilises an adaptation of the scientific method, which is based on the idea that *empiricism*, an approach based on observation and experimentation, is

distinct and valuable apart from *idealism*, an approach based on the belief that the mind and ideas are the truest source of knowledge (Vogt, 2005). Therefore, researchers identify questions or problems, based on other scholarly research or occurring in communication practices, identify concepts that may be involved in this problem or question, and propose possible explanations for the observed problem or question (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2014).

The concept of “content” in analyses of news media research seems fairly straightforward: it is the product that is created and delivered to the public, primarily via words and images. However, such content is the result of a complex system of inputs, ranging from larger cultural values to individual contributions from journalists. Riffe, Lacy and Fico (2014) provide a standard news outlet web page as an example, describing how it can be conceived of as reflecting the news organisation’s selection and omission from an array of potential stories, graphics, interactive features, and other content; a consequence of editors’ application of what has traditionally been called “news judgment”; based on numerous factors that visitors to the site need or want from that content; and shaped by other constraints such as what interactive content is available and how often material is updated. In short, “news content is the product or consequence of those routines, practices and values...is constructed by news workers...and reflects both the professional culture of journalism and the larger society” (Riffe et al., 2014, p. 9).

As such, news media cannot objectively “hold a mirror” to reality because that reality is always shaped by existing conditions. However, content can shine a light on the structures, from individual journalists to cultural values, that shape news coverage. By using content as a research subject, academics can draw inferences about the conditions of a news story’s production and the factors that shaped it. Riffe, Lacy and Fico (2014) propose the following content-centred model, which helps to illustrate how content analysis can be integral to theory-building about both communication effects and processes:

Table 2A. Riffe, Lacy and Fico’s Centrality Model of Communication Content



Conducting content analysis as a research method has advantages in that the content can be analysed without the risk of impacting the production itself – the research examines only the finished product, with no interference on the creation itself. As such, “there is little danger that the act of measurement itself will act as a force for change that confounds the data” (R. P. Weber, 1990, p. 10). For this reason, content analysis was selected for this research as the ideal method for discovering prominent ideology in news coverage coming from the United States and China.

The content utilised for this research comes from China Radio International (CRI), from the People’s Republic of China; and Voice of America (VOA), from the United States of America. After studying the programme schedule, it was found that both outlets have dedicated news programmes which are comparable to each other, and which therefore are ideal for a comparative content analysis. CRI has *Today*, a “locally produced program with a distinctly international flavour” that airs every weekday with two 54-minute sections on China Radio International (“CRI: Today,” 2018). VOA has *International Edition*, a world news programme which airs a 30-minute report and three 25-minute follow-up news segments Monday through Saturday (“VOA: International Edition,” 2018). Data collection took place between 1-31 March, 2016. Rather than selecting a specific news event to serve as the focus of the coverage, this timeframe was selected randomly – the idea being that this time span covers a typical monthly news cycle for both outlets, without focusing on an event that may provide skewed data focused on a single event.

The representative sample focused on Tuesday and Friday broadcasts from each outlet throughout the month. These days were selected in order to maximise the range of stories, as consecutive days were found to have a significant number of overlapping stories in both broadcasts. In order to have a comparable data set between the two, the content analysis focused on nine individual 54-minute news broadcasts from CRI, and nine 30-minute and nine 25-minute news broadcasts from VOA. The selected radio broadcasts were recorded, then transcribed using online audio transcription software. The transcription of 9 broadcasts each resulted in 63,376 words for CRI and 72,009 words for VOA, which meets the qualification for the desired “small specialized corpora” (Baker et al., 2008). Such a size allows for effective use of corpus linguistic software while also allowing for manual discourse analysis without being too labour-intensive. With both audio and text data in hand, the researcher then conducted both quantitative and qualitative content analyses, as described in detail below.

4.1.1. Quantitative Content Analysis

One of the earlier descriptions of quantitative content analysis by Berelson (1952, p. 18) defines it as “a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication.” This succinct description begs the question: how is it possible to quantify something as abstract as words and images? Riffe, Lacy and Fico (2014, p. 12) present a more precise definition of quantitative content analysis as the “systematic and replicable examination of symbols of communication, which have been assigned numeric values according to valid measurement rules, and the analysis of relationships involving these values using statistical methods, to describe the communication, draw inferences about its meaning, or infer from the communication to its context, both of production and consumption.” Whilst it is impossible to quantify a word or image, there are other ways of measuring them which, when used appropriately, can demonstrate what may not be obvious qualitatively. Typically, the process involves drawing representative samples of content, determining appropriate quantitative rules or standards by which to measure the content, and having researchers “code” or apply those predetermined categories to the content. Once the coding is complete, the quantified data is analysed to discover patterns, characteristics, or relationships between content.

This is precisely the method used for the quantitative content analysis portion of this research. Each broadcast was transcribed and assigned a unique identification number. A preliminary coding scheme was created based on the research questions, which focus on each news outlet's coverage of their own country; coverage of China (in the case of VOA) and coverage of the United States (in the case of CRI); and coverage of other countries. Through repeated trials of the coding sheet with similar news segments, the coding sheet was altered multiple times. Perhaps the most significant change involved the unit of analysis. Whilst initially the unit of analysis was intended to be one day of news broadcasts (the first 54-minute daily segment from CRI and 30- and 25-minute daily segment from VOA), it was quickly discovered that this unit simply contained too much information and too many diverse stories for the coding scheme to be useful. Instead, the researcher opted for a method that is commonly used for print news studies, and the unit of analysis was changed to be an individual news segment, referred to as a "story" in this research. A typical radio broadcast contains multiple independent news stories focusing on a single topic and using sources related to that topic. The divisions between stories are usually clearly marked with a transition, making it simple to separate each unit of analysis. The final coding sheet is included in Appendix 1. The coding quantified the following:

Time

A radio news broadcast exists in a finite period of time, and news stories are budgeted for set amounts of time accordingly. Topics that are seen as more newsworthy or important are, understandably, afforded more time. Likewise, stories are usually presented in a hierarchical fashion: the more important the story, the earlier it happens in a broadcast. As such, the length of each news segment (the unit of analysis) was recorded, as well as its placement within the overall broadcast. Time was also a factor in the second focus area, which focused on sources. Time calculations are conducted in SPSS using time variables, which allows input in hours, minutes and seconds, and bases calculations on the number of seconds ("SPSS Time Variables Basics," 2018).

Sources

One cannot research news coverage without addressing sources. News sources, similar to academic sources, are the individuals or representatives that are quoted in a news

story to give it credibility or present a perspective. As with coverage time, the choice of who is given a voice and how much time they are allowed to speak during a broadcast is a marker of perceived importance and legitimacy. Sources were first divided between internal sources, such as presenters and correspondents, or external sources, which was determined by how the sources were introduced in the story. External sources were then categorised according to their role in relation to the story (i.e., speaking as a government representative, an academic, a private individual, etc.) and country that they are associated with (i.e. from the USA, China, or another country). Sources within these categories were combined in order to give an overall speaking time (i.e. government representatives spoke for a total of 0:04:23 in this story; Australian sources spoke for a total of 0:00:87 for this story). As such, the coding reveals both how many sources were consulted and how much time those sources were given to speak.

Topics

Topics were measured nominally based on four categories – domestic current affairs, international current affairs, domestic human interest, and international human interest – as well as categorised based on topics created ad hoc. The purpose of these categories is to allow a direct comparison between the two media outlets. As mentioned in the previous chapter, media coverage is as much about what is covered as it is about what is *not* covered. Therefore, topic comparison is an ideal way to see what each outlet views as important, and what each outlet prefers to exclude. The nominal categories provide a picture of what each outlet focused on overall – domestic versus international, and current affairs versus human interest.

Countries

As with all of the above areas, the question of countries is a question of which are deemed important by the news outlets and which can be overlooked. What is particularly distinct with these outlets is that they are both aimed at international audiences, and therefore in addition to giving other countries a view into domestic affairs, they need to speak to diverse audiences across the globe. In addition to coding the country of origin of the sources, the final section of the coding sheet focused exclusively on which countries and continents were mentioned, and in what context, in the stories.

4.1.2. Criticisms of Quantitative Content Analysis

Quantitative content analysis has advantages in that it allows for a non-obtrusive, non-reactive measurement of data that is gathered directly from the source. However, it's not without its flaws, and subsequent critics. Tankard (2001), for example, questions a single researcher's objective ability to identify and define frames in a story. However, this research avoids the question of researcher subjectivity by instead following Holsti's (1969) requirements that quantitative data be restricted to manifest content. For this research, this means that the quantitative portion does not attempt to label and measure frames, but instead measures concrete, replicable information such as coverage time and country mentions to guarantee replicability. These measurements serve as points of comparison between the two news outlets, as well as valuable guides for the qualitative portion of the section. Any interpretation of these measurements occurs in the qualitative and analysis sections of the research, rather than at the point of coding.

Furthermore, Holsti (1969) recommends using a combination of both quantitative and qualitative research methods to supplement each other, which is precisely the aim of this research. Whilst the initial quantitative analysis serves to highlight disparities in coverage between the two, the quantitative analysis can investigate on a deeper level why those disparities may have occurred and can offer explanations as to their existence.

4.2. Critical Discourse Analysis

The critical discourse analysis (CDA) component of this research was conducted in two stages: the first was a corpus-based approach using corpus linguistics software, while the second was a traditional manual critical discourse analysis.

The rationale for utilising what's known as 'corpus linguistics' is that computer software can more easily identify linguistic patterns across large sets of text (Subtirelu & Baker, 2018). According to Partington (2003), this approach can benefit research in multiple ways: "At the simplest level, corpus technology helps find other examples of a phenomenon one has already noted. At the other extreme, it reveals patterns of use

previously unthought of. In between, it can reinforce, refute or revise a researcher's intuition and show them why and how much their suspicions were grounded.”

Therefore, this stage utilised Sketch Engine language corpus management software to extract and organise words and linguistic structures found in the text. For this research, the CRI complete corpus contained 63,376 words and 2,798 sentences, while the VOA complete corpus contained 72,009 words and 3,542 sentences. This puts each corpus in the range of “small specialized corpora” (Baker et al., 2008), which Aston (1997) delineates as between 20,000 and 200,000 words, or Gavioli (2005) delineates as between 50,000 and 100,000 words.

For small corpora like these, manual analyses coupled with preliminary computer analyses is recommended, as statistical significance on each item can be difficult to achieve. For very large corpora (in excess of 1 million words, for example), a critical discourse analysis is simply not feasible due to its labour- and time-intensive nature; such corpora might depend wholly on a computer-assisted critical linguistics approach. Small specialised corpora of this size, however, sit in the ideal position to allow for assistance from computational software, while still remaining feasible for manual critical discourse analysis.

In this research, the quantitative coding explained in the previous section and the critical linguistic techniques (word and cluster frequency, keywords) described in this section served as an outline or ‘map’ of the corpora. The combination of these more quantitative approaches served to highlight interesting points for a closer qualitative inspection, which was done both with the assistance of corpus concordances and manually based on the whole text (as per Baker et al., 2008). In particular, the software was used in this research to analyse word and cluster frequencies, keywords, and word sketches (including collocations and context) of predetermined terms particular to this research.

4.2.1. Word Frequency

Word frequency is a measure of how often a word appears in a set corpus. Seeing the number of occurrences of a single word allows for a comparison of other words within a single text, as well as a comparison of that word frequency compared to other texts.

This can reveal how important or salient a concept is considered within a work, or the opposite: how overlooked or ignored a concept is.

In addition to simple frequency, this approach reveals word choice. According to Haider (2017, p. 19), word frequency is important to determine “because language is not a random affair, and people have the choice to select which words to use and which words to neglect or not use.” Word choice – be it opting for a euphemism over a dysphemism, or simply avoiding a word altogether in favour of another – can hint at bias and underlying ideologies of speakers. Furthermore, word frequency can also help to determine markedness, or a means of understanding a word or concept based on its binary opposite (Baker, 2010).

For this analysis, Sketch Engine was used to first determine simple frequency for both CRI and VOA. In addition to overall frequency based on lemma – the various conjugated forms a single word can take – the word frequency was also broken down according to parts of speech – noun, verb, adjective, and adverb.

4.2.2. Cluster Frequency

Focusing on single words for frequency inherently omits multi-word nouns and expressions (Baker et al., 2008; Haider, 2017). Multi-word concepts such as “United States,” “South China Sea”, or “sub-Saharan Africa”, can easily be overlooked when examining individual words. Therefore, this research also examines multi-word expressions, also known as word clusters or n-grams.

For this section, Sketch Engine was utilised to measure multi-word expressions of two, three, and four words. Clusters also helped to define and clarify findings from a single-word search. For example, a single-word list of the complete VOA corpus revealed that the word “African” occurred 31 times, which might have one believe there are frequent mentions of people from the African continent; however, from a cluster word list, it was found that the two-word term “African American” was used 14 times, meaning that almost half of the occurrences of the word “African” were, in fact, used in reference to Americans.

4.2.3. Keywords

Keywords and key terms appear more frequently in the focus corpus than in a reference corpus, which serves to highlight rarer or more unusual low-frequency words. In this case, general language corpora are used as a gauge of word rarity. These words are calculated by utilising chi-squared or comparable measures to test for words or terms which have a difference in rate of occurrence that is statistically significant. As such, it takes into account the total number of words in the target corpus and the reference corpus, as well as the occurrence of a particular word or term in both the target corpus and the reference corpus (Haider, 2017).

4.2.4. Collocation and Concordance Analyses

Once linguistic patterns in the corpora as a whole had been established, the word sketches allowed for more specialised findings, particularly in the form of word collocations. For this research, the goal was to understand the language and linguistic components used not only in news stories in general, but also in coverage of different countries. Therefore, word sketches were used in relation to China, the United States, and other nations. Both the country as a noun (“China”) and demonym (“Chinese”) were utilised. For the United States, multiple word sketches were utilised to cover all possible monikers (“USA”, “US”, “United States”, “Americans”). Occurrences of these words were grouped by part of speech and by the frequency of their collocates. Collocation is determined by observing how many times a word appears in conjunction with the target word, and therefore gives the researcher an idea of how commonly a word is used in a particular context. It is calculated based on the frequency of the target word, the frequency of the collocated words, and the frequency of that collocation itself (Baker et al., 2008). Determining collocations is essential for discovering discourse prosody, or the way in which the target word is associated with positive or negative words (Stubbs, 2001). Haider argues that this itself is a source of linguistic influence: when a country is frequently collocated with negative language over time, it can create an association that was not previously present.

While collocation lists are useful for an overall perspective, it is also essential to examine the context in which these words and their collocates occur. For that, concordance analysis allows the researcher to see the keyword in context (KWIC). For example, concordance was used to determine that the term “Americans” was used in

reference to citizens of the United States, rather than in reference to “Latin Americans” or “South Americans”.

4.2.5. Manual Critical Discourse Analysis

Corpus linguistics brings a quantitative aspect to critical discourse analysis, which is otherwise a purely qualitative process. However, corpus linguistic approaches are often criticised for disregarding context for the sake of appearing more objective and quantifiable, which can lead analyses to be more descriptive than interpretive (Baker et al., 2008; Mautner, 2007). Similarly, Stubbs (1994) argues that the large-scale patterns across long texts found in corpus linguistics need to be combined with the detailed study enabled by seeing the words in context.

Furthermore, this research is positioned in the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) to critical discourse analysis, which demands an extensive familiarity with the historical and social context of the researched items. Baker, et al. (2008, p. 295) argue that the strength of the DHA approach is in building on “a network of referential, predicational and argumentative strategies along with analysis of metaphors, presuppositions, mitigation and hyperboles, etc. in deconstructing a text, all of which require a close analysis of context,” all of which lie beyond the capabilities of a quantitative corpus linguistic approach.

Therefore, this research takes the view that neither a strictly quantitative nor a strictly qualitative approach can create a holistic image of the radio broadcasts. It follows the conclusions of Baker, et al (2008, p. 297) that CDA “can benefit from incorporating more objective, quantitative CL approaches, as quantification can reveal the degree of generality of, or confidence in, the study findings and conclusions, thus guarding against over- or under-interpretation”, while at the same time acknowledging that “CL needs to be supplemented by the close analysis of selected texts using CDA theory and methodology.” Once the content analysis had highlighted patterns in speakers, topics, and countries mentioned, and the corpus linguistics had highlighted the words used to describe specific countries and the news in general, the final step was to take that information and examine in detail exactly what those findings meant in terms of language.

The findings from the content analysis and corpus linguistic approaches highlighted certain stories that were significant to the research based on DHA, and these stories in their entirety were subjected to a manual critical discourse reading. This approach also proved both more achievable and more necessary based on the small, specialised nature of the corpus; as both corpora were fewer than 100,000 words, it was difficult to establish high keyness scores for CL, but possible to examine each word in more detail using CDA. This step became even more crucial when examining topics that appeared infrequently throughout the text.

This approach also revealed a limitation of corpus linguistics: while the keywords in context provided more explanation for the target word, there is no way for such a tool to account for pronouns or various descriptions which referenced that same target word. For example, the software identified the name “Gambia” in the sentence “*China on Thursday resumed ties with former Taiwan ally Gambia...*” (VOA_20160318_2330_2); however, the software could not detect the reference to Gambia in the introduction to the story: “*China renews relations with an African nation no longer recognising Taiwan*” (VOA_20160318). Such a detail might not be important for large corpora. For small corpora, as analysed in this research, however, it was not only important to have every reference included, but also important to note when references were made via omission (i.e. the failure to include the name of that “African nation”.)

For the manual critical discourse analysis, MAXCQD qualitative data analysis software was utilised. To highlight trends in how VOA and CRI covered other countries, the process of open, axial, and theoretical coding was utilised (Böhm, Glaser, & Strauss, 2004). As open coding is based on background knowledge of the situation, the initial open coding was heavily shaped by the previous content analysis and corpus linguistic approaches. Axial coding followed another close reading of those open codes to determine categories. Those axial categories were then organised and examined to determine the central theme or phenomena. These final theoretical codes, with extensive examples from the corpora, are discussed in the manual critical discourse analysis section of the results chapter.

5. Results: Content Analysis

Of the nine 54-minute CRI broadcasts, there was a total of 7 hours, 42 minutes, and 31 seconds of stories. Similarly, the 9 55-minute VOA stories came to a total of 7 hours, 14 minutes, and 31 seconds. These totals are based on the stories analysed, excluding dead time and advertisements. For both outlets, as expected, advertisements were only for internal promotion – either a general advert for CRI or VOA itself, or an advert for other CRI or VOA programmes.

5.1. Topics

5.1.1. Story Length

The most striking difference between CRI and VOA’s broadcasts is in the length of their stories. CRI chose to cover fewer topics in much greater detail. The 9 CRI broadcasts covered a total of 30 independent stories. Those stories had an average duration of 15 minutes and 23 seconds per story, with the shortest story lasting 56 seconds and the longest lasting 53 minutes and 37 seconds – almost the length of one entire broadcast (Table 3A). In sharp contrast, VOA had 122 stories over the course of the 9 broadcasts. The average story was 3 minutes and 33 seconds, with the shortest story lasting 24 seconds and the longest lasting 10 minutes and 57 seconds (Table 3A). Due to this drastic difference between the two, this section calculated for two separate units of analysis: frequency counts are based on a story as a unit of analysis, with “story” referencing a discussion around a single topic or with a singular focus; however, the drastic difference in story duration between CRI and VOA means that a story as a unit of analysis only reveals part of the picture. Therefore, time, as measured in hours, minutes and seconds, was also used as a unit of analysis when comparing stories and topics.

| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
|-----|-----|---------|---------|---------|----------------|
| CRI | 30 | 0:00:56 | 0:53:37 | 0:15:23 | 0:18:03 |
| VOA | 122 | 0:00:24 | 0:10:57 | 0:03:33 | 0:01:55 |

5.1.2. Domestic versus International Stories

For the comparison between international and domestic stories, CRI and VOA had comparable coverage. For CRI, 36.7% of stories focused on domestic issues, as opposed to 63.3% that focused on international stories (Table 3B), as explained in the Methodology chapter. For VOA, those numbers were slightly lower for domestic, at 29.5%, and slightly higher for international, at 70.5% (Table 3B).

| Table 3B. Domestic vs. International Stories | | | | |
|---|---------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|
| | domestic N | domestic percent | international N | international percent |
| CRI | 11 | 36.7 | 19 | 63.3 |
| VOA | 36 | 29.5 | 86 | 70.5 |
| $X^2 = .578$ | | | | |
| $p = .447$ | | | | |

A chi-square test was used to determine whether there was an association between the number of international or domestic stories and the news outlet. With a chi-square value of .578 and a p-value greater than 0.05, the difference was not statistically significant. As such, we can reject an association between domestic or international stories in relation to news outlet – both CRI and VOA were equally likely to cover domestic as international stories in their broadcasts.

However, the number of stories is only part of the issue. These are based on percentage of total stories and, as mentioned above, VOA had a significantly larger number of stories overall. Therefore, it is also important to analyse these based on the time component, as these are more comparable between CRI and VOA's broadcasts. For CRI, domestic stories took up a total of 3 hours, 28 minutes, and 48 seconds, or 45% of total coverage time. The mean of domestic stories is 18 minutes and 58 seconds. For international stories, those took a total of 4 hours, 12 minutes, and 48 seconds, or 54.8% of total coverage time (Table 3C). For VOA, only 34.5% of the stories were domestic, for a total of 2 hours, 30 minutes, and 1 second spent exclusively on the country (Table 3C). The remainder of the time – 4 hours, 44 minutes, and 20 seconds – focused on international stories, taking up 65.5% of the time. This difference is

probably due to the fact that a few CRI broadcasts – including the longest one – focused exclusively on a single, China-centric story.

| Table 3C. Domestic vs. International Story Duration | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------|------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|
| | domestic sum | domestic mean | domestic % of total | internation al sum | international mean | internationa l % of total |
| CRI | 3:28:48 | 0:18:58 | 45.20% | 4:12:48 | 0:13:18 | 54.80% |
| VOA | 2:30:01 | 0:04:10 | 34.50% | 4:44:29 | 0:03:18 | 65.50% |

5.1.3. Story Topics

Story topics were created on an ad-hoc basis, which resulted in a total of 24 independent categories. Some were quite specific – such as Topic 5, which focused exclusively on the Syrian Civil War – due to the amount of coverage by both CRI and VOA. For CRI, the highest frequency topics were jointly *diplomacy/international relations* and *domestic policy/activity* (each 16.7% of stories) and *science/technology* (13.3% of stories) (Table 3D). This was consistent with the top three topics based on time: *domestic policy/activity* took up 27.4% of the total time, *diplomacy/international relations* took up 22.5%, and *science/technology* took up 11.8% (Table 3D). The topics not covered were domestic elections (as there were no domestic elections at the time of the study), North Korea, music/film/entertainment, health, foreign economy, personality profile, nature/environment, military actions, humanitarian efforts or sports.

For VOA, the most frequent topics were, jointly, *ISIS/ISIS-related terrorism* and *music/film/entertainment* (each 13.1% of stories) and domestic elections (10.7% of stories) (Table 3D). Similarly, ISIS-related terrorism accounted for the highest amount of time on a single topic, at 16.6%, with domestic elections second at 15.8% of the time, and music/film/entertainment at 11.9% of the time (Table 3D). Since VOA has a greater number of stories, and therefore greater potential for diverse topics, it covered most of the topics with the exception of *multiple/world news update* – a category created for CRI’s regular news segment.

However, these numbers exclude the *editorials* topic, which refers specifically to the opinion piece at the end of each broadcast “reflecting the views of the United States government” (as per the introduction to each editorial). These covered a range of topics, but the noteworthy point is that they were opinion rather than news pieces.

