

DOCTORAL THESIS

Synthesising media, politics and foreign intervention: an examination into Malawi's media system transformation

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Date of Award:
2017

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HONG KONG BAPTIST UNIVERSITY

Doctor of Philosophy

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DATE: August 21, 2017

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**Synthesising Media, Politics and Foreign Intervention: An Examination
into Malawi's Media System Transformation**

HARRIS Suzanne Temwa

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Principal Supervisor:
Prof. Colin Sparks (Hong Kong Baptist University)

August 2017

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis represents my own work which has been done after registration for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Hong Kong Baptist University, and has not been previously included in a thesis or dissertation submitted to this or any other institution for a degree, diploma or other qualifications.

I have read the University's current research ethics guidelines, and accept responsibility for the conduct of the procedures in accordance with the University's Committee on the Use of Human & Animal Subjects in Teaching and Research (HASC). I have attempted to identify all the risks related to this research that may arise in conducting this research, obtained the relevant ethical and/or safety approval (where applicable), and acknowledged my obligations and the rights of the participants.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'J. Lee', written in a cursive style.

Signature: _____

Date: August 2017

Abstract

The conventional method for studying media systems has been to analyse the relationship between media and politics, based on Hallin and Mancini's (2004) seminal research *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Their approach automatically places the nation-state as the key unit of analysis to understand why media systems are the way they are and why they change. Research that has advanced this endogenous method of analysis in countries outside of the Western, democratically advanced context, has brought to light the importance of including external factors in studying media systems. Building off this analytical direction, this thesis introduces three new external factors; foreign aid, the conditionalities attached to foreign aid, and the role of externally created Pan-African media policy agreements.

Using a case study of Malawi, a small aid-dependent country in Southeast Africa, this research interrogates these three factors to reveal that foreign aid is a coercive foreign policy tool that has been used for manipulating change and shaping the type of media Malawi has. Based on the country's recent transformation from its authoritarian populist¹ past towards the dominant liberal media model in 2012, this research also reassesses Hallin and Mancini's convergence thesis, which claimed that most countries are 'naturally' heading towards the dominant liberal media model.

Drawing on theoretical contributions made from the fields of international relations and international development, this thesis develops a critical international political economy approach to the theory of foreign intervention to challenge this claim. By including the structural and ideological power arrangements of the global economy this theoretical framework reinvigorates post-colonial thinking, as well as broadening our understanding of how power is exercised in order to capture existing international power imbalances that exogenously influence change.

¹ The term "authoritarian populist" will be used throughout this thesis as described by Reuben Makayiko Chirambo (2009) to describe the political and cultural make up of Malawi since the political leadership of President Kamuzu Banda, who was often described as a political populist.

Therefore, the general conclusions drawn from this thesis indicate that media systems analysis is best accomplished through detailed empirical case studies, which not only rely on historical insights, but synthesise the role that media, politics and foreign intervention play collectively, especially in the era of neoliberal capitalism. By moving beyond the parameters of the nation-state in this way, and examining what external forces that are extraterritorial to the nation-state, it is hoped that media systems researchers will engage more critically with factors that are opaque, and view variables such as foreign intervention as instrumental in future media system research.

Dedication

To my late father John-Dane Harris

(1939-1984)

Acknowledgements

Obtaining this PhD means more than gaining a degree, it has been an intellectual endeavour, and it would be almost impossible to mention all the generous support I have received over these four years. However, I would like to first and foremost, give thanks to the Hong Kong Baptist University for accepting my application and granting me a studentship during the first 3 years of my study. Without this financial support, it would have been impossible to study full-time. Secondly, I must extend my gratitude to the Hong Kong Association of University Women (大學婦女香港聯協會, HKAUW) who, during my final year awarded me the Lisa Stewart Memorial Postgraduate Scholarship, for which I am immensely thankful. Their confidence in my ability to complete this PhD goes beyond their financial contribution.

Intellectually, my greatest debts are owed to Karl Marx. Upon discovering his scholarly works during my undergraduate degree, alongside many others such as, Frantz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah, Noam Chomsky, Edward Said, and John Pilgar, the legacy of his work pushed my intellectual curiosity and philosophy as an activist. In addition, my supervisor Professor Colin Sparks, who has not only been my academic mentor, but he provided me with the intellectual encouragement to pursue this goal. I thank him dearly for his patience and understanding, and beyond that giving me the intellectual freedom to choose my own research path. I will also be forever indebted to the various scholars and media practitioners such as Thandika Mkandawire, Linje Manyzo and Dumisani Moyo who kindly offered and invested their time to correspond with me on various aspects of this research. Such support played a key role in keeping me up to date with the reality in Malawi, and Africa more broadly whilst I was in Hong Kong.

