

## DOCTORAL THESIS

### 中國國有企業的產權變革與黨的領導

陳生洛

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# 中國國有企業的產權變革與黨的領導

The Change of Property Rights in State-owned  
Enterprises and the Party Leadership

陳生洛

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## 內 容 提 要

中國共產黨對中國社會的領導和控制，在宏觀制度層面，主要通過建立和維持全能主義大行政系統來實現的，在微觀操作層面，主要是通過對大行政系統中的單位的管理和控制來實現的，這種管理和控制主要通過三個途徑：黨管理幹部、黨委決策和黨的建設。

本文利用在實地調查中獲得第一手資料及其它文獻，具體深入地說明，國有企業的產權變革瓦解了全能主義大行政系統的經濟基礎：全民所有制，改變了國有企業作為政府附屬物的性質，割斷了國有企業與政府間的“臍帶”，在這種情況下，黨組織繼續通過原來的三個途徑對企業進行領導和控制，將面臨一系列難以克服的困難。

在黨管幹部方面，黨組織面臨着屬地管理與按照產權進行管理的二難選擇等問題，在參與決策上，面臨着法人治理結構的制約等問題，在黨的建設上面臨着黨組織在法人治理結構中缺乏合法地位的困難處境。

因此，在國有企業的產權變革以後，黨組織繼續象過去那樣通過黨管幹部、參與決策和黨的建設三個途徑領導和控制企業，實際上已經不可能了。黨組織對國有企業的領導和控制，將隨着國有企業產權變革展開和深入，逐步走向瓦解。

## Abstract

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) used to exercise its totalist control over society by linking the macro administrative structure to micro work units (danwei) through three means: cadre appointment and dismissal, the monopoly of decision making power, and the party building. Using both first hand data from the field work and archival materials, this research shows that, with the change of property rights in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the economic basis of the party's totalist administrative system has been undermined. As SOEs are turned into shareholding companies or sold to foreign or domestic private owners, the CCP has found itself in an increasing difficulty in controlling SOEs. It can no longer effectively exercise its appointment and dismissal power since many enterprises are now subject to multiple owners across regions and even provinces and their administrative and organizational affiliation can hardly be clearly defined. In those enterprises which have become privately or foreign owned, the party has simply no influence at all on managerial appointment. Furthermore, by granting more autonomy and independence to managers, the new enterprise system has actually deprived the party organizations of decision making power in management and made its role in factories irrelevant. Finally, as the Party is no longer in charge, it has lost much of its attraction as a political organization. Indeed, its activities on the shop floor have become unwelcome. The research concludes that as the property rights reform have in effect made it impossible for the Party to continue using its traditional means of control, it will have no alternative but retreating from SOEs.

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