Table 3D. Story Topics and Duration

| | CRI N | CRI N percent | CRI time | CRI time percent | VOA N | VOA N percent | VOA time | VOA time percent |
|---|----------|------------------|-------------|---------------------|----------|------------------|-------------|---------------------|
| domestic elections | -- | -- | -- | -- | 13 | 10.7% | 1:08:39 | 15.8% |
| foreign elections | 2 | 6.7% | 0:21:12 | 4.6% | 3 | 2.5% | 0:10:09 | 2.3% |
| domestic gov policy/activity | 5 | 16.7% | 2:06:42 | 27.4% | 2 | 1.6% | 0:08:57 | 2.1% |
| foreign gov policy/activity | 2 | 6.7% | 0:24:38 | 5.3% | 5 | 4.1% | 0:18:07 | 4.2% |
| Syrian Civil War | 1 | 3.3% | 0:20:40 | 4.5% | 6 | 4.9% | 0:21:53 | 5.0% |
| ISIS/terrorism | 1 | 3.3% | 0:03:29 | 0.8% | 16 | 13.1% | 1:12:13 | 16.6% |
| North Korea | -- | -- | -- | -- | 3 | 2.5% | 0:16:59 | 3.9% |
| entertainment | -- | -- | -- | -- | 16 | 13.1% | 0:51:40 | 11.9% |
| health | -- | -- | -- | -- | 4 | 3.3% | 0:05:26 | 1.3% |
| science/technology | 4 | 13.3% | 0:54:16 | 11.8% | 8 | 6.6% | 0:15:05 | 3.5% |
| business/industry | 2 | 6.7% | 0:40:47 | 8.8% | 6 | 4.9% | 0:12:11 | 2.8% |
| domestic economy | 1 | 3.3% | 0:50:39 | 11.0% | 1 | 0.8% | 0:01:09 | 0.3% |
| foreign economy | -- | -- | -- | -- | 1 | 0.8% | 0:03:21 | 0.8% |
| diplomacy/international relations | 5 | 16.7% | 1:43:53 | 22.5% | 8 | 6.6% | 0:32:25 | 7.5% |
| multiple stories/global update | 3 | 10.0% | 0:07:20 | 1.6% | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| refugee crisis | 1 | 3.3% | 0:02:54 | 0.6% | 3 | 2.5% | 0:08:46 | 2.0% |
| tourism | 3 | 10.0% | 0:05:06 | 1.1% | 1 | 0.8% | 0:03:39 | 0.8% |
| personality profile | -- | -- | -- | -- | 1 | 0.8% | 0:02:44 | 0.6% |
| editorial | -- | -- | -- | -- | 15 | 12.3% | 0:39:37 | 9.1% |
| nature/environment | -- | -- | -- | -- | 1 | 0.8% | 0:04:46 | 1.1% |
| military activities (not ISIS/Syria) | -- | -- | -- | -- | 1 | 0.8% | 0:05:10 | 1.2% |
| humanitarian/NGO | -- | -- | -- | -- | 4 | 3.3% | 0:14:09 | 3.3% |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|----|----|----|----|---|------|---------|------|
| sports | -- | -- | -- | -- | 1 | 0.8% | 0:03:15 | 0.7% |
| law/court | -- | -- | -- | -- | 3 | 2.5% | 0:14:11 | 3.3% |
| $X^2= 56.686$ | | | | | | | | |
| $p < .001$ | | | | | | | | |

A chi-square test was used to determine if there is an association between topics covered and news outlet. This resulted in a chi square value of 56.686, and a p-value of less than 0.05, meaning that we can conclude there is an association between news outlet and topic covered. The topics covered by VOA that were not at all covered by CRI are *domestic elections*, *music/film/entertainment*, *sports*, *health*, *foreign economies*, *nature/environment*, *laws/court cases*, and *military actions* beyond the Syrian War. For some of these, the reason for the discrepancy were obvious – the US was undergoing a national election at the time and so devoted a significant portion of time to this discussion, while *domestic elections* were not an issue in China at the time.

This does not mean that these topics were completely absent, just that they were not the focus of a news story. For example, football was discussed during one CRI story; however, the story was an interview with the Italian ambassador focusing on Italian-Chinese diplomatic relations, of which sports diplomacy is only a part. Likewise, a number of CRI stories mentioned North Korea, but it was never the sole focus of a CRI story. This can also be explained by the length of stories by CRI; CRI had many lengthy broadcasts focused on a single topic, whilst VOA would touch on several stories related to several topics in the same amount of time. As Table 1D makes clear, VOA simply had more news stories covering more news topics overall.

5.2. Sources

5.2.1. Internal and External Speakers

For sources, the unit of analysis was a single speaker, and each speaker’s country of origin, profession/classification, and speaking time were recorded. Although CRI had fewer overall sources with a total of 41, those sources spoke 66.2% of the time, for a total of 4 hours, 57 minutes, and 36 seconds. The remaining 2 hours, 32 minutes and 6 seconds was presenters and correspondents (Table 4A). The average speaking time for a single source was 7 minutes and 15 seconds.

In contrast, VOA had more than double the total number of sources at 98. However, the mean speaking time of those sources was just over one minute, so that source speaking time only made up for 26.2% of the total speaking time. Instead, presenters and correspondents took on the bulk of speaking, for a total of 5 hours, 7 minutes, and 34 seconds, making it 73.8% of the total speaking time overall. This is unsurprising, as a number of stories did not include any external sources, but simply had a presenter speaking to a correspondent – a phenomenon that rarely occurred with CRI. While VOA had more stories, and it’s understandable that some of the shorter segments don’t have the time to accommodate external sources, the fact that external sources had such little talking time overall is surprising.

| Table 4A. Internal vs. External Speakers | | | | | |
|---|--------------|---------------------|------------|--------------|---------------------|
| | internal sum | internal % of total | external N | external sum | external % of total |
| CRI | 2:32:06 | 33.8% | 41 | 4:57:36 | 66.2% |
| VOA | 5:07:34 | 73.8% | 98 | 1:49:28 | 26.2% |

5.2.2. Domestic and International External Speakers

As far as origin of the external speakers, there was a relatively comparable number of domestic and international sources between CRI and VOA. A chi-square test of association between CRI and VOA’s use of domestic and international sources resulted in a p-value of 0.470, meaning that there was no significant difference between the two.

| Table 4B. Domestic vs. International External Speakers | | | | | | |
|---|------------|--------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------------------|------------------------------|
| | domestic N | domestic sum | domestic % of total | international N | international sum | international % of total sum |
| CRI | 19 | 2:47:43 | 56.4% | 22 | 2:09:54 | 43.6% |
| VOA | 52 | 1:08:56 | 63.0% | 46 | 0:40:31 | 37.0% |
| $X^2 = .522$ | | | | | | |
| $p = 0.470$ | | | | | | |

CRI's 19 domestic speakers spoke 56.4% of the time, while the 22 international speakers spoke 43.6% of the time (Table 4B). For VOA, while there was not much difference in the number of domestic and international speakers – 52 and 46, respectively – the amount of time was more drastically different. Domestic speakers made up 63% of the time, and international speakers made up the remaining 37%. When you consider that the majority of speaking time for VOA was used by presenters and correspondents, and that international sources spoke for only 40 minutes in a dataset of more than 7 hours, it is especially noteworthy.

The country of origin of CRI's international speakers is telling as well. Aside from domestic speakers, the top sources in terms of speaking duration were from the USA, with 8 unique sources representing 12% of the speaking time, and Australia, with 3 speakers representing 11.9% of the speaking time (Table 4C). For this table, Hong Kong was counted as domestic yet still had a separately coded country number, which accounts for the discrepancy in domestic numbers from the previous chart. Singapore also had 3 speakers, while 9 other countries had one – four European (France, UK, Italy, Belgium), two from the Middle East (Syria and Iran), one from Southeast Asia (Cambodia) and one from Russia, which spans Europe and Asia but is usually considered a European nation. There were no sources from the continents of Africa or South America.

| | CRI N | CRI sum | CRI % of total | VOA N | VOA sum | VOA % of total |
|--------------|-----------|----------------|-------------------|----------|------------|-------------------|
| Argentina | -- | -- | -- | 3 | 0:00:22 | 0.3% |
| Australia | 3 | 0:35:27 | 11.9% | 7 | 0:10:05 | 9.2% |
| Bangladesh | -- | -- | -- | 1 | 0:00:10 | 0.2% |
| Belgium | 1 | 0:00:25 | 0.1% | -- | -- | -- |
| Cambodia | 1 | 0:15:24 | 5.2% | -- | -- | -- |
| Canada | -- | -- | -- | 1 | 0:03:01 | 2.8% |
| <i>China</i> | <i>18</i> | <i>2:34:32</i> | <i>51.9%</i> | -- | -- | -- |
| France | 1 | 0:00:22 | 0.1% | -- | -- | -- |
| Hong Kong | 1 | 0:13:11 | 4.4% | 1 | 0:00:03 | 0.0% |
| India | -- | -- | -- | 1 | 0:01:11 | 1.1% |

| | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|----------|----------------|--------------|----|---------|-------|
| Iran | 1 | 0:00:27 | 0.2% | -- | -- | -- |
| Iraq | -- | -- | -- | 2 | 0:03:23 | 3.1% |
| Italy | 1 | 0:06:50 | 2.3% | -- | -- | -- |
| Japan | -- | -- | -- | 1 | 0:02:24 | 2.2% |
| Lebanon | -- | -- | -- | 1 | 0:00:58 | 0.9% |
| Russia | 1 | 0:00:27 | 0.2% | -- | -- | -- |
| Singapore | 3 | 0:26:12 | 8.8% | 1 | 0:02:25 | 2.2% |
| South Africa | -- | -- | -- | 1 | 0:00:48 | 0.7% |
| Sweden | -- | -- | -- | 1 | 0:00:48 | 0.7% |
| Syria | 1 | 0:00:24 | 0.1% | 1 | 0:00:15 | 0.2% |
| Thailand | -- | -- | -- | 1 | 0:00:35 | 0.5% |
| Turkey | -- | -- | -- | 4 | 0:01:04 | 1.0% |
| UK | 1 | 0:08:12 | 2.8% | 9 | 0:03:13 | 2.9% |
| <i>USA</i> | <i>8</i> | <i>0:35:44</i> | <i>12.0%</i> | 52 | 1:08:56 | 63.0% |
| international organisation | -- | -- | -- | 10 | 0:09:46 | 8.9% |

For VOA, there were no sources from China with the exception of one from Hong Kong. Surprisingly, Australia also came out on top as far as speaking time of international sources, with 7 speakers representing 9.2% of the total talk time. However, the most frequent sources represented international organisations, such as the EU or UN, and which were not affiliated with one specific country. These 10 sources had the second-highest speaking time at 8.9%. There were also 9 from the United Kingdom, which made up a small percentage at 2.9%. Otherwise, there were four total sources from the Middle East (Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon), five from Asia (Singapore, Japan, India, Thailand, and Bangladesh), three from South America (all from Argentina), one from South Africa, one from Sweden, one from Canada, and four from Turkey.

5.2.3. External Speaker Profession/Classification

In addition to country representation, this research also examined sources' occupation or other classification. Each source that was interviewed or otherwise involved in a broadcast was included as a credible representative with a valuable opinion. A chi-

square test of association between news outlet and source profession/classification resulted in a p-value of 0.002, suggesting an association between the two.

For CRI, a majority of those sources were academics. There was a total of 20 unique academic sources, which spoke for a combined 3 hours, 10 minutes, and 33 seconds – by far the most prominent amount of speaking time at 64%. The second most common sources were from think tanks, with 3 representing just 12.5%, and 7 government representatives at 11.2% (Table 2D). It was common in many broadcasts to have multiple academics, both domestic and international, discuss a single topic for a story. In these cases, the presenters served only to prompt questions and mediate the discussion. In this case, CRI broadcasts had more of a talk show feel than a strictly news journalism feel.

| Table 2D. External Speaker Profession/Classification | | | | | | |
|---|-----------|----------------|----------------|-----------|----------------|-----------------|
| | CRI N | CRI sum | CRI % of total | VOA N | VOA sum | VOA % of target |
| government rep. | 7 | 0:33:15 | 11.2% | 15 | 0:13:51 | 12.7% |
| public sector rep. | 2 | 0:00:47 | 0.3% | 4 | 0:01:47 | 1.6% |
| academic | 20 | 3:10:33 | 64.0% | 13 | 0:24:51 | 22.7% |
| think tank rep. | 3 | 0:37:06 | 12.5% | 5 | 0:05:23 | 4.9% |
| NGO/nonprofit rep. | 2 | 0:15:55 | 5.3% | 5 | 0:08:29 | 7.7% |
| INGO/intergov rep. | -- | -- | -- | 9 | 0:09:42 | 8.9% |
| private sector rep. | 3 | 0:14:32 | 4.9% | 13 | 0:07:31 | 6.9% |
| independent artist | -- | -- | -- | 10 | 0:11:25 | 10.4% |
| private individual | 3 | 0:00:13 | 0.1% | 7 | 0:01:33 | 1.4% |
| journalist | 1 | 0:05:16 | 1.8% | 11 | 0:23:42 | 21.7% |
| election nominee | -- | -- | -- | 3 | 0:00:34 | 0.5% |
| unknown | -- | -- | -- | 3 | 0:00:38 | 0.6% |
| $X^2 = 29.64$ | | | | | | |
| $p < 0.05$ | | | | | | |

Academics also topped the list of sources for VOA, albeit at a much lower percentage, with 13 academics speaking for 22.7% of the time. Similar to CRI, government representatives were also well-represented. In fact, VOA had double the frequency of government representatives with 15 total, though they spoke only a slightly higher percentage of the time at 12.7% (Table 2D). Perhaps the most interesting division between the two is in their use of journalists as sources. For China, a handful of unidentified journalists were included in a live-broadcast press conference to ask questions of Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi, which only accounted for slightly more than 5 minutes, or 1.8% of total speaking time. For VOA, journalists were used as reliable sources, much like they use correspondents. Journalists were consulted as witnesses and commentators, with a particularly high representation from the US-based International Business Times. Journalists in general made up the second-highest amount of speaking time, at 21.7%, just below the top-ranked academics.

5.3. Countries

For this section, the unit of analysis was an individual story, determined by topic, as in the first section. Despite the difference in number of stories between CRI and VOA, it was decided that this was the best approach because it provides a glimpse of the number of stories which did and did not include these countries. While the context is important, this is covered in later sections; for this section, it does not matter if a country was the whole focus of a story or just mentioned in passing. What this section seeks to highlight is the attention paid to specific countries or regions of the world, and which countries or regions might be forgotten altogether.

The continent and regional designations listed here are used throughout this research. Given the large numbers of countries mentioned and the small number of repetitions, the majority of countries here are simply listed by percentage. Continent and region designations are based on the United Nations Statistical Commission (“UN Statistical Commission,” 2018).

Australia was the highest mentioned country in Oceania for both CRI and VOA, and was especially prominent in CRI broadcasts. The other three Oceanian countries –

Nauru, New Zealand, and Palau – were only mentioned once across CRI and VOA broadcasts.

| Table 5A. Percentage of Stories Mentioning Oceanian Countries | | |
|--|------------|------------|
| Country | CRI | VOA |
| <i>Australia</i> | 20.0% | 4.9% |
| Nauru | - | 0.8% |
| New Zealand | 3.3% | - |
| Palau | - | 0.8% |

For this research, Western Asia (colloquially referred to as the Middle East) was calculated separately from the rest of Asia due to the high number of stories that focused specifically on Western Asian countries. The remainder of the Asian countries are listed in Table 3B. For CRI, Japan and North Korea were mentioned most frequently (aside from China itself). Japan appeared in a third of CRI stories, for reasons which will be explored in the critical discourse analysis section. For VOA, China was mentioned most frequently, though still at a comparatively low percentage compared to others countries and continents. For this section, Hong Kong and Taiwan were recorded separately from China because that is how they were referenced in the stories themselves.

| Table 5B. Percentage of Stories Mentioning Asian Countries (excluding West Asia) | | |
|---|------------|------------|
| Country | CRI | VOA |
| Afghanistan | 3.33% | 1.64% |
| Bangladesh | - | 0.82% |
| Brunei | 3.33% | - |
| Cambodia | 3.33% | - |
| <i>China</i> | 83.33% | 7.38% |
| Hong Kong* | 6.67% | - |
| India | 10.00% | 1.64% |
| Indonesia | 6.67% | - |

| | | |
|--------------------|--------|-------|
| Iran | 3.33% | 6.56% |
| <i>Japan</i> | 33.33% | 3.28% |
| Kazakhstan | - | 0.82% |
| <i>North Korea</i> | 16.67% | 5.74% |
| South Korea | 13.33% | 5.74% |
| Laos | 3.33% | - |
| Myanmar (Burma) | 3.33% | 3.28% |
| Pakistan | 3.33% | 2.46% |
| Philippines | 13.33% | - |
| Singapore | 3.33% | - |
| Sri Lanka | 3.33% | - |
| Taiwan* | 3.33% | 1.64% |
| Thailand | 3.33% | 0.82% |
| Vietnam | 6.67% | 0.82% |

For Western Asia, Syria topped the list for both CRI and VOA, as it was included in roughly 16% of stories for both. This can be attributed to the nature of the stories and the news cycle, as the Syrian Civil War, ISIS and the refugee crisis all featured prominently in stories throughout the month.

| Table 5C. Percentage of Stories Mentioning West Asian Countries | | |
|--|------------|------------|
| Country | CRI | VOA |
| Bahrain | - | 0.82% |
| Iraq | 6.67% | 11.48% |
| Israel | - | 4.92% |
| Jordan | 3.33% | 0.82% |
| Lebanon | - | 0.82% |
| Qatar | 3.33% | - |
| Saudi Arabia | 10.00% | 1.64% |
| <i>Syria</i> | 16.67% | 16.39% |
| Turkey | 3.33% | 4.92% |
| Yemen | 10.00% | - |

For both CRI and VOA, a single African country never appeared in more than two stories. CRI mentioned a total of seven African countries in stories, while VOA had fifteen. It's worth noting that, of the nine total mentions of African nations by CRI (Mozambique and Somalia were mentioned twice), eight of them occurred in the Global Survey of Headlines – a section of the programme that intentionally includes news from each continent. The only mention of an African nation by CRI outside of the Global Survey of Headlines was Djibouti, which was included in a story about a Chinese naval logistics centre being built in the country. The situation was not terribly different for VOA: though VOA mentioned African countries in 16 stories, five of those mentions were in the editorials section, which focused on actions and policies of the US government.

| Table 5D. Percentage of Stories Mentioning African Countries | | |
|---|------------|------------|
| Country | CRI | VOA |
| Algeria | - | 0.82% |
| Benin | 3.33% | - |
| Burundi | - | 0.82% |
| Côte d'Ivoire | - | 0.82% |
| Djibouti | 3.33% | - |
| Egypt | - | 0.82% |
| Ethiopia | - | 0.82% |
| Gambia | - | 0.82% |
| Ghana | - | 0.82% |
| Kenya | - | 0.82% |
| Libya | 3.33% | 1.64% |
| Malawi | - | 0.82% |
| Mozambique | 6.67% | - |
| Nigeria | 3.33% | 1.64% |
| Somalia | 6.67% | 0.82% |
| South Africa | - | 0.82% |
| South Sudan | - | 0.82% |

| | | |
|---------|-------|-------|
| Tunisia | 3.33% | 0.82% |
|---------|-------|-------|

For Europe, the United Kingdom dominated the list for CRI by appearing in 20% of stories, while Russia was at the top of the list for VOA. Greece and Macedonia also appeared relatively frequently in both, most likely due to the migrant crisis in that area.

| Table 5E. Percentage of Stories Mentioning European Countries | | |
|--|---------------|--------------|
| Country | CRI | VOA |
| Austria | 3.33% | 0.82% |
| Belgium | 6.67% | 9.02% |
| Denmark | - | 0.82% |
| France | 13.33% | 8.20% |
| Finland | - | 0.82% |
| Germany | - | 4.92% |
| Greece | 10.00% | 3.28% |
| Hungary | 3.33% | - |
| Italy | 6.67% | 3.28% |
| Macedonia | 10.00% | 1.64% |
| Netherlands | 3.33% | 0.82% |
| Poland | - | 0.82% |
| Russia | 13.33% | 13.93% |
| Spain | 3.33% | 0.82% |
| Sweden | - | 0.82% |
| Switzerland | 6.67% | - |
| <i>United Kingdom</i> | <i>20.00%</i> | <i>9.84%</i> |
| Ukraine | 3.33% | 2.46% |
| Vatican City | - | 0.82% |

In North America, the most interesting finding is that CRI mentioned the USA in a higher percentage of stories than VOA did. China was the most mentioned by CRI, appearing in 83% of stories, but the USA was not far behind at 70%. In comparison,

VOA mentioned China in less than 8% of its stories. As such, this discrepancy with be explored and explained in the critical discourse analysis section.

| Table 5F. Percentage of Stories Mentioning North American Countries | | |
|--|---------------|---------------|
| Country | CRI | VOA |
| Canada | - | 4.10% |
| Cuba | 6.67% | 6.56% |
| Dominican Republic | - | 1.64% |
| Mexico | 3.33% | 2.46% |
| Puerto Rico** | - | 1.64% |
| <i>USA</i> | <i>70.00%</i> | <i>59.02%</i> |

South America was one of the more neglected continents overall. CRI only mentioned three South American countries total, with Brazil mentioned twice. VOA mentioned six South American countries in its stories.

| Table 5G. Percentage of Stories Mentioning South American Countries | | |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|
| Country | CRI mentions | VOA mentions |
| Argentina | 3.33% | 4.92% |
| Brazil | 6.67% | 1.64% |
| Chile | - | 1.64% |
| Colombia | 3.33% | 0.82% |
| Peru | - | 0.82% |
| Uruguay | - | 0.82% |
| Venezuela | - | 0.82% |

6. Results: Corpus Linguistic Critical Discourse Analysis

6.1. China Radio International

6.1.1. Themes based on corpus frequencies

As explained in the Methodology chapter, Sketch Engine text analysis software was utilized to determine frequency for words and multi-word expressions, keywords and collocations. Results were coded and then divided into thematic sections. From these tests, some common themes became immediately apparent: government, economy, international relations/diplomacy, and positive focus. Within the theme of international relations/diplomacy, a list of countries mentioned was also generated.

These themes and their supporting words/phrases are listed in the tables below, alongside their frequency and test. For those words that were the result of keywords, their keyness score are also included in the final column. Asterisks are used to denote words that appeared both as individual words (“government”) and in multi-word expressions (“Chinese government”).

| word | frequency | test | keyness score |
|---------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| government* | 194 | raw frequency | N/A |
| political | 41 | raw frequency | N/A |
| Chinese government* | 22 | cluster frequency, keywords | 137.57 |
| central government* | 15 | cluster frequency | N/A |
| President XI | 14 | cluster frequency | N/A |

| word | frequency | test | keyness score |
|-------------|------------------|---------------|----------------------|
| market* | 102 | raw frequency | N/A |
| economy | 83 | raw frequency | N/A |
| economic | 74 | raw frequency | N/A |

| | | | |
|------------------|----|--------------------------------|-------|
| Chinese economy* | 18 | cluster frequency; keywords | N/A |
| property market* | 15 | keywords | 89.34 |
| real estate | 25 | cluster frequency | N/A |
| housing prices | 12 | cluster frequency | N/A |
| Ali Baba | 24 | cluster frequency | N/A |

| Table 6C. International relations/diplomacy in CRI | | | |
|---|------------------|-------------------|----------------------|
| word | frequency | test | keyness score |
| cooperation | 65 | raw frequency | N/A |
| diplomacy | 26 | keywords | 81.63 |
| international community | 16 | cluster frequency | N/A |
| foreign | 40 | raw frequency | N/A |
| ASEAN | 20 | keywords | 104 |

| Table 6D. Countries in CRI | | | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------|-------------------|----------------------|
| word | frequency | test | keyness score |
| Japan | 88 | raw frequency | N/A |
| Japanese | 26 | raw frequency | N/A |
| US | 73 | raw frequency | N/A |
| United States | 40 | cluster frequency | N/A |
| Korean | 22 | raw frequency | N/A |
| South Korea | 9 | cluster frequency | N/A |
| DPRK | 9 | keywords | 76.46 |
| Philippines | 9 | cluster frequency | N/A |
| Brazil | 8 | keywords | 70 |
| Cambodia | 20 | keywords | 51.4 |

| Table 6E. Positive focus in CRI | | | |
|--|------------------|---------------|----------------------|
| word | frequency | test | keyness score |
| believe | 44 | raw frequency | N/A |

| | | | |
|----------|----|---------------|-----|
| agree | 33 | raw frequency | N/A |
| achieve | 30 | raw frequency | N/A |
| help | 29 | raw frequency | N/A |
| increase | 28 | raw frequency | N/A |
| improve | 27 | raw frequency | N/A |
| great | 30 | raw frequency | N/A |

6.1.2. Themes based on geopolitical word sketches

In addition to an overall textual analysis of the corpus, specific keywords were subjected to a “word sketch” for a more in-depth look at how those words are utilized and treated in the text, and in relation to external corpora. For this research, the selected keywords were determined by the research questions and focus on geopolitics. The word sketch of each geopolitical entity resulted in a list of uses and collocations, which were then examined in context in order to determine their contribution to the text. As such, the sections below are divided into CRI’s linguistic coverage of each entity: CRI talking about China, CRI talking about the USA, and CRI talking about other nations. Each word sketch listed the words most often associated with the target word; those lists were then coded and grouped into categories, as expounded below.

6.1.2.1. *CRI talking about China*

To discern CRI’s coverage of China, word sketches were conducted for both the word “China” and the word “Chinese.” The word “China” appeared a total of 539 times in the CRI corpus, while “Chinese” appeared 182 times.