And this journey would have never been complete without the love and support of my family and friends. In particular, my mother Kwini NyaGondwe Lusher who has supported me immensely and in ways that I could never be able to repay, and my husband Pablo Verbeke, for whom I owe so much. His unconditional support, encouragement and through provoking discussions on a daily basis gave me the strength to complete this thesis.

And a special thanks goes to my auntie and uncle Mrs & Mrs Nyirenda for their unlimited support whilst I was collecting my data in Malawi, and my friends Anna Szilagyi and Swati Maheshwari whose constructive criticisms and guidance helped me to craft the research into the meaningful shape that it exists today. Finally, I want to wholeheartedly thank Professor Robert Beckford for persuading me to take this intellectual step and pursue my PhD. His words of inspiration that African women should not be held back by any glass ceilings will remain a rule to which I live my life by.

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List of Abbreviations

ACP - African, Caribbean and Pacific

AfDB - The African Development Bank

AU – African Union

BBC - British Broadcasting Corporation

BCA - British Central Africa Protectorate

CEE - Central and Eastern Europe

CDA – Critical Discourse Analysis

CIA - Central Intelligence Agency

DPP - Democratic Progressive Party

DfID - UK's Department for International Development

EDF - European Development Fund

EU – European Union

FDI - Foreign Direct Investment

FRDP - Fiscal Restructuring and Deregulation Programmes

GTZ - German Technical Cooperation Agency

HIPC - Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative

IFI - International Financial Institutions

IMF – International Monetary Fund

INGO - International Non-Governmental Organizations

IPE - International Political Economy

IR - International Relations

MANA - Malawi News Agency

MBC - Malawi Broadcasting Corporation

MCM - Media Council of Malawi

MCP - Malawi Congress Party

MDGs - Millennium Development Goals

MISA - Media Institute of Southern Africa

NAC - Nyasaland African Congress

NAFTA - North American Free Trade Agreement

OAU - Organisation of African Unity

OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

OPEC - Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

OSI - Open Society Institute

SADC - Southern African Development Community

SAPs - Structural Adjustment Programmes

SDG - Sustainable Development Goals

TMCs - Transnational Media Corporations

TNCs - Transnational Corporations

TRIPS - Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

TVM - Television Malawi

UDF – United Democratic Front

UK – United Kingdom

UMCA - Universities Mission to Central Africa

UNECA - United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

US - United States of America

USAID - United States Agency for International Development

WB – World Bank

ZDB - Zero Deficit Budget

New Directions in Media Systems Research

In the past two decades' media systems research has grown exponentially. Moving above and beyond the normative approach that was once used by Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm (1956) in *Four Theories of the Press*, which celebrated “the superiority of the Anglo-American models” (Downing, 1996: 191), to Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini's (2004) *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics* which provided “an original framework for open-ended empirical research” (Benson, 2010: 615). Although Hallin and Mancini (2004) were the first to break away from the “what ought to be” to the “what is” both books aimed at answering the same underlying question - why is the media the way it is? In order to navigate through the breadth of such a question, Hallin and Mancini argued that the answer could be found in examining the nation-state².

As the key unit of analysis in *Comparing Media Systems*, which assessed the media of 18 Western democratically advanced countries, Hallin and Mancini maintained that the key dimensions of media systems, such as “role of the state” (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 11) will explain the underlying question posed above. In addition, they argued that their endogenous assessment of media systems can also explain the forces of change that are currently transforming them. This thesis questions this hypothesis by reexamining whether or not the nation state, or more specifically a country's political system and its structures, serves as the most important object of inquiry for analysing media systems, when countries are in an increasingly complex and ever changing global environment. For example, can international relations and the proliferation of multilevel involvement from transnational corporations (TNCs), transnational media corporations (TMCs), intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) be excluded from the research table when they are often the ones undermining the traditional roles and sovereignty of nation states?