For CRI’s coverage of China, many of the same themes from the word frequencies were found. When discussing China, the primary emphasis was, naturally, on the Chinese government. Beyond that, China’s international relations and diplomacy – especially with Asian neighbours – was discussed in detail, along with many aspects of the Chinese economy. These high-level, government-centric topics dominated over more local or human-interest aspects of Chinese society – Chinese “people” were only mentioned three times. This reflects the finding from the content analysis that most CRI stories focused on breaking news and international coverage, rather than human-interest feature stories.

The charts below show the word sketch term (i.e., “China” or “Chinese”), how the term was categorized in the resulting word sketch table, the term itself, the term frequency, and the keyness score.

| Table 7A. Chinese government in CRI | | | | |
|--|---------------------------|-------------------|------------------|----------------|
| word sketch | category | term | frequency | keyness |
| China | China's | plans | 4 | 10.75 |
| China | China's | ministry | 2 | 9.79 |
| Chinese | nouns modified by Chinese | government | 20 | 11.36 |
| Chinese | nouns modified by Chinese | ministry | 4 | 9.56 |
| Chinese | nouns modified by Chinese | side | 4 | 9.43 |
| Chinese | nouns modified by Chinese | authority | 3 | 9.14 |
| Chinese | nouns modified by Chinese | mainland | 2 | 8.63 |
| Chinese | Chinese and/or | foreign | 6 | 12.41 |

| Table 7B. China and international relations/diplomacy in CRI | | | | |
|---|-------------------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|
| word sketch | category | term | frequency | keyness |
| China | nouns modified by China | Sea | 25 | 12.68 |
| China | nouns modified by China | threat | 3 | 10.22 |
| China | nouns modified by China | dispute | 3 | 10.01 |
| China | nouns modified by China | ASEAN | 2 | 9.71 |

| | | | | |
|---------|--------------------------------|------------------------|---|-------|
| China | nouns modified by China | Plus | 2 | 9.71 |
| China | nouns modified by China | diplomacy | 2 | 9.44 |
| China | verbs with China as subject | help | 3 | 9.07 |
| China | verbs with China as subject | participate | 2 | 8.52 |
| China | verbs with China as subject | contribute | 2 | 8.52 |
| China | verbs with China as subject | develop | 2 | 8.46 |
| China | China and/or | Italy | 5 | 11.01 |
| China | China and/or | Vietnam | 5 | 10.91 |
| China | China and/or | nations | 2 | 9.71 |
| China | China and/or | diplomacy | 2 | 9.67 |
| China | China and/or | Korea | 2 | 9.58 |
| China | China is a... | partner | 2 | 12.41 |
| China | China's... | interests | 6 | 11.3 |
| China | China's... | policy | 4 | 10.69 |
| China | China's... | diplomacy | 3 | 10.35 |
| China | China's... | relations | 3 | 10.32 |
| Chinese | nouns modified by Chinese | diplomacy | 9 | 10.65 |
| Chinese | nouns modified by Chinese | interests | 5 | 9.66 |
| Chinese | nouns modified by Chinese | characteristics | 2 | 8.63 |
| Chinese | Chinese and/or | naval | 3 | 11.58 |
| Chinese | Chinese and/or | Italian | 2 | 11.09 |

Table 7C. China and economy in CRI

| word sketch | category | term | frequency | keyness |
|--------------------|------------------------------|--------------------|------------------|----------------|
| China | nouns modified by China | economy | 2 | 9.06 |
| China | China's... | market | 11 | 12.08 |
| China | China's... | interests | 6 | 11.3 |
| China | China's | economy | 2 | 9.75 |
| Chinese | nouns modified by Chinese | economy | 14 | 11.08 |
| Chinese | nouns modified by Chinese | consumers | 4 | 9.61 |
| Chinese | nouns modified by Chinese | tourists | 4 | 9.58 |
| Chinese | nouns modified by Chinese | firms | 4 | 9.49 |
| Chinese | nouns modified by Chinese | customers | 3 | 9.2 |
| Chinese | nouns modified by Chinese | enterprise | 3 | 9.11 |
| Chinese | nouns modified by Chinese | market | 3 | 8.6 |
| Chinese | nouns modified by Chinese | business | 2 | 8.54 |
| Chinese | Chinese and/or | economic | 2 | 10.3 |
| Chinese | Chinese and/or | state-owned | 1 | 10.14 |

6.1.2.2. CRI talking about the United States

The United States proved trickier than China to isolate in text, due to its multiword nature and various monikers. Trial and error were used before the researcher decided to use “US”, “USA”, and “States” (capitalized) in the key word in context searches. In the corpora used for this research, the abbreviated acronym “US” proved most common as both a noun and an adjective. “USA” was used very rarely, and only as a noun. As “United States” is a multi-word expression and more difficult to pin down in

searches, “States” was instead utilized. This is not only because “the States” is a colloquial expression commonly used in reference to the United States, but also because “United” is used in “United Nations,” “United Kingdom”, and is the name of an airline. A concordance search of “States” produced results exclusively linked to the United States, which was the goal. For more comprehensive results, “America” was also used but manually limited only to those referring to the United States of America via the concordance list and not already included in the multiword expressions “United States of America.” This method also guaranteed that there was no overlap between the target terms; each was verified to be mutually exclusive.

In this section, “US” occurred 73 times, “States” occurred 41 times, “USA” occurred 1 time, and “American” in reference to the USA occurred 7 times. “America” was not utilized due to its frequent use for Latin America as well as North America. Together, these constituted a total of 122 independent references to the United States. While this is understandably significantly less than CRI’s 539 mentions of China, this is still the most-mentioned international country (Japan was the second most-mentioned with 88 occurrences of “Japan” and 26 occurrences of “Japanese” for a total of 114). While references to the US appeared to cover a variety of topics, there was one code that immediately became apparent: military involvement. Many of the military-linked words only appeared once, as shown in the table below; however, there was enough of these military-linked words overall to draw notice. These terms, along with their context and keyness score, are as follows:

| Table 8A. US military in CRI | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|---|---|-------|
| US | nouns modified by US | security | 2 | 10.54 |
| US | nouns modified by US | aggression | 1 | 9.95 |
| US | nouns modified by US | operation | 1 | 9.91 |
| US | verbs with US as subject | disengage (from the Middle East) | 1 | 11 |

| | | | | |
|--------|--------------------------|--|---|-------|
| US | verbs with US as subject | withdraw (forces) | 1 | 10.91 |
| US | verbs with US as subject | remain (the major military power) | 1 | 10.68 |
| States | States and/or | Seal (United States Navy Seal) | 1 | 10.82 |

Other codes that appeared but were less prominent included “economy” and “government”. For economy, “US dollar/s” appeared five times, and “United States economy” appeared once. For government, “Obama” was mentioned 4 times, while “Secretary of State” was mentioned once. There were also a few mentions of the US perspective on issues, as highlighted by the phrases “US view,” “US position,” and “US point of view.”

In addition, much of the linguistic inclusion for the United States, came from analyses on “China” in the CRI corpus, and analyzing the collocated mentions of the United States present there. There were seven collocations between “States” and “China”, and 5 between “US” and “China.” Looking at the key words in context revealed these references focused largely on diplomatic arrangements between the two countries, as seen in the phrases “recent agreement between China and the US to intensify sanctions on North Korea”; “there’s been lots of dialogue between China and the US recently”; “see if the presidents of both China and the US can come to any further agreement”; “good opportunity for Japan to work with China, the US and South Korea”; and “China and the United States should be on the same page.” Furthermore, the US is described as a “major power”, alongside China, Japan, South Korea and Australia.

However, with so few occurrences, the corpus linguistics statistics here cannot begin to paint a full picture, even with the key words in context. As such, these references are explored in more detail in the manual critical discourse analysis section.

6.1.3. Themes based on manual critical discourse analysis

Many of the results suggested from the content analysis and computer linguistic critical discourse analysis were confirmed and expanded upon in the critical discourse analysis. These included an emphasis on international relationships and diplomacy throughout the broadcasts; an emphasis on the Chinese government's involvement (directly stated or implied) on both domestic and international issues, and especially on the economy; a preference for coverage of institutional-level actions rather than on individuals; and, across all of these, a preference for optimistic, positive language by both presenters and external sources. This section will first introduce this positive language, and then describe and explain how it was used in relation to the Chinese government and its actions, international relations, and the domestic and international economy.

It should be noted that this section is not an exhaustive list of the instances in which positive language, or other linguistic patterns, was used. Especially in the case of positive language, there are simply too many instances to include them all, and little reason to do so. The computer linguistic critical discourse analysis above is better suited to giving an overall image of the positive terminology used. This section, in contrast, highlights specific patterns where positive language is used repeatedly in relation to countries or topics.

6.1.3.1. Positive Language: Close-Ended and Leading Questions

The corpus linguistic critical discourse analysis hinted at a tendency towards positive language in the CRI texts. However, it did not predict the extent of the dominantly positive language used by both the CRI presenters as well as the external sources. Perhaps one of the most remarkable uses of positive language was in questions posed by presenters, particularly in close-ended questions. Close-ended questions refers to questions in which the presenter makes a statement, potentially of their own opinion or belief, in the form of a question which can simply be answered by “yes” or “no”. Leading questions suggest or prompt a certain type or tone of response based on the phrasing of the question.

It is worth pointing out that in US and European journalistic practices (including where this researcher received her journalism training), leading questions are usually condemned as lazy or biased journalism, whereas open-ended questions are favoured. This research also cannot speak to the cause of these leading questions – whether it is simply a practice favoured by these individual reporters, an institutional practice promoted by CRI, or simply based on a journalistic culture as a whole. While such debate is well beyond the scope of this research, this research can nevertheless provide linguistic examples and debate their origins, as is practiced in critical discourse analysis.

The close-ended and leading questions found in the CRI corpus were especially prevalent in discussions that related to China and policies conducted by the Chinese government, and usually contained positive or optimistic language in reference to such. For example, on a discussion on China’s property market, the presenter asks, “*So Professor Chen, what challenges do you think China will face in accomplishing this successfully?*” (CRI_20160304). While this in itself is not a close-ended question (it requires more than a yes/no response), it is subtly leading in its assumptions. The stated assumption is that China will successfully accomplish their goal of destocking excess property inventory; the question for the external source is only a question of what challenges will be met along the way. This also shows a common trend of using these positive/leading questions to favourably present the actions of the Chinese government. In this case, when referring to what challenges “China” will face, the context of the debate makes clear that “China” is a synecdoche for the Chinese government (two sentences prior to this question, the presenter states that “*de-stocking the property inventory around China is going to be one of the main tasks for governments at all levels this year and, in fact, it's been stated in 13 provincial regions' annual government work reports for this year.*”).

Keeping to the same topic, the presenter asks an external source, “*First of all, actually two, er, three of you, Professor Chen, how optimistic are you about the development of China’s property market in the near future?*” (CRI_20160304). The leading question by the presenter asks about *optimism*, which omits the possibility of its binary opposite pessimism, suggesting that the external sources can only have a positive opinion about the current state of the property market. It’s worth noting, in this case,

that one of those responses directly contradicted this approach, with the external source stating *“I’m quite pessimistic, not optimistic.”* (CRI_20160304).

Leading questions were also used in a discussion on the state of children’s welfare in China based on a recently released research report. In this instance, a correspondent asked an external source *“What are your hopes for the implications that your new report will have on helping the government to decide which areas are the best to address at the moment?”* (CRI_20160315). The crux of this rather meandering question is “what are your hopes...?”, which phrases the question in an optimistic, hopeful manner focused on positive outcomes. Furthermore, it goes on to outline “helping the government” (which also suggests positive, constructive government involvement, another common theme), and wraps up with “the best” areas to address, which is a positive emphasis, and whose binary opposite is, of course, “the worst.”

In the same discussion on the child welfare report, the correspondent states that *“China’s hukou system and also the family planning policies are some of the most influential factors on the current state of children. We’ve seen some policy relaxations in both of those areas over recent years, so would you say we’re taking steps in the right direction in these questions?”* (CRI_20160315). A close reading shows, first of all, a euphemism in the discussion on the *hukou* system (in short, a household registration system based on rural or urban residency), with the correspondent stating that the system is one of the “most influential factors on the current state of children.” According to the external source, the report states that *hukou* “restrains mobility” and results in “left behind children”, which is the reason for the stated policy relaxations. Again, the phrasing of the question “would you say we’re taking steps in the right direction” creates a leading question that only requires a binary yes/no answer; furthermore, the positive emphasis is on “taking the rights step”, implying the presenter’s opinion that this is surely a positive move. Furthermore, this reveals the positive, constructive government involvement angle as well.

In a discussion on the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation summit between China, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, Laos and Myanmar, the presenter asks, *“Well Mr Jia, what do you say, then, are the main benefits of cooperation for each of these countries?”* (CRI_20160325). While this question itself is not leading – the answer

requires much more than a yes/no response – the positive tone is. It is phrased as asking about the “main benefits”, which precludes any discussion on if there are benefits for all of the countries involved. Such as question not only reveals the presenter’s opinion that the LMC is beneficial to all countries involved, but also directs the discussion to only focus on the benefits for each country, and not the disadvantages or disputes. Again, the positive, constructive government involvement angle is also shown, as these benefits are the result of the Chinese-government-led LMC initiative.

In the same discussion, the presenter asks two lengthy back-to-back leading questions about the LMC: *“So Dr Matthews, would you say there will be more consultation among the different LMC members when it comes to utilizing the water resources, say building dams upstream, like what the Laos [sic] has done before? So how do you think that this LMC can devise rules that really reflect each country’s respective geographical positions going forward?”* (CRI_20160325). In the first question, the statement “would you say” allows the presenter to phrase her understanding or opinion about the situation as a question. To provide context to her question, she is following up after an external source (not the referenced Dr Matthews, but an academic based at the University of Michigan in the United States) stated about a previous cooperation attempt that “when there wasn’t agreement in the Mekong River Commission, the project simply went ahead, and the commission had to resort to saying that the parties would have to work it out diplomatically through other channels.” As such, the presenter’s statement that there would be “more consultation among the different LMC members” suggests a positive solution to this previous unsuccessful attempt, while also phrasing a question to another external source. The fact that the presenter did not allow the external source to respond to her first question, but instead went directly into another question, suggests that her intention was not actually to understand the external speaker’s opinion on the matter, but instead respond to the previous external speaker’s perspective with her own perspective. In her second question, she phrases her question as a “how” instead of an “if” question – instead of asking “if” the LMC will devise rules that reflect each country’s geographical position, she instead asks “how” it will be done, which again precludes any doubts that this will be a focus for the new LMC cooperation.

Similarly, in the same discussion the presenter asked, *“So as far as governance of the LMC is concerned, how do you think that this organisation can ensure winning cooperation with benefits balanced to all, and that decisions are multilateral and mutual, with the concerns and wills of each country being taken into account?”* (CRI_20160325). Ten minutes later, the presenter poses a similar question asking *“So how do you think the LMC can cooperate, coordinate the interests of different parties and make fair and equitable use of the shared natural resources of the river for everyone?”* (CRI_20160325). Again, both of these are phrased as “how” rather than “if” questions. It’s also worth noting that the phrases utilized here originate with the presenter; there was no previous statement of an LMC goal being to “ensure winning cooperation with benefits balanced to all”, or to “make fair and equitable use of shared natural resources,” to which the presenter’s response was, “How can LMC do that?” Instead, one would have to surmise that these phrases are being read from some sort of prepared questions. This in itself is not noteworthy – having prepared interview questions is a common practice in quality journalism. Rather, the interesting point is the pointedly positive language used – “winning cooperation,” “benefits balanced to all”, “decisions that are multilateral and mutual”, “fair and equitable”, etc. These are positively loaded phrases that intentionally state desirable aims of the LMC as questions.

This same discussion included debate about tensions in the South China Sea, an ongoing dispute concerning the ownership and use of maritime territory between China and several of its neighbours. On this topic, the presenter states: *“We also see that Vietnam is a member of the LMC, and China and Vietnam are at odds over issues in the South China Sea. How might this cooperation within the LMC effect such tensions? Do you think that the LMC can help to ease tensions by closer cooperation in other fields between the two sides going forward?”* (CRI_20160325). The first question is a question that cannot be answered by a yes/no and allows for both positive and negative possible responses, thereby inviting discussion on possible impacts; however, the presenter does not allow a response from the external sources before she seemingly answers her own question with a leading statement-as-question and solution: *“Do you think the LMC can help ease tensions by closer cooperation...?”* Again, we see not only is the presenter offering a solution and yes/no question for the external source, but the question also contains several positive-perception keywords

that allow for an easily positive response, with phrases such as “ease tensions” and “closer cooperation”, both diplomatically favourable actions and results. Furthermore, the positive, constructive government angle is seen once more in the debate about the Chinese-government-led initiative.

The Government Work Report was another topic CRI covered. In a discussion with a domestic academic, the presenter asks: *“Professor Zhang, so instead of a particular figure for the GDP growth this year, this year’s Government Work Report actually sets a range for the GDP growth. Now, what do you think of that? Do you think it’s also a practical, more realistic move?”* (CRI_20160311). The first question asked by the presenter is an open-ended, non-leading question; the second is the presenter’s response to her own question, phrased as a close-ended, leading question (the terms “practical” and “realistic” had not been mentioned before in the discussion, but instead were introduced by the presenter.). Again, both of these words, “practical” and “realistic” can be interpreted as positive, optimistic terms, which could even be interpreted as euphemisms for a relatively modest growth projection.

In an interview with the Italian ambassador to China, the presenter asked a series of questions in a single statement pertaining to the relationship between China and Italy: *“And do you see any cooperation, or do you see the two more of competitors, you know, or do you foresee any cooperative opportunities there?”* (CRI_20160311). It seems as though the presenter started to ask a question (are the two more cooperative or competitive), but after mentioning “competitors”, she promptly rephrased her question to a more definitively positive angle. The phrase itself “do you foresee any cooperative opportunities there?”, largely undermines her previous statement about potentially being competitors, and instead ends on a close-ended leading question with a positive, cooperative focus.

The positive-angle leading questions weren’t limited to only serious diplomatic topics, however. In the same interview with the Italian ambassador to China, the presenter also asked, more amicably, *“So you’re here for eight months already. How much do you like Chinese food?”* (CRI_20160311). Though the statement has nothing to do with the Chinese government or international relations, it is still phrased as a “how much” rather than “if” question – not asking if the ambassador likes or disliked

Chinese food, but “how much” he likes Chinese food, as though the liking of the cuisine was undoubtedly a foregone and unquestionable conclusion.

Of course, the leading questions are not limited to discussions on actions of the Chinese government; however, the leading questions used in other contexts also suggest a bias against others. For example, when discussing Japan’s building of a radar station in the East China Sea, the presenter asked, “*So why is Japan making the move now? Is it trying to cash in on the window in which China has to simultaneously deal with the issues in the South China Sea?*” (CRI_20160329). This closed-ended question contains loaded terms, such as “cash in”, suggesting that Japan’s move is taking advantage of an opportunity at another actor’s expense – in this case, China. Furthermore, stating that China has to deal with issues in the South China Sea suggests that Japan intentionally selected this time in order to make the situation more difficult for China. This negative language in regards to Japan is further discussed in another section. Another such instance, in regards to the US, occurred in a discussion on Japan sending plutonium to the United States for storage. On this broadcast, the presenter stated: “*Some environmental groups have criticized the US for agreeing to store all the plutonium, even though some of it originally belonged to Britain and France as we mentioned earlier. Do you think people should be concerned about the US taking all this plutonium of foreign origin?*” (CRI_20160322). This close-ended question is the only instance of a presenter using the word “criticize” – a decidedly negative term – and again states the presenter’s opinion as a question: people should be concerned – also a negative term – about the US taking all this plutonium. This research is not in any way suggesting that all positive close-ended questions were in support of the government while all negative close-ended questions were in opposition to other nations’ governments; however, these questions are significant simply because they exist, which makes them worth paying attention to.

6.1.3.2. Positive Language: ‘Peace and Stability’, and the opposite

Beyond close-ended questions, positive language was used repeatedly regarding China’s relationships with other countries. A significant portion of the stories focused on government-level diplomacy and multilateral meetings and agreements; indeed,

one entire 54-minute broadcast was coverage of a press conference – conducted in Chinese and translated by CRI into English – with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

One phrase that occurred repeatedly was the concept of furthering “peace and stability” among countries, or even, in the case of ties between Vietnam and China, “*regional and world peace and prosperity*” (CRI_20160301). Surprisingly, variations on the word “peace” did not rank high on keyness – only 5.07 for 24 occurrences of “peace”, 4.68 for 6 occurrences of “peaceful”, and 4.03 for four occurrences of “Peace” (capital “P”, in reference to a proper noun). In multi-word expressions, the phrase “regional peace” occurred four times, for a keyness score of 48.03, and “peaceful development” occurred three times for a keyness score of 40.97. “Stability” occurred 16 times for a keyness score of 9.94; “peace” and “stability” occurred in conjunction nine times. None of these were ranked high enough to warrant attention in the frequency or keyness tests. However, their use in the corpus stood out in combination with other positive, diplomatic terms.

Two stories in particular highlight how the language “peace and stability” is used by CRI, both positively and negatively. The first story lasted for an entire 54-minute broadcast: live coverage of a press conference with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The second was a 14-minute segment on Chinese-Japanese diplomatic relations.

The first story, the press conference with Foreign Minister Wang Yi is noteworthy first of all by its inclusion: it was not a summary or recap, but instead live coverage of a press conference with the Foreign Minister accompanied by commentary by presenters and correspondents. In this story, the Chinese government’s approach to diplomacy is made clear through Foreign Minister Wang Yi: “*Major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics is very important policy for China. We will adhere to peaceful development, as well as push for global peaceful development. The basic principal is cooperation and win/win. And to build a new model of international relations. We'll form various partnerships but not alliance, we seek dialogues but not confrontation. As far as our values are concerned, we uphold justice on international issues. We solidify all the relations of the different countries.*” (CRI_20160308). The repetition of “peaceful development” makes clear that China’s goal is for itself domestically, as well as other nations globally. In addition to this positive, peaceful discourse, there are

a number of other positive, diplomatic terms: “cooperation,” “win/win”, “partnerships,” “dialogues”, “values”. Through the Foreign Minister, via CRI, it’s made clear that China’s diplomacy should be viewed favourably, and that the benefits of cooperation with China will be shared by all in a win/win scenario.

This peaceful discourse is utilized even in reference to a decidedly non-peaceful situation: the issue of North Korea’s nuclear programme. More will be discussed about this in a later section, but for this section, Foreign Minister Wang states: *“China seeks the due track of de-nuclearization and the replacement of the Korean armistice with a peace agreement. The replacement mechanism is a concern of the DPRK side, we can push for a parallel negotiation. As far as other proposals are concerned, whether three party, four party or five party negotiations, as far as they are conducive to the peace of the Korean peninsula, we remain open to all of these proposals.”* (CRI_20160308). Again, the Foreign Minister stresses that the goal, and the work of the Chinese government will focus on peace and measures that are conducive to achieving that peace only. The CRI correspondent echoed these sentiments by stating: *“No country should tolerate the prospect of the reality of DPRK possessing nuclear weapons. That’s a major threat to international peace and stability.”* (CRI_20160308). Later, that same correspondent states that North Korea’s actions *“really raised the stake on the stability and peace on the Korean peninsula.”* (CRI_20160308). There is no mention of “war” or even “disputes”; instead, there appears only to be discourse about “peace and stability”, and threats to that peace and stability.

The emphasis on “peace and stability” is used repeatedly in the second story, though in a very different context. The presenter introduces the broadcast as follows: *“Our top stories include, the final print edition of the UK’s The Independent hits the newsstands. China urges Japan to do more for regional peace and stability. Asian-Americans push for greater influence in the US election.”* (CRI_20160329). A similar enigmatic phrase is used to introduce the story itself 30 minutes later: *“Chinese authorities are calling on Japan to do more to safeguard regional peace and stability.”* (CRI_20160329). This is followed closely by the presenter elaborating: *“A statement from the Chinese foreign ministry said the Chinese side hopes Japan will do much more to benefit regional peace and stability.”* (CRI_20160329). Several minutes later, the presenter repeats: *“...and Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said that the*

Chinese side would hope much more to benefit regional peace and stability instead of doing the opposite.” (CRI_20160329). Repetition is a commonly used literary and rhetorical device, used to emphasize a point or make it more memorable. This fourth and final repetition is especially noteworthy, because it explicitly references “doing the opposite” – the implication that has been present since the beginning.

The explicit statement is that Chinese authorities – with “China” and “Chinese authorities” referring to the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson – are positively encouraging a desirable outcome (“peace and stability”); however, it’s not difficult to infer that this means Japan is considered to be doing the opposite, whether that’s causing a dispute, or creating instability. With the presenter’s mention of “instead of doing the opposite”, it’s a more direct accusation that the Japanese government is acting aggressively. Examining only these words in isolation, there is a clear dichotomy that can be understood as “the Chinese government works for peace and stability” and “the Japanese government challenges peace and stability.” Furthermore, this particular topic was described by the presenter as *“Chinese authorities are calling on Japan to do more to safeguard regional peace and stability. The suggestion comes after Japanese authorities switched on a radar station around 150 kilometres from the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea.”* (CRI_20160329). However, the external source interviewed on this topic, a domestic academic, described the issue as *“the deployment of radar forces at the Senkaku Islands in Japan”* (CRI_20160329). The implication from the presenter is that Japan is encroaching on Chinese territory – again using Japan as the aggressor and China as calling for peace – while the external source makes clear that these islands are actually a recognized part of Japan. What’s most interesting in this story, however, is how CRI is able to maintain its preference for positive language. There is no direct mention of aggression or trouble on the part of Japan; however, through its use of positive language in “peace and stability”, and its implications of parties *not* upholding those desirable values, CRI is able to simultaneously maintain China’s image as a peacekeeper, and accuse other countries of failing to be likewise.

Along similar lines of language, but in contrast to the active condemnation of Japan, is the language used around the Middle Eastern and African regions. In one Global Survey of Headlines, a CRI presenter states: *“Moving on to Africa, Nigeria’s former*

*interior minister has been charged with **fraud** over a **botched** recruitment drive which resulted in stampedes which left **20 people dead**. Islamist militant group Al-Shahad has said it carried out Sunday's **attack** in Somalia's southern city of Baidoa that **killed at least 30 people**.*" (CRI20160301_2) (emphasis added). The coverage here does not paint a pretty picture of these two African countries. Words with negative connotation include "charged with fraud", "botched", and "attack", to say nothing of the fact that 20 people are dead in the first one and 30 people dead in the second one. These sentences focusing on fraud and attacks are the only mentions of African countries in this 54-minute broadcast. Another Global Survey of Headlines has similarly negative and violent language: "*Moving on to Africa, at least 150 members of the militant Islamist group al-Shabaab have reportedly **been killed in heavy fighting** with pro-government forces in northern Somalia. Police in Mozambique say they **seized 47 weapons** from the headquarters of the main opposition party and the home of the leader Afonso Dhlakama. ... And in the Middle East, the Saudi-led coalition and Houthi rebels **fighting** in Yemen say they have swapped prisoners. Libya's UN-backed unity government has **accused authorities** in Tripoli of closing down the capital airspace to prevent it from travelling to Tunisia to start work.*" (CRI_20160329_2) (emphasis added). If CRI is attempting to subtly suggest that Japan is failing to promote peace and stability, it blatantly makes no attempt to do the same for these regions. Interestingly, the fact that these regions are so infrequently mentioned – and especially not beyond the Global Survey of Headlines – hints that the reason for the use of violent and negative language is not necessarily intentional, but perhaps merely the result of indifference to the region and the use of lazy stereotyping, as was discussed in the literature review.

6.1.3.3. Positive Language: North Korea and the question of blame

While conducting the content analysis, an interesting result was the lack of CRI stories focused on North Korea, which was a heavily-covered news topic in the target month. However, this proved to be a shortcoming of the content analysis: while North Korea was the dominant topic in only three stories, it was referenced in many more. The critical analysis revealed that not only were references to North Korea usually embedded in the context of other stories, but CRI discussed North Korea in a very distinct and consistent manner.

For one, discourse surrounding North Korea consistently referred to a “situation” or “issue”, and more often than not, it was not a purely North Korean issue, but an issue on “the Korean peninsula”. For example, when discussing China’s diplomacy with neighbours, the presenter states: “*So Chinese President Xi Jinping is going to attend the meeting and of course **the situation the Korean peninsula** will be highly expected on the agenda.*” (CRI_20160301) (*emphasis added*).

Later, an international academic says “*And there are **issues like North Korea** that have come up quite prominently in recent days, which provide the opportunity for greater cooperation among even the major powers, together with the middle powers, major powers referring to the US, China, Japan and South Korea and Australia.*” (CRI_20160301) (*emphasis added*). Here, an international academic refers to North Korea as an “issue”, but still uses the aforementioned positive language to provide optimism to the situation – namely, phrasing the issue of North Korea as an “opportunity for greater cooperation” among countries. In the same story, the presenter states: “*Well there’s been lots of dialogue between China and the US recently, we’ve seen Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi and US Secretary of State John Kerry meeting only last week to discuss **the issue of the Korean peninsula** ...*” (CRI_20160301) (*emphasis added*).

Likewise, in the coverage of the press conference with Foreign Minister Wang Yi, a presenter states: “*North Korea, nuclear, uh... **nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula** is not something new.*” (*emphasis added*) (CRI_20160308). This reference is more interesting because it seems that the presenter originally started to refer to North Korea’s nuclear programme, then quickly changed tact and instead shifted the focus to the entire Korean peninsula. In that same broadcast, Foreign Minister Wang Yi himself uses this approach when he states: “*The resolution 2270 is not only about sanctions, it also reinstated, restated that all the parties shall not take any actions that might **deteriorate the situation on the Korean peninsula.***” (CRI_20160308) (*emphasis added*). The term was used again in the “Global Survey of Headlines” segment of a later broadcast. Here, the presenter stated: “*And finally, in North America, US President Barack Obama will hold a trilateral meeting with South*

Korean and Japanese leaders on Thursday on the issue of North Korea.” (CRI_20160329) (*emphasis added*).

Another distinct use of discourse regarding North Korea is the careful avoidance of blame. This is seen in the aforementioned reference to issues on the Korean peninsula (which implies multiple aggressors, rather than placing the blame on North Korea), as well as in the following examples: in one, the presenter says: *“Well, moving on a little bit north now from Vietnam, moving up to North Korea, we’ve seen recently that that country’s attempts to continue its nuclear programme have somewhat strained relations on the Korean peninsula and in the surrounding area as well.”* (CRI_20160301) Here, in a story focused on China’s diplomacy with its neighbours, the presenter euphemistically refers to North Korea’s “attempts to continue its nuclear programme”, suggesting that this is a simple continuation of an existing policy without any other provoking factors. Furthermore, it is not North Korea itself that has euphemistically “somewhat strained relations on the Korean peninsula”, but instead this continuation of their nuclear programme, thereby avoiding putting blame on North Korea.

In another story, in response to Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s statement on the Korean peninsula, a presenter stated: *“Well Victor, the Minister said that this issue should be solved step by step, and I acknowledge that this Minister when he visited the United States last month, he also stated **“the Korean peninsula must be de-nuclearized, and there can be no more turbulence.”**”* (CRI_20160308) (*emphasis added*). The latter part of this sentence, which quotes the Foreign Minister, not only uses the aforementioned tactic of referring to “the Korean peninsula,” but also uses the passive voice. In the English language, the passive voice sentence structure is used to avoid labelling a subject, or who is doing the action. Not only does this quote avoid stating that it is North Korea that must de-nuclearize by instead including the whole of the Korean peninsula, but the passive voice also allows there to be no actor doing the de-nuclearization at all, thereby avoiding both assigning action and assigning blame.

A similar sentiment is echoed in this story by a correspondent, who states that *“the challenge is really for all the parties concerned to look into this issue squarely and see the true nature and the ever-changing nature of the nuclear weapons programme of*

the DPRK on the Korean peninsula, and really come up with the very effective way of achieving the ultimate goal of denuclearization.” (CRI_20160308) (**emphasis added**). Again, denuclearization is seen as a goal, one that all parties must work towards to achieve. Though this statement references both the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Korean peninsula as a whole, it again avoids assigning action or blame for the current state of nuclearization on North Korea specifically. This statement is also an example of the aforementioned positive language in diplomacy, by phrasing denuclearization as both a “challenge” that can lead to the “achievement of a goal” by all parties.

The same correspondent, later in that story, also stated: *“Simply by talking about the issue will not achieve the denuclearization goal on the Korean Peninsula. Effective measures need to be adopted and the international community need to be brought onto the same page in dealing with the DPRK government.”* (CRI_20160308) (*emphasis added*). Again, we see the Korean situation phrased as a “denuclearization goal” that is shared by all parties on the Korean peninsula; again, we see the use of passive voice sentence construction, in that effective measures “need to be adopted” (by whom?) and the international community “need to be brought onto the same page” (by whom?), in a careful avoidance of delegating action and responsibility. The use of the phrase “international community” is also extremely vague, and seems to simultaneously target all countries and yet no one country specifically.

In the press conference with Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the Foreign Minister himself stated: *“...we will provide support for North Korea to seek security and development, but at the same time, I want to make clear that we will uphold peace on the Korean peninsula. We will not allow North Korea to proceed with this nuclear programme. Dialogues would be the ultimate way out.”* (CRI_20160308). This is perhaps the most direct mention of China (through the pronoun “we”) condemning North Korea’s nuclear programme. While the Foreign Minister can be more explicit, perhaps due to his prestigious position, he balances this direct statement with positive language: “provide support” for North Korea, allowing them to “seek security and development”, while at the same time China will “uphold peace”, and promote “dialogues” as a way out.

Several weeks later, the situation with North Korea changed when Pyongyang fired projectiles in the direction of Japan. This news warranted a very short segment, however, appearing only in one sentence in the Global Survey of Headlines: “*First off, in Asia, North Korea has fired five short-range projectiles into its eastern waters in an apparent show of force toward ongoing US-South Korea joint military exercises.*” (CRI_20160322). Unlike previous references to the country, this one directly states that North Korea is an aggressor; however, even this short sentence manages to curtail the blame: it is credited as a show of force in seeming retaliation to actions by the US and South Korea. The statement could be interpreted as justification for North Korea’s actions, as the initial aggressors were actually the US and South Korea.

This avoidance of blame placement becomes more pronounced in comparison to how blame is directly ascribed to other international actors. Discourses of blame typically focused on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. As previously mentioned, Japan was commonly cited as a culprit for such disputes. For example, in the discussion on the situation on the Korean peninsula, a presenter asked: “*Do you think what Dr Lin has just said is a good opportunity for Japan to work with China and maybe, mending their relationship, since it’s been strained since last year, pretty much, by Japan’s new position on its defense law...?*” (CRI_20160301). Here, the presenter phrases Japan’s potential involvement positively – focusing on an “opportunity” to “mend” their relationship. However, the presenter also makes clear that the reason the relationship needs mending is Japan’s fault: “...since it’s been strained since last year, pretty much, by Japan’s new position on its defense law...”.

In the same story, the presenter later asked “*Do you think that Japan is taking advantage of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and teaming up with South East Asian countries against China?*” (CRI_20160301). This is both a leading question (as per the previous section), as well as suggesting that the territorial disputes are due to Japan’s “taking advantage” and “teaming up” against China – both negative phrases that suggest unethical, devious behaviour. Shortly after, the presenter mentions “*Japan’s so-called ‘united front’ against China,*” (CRI20160301), again fashioning Japan as opposed to China without reason. And as previously mentioned in the section on leading questions, when discussing Japan’s new radar system, the

presenter asked if Japan was “*trying to cash in on the window in which China has to simultaneously deal with the issues in the South China Sea?*” (CRI_20160329).

In the press conference with Foreign Minister Wang Yi, he was less specific about who was to blame for the situation in the South China Sea, but also made clear that the blame lay outside of China. He stated: “*On the stage of the South China Sea there is legal occupation. Now **some are stirring up troubles and flexing their muscles**. All these intentions will be in vain. History will prove again that who will be the genuine owner and who will be just passers-by.*” (CRI_20160308) (**emphasis added**). He very decisively states that China’s presence in the South China Sea is legal; any disputes he credits to “some” who “are stirring up troubles and flexing their muscles.” Without directly stating a responsible nation, he chalks up any disputes to aggression on the part of outsiders, who are interfering with China’s rightful claim to the territory.

Similarly, when listing China’s peaceful initiatives in the South China Sea, Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated: “*I think these all demonstrate fully China's sincere gratitude in the South China Sea, **but due to objections made by other countries**, I think, China's habits in the area's not as smooth as it is expected, but we have full confidence that along with other countries, we can safeguard the peaceful development of the South China Sea.*” (CRI_20160308) (*emphasis added*). In this statement, Minister Wang says that China’s “habits” are “not as smooth as it is expected”, which seems to be an acknowledgement that the situation is not exactly as it should be. However, this is prefaced by his assigning blame: the word “due to” establishes direct causation, and the culprit are “objections made by other countries.” While this seems a strange way of phrasing this sentence – “objections” themselves are not capable of causing issues – it is again clear that other countries are behind any issues in the South China Sea.

6.1.3.4. CRI talking about China

When CRI spoke of ‘China’, it was very often using a synecdoche to refer to the Chinese government – and CRI talked about the Chinese government a lot. Not only were several broadcasts dedicated exclusively to government-related issues, but discussion on government involvement occurred even when there was no obvious (to this Western researcher) link between the story topic and the government. This was

partly due to another finding: that language used to talk about the government often focused on how the government could solve or ameliorate difficult situations. In short, CRI's discussion on China often incorporated the Chinese government on a variety of topics, and those incorporations often portrayed the Chinese government as a sort of panacea.

There was a total of four stories that occupied an entire 54-minute broadcast (minus a 1-minute filler story). Of those four stories, three of them focused on a topic directly related to the Chinese government: the story on China's property market (CRI_20160304_1), the press conference with Foreign Minister Wang Yi (CRI_20160308_1), the story on the 2016 Government Work Report (CRI_20160311_1), and the story on the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (CRI_20160325_1). The only remaining full-broadcast story was the discussion on Artificial Intelligence, which did not focus on any one country.

The story focusing on China's property market might appear to be more of an economic than political story; however, these two are intertwined in the context of China, and treated as such in CRI's broadcasts. This interrelatedness of politics and economics seemed a subtle but assumed aspect of the discussions on CRI. There are several examples from the story on China's property market, which reveal how economic issues are treated as government issues. For one, a presenter asks "*So how might the soaring prices in China's first tier cities be stabilized and regulated? How should the Chinese government deal with the excess of real estate in smaller cities?*" (CRI_20160304_1). These questions by the presenter reflects a number of trends identified in this research: firstly, linking an economic issue to the Chinese government, and secondly, portraying the government as a solution to an issue. These questions posed by the presenter also show the tendency to ask an open-ended question followed by a suggested answer to that question in the form of an ensuing leading question. In this case, the presenter first asks "...*how might the soaring prices...be stabilized?*", and then partially answers that question by following it with "*How should the Chinese government deal with the excess of real estate...?*" By the phrasing of the second question, the presenter is implying that the solution must involve the Chinese government, and therefore that the government can solve this problem.

Later in the broadcast, a presenter states *“Professor Chin, as I mentioned in the intro there, we obviously saw that China's financial market suffered quite a slump last summer. And the Chinese government has also introduced several stimulus packages including the cutting of deep tax as well.”* (CRI_20160304_1). Here, the statement about the financial market is presented using understandably negative language (“suffered”, “slump”), but immediately followed by positive actions that have been taken by the government to remedy this unfavourable situation. Another example is the following: *“Well talking about the demand that there is for property in places like Shanghai and Shenzhen, the central government has been calling for the stabilization or control of house prices in first tier cities.”* (CRI_20160304_1). Similarly, a difficult situation on the high demand for property is immediately followed by a statement on actions taken by the government to solve the problem.

The involvement of the Chinese government in the property market is also shown in the statement: *“Well, de-stocking the property inventory around China is going to be one of the main tasks for governments at all levels this year and, in fact, it's been stated in 13 provincial regions' annual government work reports for this year.”* (CRI_20160304_1). Another statement is: *“Well, clearly China's real estate market is very interrelated with the wider Chinese economy as a whole. Now Professor Ray, you said just now that you were somewhat pessimistic about the development of China's property market. How do you think the central government should deal with the relationship between developing the real estate market and developing the macroeconomy as well?”* (CRI_20160304_1). Again, the Chinese real estate market and the Chinese economy as a whole are framed as issues for the government to address.

The interview with Foreign Minister Wang Yi (CRI_20160308_1) has already been discussed in detail; however, it is also pertinent here, as it also contained language contributing to the Chinese government-as-problem-solver theme: A CRI correspondent stated: *“I think the first question raised the press conference for Foreign Minister Wang Yi is about the G20 and what the G20 framework as well as **what China can do to help the world economy pull itself out of the woods.**”* (emphasis added). In reference to the work of Chinese President Xi Jinping, the correspondent states: *“And I think he has also come up with major pronouncements about his*

satisfaction with some of the major defects in the current international security order, and what China and other emerging countries need to do on it to be **recognised for their major contribution to a new model of international order** and the global order going forwards.” (emphasis added). Foreign Minister Wang Yi states that, “China safeguards the freedom of navigation with all the efforts made by China and the relevant parties with make it the safest passage in the world.” A few sentences later, Minister Wang lists the “efforts by China to safeguard the stability in the South China Sea. China has set up the China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation mechanism and implemented more than 40 projects. We also actively pushed forward consultations on issues in the South China Sea. We have pushed the consultation to a new place, which tackles complex issues. We also established the risk management analysis. We established two hotlines.” All of these mentions of China are, of course, referring specifically to the Chinese government and its actions.

Even when there was a direct question concerning other countries, the agency and positive language was reserved for China. In one instance, a domestic journalist asks: “The Chinese leaders have gone to **Arab, African, Latin American** countries and pledged support to these countries. China's also established exporting large-scale infrastructures. Do you think that China wants to establish its own sphere of influence by reshuffling the international order?” (CRI_20160308_1). In this question, the subject of the sentence – the actor – is “Chinese leaders”, while the object of the sentence – that receiving the action – is “Arab, African and Latin American countries.” The focus of this sentence is China and the Chinese government. If this point is not made clear enough in the question, it is made more so by Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s response: “That's another penetrating question. As China becomes more active in the international arena, especially last year. China has witnessed a remarkable rise in the order-building in the international area. we have risen to the third place in the terms of, say, the IMF, and the special joining rights is achieved. China is rated second in the comprehensive evaluation in terms of contributions to the UN. I think all these facts speak volumes that China is not overhauling the international system, we are trying to, based on the current system, play a bigger role. As China's strength rose, we'll need development space commensurate to China's size. I think this is a common.” (CRI_20160308_1). The Minister refers to China six times; there is no mention of the “Arab, African, Latin American” countries from the question. This point is interesting

for two reasons: one, because it reinforces the idea that China is the benevolent actor in world affairs in general, and especially in developing regions such as the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America; and two, because this exchange is representative of *Today's* general approach to those regions in this research. As non-Western, 'developing' nations, these regions are portrayed as passive beneficiaries of Chinese support, yet are otherwise overlooked entirely in broadcasts, as evidenced by the quantitative results.

In the story on the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (CRI_20160325_1), both the presenters and one of the external sources used language portraying China as a benevolent benefactor or problem-solver. A presenter states: *"As we have seen, Vietnam, for instance, was suffering from severe drought recently and China sort of opened up wider the gate to let the flow of the river to irrigate, you know, the lands in Vietnam."* Here, the presenter portrays the actions of the Chinese government (phrased as "China") as saving Vietnam from "suffering." This statement takes for granted that the river was dammed in the first place. In fact, the creation of many of these dams on the Lancang/Mekong River was a controversial move by China, and one that the Vietnamese government was opposed to, for the very reason that these dams could potentially cut off Vietnam's supply of irrigation water.

Later, an external source states: *"And China has been very active in the past 3 years, since President Xi Jinping came into office, has come up with many major initiatives, as the one you mentioned the Maritime Silk Road. So MSR certainly will play a major link in the implementation of the Maritime Silk Road. And China is working very hard to make sure that all these initiatives will produce winning results."* Again, the Chinese government is portrayed as proactively working to improve relations with its neighbouring countries, in order to "produce winning results." The source of this statement is Dr Joseph Matthews, who is introduced as the Director of the ASEAN Education Center in Cambodia. Throughout this broadcast, he spoke his support for the Chinese government, and at least one Cambodian newspaper has stated that this is par for the course in Dr Matthews' role as political commentator (Paviour: "Among Foreign Pundits, a Lonely Fan of CPP").

The other full-broadcast stories have more obvious links to the government and government involvement, in that they focus on foreign policy and a government report. Other stories that had a government focus included a story on Chinese President Xi Jinping meeting with the Vietnamese Communist Party (CRI_20160301_1). The presenter summarised this story by saying, *“Well, it will certainly be interesting to see if China can mediate these disputes effectively and therefore improve its relations with its neighbouring countries”*, which is an example of portraying the government as a positive force, able to singlehandedly solve the problems of its neighbouring countries and overall improve their relationships. Another story focuses on Chinese President Xi Jinping meeting with US President Obama ahead of nuclear summit (CRI_20160301_5); another story was an interview with the Italian ambassador to China (CRI_20160315_3); another focused on tighter monitoring of local Chinese elections following corruption scandal (CRI_20160322_6); and in a final story China condemns Japanese radar set up on Senkaku Islands (CRI_20160329_3).

Beyond these stories directly pertaining to the Chinese government, there were several others which incorporated the government and made use of the “government as panacea” perspective. In the story concerning the report on child welfare in China (CRI_20160315_4), the Chinese government is portrayed as creating solutions to the problem multiple times, as well as portraying previous Chinese government actions as positively contributing to the situation. Statements by presenters and correspondents about these past, present and future solutions by the Chinese government include: *“The topic of children's welfare is one which is at the top of the Chinese government's agenda, with new guidelines to protect left-behind children and a law against family violence both having been effect in recent weeks”*; and *“So, you mention that the Chinese government is undertaking many different policies and different measures to try and address this situation with the left-behind children and children in general in China”*; and finally, *“So, looking forward to the recommendations in your report, one of the key ideas is that local governments can set up an agency dedicated to providing services to vulnerable children and families in the region.”* (CRI_20160315_4).

Similarly, the story about the impact of ride-hailing apps on traditional taxi drivers in China (CRI_20160315_5) approached the subject from the perspective of government involvement/government solutions. The presenter states: *“The arrival of ride-hailing*

services such as Uber and China's DD has made Chinese people's lives easier, with new services and cheaper prices. However, it's not been such good news for traditional taxi operators. To solve this dilemma, China's transport authority is working on a plan to create a fairer competition environment for both old and new players in the market.” Here, the government is positively portrayed as *solving* a dilemma, in a way that is “fairer” to all parties involved. Later, a presenter states: *“I think competition is good for creating a fairer business environment, and it's good, the government's decision not to outlaw those taxi-hailing apps, but to reform the old or outdated taxi system, under which the burden on taxi drivers is already very high, as we've heard in the report.”* (CRI_20160315_5). In this statement, the presenter praises the government’s decision “not to outlaw” taxi-hailing apps, which implies that the outlawing is a given, while the decision not to do so is implicated as a wise and benevolent choice. Likewise, the presenter lends credibility to the need for government reform by calling the existing system “old or outdated”. As such, the presenter appears to be in favour of the government’s actions in this situation.

6.1.3.5. CRI talking about the United States of America

Both the content analysis and the CLCDA showed a high volume of coverage on international relations and diplomacy in CRI’s broadcasts. This trend continued to coverage of the United States. Overwhelming, references to the United States by CRI were in the context of international relations, and stories which referred to the United States also referred to at least one other country. Other times, the United States was used by both presenters and external sources as a frame of reference or convenient comparison. Many of these mentions included an economic perspective.

The stories which referenced the United States in the context of international relations included: in a story focusing on China’s diplomatic activities with its neighbours, the United States was mentioned in reference to its ties to both Japan and South Korea; (CRI20160301_1) in a story focused on Chinese President Xi meeting with American President Obama as part of a nuclear security summit. (CRI20160301_5); the United States in specific and the “West” in general is referred to in terms of international relations in the press conference with Foreign Minister Wang Yi (CRI_20160308_1); in a story about Russia’s military withdrawal from Syria discussed the Russian and US

military involvement in the country (CRI_20160315_1); a joint US-Chinese research project on the welfare of children in China was covered in a story, which included discussion on the academic cooperation between the two nations (CRI_20160315_3); a story covered a diplomatic gesture of Japan delivering a shipment of plutonium to the United States for storage (CRI_20160322_3); in coverage of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, the US is mentioned in reference to its role within the Asian Development Bank (CRI_20160325_1); and finally in the discussion on Japan's new radar system on the Senkaku Islands, the United States was mentioned as a military ally of Japan (CRI_20160329_3).

Beyond these full-length stories, the United States also make frequent and regular appearances in CRI's Global Survey of Headlines section. This segment, present in just three of the broadcasts, gave a brief (1-2 sentences per continent) around-the-world glimpse of news divided by continent: Asia, Oceania, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, Europe, and North America, each time in that order (CRI_20160301_2; CRI_20160322_4; CRI_20160329_2). The presence of the United States is notable here for two reasons: one, because it was always the *only* country mentioned in North America, despite Mexico and Canada also fitting in that category, and despite there always being multiple headlines; and two, because the United States not only dominated its own continent but was also frequently referred to in the context of other countries.