² The definition of nation state is highly complex, but when Hallin and Mancini use it, they are referring to latter of this coined concept 'state' meaning government, or a set of institutions through which public authority is exercised, rules are created and democracy is upheld (cf. Holton, 2011). While many scholars have long been debating the decline of the nation state within the new globalizing context (cf. McGrew and Lewis, 1992; Robertson and White, 2003), this thesis is also referring to the nation state by a country's sovereignty, its geopolitical location and status control of several functions, and as an important actor in the international system, yet it should be noted that nation states are neither fixed territorial spaces, defined between domestic and foreign, nor containers of societies (Agnew, 1994).

Using a case study of Malawi, a young democracy in southeast Africa, responds to this question by probing at these external variables to challenge the role of the nation state as the key unit of analysis in current media systems research. Based on arguments made within the field of international relations that emphasize how the role of non-state actors, be it TMCs or INGOs, have the ability to “assume some of the functions of the nation-state” (Griffiths et al., 2014: 231), this thesis not only reassesses “what is” influencing change in this new global climate, but “who is”. By theoretically shifting how we study media systems, we learn who possesses the most influence over the media and subsequently the changes to media systems. This research into Malawi’s media system served as a unique a case study to identify these non-state actors, as Malawi, like many African states, is heavily dependent on foreign actors and foreign aid to compensate for the country’s economic shortfalls, thus allowing non-state actors to be part of the country’s decision-making processes.

However, foreign aid and foreign intervention more broadly, remain largely under researched, especially within the study of media systems³. Yet in other fields, both have developed into an extensive scholarly debate (Morgenthau, 1962; Sørensen, 2004; Boone and Faguet, 1998; Klein, 2007; Taffet, 2007; Brainard, 2007; Almezaini, 2012). In an attempt to address this knowledge gap, this research investigates and synthesises the relationship between media, politics⁴ and foreign intervention following an event in 2012 which witnessed, for the first time in Malawi’s history, the opening up of the media by issuing fifteen new television and radio licences to all political parties, foreign owners and investors. This shift from Malawi’s authoritarian populist past towards what Hallin and Mancini’s defined as the North Atlantic/Liberal Model⁵ not only poses a conceptual challenge to the idea that the nation state is the primary unit of analysis, but also examines why the liberal media model “has clearly become increasingly dominant across Europe as well as North America – as it has, no doubt, across much of the world – its structures, practices, and values displacing, to a substantial degree, those of the other media systems” (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 251).

³ Although the role of foreign investors and companies were a prominent feature in Hallin and Mancini’s follow up book *Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World* (2008), the role of external factors, especially foreign aid, remains largely overlooked in both books.

⁴ By the term ‘politics’ I am referring to Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) definition, which represents a country’s political system, more specially “the role of the state” (ibid: 49).

⁵ The North Atlantic/Liberal Model is comprised of Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, and the United States where “commercial newspapers developed relatively early, expanded with relatively little state involvement, and became over-whelmingly dominant, marginalizing party, trade union, religious, and other kinds of noncommercial media” (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 198).

In their 2004 study, they argued that globalization and the commercialization of the press has led to this convergence. An observation founded on the premise that countries in Western Europe and North America were becoming more secularist, thus adopting liberal media values in order to uphold policies of commercialization. Given Malawi's non-secularist arrangement, examining countries outside of Hallin and Mancini geographic and political range requires new questions and new indicators to understand why this is happening in other parts of the world. For example, why is the liberal media model becoming dominant in countries outside of North America and Western Europe? What is influencing this shift? What structural (institutional, policy, economic, etc.) factors are impacting changes to media systems? And it is coincidence that two of the most politically and economically powerful countries in the world, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) and their media systems (public service broadcasting and commercial broadcasting, respectively) have become the most dominant models globally?

Based on this last question, it is undeniable that the UK's and US's political, economic, cultural and ideological⁶ influence stretches far beyond their neighbouring countries (Eckes, 2011; Held and Mephram, 2007; Herman and McChesney, 1997). Therefore, we must, as media systems researchers, not only reflect on what's happening in other parts of the world, but study this in tandem with the interests of other nation states, as it is these interrelationships and interdependencies that provide us with a deeper understanding of why media systems are the way they are.