The entirety of the North American headlines are as follows:

- *“And finally, in North America, in the United States, a Navy Seal who helped rescue an American civilian being held hostage in Afghanistan has been awarded the nation's highest military honour. Still in the country, TIME magazine's photographers were reportedly escorted from a Trump rally in Virginia by US Secret Service agents after attempting to photograph protesters.”* (CRI20160301_2). Here, two separate stories are given in the context of “North America”; both of them focus on the United States.
- *“Finally, in North America, Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump has revealed his first members of his foreign policy team. Staying in the country, the FBI says it may have found a way to unlock the iPhone of San*

Bernardino attacker Rizwan Farook without Apple's assistance.” (CRI_20160322_4). Again, there are two stories; again, they focus solely on the United States.

- *“And finally, in North America, US President Barack Obama will hold a trilateral meeting with South Korean and Japanese leaders on Thursday on the issue of North Korea. Staying in the country, the FBI has managed to unlock the iPhone of the San Bernardino gunman without Apple’s help, and dropped legal action against Apple. And that’s the global headlines survey. It’s now back to Nick Lannigan with our next story.”* (CR1_20160329_2). Once more, the phrase “staying in the country” is utilized because both stories focus exclusively on the United States. Though stories about Mexico could conceivably be placed under the Latin American heading (there are no references to Mexico in the CRI broadcasts to use as reference), these headlines make one assume the United States is the only country in North America.

Beyond the United States’ dominance of North American headlines, there is also the appearance of the United States in the context of other continents in each Global Survey of Headlines segment. These include, in full: *“Looking to Latin America, Argentina has signed an agreement with US hedge funds to settle a protracted dispute over its failure to repay billions of dollars’ worth of bonds.”* (CRI20160301_2); *“And in the Middle East, Russia says it will unilaterally start using force against those violating the partial truce in Syria if the US does not agree to joint rules by Tuesday.”* (CRI_20160322_4); *“Looking to Latin America, Cuban President Raul Castro and US President Barack Obama have held a joint news conference in Cuba, discussing human rights and the lifting of a trade embargo.”* (CRI_20160322_4); and lastly, *“Looking to Latin America...In Cuba, former leader Fidel Castro has responded to US President Barack Obama’s historic visit to the country saying the Cuban people need to remember past US aggression and the embargo.”* (CR1_20160329_2)

The Global Survey segments focused on North America cover both international relations issues and domestic issues (the FBI’s unlocking of the iPhone, matters dealing with a presidential nominee), while the segments focusing on other continents cover the United States in purely international relations terms. This makes sense given the context (an entirely domestic US story in a segment about a foreign continent

would be a bit too much) and is in keeping with the findings that CRI covers the United States primarily in the context of government-level international relations. But it is noteworthy that there is so much coverage on the United States. This is particularly noteworthy when contrasted with coverage of African nations, which is further discussed in the following section.

Beyond these many references in the context of international news, there were also references to the United States on a much less significant scale. As seen in the examples, the United States often served simply as a frame of reference for both presenters and external sources. Many of these seemingly offhand references can be interpreted as lending credibility to a statement or opinion. While responding to a question about the current global economic environment, Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated: *“The United States economy is very soft right now, it's not completely out of the woods, the EU is facing major challenges and the Chinese economy is slowing down, and there are different interpretations as to what exactly is the long-term implication of the slowing down of the Chinese economy.”* (CRI_20160308_1). Here, in addition to referencing the United States economically, the Foreign Minister is using the country as a frame of reference or benchmark, intended to show the breadth of the economic slowdown.

When covering China’s property market, a presenter referred to an economic approach used in the United States: *“So you're saying after 20 months of trying almost every theory from Keynesianism, I mean, demand stimulation to Friedman's Monetary Theory, which once worked in the United States, eventually we are now back to the track we are most familiar with, that is rely on the real estate sector to power the economy.”* (CRI_20160304_1). Here the reference to the United States seems intended to give legitimacy to a theory, which many listeners might not be familiar with. It is also in reference to an economic scenario, as mentioned above.

While international relations were mostly absent from the story focusing on Artificial Intelligence, an external source’s example of the benefits of AI included the following: *“At the moment I think there are around 30,000 deaths by car accidents in the United States per year. So let’s assume we have self-driving cars in the United States taking over, and there are 15,000 deaths only, right? You would save 15,000 lives.”*

(CRI_20160318_1). Though this particular external source was an academic from an Australian university, he referenced the United States. This could be due to a number of factors: perhaps there is simply more data on self-driving cars in the United States, or perhaps the publications he reads are primarily written in the United States, or perhaps the United States is more commonly affiliated with discussions on artificial intelligence and AI.

In a story on China's annual work report, a presenter asks *"Hmm, well, Mr Liu, one of the things that we hear in the US when we talk about supply side economics, which is where I'm from, it often means less taxes or tax cuts. Would we see that sort of thing happening with the Chinese government's supply-side reforms?"* (CRI 20160311_1). Again, this question and the corresponding answer (*"Yes, I think so, because I think tax cutting or reform is one of the major tools for all over the countries including America and the European countries..."*) use the US and Europe as a reference and comparison for China in relation to economics. It's also interesting because this is the only time in the broadcasts that a presenter has stated his foreign nationality.

In the story on the Russian military's withdrawal from Syria, a domestic academic states that the move is not entirely unexpected: *"Not completely surprised, because [the move] has been expected by some of the experts in China and also in the US Think Tanks..."* (CRI_20160315_1). The brief reference to the United States here seems intended to lend credibility. The speaker could have simply stated the expectations of the experts in China; instead, he seems to be lending credibility by asserting that experts in the US have arrived at the same conclusion.

In a story focused on the decline of print newspapers, an external source states: *"Look it's as the professor says, it's not news, it might be the first time it's happened in the UK, but we've seen the USA lose a number of very high-quality papers, including some that have disappeared altogether, others that have gone entirely online."* (CRI_20160329_1). Here, the reference to the United States is apparently to reassure listeners that this is a fairly common occurrence. The implication is that if it can even happen in the United States, that it only makes sense for it to happen elsewhere. Later in that same story, a domestic academic refers to a possible rivalry between print and online news by saying: *"Yeah, it's hard to say and in China's situation, China's mobile*

media and internet media have been developing very fast, even faster than those in the United States.” (CRI_20160329_1).

While these seemingly offhand references to the United States may not offer much to examine rhetorically, their existence is in itself noteworthy. Even among China’s state-sponsored radio broadcasts, a familiarity with the United States and its place as a supposed world power is reinforced by the frequent references to it across a variety of topics – from think tanks, to car safety, to newspaper economics, to tax policy. It’s difficult to imagine many other countries that could be mentioned in such a way without drawing attention or raising questions.

One story that frequently and directly mentioned the United States and its alleged role as a world power was in the press conference with Foreign Minister Wang Yi. As a high-ranking official in the Chinese government, his perspective is perhaps the closest to government perspective and policy, and he speaks directly to beliefs and assumptions about the United States and its relations with China. Of course, Minister Wang is an external source, and not directly linked to CRI, and the press conference was open to the public. However, as explained in the literature, the choice of source itself is rhetorically significant; this source in particular enjoyed an entire 54-minute broadcast on CRI. As such, it is worth including his perspective on the United States here. Though the minister himself was speaking in Mandarin Chinese, the transcription is based on the English translator provided at the press conference, so that the following is what English-language listeners heard. In the references included below, we can see the minister’s nuanced perspective on the question of the United States: *“Further, I would say, the Chinese emphasis on, or the righteousness, I think, in diplomacy is something very rare, I would say, and I think major countries like the United States or major European countries need to come to the firm conclusion that the Chinese way of doing its diplomacy in the world is not a threat to any other country, the Chinese emphasis on being righteous, doing the right thing, using the right way to deal with all the other countries, dealing with international issues, in the righteous manner, is also very much of a distinction from the Chinese diplomacy under President Xi Jinping over the past three years.”* (CRI_20160308_1). In this statement, Minister Wang is drawing a clear distinction, which could be considered a form of ‘othering’, to contrast the European and American approach to the Chinese one. He is unequivocal

in his assertion that China's approach is "right" – "doing the right thing" and "using the right way" to do so. His approach is simultaneously defensive and offensive; without directly stating that other countries have condemned China's approach, he states that they need to see the Chinese perspective; similarly, by emphasising that China is doing things the "right way", he is implying the binary opposite – that nations that disagree with this approach are using the "wrong" way.

Without explicitly mentioning the United States, Foreign Minister Wang Yi later states: *"And from a Chinese perception, I think it will be very much centred around the leadership role of the United Nations, especially the United Nations Security Council and the political issues, for example, rather than being dominated by any single country, or the remaining superpowers, some country is calling itself."* (CRI_20160308_1). He offers positive support for the institution of the United Nations first and foremost; the "single country" currently dominating the scene is presented as a contrast to this institution. He furthermore undermines these supposed "superpowers" with the phrase "some country is calling itself." As he never explicitly mentions the United States, it is not a directly accusatory statement; however, the implication given the context is clear.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi's contrasting of China and other world powers continues with his statement: *"If you look at the realities today, the United States has been accusing China of becoming a free rider over the past 30 years or so. On the other hand, the United States and other major Western European countries are coming up with major criticism or even accusation of China's increase in the military budget."* (CRI_20160308_1). Here, the Foreign Minister raises the question of hypocrisy on the part of the United States and Europe. He seems to cast these nations as aggressors, stating that they are "accusing China", and "coming up with major criticism or even accusation". The implication here is that these powers will not be satisfied with anything that China does – it will always be either too much or not enough to those superpowers. With this statement, the Foreign Minister shows that he is aware of accusations by the West, and not only reassures listeners that China is abiding by legitimate international organisations – such as the United Nations – but also questioning the biases of those nations in the first place, implying that the hypocrisy of those claims makes those nations less trustworthy.

A presenter appears to support such assertions by Foreign Minister Wang Yi when she asks: *“Well Victor this question is about the so-called rivalry between China and the United States. Why the West has such a big concern?”* (CRI_20160308_1). While the first sentence frames the issue as a China-US rivalry, with both sharing equal blame, the ensuing question makes clear where the blame lies: it is “the West” that has an issue with China, rather than both sides.

The response by the CRI commentator returns the issue to a more level playing field, in which both China and the United States are presented as engaged – knowingly or otherwise – in a rivalry: *“Well, the United States and China are at present the two largest economies in the world, and they are the two largest political powers in the world. And I would say, in a sense, they are all, they are both two largest military powers in the world. And it would be only logical and natural for these two countries to have some kinds of odds against each other, for example, sometimes even conflict with each other. And this should be logical and everyone should expect that, rather than being surprised with that.”* (CRI_20160308_1). Rather than blaming one side or the other as the aggressor, the commentator chooses to acknowledge a rivalry, but phrases it as a natural, perhaps acceptable occurrence. His method is in keeping with the presentation of China and US as competitors, but without any animosity or real concern.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s perception of the situation and reassurances about China’s role reflect his own view, and presumably that of the government. However, as an external source on CRI receiving such a significant amount of coverage, his words are an important inclusion into studies on CRI rhetoric and discourse. Overall, his references to the US are used to contrast that nation’s perspective with the Chinese perspective. The Foreign Minister seems to adhere to the idea that China’s story needs to be told from the Chinese perspective – yet it’s interesting that he chooses to do so by directly contrasting or even contradicting China’s perception coming from the West. His comments represent one perspective seen in CRI’s coverage of the United States and contribute to a fascinating picture that CRI paints of the US in their broadcasts.

Perhaps the most significant conclusion from CRI's references to the United States is that the coverage is frequent and, most importantly, multi-faceted. While the CLCDA suggested a focus on the United States' military authority, the critical discourse analysis shows that this is just one type of coverage (primarily limited to a story about the Syrian Civil War and Japan's military movements), while other mentions focus on diplomacy, economics, and education, to name a few, from presenters and external sources alike. The United States, from CRI's portrayal, can be a fellow world power, an economic rival, an academic partner, a military powerhouse, and a development yardstick, all in one.

Furthermore, while the majority of references to the United States focused on institutional-level international relations, there was even a story that focused on American domestic issues and individuals concerning the voting power of Asian Americans in the upcoming US presidential elections (CRI_20160329_4). This story has more of a human-interest focus, as it interviewed unnamed Asian Americans in the United States about their perspectives on the upcoming election. It is one of the only CRI stories that included private individuals as sources.

6.1.4. Summary

CRI does not openly express support to the Chinese government or the countries it perceives of as allies to China. However, there is a clear preference for positive language, especially regarding 'peace' and 'stability' throughout the broadcast, and especially when referring to the Chinese government and countries such as North Korea. This is seen not only through the positive language itself, but also in the form of close-ended and leading questions posed by CRI presenters and correspondents. This positivity does not extend to countries such as Japan, which is presented in opposition to China's peace and stability, or Africa and the Middle East, which is characterised by negative and violent language.

As far as CRI's coverage of China goes, CRI broadcasts include several government-focused stories, and more stories that refer to actions by the Chinese government, making the government a salient presence throughout the broadcasts. Furthermore, actions by the Chinese government are usually presented in a positive fashion,

primarily focusing on proactive, mutually beneficial diplomatic activities between it and other countries, or advantageous domestic policies.

CRI’s coverage of the United States is frequent and multifaceted: topics range from American people to American technology to American diplomatic approaches, and the country is described using active language. This is in sharp contrast to regions like Latin America – which is basically ignored – and the Middle East and Africa, as mentioned above. While such disparate portrayals may not be intentional on the part of the news writers or correspondents, they nevertheless reveal implicit biases about these countries.

6.2. Voice of America

6.2.1. Themes based on corpus frequencies

Sketch Engine text analysis software was used to determine the most frequently used words and phrases, as well as the most unusual words and phrases as determined by keyness. The most frequent and prominent words, understandably, overlapped with the most-discussed topics on VOA: the US presidential election, and the ongoing war in Syria. As shown below, words related to the United States, the US election, Syria, and ISIS had high frequencies and keyness scores.

| word | frequency | test |
|-----------------------------|------------------|----------------------|
| United States | 117 | cluster frequency |
| government | 139 | raw frequency |
| President | 86 | raw frequency |
| Obama | 79 | raw frequency |
| Washington | 75 | raw frequency |
| president | 52 | raw frequency |
| political | 50 | raw frequency |
| American | 38 | raw frequency |
| United States government | 31 | cluster frequency |
| the US | 15 | cluster frequency |
| White House | 25 | cluster frequency |

The theme of “domestic elections” was separated from the overall “domestic government” due to the emphasis placed on the individual candidates. As can be seen below, the most controversial presidential candidate was mentioned 108 times by last name; candidates Bernie Sanders, Hillary Clinton, and Marco Rubio also had regular mentions.

| word | frequency | test | keyness score |
|-------------------|------------------|---------------|----------------------|
| Trump | 108 | raw frequency | |
| Donald | 53 | raw frequency | |
| Sanders | 71 | raw frequency | |
| Bernie | 45 | keywords | 168.08 |
| Clinton | 71 | raw frequency | |
| Hillary | 50 | raw frequency | |
| president | 52 | raw frequency | |
| Republican | 48 | raw frequency | |
| presidential | 42 | raw frequency | |
| presidential race | 5 | keywords | 56.86 |
| Democratic | 39 | raw frequency | |
| Rubio | 14 | keywords | 80.34 |

| word | frequency | test | keyness score |
|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|----------------------|
| Syria | 70 | raw frequency | |
| Syrian | 47 | raw frequency | |
| Syrian refugees* | 9 | cluster frequency | |
| Syrian government* | 6 | keywords | 62.87 |
| Erdogan | 9 | keywords | 59.3 |
| migrant | 31 | keywords | 52.05 |
| migrant crisis* | 5 | keywords | 61.41 |

| word | frequency | test | keyness score |
|----------------|------------------|-------------------|----------------------|
| terror attacks | 9 | cluster frequency | |
| Islamic State | 53 | cluster frequency | |
| ISIS | 44 | frequency | |
| ISIL | 10 | keywords | 116.64 |
| Daesh | 7 | keywords | 85.58 |

| | | | |
|-------------------|---|----------|-------|
| militant group | 5 | keywords | 61.41 |
| violent extremism | 4 | keywords | 49.33 |
| US-led coalition | 4 | keywords | 43.2 |

The themes of the “Syrian Civil War” and “terrorism/ISIS” inherently have a certain amount of overlap, given that ISIS is active in Syria and contributes to the continuation of the Syrian Civil War. In the latter theme, ISIS appears by a number of monikers: Islamic State, ISIS (for “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria”), ISIL (for “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,” the region in which the group operates), and Daesh (the English-language equivalent of Arabic language), depending on the speaker.

6.2.1.1. *VOA talking about the United States*

As previously mentioned in the CRI section, a variety of terms were used to determine collocations in reference to the United States. “US” was the most commonly used term, with a total of 154 occurrences, while “States” had 132 occurrences and “USA” had 6 occurrences. “American” was also analysed, and resulted in 37 total occurrences referring to the USA (as verified by key word in context).

As shown in the overall frequencies, VOA frequently references the United States in terms of its government, as seen in the various uses of “government” and various government-affiliated titles, such as “official”, “president”, “secretary”, and “diplomat”.

| word sketch | category | term | frequency | keyness |
|--------------------|------------------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|
| US | nouns modified by “US” | official | 8 | 11.01 |
| American | nouns modified by “American” | official | 2 | 10.04 |
| US | nouns modified by “US” | Obama | 7 | 10.35 |
| US | nouns modified by “US” | politics | 4 | 10.25 |
| US | nouns modified by “US” | secretary | 3 | 9.78 |
| US | nouns modified by “US” | diplomat | 3 | 9.72 |

| | | | | |
|--------|----------------------------|-------------------|----|-------|
| US | nouns modified by “US” | government | 4 | 9.31 |
| States | nouns modified by “States” | government | 31 | 12.8 |
| States | States’... | government | 5 | 13.32 |
| US | nouns modified by “US” | military | 2 | 9.31 |
| US | nouns modified by “US” | general | 2 | 9.3 |

Similar to CRI’s discussion on China, VOA’s references to the United States also frequently included other countries and diplomatic terminology.

| Table 11B. USA and other countries in VOA | | | | |
|--|----------------------------|-----------------|------------------|----------------|
| word sketch | category | term | frequency | keyness |
| US | US and/or | Canada | 2 | 12.19 |
| US | US and/or | Mexico | 1 | 11.09 |
| States | States and/or | Cuba | 4 | 12.04 |
| States | States and/or | Russia | 4 | 11.79 |
| States | States and/or | India | 2 | 11.19 |
| States | States and/or | Baghdad | 1 | 10.35 |
| States | States and/or | Malawi | 1 | 10.24 |
| States | States and/or | France | 1 | 10.19 |
| States | States and/or | Iran | 1 | 10.19 |
| American | American and/or | Dutch | 1 | 10.47 |
| American | American and/or | British | 1 | 10.41 |
| US | nouns modified by “US” | diplomat | 3 | 9.72 |
| States | States and/or | embassy | 1 | 10.24 |
| States | nouns modified by “States” | delegate | 1 | 9.53 |

6.2.1.2. VOA talking about China

VOA referenced “China” 34 times and “Chinese” just 4 times. This is a noticeably small number compared to VOA’s mentions of other countries, as well as in

comparison to CRI’s 122 mentions of the United States. While the United States was the most-mentioned foreign country on CRI’s broadcasts, China did not rank high on VOA’s list of country mentions. The countries most mentioned were linked to two main topics covered by VOA: the Syrian Civil War (“Syria”, “Iraq”, “Russia”), and the situation in North Korea (“Korea”). Overall, this suggests that VOA pays much less attention to China than CRI does to the United States.

Table 12A. VOA country mentions

| country | frequency |
|-------------------------|------------------|
| Syria | 70 |
| Korea (North and South) | 55 |
| Iraq | 44 |
| Russia | 44 |
| Cuba | 37 |
| Iran | 36 |
| Turkey | 35 |
| <i>China</i> | 34 |

With so few mentions, it was more difficult to establish patterns in VOA’s language use toward China through the computer linguistic critical discourse analysis. As far as countries mentioned alongside China, only Russia, Korea and Taiwan were mentioned once each. Aside from this, there was a notable absence of positive language when talking about China. Instead, some of the negative terms included the following:

Table 12B. China and negative language in VOA

| word sketch | category | term | frequency | keyness |
|--------------------|-------------------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|
| China | verbs with “China” as subject | suffer | 1 | 10.54 |
| China | China’s... | suffering | 1 | 11.83 |
| China | adjective predicates | negative | 1 | 13.99 |
| China | China’s | pressure | 1 | 11.83 |
| China | China’s | slowdown | 1 | 11.83 |

| | | | | |
|---------|----------------|----------------------|---|-------|
| Chinese | Chinese and/or | deteriorating | 1 | 13.99 |
|---------|----------------|----------------------|---|-------|

While each of these terms only appeared once, they still represent a significant portion of the 38 total mentions of China in VOA broadcasts. This use of negative language is particularly noteworthy, albeit not unexpected, when compared to the positive language used throughout the CRI broadcasts.

6.2.2. Themes based on manual critical discourse analysis

As found in the content analysis section, VOA broadcasts included many more stories than CRI, and these stories were shorter in length. It was also found that presenters and correspondents spoke a significantly higher percentage of the time than did external sources – presenters and correspondents spoke 73.8% of the total broadcasting time. The critical discourse analysis showed that the use of external sources was inherently very different than CRI’s. While CRI exclusively made use of question-and-answer sessions with external sources, VOA more commonly would only include selected quotes from sources, framed by statements from correspondents. In this way, many VOA stories more closely resemble print news stories: the presenter tells the story, and the soundbites from external sources are used throughout, usually, only a sentence or two at a time. Take as an example a segment from a story focusing on an African musician:

Correspondent: *“Gibson says she uses instrument like the didgeridoo to mimic the sounds of Africa's animals, like the slow, violent growl of a lion on a night time hunt.”*

External Source: *“I try and pull those sounds into the didg, and the drums obviously help a lot because the drums is part of Africa. The beat has got the rhythm of Africa and everything we are.”*

Correspondent: *“Her love of Africa, its nature and its people, was inspired by her upbringing on a farm in the mountains of Mpumalanga Province. Here, the leaders taught her to make music using waste materials from a local dump.”*

External Source: *“I kind of picked up a pool pipe, and started playing a pool pipe, because I didn't have money for a didgeridoo, as us South Africans don't much have money so.”*

(VOA_20160308_1705_6)

Even stories that made use of the question-and-answer format also included summarizing by the presenters and correspondents. As seen in print news stories, VOA presenters and correspondents made regular use of “she says” or “he said” to summarize information from external sources.

External Source: *“The situation therefore could be summarized as fragile. Success is not guaranteed, but progress has been visible, ask the Syrians. We are committed to make it work. And, of course, that is the hope of everyone.”*

Correspondent: *“De Mistura says the peace talks, which were abruptly suspended on February 3rd, will resume on March 9th. Since government and opposition representatives refused to meet face-to-face, he says he will conduct proximity talks, as before. He says this allows a lot of flexibility, so not all of the delegations need to be present at the opening session. He says he will stagger the days of arrival of the various groups. UN officials say the cessation of hostilities agreement has made it possible for UN and partner agencies to deliver food, medicine, and other aid to 115,000 Syrian civilians living in areas under siege by government or opposition forces. They say, last year, aid agencies were unable to access any of these areas.”* (emphasis added). (VOA_20160304_1705_2)

This approach of summarizing sources’ statements and selectively including direct quotes allowed for information to be delivered more succinctly and kept a consistent pace throughout broadcasts. This also helps explain how VOA covered so many stories in a single broadcast. However, this method also unquestionably provides more editorial control to VOA, as the story presenters have complete control over what to include and exclude from the external sources. Summarizing information from external sources also gives presenters more control not only of what sources said, but how they choose to convey what they said as well. This is certainly not uncommon in journalistic practice, but it does differ greatly from CRI’s approach of broadcasting apparently complete question-and-answer sessions with external sources.

6.2.2.1. Editorials ‘reflecting the views of the United States’ government’

Each VOA broadcast finished with a 2- to 4-minute segment stating the United States’ government’s opinion on a topic. Each of the 18 segments were introduced with “*Next, an editorial reflecting the views of the United States’ government.*” and closed with “*That was an editorial reflecting the views of the United States’ government.*” Each segment focused on a single topic, with some relating to recent news stories (as in the editorial reacting to the news of terrorist attacks in Belgium), and others seemingly unprompted.

These editorials represent the most direct voice of the US government; the first-person plural voice was regularly utilized (“*we*”, “*our*”), and on the whole the language was usually stronger and more forceful. For example, one editorial focused on former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein stated: “*The Iraqi Special Tribunal dropped charges against Saddam Hussein himself only because he was executed after being convicted in a separate case. The head of government has a responsibility to the country and to its people to act in their best interests. Ultimately few dictators die in bed or exit the scene of their crimes gracefully. The fate of those who instigated the Al-Anfa and killed thousands of innocents in Halabja should serve as a warning to others who follow in their murderous footsteps.*” The US government is not mentioned at any point in this particular editorial. However, the editorial’s stance is clear in the use of phrases such as “*should serve as a warning*”, and the use of the word “*murderous*”: dictators who kill their citizens deserve to be executed.

The absence of a direct mention of the United States was unusual; in most editorials, the United States was unquestionably the active player while other countries were passively referenced – often only used as geographic references preceded by a preposition. For example, note how the country of Nigeria is repeatedly referenced in the following editorial in contrast to the United States: “*The US Agency for International Development, or USAID, and the Coca-Cola Company, have announced support for a new programme in Nigeria under the Water and Development Alliance, also known as the WADA project. ... This joint investment is aligned with USAID and Coca-Cola's shared focus on clean water provision, as a means to help build healthy, sustainable communities in Nigeria. ... We are proud to collaborate with Coca-Cola*

to bring a sustainable and safe water solution to thousands of people **in Nigeria**, he added.” ... “USAID and Coca-Cola have collaborated **in Nigeria** since 2007.” ... “This new agreement will provide a framework to implement WADA and to allow the parties to establish a range of policy issues to achieve their shared objectives **in Nigeria**.” (emphasis added). Nigeria is never the subject of a sentence – it is always referred in a prepositional phrase, which suggests a geographic location rather than an autonomous entity. The result is that the country is never attributed with taking any action – that is reserved for the United States and the Coca-Cola company. This was a recurring find in the editorials.

Other research findings from the editorials are incorporated into the sections below, as the same themes were seen both in editorials and main stories. For clarity, they are designated as “editorials” in order to distinguish them from the regular broadcasts.

6.2.2.2. *Democracy as a value*

The concept of “democracy” appeared repeatedly throughout the VOA broadcasts. It was used as both an adjective (“democratic”) and a noun (“democracy”), was usually framed using positive language, and was frequently collocated with the terms “human rights” and “freedom”. In the VOA broadcasts, the gaining of democracy is presented as a positive step; the loss of democracy is cause for concern.

An example of the positive gaining of democracy can be seen in stories focused on Myanmar. The country’s elections were addressed in both a regular broadcast and in an editorial. In these instances, the transition to democracy is encouraged and praised. The editorial especially was direct in its praise of democracy and Myanmar’s transition to such a government. The editorial states: “*November's elections were another step forward in Burma's historic democratic transition, and the culmination of a reform process that started in 2011 with the relaxation of press and Internet censorship laws, the release of political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and efforts to improve the electoral process.*” (VOA_20160318_1305_10). The elections and the transition to democracy are called a “step forward” and “historic”, as well as a way to “improve” the electoral process. Similarly, the editorial goes on to state that: “*The presidential election is another important step forward in Burma's democratic transition, noted*

US Secretary of State John Kerry in a message of congratulations.” (VOA_20160318_1305_10). Again, the transition is portrayed as a “step forward,” and is cause for “congratulations”. This implies that democracy and elections are inherently an improvement over any other governmental system.

The same editorial also states: *“The United States remains committed to supporting the people of Burma and their ongoing pursuit of democracy, development and national reconciliation, said Secretary Kerry.”* (VOA_20160318_1305_10). This statement not only includes the emphasis on “people”, which is discussed in more detail below, but also links a movement to a democratic government with “development” (a positive, progressive term) and “reconciliation”. Similarly, the non-editorial story focused on the Myanmar elections quotes an Australian academic as saying: *“But it will be a gradual transition to a more democratic government, and a government that is more interested in the welfare of the people than previous governments in Myanmar.”* (VOA_20160315_1805_4). In this instance, the speaker implies that a democratic government is linked to more concern with the welfare of the people.

It is also worth noting that in the non-editorial news segment concerning Myanmar’s elections, VOA presenters used the name “Myanmar”, while the external sources used both “Burma” and “Myanmar” in reference to the country (VOA_20160315_1805_4). However, the editorial exclusively used the name “Burma” (VOA_20160318_1305_10). This was the name of the country prior to 1989, when the ruling military government formally changed the name to “Myanmar”. While both names are used colloquially, Myanmar is the official name used for any formal government and diplomatic activities. VOA’s preference for the name “Burma” mirrors United States’ government’s approach, which saw the military government as illegitimately in charge (“U.S. Relations With Burma,” 2018). The research adheres to the country’s formal title, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, and therefore the commonly used name “Myanmar.”

In a separate editorial focusing on perceived human rights abuses (VOA_20160329IE2330_6), Myanmar’s transition to democracy is again portrayed as cause for congratulations, but also contrasted with perceived failures to adhere to

democracy: *“The delegates congratulated the government of Burma for taking key steps in the direction of democracy, but noted concerns about continued military influence over the Parliament and key Ministries, abuses and discrimination against ethnic minorities, and continued legal restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly, and association.”* (VOA_20160329IE2330_6). The use of the conjunction “but” denotes a juxtaposition between “democracy” and what the editorial states is not democracy: namely, military influence in Parliament, abuses and discrimination, and legal restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly and association. Democracy is often associated with “freedoms” in the VOA broadcasts, as is seen here. While positive language is once again used in reference to democracy and “freedom”, negative words, such as “abuses”, “discrimination”, and “restrictions” are presented as cause for concern.

The editorial makes clear that the United States’ government sees Myanmar’s transition to democracy is a positive movement to be celebrated. Likewise, a separate editorial encourages such a process for another country, Russia. Much of the editorial describes Russia using negative language, stating that *“Human rights abuses in Russia under President Vladimir Putin have deteriorated significantly in the last year,”* (VOA_20160311_2230_9), due to the government’s efforts to *“suppress political opposition, suffocate civil society, silence independent voices, and stigmatised members of minority groups”*. Verbs like “deteriorate”, “suffocate”, “silence” and “stigmatize” all carry heavily negative connotations, which are directly attributed to the government. This is a common recurrence in VOA’s representation of Russia. For this section, it is worth pointing out that the editorial also seems to offer a positive solution to these ills: democracy. The editorial states: *“It is in America’s interests to see a strong, prosperous, and democratic Russia emerge, a Russia that can be a reliable partner in support of global peace, the type of Russian dream to which Boris Nemtsov and many other activists have devoted their lives.”* (VOA_20160311_2230_9). Here, the editorial links democracy with adjectives like “strong”, “prosperous” and “reliable”, which naturally leads to “global peace”. This, of course, ignores the fact that the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation classifies the country as democratic (“The Constitution of the Russian Federation,” 1993).

The same editorial goes on to state: *“The best way to honour the memory of Mr Nemtsov, said Deputy Assistant Secretary Bershinsky, is to support human rights, democratic principles in Russia, and international norms.”* (VOA_20160311_2230_9). Again, the concept of democracy is linked to human rights and “international norms”, suggesting that this preference for democracy is not merely an American ideal, but a universal one, shared internationally by all those who support human rights. Furthermore, both statements mention the assassinated Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, arguing that such a transition is actually his “dream” and honouring “his memory.” This use of a domestic person, or simply the “people” of a country, appears repeatedly in the broadcasts, and is discussed below. Here, the primary purpose of including his name is to imply that the perspective is not simply that of the United States government, but of Russians themselves, and therefore the United States’ stance and involvement is thereby more justified.

Similar language was used in stories on US President Barack Obama’s visit to Cuba, which is under the leadership of the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba). In these stories, both presenters and external sources included language focused on the association between “democracy” and “human rights”, in particular the need for Cuba to adopt an American-style approach to these terms. In one story, a presenter stated: *“US President Barack Obama hailed the progress in relations between the United States and Cuba, while acknowledging that the two sides continued to have very serious differences on democracy and human rights.”* (VOA_20160322_2330_1). Likewise, an external source representing an American non-government organisation said the United States was not doing enough to force American values on the country: *“We’re not promoting our values of freedom and democracy, which after all, we do think is a good thing, and we do think would be better for the Cuban people.”* (VOA_20160322_1805_3). In another story, a source stated: *“And while we will and we are making diplomatic connections and strides with the government, we also intend to continue to respectfully and diplomatically but forcefully stand up for American values of human rights and democracy.”* (VOA_20160318_2330_3).

In all three of these statements, “democracy and human rights” are presented as a set package, implying that one is not possible without the other. While the first statement

by a presenter says that the US and Cuba simply disagree on these issues, the latter two statements support an active promotion of these supposed American values. The second statement uses the phrases “our values of freedom and democracy” and uses the tactic of calling on the “Cuban people” as justification for promoting those values in a foreign country. The final statement argues for “American values”, and although it argues that the US should simply “stand up for” those values, the implication is that it should stand up for those values in the context of Cuba, a self-governing and autonomous foreign country. Phrasing American democracy as a human rights’ issue and claiming the people of foreign countries are in support of these values are used as justification for America’s involvement in politics beyond its borders.

Similarly, “democracy” was presented in association with the concept of “freedom.” In one story about a new book about ISIS, the author describes how ISIS attempts to recruit existing extremists by saying *“And it wants to appeal to these people, because it knows that these people are more resilient, more committed, potential recruits than ordinary people who don't accept these things, so want to live in a democracy, want to live in freedom and so on.”* (VOA_201603291805_3). The parallel sentence structure of “want to live in a democracy, want to live in freedom” stresses the association between “democracy” and “freedom.” The statement also implies that “ordinary”, non-extremist people want to live in a democracy and live with freedom, which suggests a normative approach to the concepts of freedom and democracy.

If the transition toward democracy is portrayed as desirable and commendable by VOA, then the perceived movement away from it is portrayed as equally reprehensible. This is seen in two stories focusing on Turkey, which use negative language to describe the country’s perceived move away from the American idea of democracy. In one story concerning the trial of two Turkish journalists, the presenters introduce the story as: *“Senior diplomats from Turkey's Western allies, concerned about what they see as an erosion of human rights and democracy in the country, have been attending the trial.”* (VOA_20160329_2330_3). Later, the same story states that *“The diplomatic spat comes amid already strained relations between Ankara and its Western allies over growing concerns of human rights and democracy.”* (VOA_20160329_2330_3). In these two statements, there is the presumed association between “democracy” and “human rights”. Furthermore, the phrase “Western allies”

is used in both statements, as though to emphasise that these foreign diplomats are there as friends and allies to Turkey. In the first statement, the dependent clause describing the allies is *“concerned about what they see as an erosion of human rights and democracy in the country”*, as though offering legitimate justification for their presence. The implication is that these partners of Turkey are present merely out of concern for Turkey’s best interests. Again, in the second statement, the reason for the strain in relationship is described as based on *“concerns of human rights and democracy”*, thereby seeking to legitimize the foreign involvement on the basis of such universal norms as human rights and democracy.

In another story focusing on the government’s forced closure of a Turkish media outlet, a former US State Department official currently affiliated with a US university states: *“This is quite a disappointment because Turkey through trial and error since World War II has been developing into a fairly reliable democracy with a multi-party system, and free and honest elections and it is through that process that Recep Tayyip Erdogan came into power, and then continued to win re-election several times, which is in itself a great accomplishment in the history of Turkish politics.”* (VOA_20160308_2230_3). The stance is clear: Turkey’s “fairly reliable democracy” is linked with positive words, such as “free and honest” elections and a “great accomplishment” in Turkish politics; as such, the move away from this democracy is a “disappointment”.

The external source goes on to state: *“You know, all this talk about the deep state, and the deep state is trying to undermine Turkish life and Turkish democracy, this has been a phrase that has been kicked around for more than half a dozen years.”* (VOA_20160308_2230_3). Here, “Turkish democracy” is joined with “Turkish life”, implying that “democracy” is not only linked to “life”, but also just as crucial to Turkey as “life” itself. The implication is that those try to “undermine” democracy and, likewise, undermining the very life of Turkey and its people.

An interesting contrast to this treatment of the concept “democracy” can be seen in the broadcasts’ treatment of the concept of “communism”. As shown above, the term “democracy” was presented as a value, in addition to a political system, in many of the VOA broadcasts. This was not the case for the concept of communism. This term

was exclusively used as an adjective (“communist”) used to describe just two countries: North Korea and Cuba.

In one story focused on North Korea, a correspondent stated: “*So, to elaborate on what you said earlier, **the communist country** fired six projectiles into the East Sea early Thursday, and South Korea's Defence Minister said they were either rockets or guided missiles.*” (*emphasis added*) (VOA_20160304_1705_1). In a different story, a correspondent said: “*The State Department on Twitter shared a video of Deputy Spokesperson Mark Toner commenting on the conviction of Otto Warmbier, and urging Pyongyang to pardon him. Some of the replies asked for a ban on leisure travel to **the communist country**.*” (*emphasis added*) (VOA_20160318_2330_1). In both of these instance, “communist” is used to modify the country of North Korea. North Korea appeared frequently in VOA broadcasts primarily due to its missile launches, but also due to the sentencing of American Otto Warmbier.

The other country described as communist was Cuba. It appeared in several stories linked to US President Obama’s visit to the country. In one story, the presenter states: “*President Obama makes history Sunday when he arrives on the **communist-ruled** island nation of Cuba.*” (*emphasis added*) (VOA_20160318_2330_3); a later story states: “*In his remarks, Castro welcomed the easing of trade and travel restrictions announced by Washington, but stressed the need for action to lift a 55-year trade embargo on **the communist country**.*” (*emphasis added*) (VOA_20160322_2330_1); the same broadcast said: “*And the president of **this communist nation** actually took some questions. He was clearly not used to it.*” (*emphasis added*) (VOA_20160322_2330_1).

Cuba and North Korea were the only countries described by their governmental system in these broadcasts; no country was described as a “democratic country” or a “socialist country” in the way that these countries were described as “communist countries”. The inclusion of the government system, without any further description, therefore seems gratuitous, and intended to draw attention to communism simply by its association with Cuba and North Korea, two countries that have complicated relationships with the United States government. Furthermore, as explained above, VOA portrays “democracy” less as a government system (with the exception of the phrase “*a more*

democratic government”, VOA_20160315_1805_4) and more as a value and a right, alongside the concepts of “freedom” and “human rights”. While a discussion on the nature, classification and values of “democracy” and “communism” are well beyond the scope of this research, it’s still important to highlight how these concepts are treated in the language of the text, as this reveals the assumptions and biases inherent in these broadcasts.

6.2.2.3. *Human rights and freedoms as American and universal*

In other instances, “human rights” and “freedoms” were used beyond the context of democracy, often with the support or protection of these concepts being used as justification for the US government’s stance or involvement on issues. Organisations associated with human rights were also used as sources on several occasions. The main takeaway from VOA’s references to “human rights” and “freedoms” is that, for one, they are referenced in many discussions, thereby situating them in the agenda and discussions of the stories; and two, that they are taken as a universal norm, with no need for description or explanation, and an assumption that the specific rights and freedoms discussed are apolitical and inherently positive. VOA’s approach to human rights and freedom is best encapsulated by this statement from an editorial: “*The promotion of **human rights** remains a pillar of US foreign policy. The fight for greater **freedom**, greater respect, greater dignity is a unifying narrative about **humanity** in all its diversity.*” (*emphasis added*) (VOA_20160329_2330_6). This perspective – that rights and freedoms are “unifying” and “about humanity” – is seen in the non-editorial stories, where the concepts are discussed normatively, under the assumption that they are apolitical, universally agreed upon ideals.

“Freedom” was presented as both a positive concept and an American concept in a story focusing on US President Barack Obama meeting Canadian President Justin Trudeau. The story states that “*During an arrival ceremony earlier in the day, Mr Obama highlighted the shared values, noting universal healthcare, **freedom of religion**, and the diversity in both nations.*” (*emphasis added*) (VOA_20160311_1705_3). Here freedom of religion is presented as a “value”, a positive principle belief that exists in both the United States and Canada.

In contrast to this positive support of the “freedom of religion,” one story focused on the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief’s statement on the need for repeal of blasphemy laws. The story is introduced at the beginning of the broadcast in the context of freedom of religion: “*Also ahead, the more we learn about Zika, the grimmer the news; **freedom of religion under siege**; plus, US presidential debates ahead of another multi-state vote.*” (emphasis added) (VOA_20160311_2230). The story states that: “***Human rights expert Heiner Bielefeldt says freedom of religion and freedom of expression are mutually reinforcing, allowing both rights to flourish, but that blasphemy laws cast a pall over these basic rights.***” (emphasis added) (VOA_20160311_2230_4). The freedoms mentioned in the story as described with the positively connotated word “*flourish*”, as well as being described as “*basic rights*”. The implication is that these rights are unquestionably universal and beneficial. In contrast, blasphemy laws – which traditionally are seen as protecting a specific religion – are described negatively as “casting a pall” over these rights. In this story, the aforementioned UN Special Rapporteur also referred to human rights organizations to support his statements: “*Russia, **according to Human Rights Council**, now really has taken over the torch from Pakistan to argue for the protection of the feelings of ordinary believers – which means mainly, of course, Orthodox believers.*” (emphasis added) (VOA_20160311_2230_4). Human rights and freedoms are presented together throughout the story, and the statements being delivered by a representative of the United Nations provides perceived credibility to the accusations levelled against Russia and Pakistan.

Russia was also referenced in two editorials focusing on human rights. In one editorial about Ukrainians “unjustly held in Russia”, the US ambassador to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe is used as a source, stating: “*He noted that **human rights groups** estimate that there are currently at least 20 such cases.*” (emphasis added) (VOA_20160311_1705_6). The other editorial begins: “*Human rights abuses in Russia under President Vladimir Putin have deteriorated significantly in the last year, said Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy Human Rights and Labour Robert Bershinsky.*” (VOA_20160311_2230_9). This sentence, attributed to a US official, is phrased oddly: instead of stating that “human rights in Russia have deteriorated,” which would be more grammatically correct (as opposed to “abuses deteriorating”, which might actually suggest lessening abuses), the statement is that

“human rights abuses in Russia...have deteriorated.” This method of phrasing makes “human rights” an adjective to describe “abuses”, which is the noun and subject of the sentence. This suggests that ‘human rights abuses’ in Russia is a set concept, and uses the negatively connotated word “deteriorating” to impress that these abuses are getting worse. The editorial goes on to state: “*The United States will also continue to hold Russians accountable for their roles in the imprisonment and death of Sergei Magnitsky and other **gross violations of human rights.***” (emphasis added) (VOA_20160311_2230_9). The entire editorial takes a negative tone regarding the Russian government and its actions, and it does so through the lens of human rights.

Another story is introduced as the beginning of the broadcast as “*Media freedom continues to erode in Turkey.*” (VOA_20160308_2230). The intro to the full story is: “*As the European Union seeks Turkey's cooperation in slowing the movement of migrants and refugees, it's under pressure to speak out over the **erosion of media freedom** following the government's takeover of the country's largest circulation newspaper Zaman on Friday.*” (emphasis added) (VOA_20160308_2230_3). In these statements, “media freedom” is a set, presumed concept; there is no explanation over what is meant by the term “media freedom”, only the firm assertion that in the case of Turkey it is unquestionably eroding, and the EU needs to speak out against this issue. Of course, in the same sentence it is made clear that it is the Turkish government itself that is at fault, given the issue is the “*government's takeover*” of a newspaper. The word “takeover” has aggressive connotations, as it implies an unwarranted invasion. These sentences also do not offer any explanation of the Turkish government’s stance or reason for the takeover, which is later revealed to be due to “*an investigation of illicit financing of an alleged terrorist organisation.*” (VOA_20160308_2230_3). The external source for this story is an academic from the United States, and the presenter later asks the academic the question: “*What's the status of freedom of expression in Turkey today?*” (VOA_20160308_2230_3). Again, the concept of “freedom of expression” in this question is taken as an apolitical, universal concept, the same as one might ask “What’s the weather like in Turkey today?”. The question is noteworthy in its assumptions about the universality of a concept such as the “freedom of expression”, as well as through the question’s inclusion in the broadcast overall.

Rights, freedoms and democracy were central to another editorial focusing on Vietnam. This editorial began: “*A Vietnamese Court convicted and sentenced Nguyen Huu Vinh and his colleague Nguyen Thi Minh Thuy on March 23rd under article 258 of the penal code, for allegedly abusing the **right to freedom and democracy** to infringe upon the interests of the State.*” (emphasis added) (VOA20160329_1805_7). This introduction includes the aforementioned emphasis on democracy, as well as associating it with the concept of the “right to freedom.” The editorial goes on to elaborate the US government’s perspective that “*the use of criminal provisions by Vietnamese authorities to penalize individuals peacefully exercising the **right to freedom of expression** is disturbing.*” (VOA20160329_1805_7). The positively connotated adverb “peacefully” is associated with the right to freedom of expression, while the stated criminalization of it is classified as “disturbing.” The editorial appears to justify the US government’s perspective by stating that these concepts are promoted by the government of Vietnam itself: “*These convictions appear to be inconsistent with the right to **freedom of expression and the freedom of the press**, provided for in Vietnam's constitution, and with Vietnam's obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other international commitments.*” In this way, the editorial implies that the Vietnamese government is behaving hypocritically, and the US government is only attempting to hold the government of Vietnam accountable to its own laws by condemning these practices.

Finally, the concept of women’s rights also appeared in the editorials. One editorial that was used at the end of both broadcasts on 8 March began by stating: “*March 8 is International Women's Day, celebrated by the United Nations since 1975, and adopted by UN Resolution in 1977 as United Nation's Day for Women's Rights and International Peace.*” (VOA20160308_2230_4, VOA20160308_1705_7). The broadcast focused on “rights” throughout, stating “*Protecting **women's rights** and defending against gender-based violence is a struggle women face in virtually every part of the world.*” (emphasis added); describing the UN’s 2030 agenda as “*an all-out push to implement a number of United Nations commitments on gender equality, women's empowerment, and **women's human rights**.*” (emphasis added); and stating that “*Nowhere in the world can women claim to have all the same **rights** and opportunities as men.*” (emphasis added) and, “*Any society hoping to flourish must begin by empowering its women, and by promoting for them the same rights that men*

already enjoy.” Though this is a more specific form of “human rights”, it is still an emphasis within the broad spectrum in human rights. As will be addressed in the discussion section, VOA’s approach on this topic also differs noticeably from CRI’s approach to this topic.

6.2.2.4. *Including the military*

With a large number of stories focused on the Syrian civil war, the Islamic State, and North Korea, references to the US military appeared frequently in VOA’s broadcasts. In fact, at least three stories focused entirely on US military exploits: one story focused on an elite US special forces operation capturing an important IS operative in Iraq (VOA_20160304_2230_1); another story focused on a US airstrike in Somalia that allegedly killed more than 150 Al-Shabaab militants (VOA_20160308_2230_1); and another focused on an Islamic State commander that was killed in a US-led coalition airstrike in Syria (VOA_20160308_1705_3).

The existence of these stories is most noteworthy because it shows that VOA does not shy away from stories on the United States’ military involvement around the world. Instead of avoiding the topic of military interventions, VOA instead seems to be in a position to control the narrative around them. And the story conveyed most clearly is the story of military success. The elite special forces operation in Iraq is described by the presenter quoting an external source that it “*appears to be the first major **success** by the new expeditionary targeting force*” (*emphasis added*) (VOA_20160304IE_2230). When discussing the Islamic State commander killed in a US-led coalition, his location is credited to military successes backed by the United States military: “*He was the, the commander was supposed to be, and believed to be in this Al-Shabadi area, due to recent **successes** against the group by the **US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces.***” (*emphasis added*) (VOA_20160308_1705_3). Later, this emphasis on US military successes is repeated: “*Back then, the US was saying that they had been gaining about 300, 400 square kilometres. The **massive gains** in this desert areas recently had sent Omar the Chechen to the area according to US officials...*” (VOA_20160308_1705_3). Even the acknowledgement of uncertainty is framed as a potential victory for the United States: “*But US officials are not claiming victory yet, let’s be clear, they’ve said, he was the target of the strike, and that there*

were up to twelve Islamic State fighters that were killed in that strike, they still don't know if one of those killed was Omar the Chechen.” (VOA_20160308_1705_3). Though the verdict appears to be playing it safe by not outright claiming victory, the subtext is clear: killing the target would be a victory, and it is a victory credited to the United States military.