The preliminary results of this research indicate that moving beyond a synthesis between the media and the politics is an important first step. As restricting the relationship of media systems to only two actors, not only limits the possibilities of discovering new factors that influence change, but also understanding those responsible for creating change. Through a combination of past research approaches, critical discourse analysis (CDA) and semi-structured interviews this research builds on the argument that nation states not only have to "share the stage with sovereignty-free actors" (Rasmussen, 1997: 42), but operate through various international agreements and ideologies. In a strategic move beyond the geographic limitations of Western democratically states, this specific focus on Malawi, as a post-colonial, transitional and aid-dependent country, not only reveals the nuances that

⁶ Critical conceptions of ideology is used in this thesis according John B. Thompson (1990: 56) coined uses it to advocate a critical conception of ideology which should analyse ideology by "studying the ways in which meaning serves to establish and sustain relations of domination".

exist in media systems research, but acts as an important reminder that we must move beyond the theoretical, analytical and geographic restrictions that past research has been confined to.

1.1 Beyond the Remit of “the West”

Any study that is looking into media systems is inevitably drawn to the work of Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini (2004) and their book *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Their study of 18 Western democracies laid the scholarly foundations and conceptual framework to discover what characteristics are specific to media systems, and ultimately answer the pivotal question; why are media systems the way there are?

Although Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) initial study was specific to Western democratically advanced countries, it provided a detailed understanding of the relationship between media and politics (the state), which become their central reference point for media systems analysis. Their conceptual framework consisted of the four dimensions that primarily focus on the internal dynamics of a countries media system;

- 1.) The structure of media markets
- 2.) Political parallelism
- 3.) Professionalization of journalism
- 4.) The role of the state.

These four dimensions where translated into three media models - the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist (France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain), North/Central European or Democratic Corporatist (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland) and the North Atlantic or Liberal models (Britain, United States, Canada, Ireland).

As seen in the following table, “these systems are marked by differences in state laws and regulations, links between media and political parties, journalistic professional traditions, and the structure of audience and advertising markets” (Benson, et al. 2012: 22). Each of these differences, Hallin and Mancini argued are endogenous to the country, to which exogenous factors are considered less significant.

Table 1: Main Characteristics of Political and Media Systems

	Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model	North/Central Europe or Democratic Corporatist Model	North Atlantic or Liberal Model
Political Systems			
Political Parallelism	High political parallelism; politics-over-broadcasting systems	External pluralism especially in national press; historically strong party press; shift toward neutral commercial press	Internal pluralism (except Britain); neutral commercial press; professional model of broadcast governance
Role of the State in Media System	Strong state intervention; press subsidies	Strong state intervention but press freedom is protected; press subsidies, strong public-service broadcasting	Market dominated (except strong public broadcasting in Britain)
Media Systems			
Political History	Late democratization; polarized pluralism	Early democratization; moderate pluralism	Early democratization; moderate pluralism
Role of the State	Dirigisme, strong involvement of state and parties in economy; periods of authoritarianism	Strong welfare state; significant involvement of state in economy	Liberalism; weaker welfare state particularly in United States
Rational-legal authority	Weaker development of rational-legal authority (except France);	Strong development of rational-legal authority	Strong development of rational-legal authority

Adapted from Hallin and Mancini (2004: 67-68)

The differences and similarities between each media model were formulated using “a set of concepts adapted from comparative politics and political sociology” (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 66) for a pragmatic handling of the relationship between a country’s media and political system. By using differentiation⁷ and modernisation theories to test these models and their convergence thesis, Hallin and Mancini were not only able to question the high levels of similarities between countries, but also the reasons why particular differences

⁷ Or what Esser and Hanitzsch (2012:13) described as the ‘most similar-cases design’ and the ‘most-different-cases design’ approach to studying comparative media systems.

between all three media systems were diminishing. One such difference was the level of political parallelism in each of the three models. Defined as “the degree and nature of the links between the media and political parties” (ibid: 21), political parallelism also reflected the rise in secularism across Europe and North America, which was one of the major differences the liberal media model had in comparison to the other two models. They argued that the involvement of political parties with the media has declined due to the philosophy of liberal values that supports the idea that journalism requires “significant autonomy from other social fields, including the political field” (ibid: 38).

Grounded on the separation of politics from the media, the liberal model was also considered “modern” as it is “closer to the world of business, and further from the world of politics” (ibid: 76), thus characterized as a commercial enterprise rather than a political mouthpiece for the ruling party. However, this is not new. As early as 1910, American sociologist Edward Alsworth Ross pointed out that the commercialization of the press was linked to the changes to the “ownership, financing, structure and function of the press” (ibid: 303). By highlighting that the private ambitions or the “drifting of ultimate control into the hands of men with business motives” (ibid) as determining the type of media a country has, is a significant part to our understanding of why media systems change. Therefore, our assessment of change must be multidirectional, involving various actors, as well as their motives, and not limited to the nation state alone. Moreover, by not examining the relationships or interactions between the economic interests of state and non-state actors, they exclude the economic interests between political institutions and their ideological norms, which are central to political sociology. Although Hallin and Mancini (2004: 49) were able to explain the “differing roles the state can play as owner, regulator and funder of the media”, this endogenous investigation discounts the other actors involved in funding the media.