Although these military activities are described as victories for the US military, these stories also include justifications for them. As is elaborated in detail in a later section, the US airstrike against Al-Shabaab militants in Somalia is described unequivocally as a defensive measure: *“The United States has come out multiple times today, in fact I just got out of a briefing with the Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James who says that this is a defensive strategy, that they saw, instead of just being an offensive attack against Al-Shabaab, they see this as something that was defensive in nature, because they were planning this attack, they had shown that they were training for this particular large-scale attack and therefore it is the United States' responsibility to protect its own in Somalia as well as its allies.”* (VOA_20160308_2230_1). This story also stated that US forces are in Somalia *“advising some of these African Union forces that are fighting against Al-Shabaab.”* (VOA_20160308_2230_1), which suggests that the United States is militarily involved at the behest and for the benefit of the local government. The other two military-focused stories did not feature language focused on ‘defensive’ tactics, but also language pointing to the involvement of other countries. In the story about the airstrikes in Syria, for example, the military target is described as having a bounty put in place by the United States and Baghdad, in reference to the Iraqi government. In this same story, the Pentagon correspondent urges listeners: *“Remember, the United States only has about 50 military special ops forces in there kind of coordinating with the Syrian Democratic Forces...”* (VOA_20160308_2230_1). This is possibly an attempt to justify US military intervention by making clear that the countries in which these airstrikes are taking place are also involved.

Furthermore, these military stories again use the sentence structure of the United States as the active subject, and other countries as geographic markers hidden behind prepositions, as previously mentioned with editorials. In this instance, the country of Somalia is repeatedly portrayed in a passive manner despite being the site of the action:

“The Pentagon says a US airstrike in central Somalia has killed more than 150 Al-Shabaab militants who were preparing for a large-scale attack.... Davis said the US had learned that the fighters were set to depart the camp and posed an imminent threat to US and African Union forces in Somalia. ... The United States doesn't really talk a lot about the US forces in Somalia, there are a small number in there advising some of these African Union forces that are fighting against Al-Shabaab. ... How common is it for the US military to carry out these kinds of operations in Somalia?... The United States doesn't want to become actively involved in Somalia... The United States has come out multiple times today... and therefore it is the United States' responsibility to protect its own in Somalia as well as its allies.”, (VOA_20160308_2230_1) (emphasis added). Through repetition of this sentence structure, it is made clear that the United States is the active player in this situation, and Somalia as a nation is denied all agency – it is merely a location denoted at the end of the sentence for context.

It's also noteworthy that these stories focus exclusively on US military activities against IS and its related organisations, although the US military was currently engaged in a number of military activities around the world. This is perhaps because IS and its affiliates are almost ubiquitously condemned in global affairs; they can be the universal villain without fear of upsetting any political stance. In which case, the US military also has the opportunity, by demonstrating its successes, to be the universal hero through its military interventions against them.

6.2.2.5. VOA talking about China

The People's Republic of China was referenced quite rarely in the VOA broadcasts, as seen from the content analysis and critical linguistic critical discourse analysis. A total of one editorial and seven stories referenced China; in three of the stories and the editorial, “China” was only referenced once.

China appeared in three stories with an economic focus. In two of the stories, China was not the focus but was mentioned in passing. For example, a story focused on the fur industry stated: *“Fur sales in Britain are strong, but the world's largest exporter, producer, and buyer of fur – China – saw a 5 percent drop in revenue and a 15 percent*

drop in exports in 2015 from the previous year. Still, Henry Sun, general manager of Hong Kong Fur Factory, says now's a golden opportunity to place orders." (VOA_20160311_2230_6). In another story about a new mobile app for tourists, the broadcast stated: *"Following their launch last year, Feinberg and Yigiter have been busy doing deals with other locations from China to Spain."* (VOA_20160315_1805_5).

The third economic story was focused entirely on China. The story was introduced at the beginning of the broadcasts as: *"...new data on Chinese manufacturing reflects a serious slowdown of the world's second-biggest economy"*. (VOA_20160301_1705). The story includes an external source in the private sector from Singapore and primarily focuses on a contracting economy and how the Chinese government is dealing with it.

The remainder of the stories involving China focused on international relations. For two of the regular stories and the editorial, the references to China can best be understood by the company it keeps: it appears alongside other countries that are negatively portrayed in VOA stories. This is most obvious in the editorial (VOA_20160329_2330_6), which begins by stating: *"During the 31st regular session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva, United States delegates raised concerns regarding human rights in Syria, Iran, Burundi, South Sudan, North Korea, and China. They also highlighted abuses in several other countries."* (VOA_20160329_2330_6). Those other countries, whose alleged human rights violations are described in more detail, are Venezuela, Cuba and Russia. The sentence immediately following the reference to China stated the delegates *"also highlighted abuses in several other countries,"* reinforces the idea that these countries are committing human rights abuses. However, in this editorial, China is referenced only in this first sentence, with no explanation as to what those perceived human rights violations are. Its inclusion alongside North Korea, Syria and Iran give the impression that these are 'the usual suspects', and their abuses are simply understood by all listeners without need for explanation. This is the same story mentioned above that stated: *"The promotion of human rights remains a pillar of US foreign policy. The fight for greater freedom, greater respect, greater dignity is a unifying narrative about humanity in all its diversity."*

Two other stories referenced China in association with Russia, North Korea and Iran. In a story focused on international sanctions on Iran, a presenter summarized the external source's statement by saying "*...he does not believe the international community, including veto-wielding **Russia** and **China**, will punish **Iran** over its missile tests with new UN sanctions in part because the country's struggling with high unemployment, and has yet to benefit fully from sanctions relief from the nuclear deal.*" (emphasis added) (VOA_20160322_2330_3). This was the only reference to China in this story. Similarly, the story focused on North Korea included this statement by a representative from a US think tank: "*Yes, but there it was pretty clear that everybody was on board to enforcing the sanctions. It's less clear that **Russia**, given the exceptions it introduced today, and **China**, are as much on board. We're just going to have to see by their behaviours.*" (emphasis added) (VOA_20160304_1705_1). In both of these stories, China (alongside Russia) is portrayed as getting in the way of progress by not "getting on board" as "everybody" else clearly was. The implication is that these countries are obstructing progress on behalf of troublesome countries like North Korea and Iran. As discussed in the above section on democracy and human rights, Russia is repeatedly referenced in relation to its perceived violation of human rights, both domestically and internationally, especially in the case of Syria. Regardless of if Russia and China did stand in the way of sanctions, the fact that these countries were specifically mentioned amongst all others seems only to serve the purpose of naming and shaming.

In the story focused on North Korea, the external source, from a US think tank, had more to say on China. When a presenter stated, "*...China's ambassador expressed some concern about the possibility that a US anti-missile system would be deployed to South Korea and he talked about a call for a return to dialogue, the six-party process.*" (VOA_20160304_1705_1), the external source responded: "*Well, I think if China had acted like a great power in the first place, North Korea would have never been allowed to develop the No-Dong or the Musudan missiles that pose the threat that the THAAD missile system, defence system, is designed to deal with. Now China needs to decide to act like a great power and get those weapons removed from North Korea.*" (VOA_20160304). Here, the blame for North Korea's actions are placed directly on China, which is also accused of not "acting like a great power". He takes the

presenter's statement regarding China's concern of US actions and turns it into China's fault – essentially, the US wouldn't have to be taking those steps if China had behaved properly. It bears repeating that this statement is by an external source and not a VOA presenter; yet the choice of who to quote and include as a source is always intentional and cannot be considered apolitical.

The final story which covers China's international relations does not portray the country as allied with other countries, but instead in opposition to Taiwan. At the beginning of the broadcast, the story is introduced as: *“Coming up, the US declares Islamic State has committed genocide; China renews relations with an African nation no longer recognising Taiwan.”* (VOA_20160318). This segment at the beginning of the broadcast serves as a sort of headline for the stories of the day, meant to succinctly summarise the story and catch the listener's interest. Right away, this reveals several things about the purpose of the story. For one, China is the primary focus of the story, as it is the first name mentioned as well as the subject that is doing the verb, “renew”. The only other entity mentioned by name in the headline is Taiwan. As will be discussed in more detail below, the “African nation” is not even named. The implication is that the African country is of secondary importance, compared to the foci of the story, China and Taiwan.

This emphasis on the China/Taiwan dynamic is continued in the story itself, which starts: *“China on Thursday resumed ties with former Taiwan ally Gambia, and that ended an unofficial diplomatic truce between China and Taiwan following January's landslide election of the leader of a pro-independence party as the self-ruled island's president.”* (VOA_20160318_2330_2). In this sentence, we learn the name of the African nation – Gambia – but instead of introducing the country on its own terms – as a Western African nation, for example – it is introduced in terms of its relation to Taiwan, as *“former Taiwan ally Gambia”*. This sentence also introduces VOA's stance on Taiwan: as a self-ruled island with elections and a pro-independence party. Of course, Taiwan is a contentious and controversial topic in relation to China, as China claims the island as a wayward province, while Taiwan calls itself the Republic of China. Officially, the United States recognizes Taiwan as part of the People's Republic of China (“U.S. Relations With Taiwan,” 2018). In this story, Taiwan is described as such: *“The small west African state was one of a few African countries to*

recognise Taiwan, **which China regards as a wayward province to be recovered by force, if necessary.**” (emphasis added). This portrayal of China using “force” and “pressure” was repeatedly throughout the story. For example, the external source, from a US-based think tank, stated: *“I think that looking at this in context really means, from 2008 onwards until now, there was kind of an informal truce between the Chinese and Taiwan on not, kind of, interfering in this kind of battle between which states would get diplomatic recognition, so this really seems to be somewhat of a **provocative move diplomatically for China** to, kind of, break with that.”* (emphasis added).

Later, the presenter asks the leading question, *“Do you think this is some sort of move, in your opinion, **to exert more pressure** to ensure that?”* (emphasis added). The external source’s response to that question included: *“We know the landmark meeting that happened between President Ma and Xi Jinping before the election that **obviously exerted some pressure** on the new government as well... So she's going to have to balance her own pressures with **pressures from China**, and I think that **Beijing is tighten the screws** even a little bit more with moves like this.”* (emphasis added). A presenter later states: *“Taiwan's foreign ministry said that they will continue to be vigilant and pay close attention to **China's pressure** on the international scene to safeguard their interests.”* (emphasis added).

Finally, the last statement from the external source broadens the recipients of China’s pressure to include African nations as well: *“So I definitely think that, especially in Africa, with there only being a few countries left that currently recognise Taiwan, that there's going to be **more and more pressure on the African states to recognise ties with China** and especially considering its footprint on that continent.”* (emphasis added).

The repeated accusation of China “putting pressure on”, “provoking” and “tightening the screws” casts China as the aggressor in this story, using force against not only the questionable status of Taiwan but also on African states in general. This also illustrates that, although this could be a simple story of newly formed ties between countries, the story instead focused on the controversial China-Taiwan issue and the power that China can exercise over other nations.

There are relatively few references to China in these broadcasts. But when it comes to VOA's coverage of China's international activities, the pattern is clear: China is amongst the countries causing problems by their disregard for human rights, and stirs up trouble even through its diplomatic tactics.

7. Discussion

7.1. Reflection on Research Questions

7.1.1. How do the United States of America and the People's Republic of China differ in their approaches to news broadcasts in their respective public diplomacy media outlets?

Voice of America's International Edition and China Radio International's Today news programmes were selected based on their similarities – they are both programmes of an equal duration that broadcast daily and focus on news from around the world. The purpose of using similar programmes was to more easily discern the different approaches used in the news broadcasts, and the findings did not disappoint.

On the surface, International Edition and Today had different ways of using their one-hour programmes. For CRI's Today, the programme tended to include fewer stories, but with more in-depth discussion: there were 30 stories which lasted an average of roughly 15 minutes each. While some broadcasts featured only a single story with the same sources for the full 54 minutes, other CRI broadcasts featured many shorter stories with perhaps only a single external source. For VOA's International Edition, there were 122 stories, with the average story lasting only 3 minutes 30 seconds, meaning there were more stories covered, and each story was covered for only a short amount of time. In this regard, some CRI broadcasts were more like a talk show, with the presenters acting as moderators to multiple sources having a conversation on a set topic. This is in contrast to the VOA approach, where presenters would often use quotes from sources as a part of the story, rather than having a question-and-answer style of story.

As far as content, both CRI and VOA broadcasts had a comparable amount of internationally- and domestically-focused stories, with internationally-focused stories taking up significantly more time than exclusively domestic stories. For CRI, 63% of stories were international, and for VOA 70.5% of stories were international. However, when looking at the time element, CRI's domestically-focused stories took up 45% of the total story time in comparison to internationally-focused stories which took up 54.8% of the total story time, narrowing the gap between the two. This is due to the fact that many of CRI's longest stories (including ones that took the entire 54-minute broadcast) were focused on domestic issues. For VOA, the ratio of international to domestic stories only changed slightly when looking at the time element; internationally-focused stories took up 65.6% of the total story time, and domestic stories took up 34.5% of total story time. Although the majority of stories were internationally-focused, both CRI and VOA referred to their own home countries in a majority of stories, suggesting that stories with an international focus still contained domestic links.

The topics of those domestic and international stories also varied greatly between the two outlets: CRI had more stories focused on diplomacy and international relations, while VOA had more stories focused on ISIS and terrorism. Both of these are focused on government-level international issues, as opposed to topics such as economic happenings, health news, or entertainment. However, the difference in coverage of government-level activities is striking, because while CRI focused on diplomacy and peace-building government activities, VOA focused more on terrorism and military activities. These differences became more pronounced when analysed through the critical discourse analysis, which is described below in Q2.

CRI and VOA also had significantly different approaches speakers in their stories. VOA relied heavily on its internal presenters and correspondents to tell stories – a notable 73.8% of speaking time was used by VOA presenters and correspondents, meaning that external sources only spoke 26.2% of the time. This is unsurprising, as many of VOA's stories featured only a presenter speaking to a correspondent. For CRI, that trend was almost reversed: external sources spoke for 66.2% of the total speaking time, while internal presenters and correspondents spoke for 33.8% of the time. By this measurement, CRI was much more interested in hearing what external sources had

to say, while VOA seemed more interested in listening to its own people. Furthermore, when looking at the country of origin of those external speakers, VOA also showed a marked preference for domestic sources, at 63% of total external speaking time. This combined with the high percentage of internal VOA speakers means that there was a startlingly minimal level of international voices for a programme titled International Edition. CRI also had more time dedicated to external speakers from China at 56.4%, but with such a high percentage of time dedicated to external speakers overall, this still meant a significant amount of time for international speakers.

As for the professions or categories of the speakers, both CRI and VOA had academics making up the largest percentage of external speakers. One major difference between sources was that VOA regularly used journalists for sources, CRI had no journalist sources beyond those included in a press conference. For government sources, VOA had a total of 15 government representatives speaking for 12.7% of the total external speaking time, while CRI had a total of 7 government representatives speaking for 11.2% of the time – a relatively comparable amount. Based on the literature review, one might expect the Chinese media outlet to have much more government representation than the American media outlet, but this does not seem to be the case for their public diplomacy media.

Of course, the most prominent difference between the broadcasts is VOA's inclusion of the government-sponsored editorial at the end of every broadcast. The 2- to 4-minute editorial segment is introduced as "representing the views of the United States government", and makes use of the first-person plural pronoun ("we believe," "we urge," etc.). This opinion section is in direct contrast to the perceived objectivity of the news broadcasts, and the ideology present here is discussed in detail for Q2. Segments like these quite possibly hurt the credibility of VOA (see El-Nawawy, 2006), as they make clear that VOA is a US government-sponsored outlet that abides by the rules and guidelines of the US government, rather than attempting to be perceived as a more independent source. CRI does not include any such government editorial segment. The inclusion of an editorial is not uncommon in US media. Van Dijk (1996) dubbed newspaper editorials "public, mass communicated types of opinion discourse par excellence". While US media outlets style their journalistic content as unbiased and objective, the editorial pages exist for that very reason – to analyse, to discuss, and to

deliver an opinion in a section intentionally segregated from the news stories themselves. Staff editorials in particular are intended to share the opinions of the journalistic outlet as a whole.

Although CRI's *Today* does not include editorials in each broadcast, they are common in Chinese media outlets. One of the most prominent editorials can be found in the *People's Daily*, which acts as a voice of not only the newspaper staff, but of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (Wu, 1994). Interestingly, the *People's Daily* editorials are more similar to VOA's editorials in that they serve as a direct mouthpiece of the government; this is made clear at the beginning of each editorial when the announcer declares. "Next, an editorial reflecting the views of the United States government." This supports the notion that VOA as whole acts as a mouthpiece of the government in the same style as Chinese state-run media. However, more research must be done to understand why editorials are not included in *Today's* daily coverage here.

Overall, CRI and VOA both utilize a global news programme as part of their public diplomacy media approaches, and these programmes generally appear to be standard journalistic products. They include both domestic and international stories, and depend largely on elites – such as academics and government representatives – for their external sources. Where they differ most is on their division of speaking time, as VOA depends on internal speakers, such as presenters and correspondents, for the majority of its content. In contrast, CRI relies more heavily on external sources, giving them more freedom to speak for a longer amount of time. VOA also includes a government-sponsored editorial segment in every broadcast which directly conveys the stated opinions of the US government. Editorials in general are not uncommon in news content such as newspapers and magazines; however, editorials directly from the US government serve as a reminder that VOA is a state-sponsored news outlet. CRI does not include such an editorial segment. The two broadcasts also differ greatly in terms of content, which is discussed in the following questions.

7.1.2. What ideologies are present in the public diplomacy media outlets China Radio International and Voice of America?

The literature review at the beginning of this research tackled some of the common practices and ideologies present in both Chinese and American media. By using the combined content analysis and critical discourse analysis, this research determined that many of those ideologies were present in these programmes. One ideological division, for example, is how China and the United States view the role of media.

In particular, Chinese media are more likely to view media as in a position to uphold stability and peacebuilding through support to those in power; while US media perceive of a responsibility to hold those in power accountability by acting as a ‘watchdog’ (Akhavan-Majid & Ramaprasad, 1998; Hanitzsch, 2011). Hanitzsch (2011) considers this Chinese approach as journalists being ‘opportunistic facilitators, while Zhang (2014) calls it ‘constructive journalism.’ Regardless of the title, research on Chinese media has repeatedly found an “emphasis on reaching solutions to critical problems...exemplified in part by the general downplaying of conflict, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in the Chinese coverage” (Akhavan-Majid & Ramaprasad, 1998, p. 147). The critical discourse analysis showed that this was the case with CRI’s *Today* as well. Content-wise, CRI stories focused most on positive, diplomatic activities between countries – such as discussing the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation summit, and high-level visits between Vietnam’s and China’s communist parties, and the meeting between the Chinese and US presidents – and positive government policies and activities – such as the update on children’s welfare in China and the government addressing policy imbalances between traditional taxi drivers and ride-hailing apps.

Beyond the topics, however, the language itself was repeatedly positively slanted. This was especially prevalent in leading questions by presenters. One example is the question, “*So as far as governance of the LMC is concerned, how do you think that this organisation can ensure winning cooperation with benefits balanced to all, and that decisions are multilateral and mutual, with the concerns and wills of each country being taken into account?*” (CRI_20160325). This is particularly example is noteworthy not only because of its use of positive language – “winning cooperation,” “benefits balanced to all”, “concerns and wills of each country”, - but because it is not

natural, conversational language; it is a question with a purpose, and that purpose is to describe the idealistic goals of this Chinese-led cooperation.

As for the “general downplaying of conflict” found by Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998, p. 147), that was seen most clearly in CRI’s references to North Korea. North Korea’s firing of missiles was continually referred to as “*the situation on the Korean peninsula,*” (CRI_20160301) or “*the issue on the Korean peninsula*” (CRI_20160308), euphemisms that mask blame and avoid a direct statement of North Korean aggression. Stories focused not on North Korea’s activities, but more on diplomatic efforts surrounding the issues, such as the story where Chinese President Xi Jinping was attending a meeting with this “situation” on the agenda (CRI_20160301), or a trilateral meeting between countries on the “issue” (CRI_20160329).

By far the most notable ideological finding based on the linguistic analysis was the regular use of “peace and stability” by CRI. These words were used repeatedly throughout the broadcasts, and served both as positive goals (such as by the Chinese government), and as a way to condemn countries that appeared to be against “peace and stability” (such as the Japanese government). ‘Peace’ itself is an inherently vague and largely unattainable term, but one that is no one can ideologically oppose; peace is generally understood to be an absence of fighting or war, which is always ideal. What is interesting is that it is repeatedly associated with ‘stability’, which on its own does not denote the idealism of peace, but instead refers to a state where a situation continues as it is, where things do not change. This likewise reflects the Chinese government’s approach to its foreign relations: do not push for change, support the existing regime, and keep everything stable, as that is associated with peace. Likewise, the associated pair of ‘peace and stability’ are also used to condemn the actions of other countries: if you are upsetting the balance, you are therefore against peace and stability, which is unfavourable.

This is also where the comparison between the media outlets becomes most insightful, because the Chinese ideology is so starkly different from the US ideology. The literature concerning US media found a notable anti-communist bias (Akhavan-Majid & Ramaprasad, 1998; Kobland et al., 1992). While this anti-communism bias was not

very pronounced in these broadcasts, there was a definite pro-democracy slant. The move towards democracy was repeatedly referred to as a progress, or a positive step in the right direction, such as in the story praising, “another step forward in Burma’s historic democratic transition” (VOA_20160318_1305_10), or the editorial highlighting the goal of “strong, prosperous and democratic Russia” (VOA_20160311_2230_9). Similar to the Chinese approach, a move away from democracy, or actions seen as un-democratic, were viewed as a negative regression and condemned. This was the case for Turkey, whose actions had Western allies concerned about the “erosion of human rights and democracy” and whose move away from democracy was “quite a disappointment” (VOA_20160329_2330_3).

Like CRI, VOA also used association to connect democracy to more universally positive terms. In this case, democracy was repeatedly used in conjunction with the words freedom (as in “promoting the values of freedom and democracy” [VOA_20160322_1805_3]) and human rights (as in “stand up for American values of human rights and democracy” [VOA_20160318_2330_3]). One editorial even used the phrase “human rights, democratic principles in Russia, and international norms” (VOA_20160311_2230_9), suggesting that democracy is not only a universally accepted value, but also, simply a ‘norm’ across the world.

Such language is ideologically directly linked with the press system of the United States, which champions freedom of the press as a necessary component of democracy, and which champions democracy as the most desirable governmental system on the earth. This also supports that findings that media assistance from the United States is more focused on democratic than developmental ideals (Cooper, 2016). It is still surprising just how frequently these terms were mentioned both in editorials and in regular news stories.

The belief that freedom and democracy are universal human rights also helps to explain the inclusion of stories focused on US military exploits. Although not directly voicing support for war, the American ideology seems to suggest that freedom and democracy are things worth fighting for at any cost. As such, the military involvement in countries such as Iraq and Somalia is justified, because it is “defensive in nature” (VOA_20160308_2230_1) and intended to protect people against the tyranny of ISIS,

which stands in opposition to the American value of freedom of religion, among other things.

Comparing the ideological language of CRI and VOA side-by-side gives a fascinating perspective on the values of both countries: China values stability and peace, which is how it justifies media censorship and clamping down on protest in its borders (Hanitzsch, 2011); while the United States values the concept of freedom and rights, which are to be protected and fought for at any cost, including war (Hanitzsch, 2011). While the author of this research was expecting a certain amount of ideologically charged language in these public diplomacy media outlets, the prominence of such language was still surprising.

Of course, this repetition of ideological terms only becomes apparent after close analysis and comparison; to the average casual listener of these stations, such language is probably not noticeable or noteworthy. This is perhaps the advantage of public diplomacy media outlets: on the surface, they resemble typical news broadcasts, with no clear government involvement or propagandistic language (except for VOA's editorial section). Instead, the news broadcasts very subtly convey links – such as “peace and stability”, or “freedom and democracy” – that, according to Haider (2017), can over time create associations that were not previously present. This is also why such critical discourse analyses are necessary: it allows potential audiences to become aware of the language and tactics used by such outlets in an attempt to support their particular beliefs and values.

What this research does not address is the cause of this ideological language in these broadcasts. It is well worth researching how such ideology and language comes to be utilized, perhaps by examining the production process, or other levels of influence according to Shoemaker and Reese (1991). Discovering the ideological leanings of news outlets is only the beginning step to understanding the how and why.

7.1.3. How do China Radio International and Voice of America portray and linguistically refer to their own respective countries in news coverage?

Much of the ideology discussed above applies to how CRI and VOA refer to China and the United States, respectively. For CRI, about 45% of the total broadcast time was dedicated to domestic affairs, including three stories which occupied one complete 54-minute broadcast, and China was referenced in 83.3% of CRI's stories. The Chinese government was primarily referenced in the context of diplomatic relations (such as the story about the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation [CRI_20160325_1]) and domestic policy issues (such as the story about China's housing market [CRI_20160304_1]).