Nonetheless, Hallin and Mancini’s study provided a “much needed intellectual toolkit for understanding the immense variations between systems of public communication in different cultural and political contexts” (Veltmer 2013: 224). Yet, understanding media systems within post-colonial, transitional, and aid-dependent contexts requires us, as media systems researchers, to redefine the specific dimensions of analysis that may be prevalent in countries that do not share a similar historical, political and economic past. As Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) correctly noted, studying media systems in different historical, political and economic contexts cannot be achieved by simply transplanting their conceptual framework onto different geographical media systems. While their follow-up book (2012)

Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World was a necessary move to emphasise this point, the countries selected were post-colonial and/or transitional⁸ but did not include matters relating to aid-dependency. By going beyond the remit of Western democratically advanced countries, as well as countries that are considered academically popular, such as BRICS countries⁹, requires us to investigate why these differences between regions and countries of the world exist. Moreover, learn “how countries respond to global influences” (Pfetsch and Esser, 2008: 119).

Based on this analytical oversight, this thesis identifies valuable information, not about how countries respond to global influences, but why media systems change in response to global influences and by whom. For example, a report from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) openly stated that the evolution of the media “may organically arise in a mature democracy, but artificial steps are necessary in many transition contexts” (Price and Krug, 2002: 4 in Miller, 2009: 13), opens up arguments to test why and who is creating these artificial changes. Therefore, a historical assessment of Malawi’s media system in relation to what these artificial steps could be was conducted¹⁰. By taking into consideration the role of international treaties, media agreements and negotiations, the relationships the state has with local and international non-state actors was brought into question for their role in directly and often indirectly influencing the decisions of nation states.

In what has been termed globalization, which has come to signify the process of international integration, through trade, investment and information technology (Scholte, 2000; Stiglitz, 2003; Held and McGrew, 2007; Castells, 2010), it has become increasingly salient that nation states do not operate in a vacuum. Therefore, if globalization, as well as its counter narrative, neo-imperialism have become the two major hallmarks of the 21st century, media systems should be studied in accordance to these factors. In other words, we must take into account the interrelationships and interdependencies that exist above and beyond a country’s internal changes. Understanding the role of these factors in influencing change is just as important as studying the role of the media and political actors. For that reason, this thesis takes on board the point made by Katrin Voltmer (2013) whilst making a case for media in transitional democracies, the media should not only be measured against the degree of influence, but also the nature of that influence.

⁸ The research covered Brazil, China, Israel, Lebanon, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Thailand.

⁹ BRICS is associated with the five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

¹⁰ Chapter 2.

1.2 The Analytical Shift

Given the significance of changing the way media systems are studied in the post-colonial, transitional, and aid-dependent contexts, not only broadens our geographical focus, but expands existing knowledge in this field. For example, with an increase in external funding towards liberal media projects in the “developing countries” (Myers, 2014), and the structural reforms packages ushered in by the international financial institutions (IFIs), namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), a critical reframing of media systems research will be established. As it would be analytically unethical not to investigate why these IFIs are funding the development of liberal media systems in post-colonial, transitional, and aid-dependent countries if we are to fully comprehend why change occurs and by whom.

While several media scholars warn that African countries and their media systems should not be fixed to over-generalised descriptions (Tomaselli, 2003; Banda, 2008; Wasserman, 2011a), Mano (2009) reminds us that many African countries do share some common experiences in the area of domination and resistance. Therefore, scholarly debates on colonialism, neo-imperialism and international development are introduced as a way of highlighting the structural and historical imbalances of power that continue to emphasize how powerful states, institutions and non-state actors dominate less powerful states, both politically, economically and ideologically.

Although this simplistic dichotomy between powerful and powerless does not outline the complexities of such a relationship, the continuum on which former colonizers and leading economic states are in direct contrast to economically weak countries like Malawi, allows this simplistic dichotomy to continue being relevant. However, media systems scholars have used other dichotomies such as the Cold War, as well as Samuel P. Huntington (1991) third wave of democratization¹¹ as a means to build their analytical arguments. Thus, such dichotomies can be a valid starting point, not only to help identify new factors for analysis, but challenging old ones. Therefore, the first step in this research was to investigate and distinguish particular factors associated with Malawi’s cultural, historical and political heritage, through the “Western” and “non-Western”, “developed” and “developing”, “donor” and “recipient” dichotomy.

¹¹ A term coined by American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington to explain the global expansion of democracy between 1974 and 1990.

By unfolding these commonly held dichotomies, which have been historically split between “rich” and “poor” nations (Rodney, 1972; Cardoso, 1972; Amin, 1977; Said, 1993; Slater, 2004), help draw attention to the unequal balances of power in the global system. Often described as a capitalist global system by the above Marxist thinkers, is what gave rise to modernization theory¹². A theory that assumes all countries must transition from a “traditional” to “modern” (see Lerner, 1958), thus unlearning any traditional thinking and reorganising a country’s political and economic agenda. For the media, this translates as a shift from authoritarian state-controlled media to a liberal (free-market) media system which Hallin and Mancini outlined above.

Malawi, which for decades has been considered by the WB (2015) as a “low income, developing” country, has been seen, like many countries in Africa, as “backward” (cf. Noorbakhsh and Paloni, 1999) or lagging behind technologically (Berger, 2003) therefore needing to follow the developmental footsteps of their former colonizers (Matunhu, 2011) in order to become “modern”. With foreign aid as the source of initiating these developmental footsteps, it has been hard to ignore the role this economic source has had to implement change¹³. Although Malawi is no longer subject to the political stranglehold of its former colonizer, as it was during the colonial era, the possibility of it being attached economically and ideologically is significant. However, many former colonial states such as the UK, have maintained their political grip over their former colonised states, but pose these relationships as apolitical (see Ferguson, 1990). The UK government’s Department for International Development (DfID), which is responsible for administering foreign aid, and one of Malawi’s largest donors, not only provides substantial financial assistance, but also policy advice that impacts on the decisions made internally (Buirea, 2003). Many economic policies, commonly known as Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) for example, were developed in the 1970s and 80s (at the same time that neoliberalism emerged), which led to the enactment of legislation that guided Malawi towards a “modern” state.

While Western, democratically advanced states have also been guided towards a modern state and subject to external forces, Malawi and other aid dependent countries, are more vulnerable as they are positioned differently in the neoliberal world order (Held and McGrew, 2002). As hypothesised by Alison Harcourt (2012), countries that are considered “economically weak” are more vulnerable to external pressure, especially in the field of

¹² One of the theories that Hallin and Mancini (2004) used to describe how change evolved.

¹³ Some have gone as far as to say that foreign aid “functions to preserve or widen economic disparities between wealthy donor states and less developed recipients” (Van Belle, et al., 2004: 13).

media policy-making. Others such as Professor Richard Olson (1979: 481) also remind us how “first world governments, their aid agencies, IFIs [...] for many LCDs¹⁴ are integral and influential parts of the domestic economy and policy-making apparatus.” Thus it is worth paying close attention to the relevant geopolitical and economic changes that run parallel to changes in the media. In order to do this, this thesis adopts a multi-disciplinary approach which includes, media, economics, international development, international relations and post-colonial theory to synthesize the complex nature of media systems analysis outside the Western, democratically advanced context.

By drawing extensively from the field of International Relations (IR), and in particular Susan Strange’s conception of structural power, this thesis examines the ways in which state and non-state actors such as the IMF and WB have been able to exercise and maintain their influence over Malawi’s internal affairs. In so doing, this thesis unpacks concepts of power to challenge Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) conclusion that change is essentially internal and naturally occurring. However, it is important to note here that this research is not disputing their conclusion for those Western European countries studied, it is only challenging the conclusion that change is internally driven. Thus, this research moves away from the political realist traditions in IR theory, which propose that change is a result of political interest rather than economic and ideological, to advance a critical international political economy approach to the theory of foreign intervention that places foreign donors and international financial institutional (IFIs) at the centre of analysis alongside the political.

This level of analysis implies a necessary shift away from earlier research that places the nation-state at the centre of analysis. While the purpose of this thesis is not to replace the nation-state with non-state actors, as nation-states normative appeal, according to political theorist Sheldon Wolin would imply “denying the central referent of the political” (ibid, 1960: 417), a more inclusive assessment would simply emphasize the multifaceted nature of media system and change. By transferring from this inward-looking assessment of media systems, new and unexplored dimensions will emerge, which, it is hoped, enrich current media systems research.