As previously mentioned, 'peace and stability' are values that are regularly referenced in these broadcasts. It's not surprising, then, that CRI sought to portray China in terms of these values. Specifically, the China government was often referenced as a mediator and global benefactor in international affairs and a positive force domestically. The former point can be seen in the press conference with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (CRI_20160308_1), where a CRI correspondent references "what China can do to help the world economy pull itself out of woods"; in a broadcast on the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (CRI_20160325_1) where a source stated that "*China is working very hard to make sure that all these initiatives will produce winning results*"; and in a story on the meeting between Vietnamese and Chinese officials where a presenter states that it will "be interesting to see if China can mediate these disputes effectively" (CRI_20160301_1). As for the latter point, we have as examples the story on children's welfare in China (CRI_20160315_4) where a presenter states that the issue "*is one which is at the top of the Chinese government's agenda*", and that the "Chinese government is undertaking many different policies and different measures to try and address this situation."

This emphasis on building peaceful, mutually beneficial relationships and actively seeking to improve its own domestic policies is consistent with the emphasis on the 'peace and stability' values, as well as with the concept of constructive journalism addressed in the literature review (Y. Zhang, 2014).

Such an approach can also be considered in the context of China's public diplomacy goals. One goal is forming a desirable image of the state, while another is issuing rebuttals to distorted overseas reports about China (Y. Wang, 2008; Zhan, 1998). By highlighting the positive, peaceful actions taken by the Chinese government both domestically and internationally, CRI is contributing to the image of China as a peaceful nation concerned with improving global affairs, which also serves as a counter to the portrayal of the government as indifferent to human rights and concerned only with neo-colonialism (W. Chen, 2013; "China 'toxic for Africa freedom,'" 2008).

VOA also had a majority of international stories, and with the USA being referenced in 59% of its stories. However, the critical discourse analysis revealed that the latter number should be higher; a number of VOA stories did not explicitly refer to the United States, but focused primarily on American content. Examples of such stories include one focused on the Country Music Hall of Fame (VOA_20160329_2330_5), and another about an upcoming biopic about an American civil rights artist (VOA_201603042230_7). Such stories are interesting because they assume listeners have a certain amount of familiarity with American culture as to be able to understand the stories without an explicitly stated context (for example, listeners needed to know that Bob Dylan is a country music legend in the United States, or needed to know that the American Civil Rights movement focused on equality for African-Americans).

The corpus linguistic critical discourse analysis showed that VOA primarily frequently referred to the United States in relations to its government and officials. This is reflected in the fact that a significant portion of the domestic stories focused on the 2016 presidential election. This topic occupied roughly 11% of all VOA stories, and 16% of the total broadcast time.

One topic that did not appear prevalent in the content analysis or corpus linguistic analysis, but was found to be linguistically significant in the critical discourse analysis was the US military. In the topics section, the US military was primarily included in stories linked to ISIS/terrorism, the Syrian Civil War and the situation with North Korea; only three stories focused exclusively on US military actions beyond these. However, the critical discourse analysis of these stories proved insightful. The target

of these military activities was exclusively ISIS and its affiliates, presumably because they can be seen as a universal enemy; they focused entirely on US military ‘successes’ (with ‘success’ being the US military hitting its desired targets or gaining land from the enemy); and, in at least one case, the attack was repeatedly stated to be a “defensive” measure intended to protect the US military and its allies (VOA_20160308_2230_1, VOA_20160308_1705_3, VOA_20160304IE_2230) . While VOA does not shy away from reporting US military activities, it is still very careful to shape the narrative as one of necessary, justifiable actions and ultimate successes against an enemy that is recognized around the world.

Many entertainment stories also focused on US culture, ranging from Hollywood (focused on the Academy Awards [VOA_201603012330_6], or an upcoming film showcasing national parks [VOA_201603041705_4]) to country music (focused on popular musicians [VOA_20160322_2330_5] or new songs [VOA_201603111705_5]) to sports (such as a popular football player’s retirement [VOA_201603082230_5]). VOA overall had many more entertainment and human interest stories, and did not miss an opportunity to share its own culture.

Unlike CRI, VOA’s endorsement of the US government was explicit: the editorials, written using first-person plural, directly and unequivocally stated the opinions of the government. While these editorials did not attempt blatant promotion of the United States’ government, they did not shy away from condemning countries the US government finds problematic, or from repeatedly promoting the ideals of democracy and human rights. An example of the former can be seen in the editorial’s repeated negative portrayals of Russia (VOA_20160311_1705_6; VOA_20160311_2230_9) and in the condemnation of countries en masse in another editorial: *“During the 31st regular session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva, United States delegates raised concerns regarding human rights in Syria, Iran, Burundi, South Sudan, North Korea, and China. They also highlighted abuses in several other countries.”* (VOA_20160329_2330_6).

Like CRI, there was no direct praise of the US government. Instead, there were repeated positive associations between democracy, human rights and freedoms (three things that are considered values in the United States), and calls for other countries to

champion these values as well. In addition to the anti-Communist rhetoric found by scholars such as Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998) and Entman (1991), it's worth investigating pro-democratic and pro-'freedom' rhetoric in American media as well.

7.1.4. How does China Radio International portray and linguistically refer to the United States, and how does Voice of American portray and linguistically refer to China, in news coverage?

When it came to coverage of China and the United States, CRI and VOA had drastically different approaches.

CRI frequently referred to the United States in its broadcasts, with 70% of CRI stories mentioning the country. It was referred to in a variety of contexts, though the most dominant one was in the context of international relations. In the "Global Survey of Headlines" segment of broadcasts, the US was the only country mentioned on several occasions, in addition to appearing in headlines pertaining to other continents. Other times, the United States was used merely as a frame of reference (using the statistic of number of traffic accidents in the US [CRI_20160318_1], to pointing out an economic approach that has been used in the US [CRI_20160304_1], for example). While the corpus linguistics analysis suggested an association in CRI stories between the United States and military activities, this did not prove to be a dominant theme, nor a negative one. For example, one story that linked the United States with the military was simply a headline about a civilian being awarded a military honour. Overall, CRI's coverage of the United States is frequent and multi-faceted. It does not stick to one narrative or one particular style of rhetoric in the stories. Though a potential enmity or competition between China and the United States is suggested in the press conference with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (CRI_20160308_1), there is not the sort of blaming or challenging rhetoric that CRI uses with, for example, Japan.

Moreover, CRI also utilized sources from the United States, allowing American residents to speak on their own behalf. There was a total of eight sources from the United States who spoke for a total of 35 minutes. Both the number of speakers and

the amount of speaking time puts American sources as the second highest, behind only Chinese sources.

The same cannot be said for VOA's coverage of China.

Overall, VOA did not include many sources from international countries. There were no sources from China in their broadcasts. China was referenced in only seven VOA stories and one editorial; in three of those, China was only mentioned a single time. In the editorial, China was directly condemned: "*During the 31st regular session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva, United States delegates raised concerns regarding human rights in Syria, Iran, Burundi, South Sudan, North Korea, and China.*" (VOA_20160329_2330_6).

VOA's coverage of China can best be understood by country associations: in addition to the above statement, it appeared multiple times in conjunction with Russia, North Korea, and Iran, all countries who were portrayed by VOA as against human rights. Given the literature surrounding anti-communist rhetoric in American media, it is not surprising that China, Russia and North Korea – all current or former Communist countries – should be highlighted for their perceived lack of human rights (Akhavan-Majid & Ramaprasad, 1998; Kobland et al., 1992). In the story focused on China's relationship with Taiwan (that included new diplomatic ties with an African country), China was described using aggressive and forceful language (VOA_20160318_2330_2).

This imbalance of coverage is not entirely unexpected: research has shown that foreign news often focuses more on "elite nations" (Lee, Wilke, and Cohen 2013; Curran et al, 2015). As the United States is considered a world superpower, China's interest in the country's affairs is not unique. It is more the United States' *disinterest* in China that raises questions, as the country has the world's second-largest economy. This suggests that Voice of America's avoidance of China is intentional. Furthermore, of the few times when China was mentioned in VOA broadcasts, most were not favourable. In this way, it seems that VOA is continuing the Cold War rhetoric of anti-Communist discourse when it comes to its treatment of China. Though more research focused directly on this point is needed to conclusively determine a reason, it could

perhaps be VOA's tactic to avoid giving any attention to China. If any publicity is good publicity, VOA prefers to avoid providing any at all.

7.1.5. How do these public diplomacy media outlets negotiate their responsibilities as journalistic entities and voices of their governments?

While conducting this research, it became clear that this final research question was largely oversimplified. In order to answer it, we first have to make clear the different approaches to media between the countries, as well as challenge the notion of public diplomacy itself.

One thing is clear: both VOA and CRI exist to promote the policies and political perspectives of their governments. In the case of VOA, the method is direct: each broadcast contains an editorial that comes directly from the United States government and voices the government's opinions, activities, and values. CRI was less explicit with its endorsement of the Chinese government. While many stories focused exclusively on China and its government – to the extent of broadcasting an entire government press conference – there was otherwise no direct sanctioning, and certainly not one that occurred in each broadcast. Furthermore, both outlets focused on domestic issues and perspectives, to the near-exclusion of regions like Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa.

Yet where both CRI and VOA's "inform and influence" charge becomes clearest is in their promotion of specific ideologies and values. This tactic is undeniably present through close inspection of the language using critical discourse analysis. Whether it is intentional and directly mandated by owners, editors and the like, or merely the result of the overall social system as describes by Shoemaker and Reese (1991) would be another interesting area of research that would need to closely examine both outlets' production processes.

For CRI, the values that were continually stressed by presenters and sources were 'peace and stability'. For VOA, the ideals and values that were repeated throughout

both the editorials and regular news stories were the universal benefit of democracy, human rights, and freedoms. Both outlets used these values not only to condone their own governments and their allies, but also to justify criticisms against their perceived challengers. In the case of CRI, Japan was condemned for failing to uphold ‘peace and stability’ through its actions in the region. For VOA, the culprit was usually Russia, for its perceived lack of democracy and support for human rights. As such, the similarities between the two outlets supports Curran et al.’s (2015) argument that global media powers such as these utilize similar tactics and framing to tell their stories. To keep with the metaphor, these outlets are working “from the same recipe book” - but using their own, local ingredients.

This also reveals that CRI and VOA’s news broadcasts do not attempt to tailor their content to a specific international audience. Despite being broadcast on multiple continents around the world, the news programme did not appear to make any effort to include equal representation from other continents. While it might be the case that CRI and VOA’s other broadcast programmes attempt to address this gap by having broadcasts beyond Today and International Edition that specifically target certain countries or regions, it is certainly a missed opportunity to extend such attention to their primary news programme.

By rhetorically framing countries and their actions through these values, CRI and VOA are able to support their own government’s perspectives and values and condemn the countries and governments which they do not approve. The repetition of these ideas and values can lead to mental associations, where the audience might begin to link certain countries with certain positive or negative values (Haider, 2017). For this reason, it is essential that we understand and bring attention to the discourse that these international broadcasting outlets utilize, so that the audience is better able to recognize and critically assess these perspectives. This is the purpose of critical discourse analysis and media effects in a nutshell. Furthermore, it is increasingly important as more states and governments are able to spread their broadcasting reach and potential influence around the globe.

This question, however, asks where that promotion of the government fits into each country’s journalistic ideology – i.e., how these outlets navigate their responsibilities

as public diplomacy outlets versus journalistic outlets. For China Radio International, the answer is fairly clear-cut. For one, this research identifies many characteristics of CRI that are commonly found in Chinese media outlets: it stresses a preference for stability as a means of peace (Hu, 2007); it focuses on positive, solution-driven narratives (Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad, 1998); and it favours elite and dominant ideology (Donald, Keane, & Yin, 2002), as seen through its preference for government sources and airing of a full press conference with the Foreign Minister. These all support the perspective that media is a representative of and voice for the government, which has long been the approach to media in China (Donald, Keane, & Yin, 2002). Of course, it is oversimplification to say that all media outlets in China fit into this mould, but it is a well-researched and -documented phenomenon in Chinese media.

While Western scholars might continue to label such media outlets in support of the government as ‘public diplomacy’, it’s clear why the term has less traction in China – the outward-facing media is simply doing the same that the inward-facing media does. Instead, a better way to understand the model of CRI and its kin might be through the concept of ‘internal and external propaganda’. It certainly meets the first two criteria, which are to 1) to tell China’s story to the world, publicize Chinese government policies and perspectives, and promote Chinese culture abroad; 2) to counter what is perceived to be hostile foreign propaganda; (Shambaugh, 2007). In this sense, and for obvious reasons given the aforementioned structure of media in China, CRI appears to have no issues navigating the divisions between its role as a journalistic entity and a voice of the government.

It's quite a different story for VOA. US media purports to be built on the pursuit of objectivity and the rejection of state propaganda, in keeping with the Anglo-American press tradition of idealising non-partisan, fact-based reporting (Siebert et al., 1963). This perspective is why the First Amendment to the US Constitution bars most government interference in media, why the majority of US news outlets are privately-owned, and why even government-funded media outlets such as the National Public Radio and Public Broadcasting Service are run independent of the government. While this research shows that VOA shares characteristics with its independently-run compatriots (such as its promotion of democracy and human rights), it also shows that VOA has uncritical support for the US government and expresses this repeatedly

through editorials and new stories. The United States' own opinion of VOA is also clear: the outlet was not permitted to be broadcast domestically due to the country's own propaganda laws prior to 2013 (Stearns, 2013). Given that government-supported news outlets such as National Public Radio and the Public Broadcasting Service enjoy high credibility within the United States (Ostertag, 2010), not using this same structure and standard for international broadcasts can be seen as a missed opportunity on the part of the US government. In navigating the role between a government mouthpiece and a journalistic entity, VOA opts for the former over the latter by the country's own media standards.

This also makes clear why the term 'public diplomacy' was necessary in the Western context. Unlike CRI, there is a clear and possibly irreconcilable division between the ideologies of US domestic media and internationally-focused VOA, and claiming that VOA adheres to US journalistic standards does it a disservice. Moreover, by public diplomacy standards, VOA and CRI fall squarely in the realm of the tough-minded approach: they are unidirectional tools of information and influence, intended to support the sponsoring government, rather than trying to create mutually beneficial relationships (Kelley, 2009; Nancy Snow, 2009; Zaharna, 2009).

The question of credibility is also one that demands attention in regards to these media outlets. Despite traditional ideas of public diplomacy, research and practice has repeatedly found that more exposure does not necessarily mean more understanding (Kelley, 2009; Nancy Snow, 2009; P. Taylor, 2009). In fact, Kelley (2009) states that transparency is crucial in today's world, where information is so easily attained through multiple sources and the impacts of foreign policy can be witnessed across the globe. Perhaps the greatest damage to US public diplomacy, according to Taylor (2009), was the War in Iraq, due to the complete loss of credibility regarding the non-existent weapons of mass destruction. The question of credibility – how it is generated, and if state-owned public diplomacy outlets can ever possess it – should be investigated in future research in the field. However, one can also argue that credibility should be a minimum requirement for public diplomacy. If one is to follow the tender-minded school or relational framework of public diplomacy, this conversation would disappear altogether, as individual exchanges negate the need for institutional credibility.

7.2. Limitations

Even a work of this magnitude is not without its limitations. Future research can greatly benefit from using the findings in this paper as a jumping-off point leading to better understanding of public diplomacy media outlets in a number of ways.

First of all, the process utilized for this research was extremely time and labour intensive in two ways. For one, the use of radio required transcription of roughly 15 hours of broadcasts, which was done entirely by the sole researcher. This process is not necessary for research on media such as newspapers, which is much more common than radio. Beyond this, manual critical discourse analyses demand a close, intensive reading of the content. Such a process is also extremely time- and labour-intensive given the amount of content used in this research. Because of time and funding constraints, including the unexpected loss of funding and research time by one full year during the course of this work, this research covered a limited number of broadcasts. Research focusing on radio and research using critical discourse analysis are both necessary to understanding public diplomacy media outlets. Therefore, future research could avoid such limitations by utilising a team of researchers on the transcription and analyses phases. Such a team would be able to transcribe and analyse a greater number of broadcasts and possibly identify even more ideologies and practices within public diplomacy media outlets.

Furthermore, having a sole researcher conduct a critical discourse analysis also raises concerns about objectivity. In qualitative research, a single researcher may have unperceived biases that lead to overlooking certain details or fixating more on certain points (Tankard, 2001). Precautions were taken in order to avoid potential biases, such as focusing on manifest content and including quantitative methods to guide the qualitative process (Holsti, 1969) in order to uphold objectivity. However, a team of researchers would allow for greater diversity of opinions and perspectives, as well as providing a system of checks and balances for potentially subjective findings.

Another limitation is that this research focused only on two news programmes broadcast by two public diplomacy media outlets. While the findings are necessary to

understand the approaches used by China Radio International and Voice of America, they cannot be assumed to apply to public diplomacy media outlets as a whole. Instead, this research should be used as a starting point for research on a number of other such outlets, in order to develop a more holistic picture of public diplomacy practices through media.

A common criticism of critical discourse studies approaches is that they fail to consider both the production and the reception of the media content being researched (Philo, 2007). While this researcher sides with scholars such as Wodak (2001) and Fürsich (2009), who argue that production and reception are too completely separate areas of study, such research would nevertheless be beneficial for a broader understanding of public diplomacy media outlets as a whole. Future research could expand on the content-focused analyses contained here by investigating the editorial process used by these outlets, or, alternatively, by conducting interviews with potential and existing audiences of CRI and VOA.

8. Conclusion

China Radio International and Voice of America are only two media outlets broadcasting their government-sponsored messages to publics outside of their respective borders. While the influence of these radio stations on the African continent might seem insignificant, the outlets themselves are representative of a much larger and more noteworthy trend in international broadcasting, one in which national governments attempt to exert their power over foreign publics by repeatedly and subtly reinforcing their national ideology through broadcasts that appear to be innocuous news reports.

In the case of CRI's *Today* and VOA's *International Edition*, the combination content analysis and Discourse-Historical critical discourse analysis revealed a number of practices and ideologies. Unsurprisingly, these findings largely reflect the cultural or media values associated with these countries from existing literature. For example, CRI emphasised, in both content and through language, diplomatic international relations and cooperation, and, especially, the values of "peace and stability". The latter terms were used both to justify and describe actions by China and its perceived

allies, as well as to condemn countries which were seen to be in opposition to these values. Existing literature links these values the overall media ideology of China, which prizes “constructive journalism” and media cooperation and support as a means of promoting stability and peace within the country. For VOA, there was more emphasis on “democracy”, “human rights”, and “freedom”, which are all values promoted by the United States government and also reflected in its media system, which prioritises media free from government intervention. Such values also were used to justify US military activities within the broadcasts, as well as to condemn countries that are perceived to be lacking in these values.

In media studies, what is omitted is just as important as what is included. In the case of these outlets, a clear hierarchy of countries emerged. CRI included numerous references to and even sources from the United States; VOA did not pay any special attention to China or include any sources. Both countries largely overlooked the regions of Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. When the Middle East was mentioned, it was usually in reference to violence or military action. These regions were also regularly denied agency; most references were geographic rather than political, and portrayed them as passive rather than active players. Such an approach seems to reflect the Western-centred categories of first-world (democratic), second-world (communist) and third-world (“everything else”) countries.

The approach utilized in this research was content analysis and critical discourse analysis in order to determine the practices and ideology these two public diplomacy media outlets. This is just one small yet significant portion of the research needed to fully understand such outlets and their potential impact. While Fürsich (2009) argues that textual analyses such as critical discourse approaches are significant and valuable on their own, such information can nevertheless be enhanced with complementary research focused on other aspects of these outlets, such as production and audience reception. For example, this research highlighted some of the ideologically-driven terminology used by CRI and VOA; one possible avenue to enhance these findings would be to determine where such ideology and terminology are introduced at the production level, perhaps using Shoemaker and Reese’s (1991) Hierarchy of Influences model. Likewise, more research should be done to determine the perceived credibility or overall perception of such outlets on audiences, as well as researching

what factors could potentially lead to audiences choosing such outlets over other media options.

8.1. Research Contribution

Academically, this research sits firmly between the realms of public diplomacy and media analysis research, providing a bridge for understanding how these two ideas connect. Existing literature addresses the increasing use of public diplomacy by national governments in their quest for soft power, and the various forms that diplomacy takes: from cultural exchanges from the individual to institutional levels in the relational framework, to the emphasis on information and influence and the question of propaganda.

From the media perspective, there is existing literature focused on international broadcasting; however, this includes private broadcasters, unaffiliated with the government and focused on overseas audiences for the purpose of profit rather than influence. In contrast, public diplomacy media outlets are unique in that they provide a form of government-sponsored public diplomacy that challenges the boundaries and ethics of media itself. While public diplomacy through news media cannot be considered propaganda in the traditional sense, it nonetheless has similar goals (such as impressing a certain perspective or ideology on its audience) that it achieves through similar means (information directly conveyed through various media outlets). It is the hope of this researcher that being able to identify and label public diplomacy media outlets, such as CRI and VOA, will draw attention to their unique status and contribute to a greater awareness of their practices and purposes.

But as with all academic research, the findings on their own are moot without practical, real-world implications. It is the belief of this research that countries should be the ones telling their own stories, in the same way that private companies are responsible for their own advertising; therefore, public diplomacy media outlets certainly have a place in global media flows, and they allow for greater understanding between the people of different nations. Nevertheless, it is vital that audiences understand the origin and purpose of such media outlets, particularly when it comes to news programming, so that they can make informed, critical opinions about the content. Such awareness

could partially be the responsibility of the governments that agree to allow such programming within their borders. While it is the opinion of this researcher that public diplomacy outlets should not be censored per se, they should be regulated by the receiving governments. For example, such outlets might be required to state their affiliation – the country, funders, or government of origin – at regular intervals during the broadcast for the sake of transparency. Or governments should have policies regarding the number of radio stations that are permitted from each foreign government. While such regulations are more difficult to enforce for online content (which can include online radio broadcasts), governments still have a lot of control over regulations for traditional mediums such as television and radio.

Furthermore, outlets such as CRI and VOA are restricted to the informational framework, or tough-minded school, of public diplomacy. As Snow (2009) states, these outlets are limited in their use of one-way informational media that preclude real exchanges and relationship building. Genuine public-to-public exchanges, even through unidirectional media outlets, have the possibility of enjoying more credibility and creating more mutual understanding than government-to-public outlets such as CRI and VOA. There are countless ways that such outlets could contribute to a mutual understanding between peoples and countries around the world, if countries were interested in making this a priority.

Yet the core of this research is the question of power – who has it, what they choose to do with it, and how they enforce it. Countries such as the United States and China have the ability to speak directly to foreign audiences, and they recognize the power that this affords them. These governments are able to share their values, their ideologies, their version of events, and in the process potentially shape how foreign publics view both their own countries, as well as the countries they view as allies, enemies, or not worthy of mention altogether. Such influence must be understood in order to give foreign governments and audiences the power to address these public diplomacy media outlets.

Appendix

1. Content Analysis Coding

BROADCAST INFO

- A1. Unique Story ID
- A2. Date
- A3. Transcription/Audio File
- A4. Time to/from
- A5. Total story time

TOPIC

- B1. Unique Story ID
- B2. Topic
- B3. Total time
- B4. Topic Covered in CRI/VOA (Y/N)
- B5. Domestic/International? (1 = domestic; 2=international)
- B6. Topic category
 - domestic elections
 - foreign elections
 - domestic gov policy/activity
 - foreign gov policy/activity
 - Syrian Civil War
 - IS & terrorism
 - North Korea
 - music/film/TV/entertainment
 - health
 - science/technology
 - business/industry
 - domestic economy
 - foreign economy
 - diplomacy/international relations
 - multiple/world news update

- refugee crisis
- tourism
- personality profile
- editorial (VOA)
- nature/environment
- other military actions (not ISIL, Syria)
- humanitarian efforts/NGO work/charities
- sports
- law/court case

SOURCES

C1. Unique Story ID

C2. Presenter(1)/Correspondent(2)/External Source(3)

For 1&2, proceed to C9. Total speaking time

C3. Source Name: _____

C4. Source Affiliation: _____ (university/dept/org/company/etc)

C5. Domestic (1) vs. International (2)

C6. Country: _____

C7. Country Number (assigned retroactively): 1-50 (see below)

C8. Source Classification: (1-9)

- government entity
- public sector
- academic
- think tank
- not-for-profit/philanthropy/NGO (local)
- INGO/intergovernmental org
- private sector/private sector org
- independent artist/musician/author/actor
- private individual
- journalist
- election nominee
- not stated/unknown

C9. Total speaking time: 0:00:00

COUNTRY

D1: Unique Story ID

D2: Countries mentioned

D3: Countries mentioned numbers

D4: Continents/regions mentioned

D5: Continents/regions mentioned numbers

D6: International/intergovernmental organisation mentioned

D7: International/intergovernmental organisation numbers

D8: Describes actions taken by domestic country's gov (China/USA)? Y/N

D9: Describes actions taken by foreign country's gov? Y/N

D10: Mentioned governments taking action

D11. Country numbers

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