Incorporated into this framework is the global impact of neoliberalism. Promoted by the IMF and the WB in “developing countries” (Harvey, 1995), this thesis contends that donors as well as IFI’s reproduce neoliberalism’s central principles of liberalisation, deregulation and privatization for certain economic motives. According to Hallin and Mancini (2004:

¹⁴ Less Developed Countries (LDCs)

305) “neoliberalism and globalization continue to diffuse liberal media structures and ideas”. This afterthought in their conclusion points out that there is a relationship between this global economic ideology and the liberal media model which should not be discounted in future media systems analysis. This relationship is explored in the chapter 7 when Norman Fairclough’s (1995) three-part analytic model was used to highlight how neoliberalism is embedded in Pan-Africa media policy agreements to command African states into adopting the liberal media model.

Therefore, as part of this thesis’s contribution to media systems research, I introduce the concept of *Forced Liberalization*, and two new research dimensions, *neoliberal parallelism* and *development parallelism* to argue that the global shift towards the liberal media model has been coercively forced on Malawi through the use of foreign aid conditionalities and the media policy agreements which are lined with foreign ideologies. The concept *Forced Liberalization* not only characterises the event which took place in Malawi in 2012, but a concept that, I hope, will be used to reframe the questions of those studying post-colonial, transitional, and aid-dependent countries in the future. The two *parallelisms* on the other hand symbolize the ideologically and discourse driven factors ascribed to foreign intervention. Similar to Hallin and Mancini’s (2004: 28) *political parallelism*, which refers to the “*organizational connections*”¹⁵ between media and political parties”, *neoliberal parallelism* and *development parallelism* reflect the impact of these global economic ideologies and practices. With neoliberalism described as the dominant hegemonic ideology of our time (Chomsky, 1999; Fourcade, 2006; Mudge, 2008), and development as a global discourse that promotes a Western form of modernity on “developing countries” (Veltmeyer, 2005; Mawuko-Yevugah, 2014), both *parallelisms* highlight the ways in which foreign actors have legitimised their intervention in Malawi. Through these contributions, it is hoped that these new research dimensions will stress the changing research needs which require new theories, research methods, and analyses to describe media systems in different contexts, going forward.

In this introduction, I develop these points further by arguing why studying media systems in the non-Western, transitional, and aid-dependent context requires a different analytical and theoretical lens. To begin, some basic definitions are required in order to better understand what constitutes “foreign intervention” and subsequently “liberalisation” and “neoliberalism” within the context of this thesis. Within these definitions I briefly introduce the role of foreign aid and conditionality as key properties of foreign intervention, which

¹⁵ Original emphasis

provide the theoretical, as well as, analytical premise that the direction of this thesis takes. I end the introduction by previewing the chapters of this thesis and relating their contributions to the framework of forced liberalization, which is the central theme of this research.

1.3 Foreign Intervention: Definition, History and Structure

As expressed by international researcher Thomas Carothers (1999), foreign intervention is a highly diverse and complex concept. Therefore, it is not only necessary to clearly define what it is, but also what it is not. Historically, international relations scholars have viewed foreign intervention as a well-established instrument of foreign policy (Morgenthau, 1962, 1967). In Malawi and across many “developing countries”, it has traditionally been tied to coercive political and military interventions (cf. Schmidt, 2013). However, who is considered “foreign” and what is understood as “intervention” has changed over the years due to shifting geopolitical arrangements. Yet, “foreign”, which has generally implied “foreign actors” or “alien political powers” (ibid: 2) which include former colonial powers, supranational institutions such as the EU, WB and IMF, and influential foreign states and their donors has remained relatively static; whereas “intervention” is a much more changeable, and consequently, complex term. Generally, defined as a form of “coercive action of some kind by an outside party (or parties) that takes place within a sovereign state” (Chatterjee and Scheid, 2003: 1). Intervention can range from military operations, secret assignments and propaganda, to economic aid, diplomatic, policy-making negotiations, and unilateral and multilateral interventions (Nalbandov, 2009). Therefore, it is important to note that foreign intervention is no longer limited to powerful states alone, but economically powerful institutions such as those identified above, as well as international non-governmental organisations (INGO), who have not only increased their presence in “developing countries” (Gibbs, 1991), but also gained “a significant and probably historically novel source of power” (Miller, 2009: 26).

One source of this power is foreign aid, and the use of conditionalities. Introduced as a form of coercive economic sanctions in foreign policy and popularised by the WB and the IMF in the early 1980s, conditionalities have been an important policy instrument for Western countries (Morgenthau, 1962; Moyo, 2009); policies that are employed to impose political or economic changes in recipient countries (Nelson and Englington, 1992). These policy

instruments alongside the role of Pan African media policy agreements were identified as the main source of foreign intervention within this research. With foreign aid as a central component in this arrangement, this thesis agrees with Therien (2002: 449) who maintains that foreign aid is considered one of the “most original political innovations of the twentieth century” at domestic, regional and international levels (Van der Veen, 2011).

However, the role of foreign aid as a foreign policy tool has changed drastically over the past five decades. From diminishing the threat of Communist power and furthering democracy, to addressing global health and poverty (Lancaster, 2007), foreign aid, whether bilateral, multilateral, project, or conditional¹⁶ has come under heavy criticism (Boone, 1996; Burnell, 1997, 2011; Carothers, 1999; Svensson, 2000; Mawuko-Yevugah, 2010; Booth, 2011; USAID, 2012). Even former World Bank employees such as William Easterly (1999, 2007), Dambisa Moyo (2009), and Joseph Stiglitz (2003), have criticised the role that foreign aid plays in international relations. For some scholars, foreign aid is a coercive form of foreign intervention that is legitimised through economic and ideological means (Chatterjee and Scheid, 2003).

Carothers (1999) who has drawn on years of field research to examine the US's governments history of promoting democracy abroad¹⁷, emphasised that foreign intervention is ideological. For example, Carothers (1999: 20) points out that under the Kennedy administration in the 1960s a “pragmatic anti-communist objective [was used to] promote economic development in the third world”. In what became known as “Project Democracy” (ibid: 30)¹⁸ under the Reagan administration, democracy itself became an ideology. Acknowledging the role of the media in disseminating this ideology, the US government spent a considerable amount of foreign aid on media projects, in fact “media programs are now part of most U.S. democracy aid portfolios” (ibid: 236). Therefore, the goal of most U.S. media aid projects should be taken seriously as matters within international intervention.

Due to the highly political and coercive nature of foreign intervention, it has become theoretically synonymous with imperialism (see Rosenau, 1969; Schellhaas and Seeger, 2009; Al Jazeera, 2014). Given Malawi's colonial ties to the British and economically weak position in the global economy, it is inevitable that foreign intervention is interlinked to

¹⁶ Also known as “tied aid”

¹⁷ Also see Peter Burnell (2011) *Promoting Democracy Abroad*

¹⁸ Democratization has its theoretical footings in modernization theory, which has been criticized for presenting a dominant view of reality within the teleological thinking that has reigned since the 1960s (Kumar, 2006).

issues of power. Therefore, it is important to note that this definition of foreign intervention is not “synonymous with engagement, involvement or influence, which reveal nothing about the power dynamics of the relationship” (Schmidt, 2013: 2-3), but aligned with Chatterjee and Scheid’s (2003) definition in which it is coercive. However, it would be naïve to suggest that some interventions do not occur without some forms of internal collaboration and government oversight (see Schmidt, 2013). To quote John Agnew (1994: 75-76) at length;

“States are major employers and through their demand for goods and services they are also important economic actors in their own right. The state still provides 'legitimation services' through social spending and potential levers over economic transactions that a fragile position within the world economy has not totally undermined. States, especially the more powerful ones, are not yet pitiful giants”.

Thus, this thesis is acutely aware that foreign intervention is a contested term and that both internal and external factors need to be considered when studying it in order to broaden the synthesis between all three dynamics under investigation. Needless to say, foreign intervention remains an under researched component in media systems literature, especially in regards to changes in media systems. Therefore, as the line of argumentation set forth in this thesis points out, foreign intervention under the guise of current diplomatic efforts “should be the subject of greater scrutiny by critical media researchers” (Miller, 2009: 27), as media systems are “no longer isolated, self-contained units, but embedded in an increasingly globalized communication system characterized by a multiplicity of diffusion, dependency, exchange, and integration” (Esser, 2013: 119).

In light of this context, it might be useful to note that this thesis addresses foreign intervention as an external force in comparison to the state (political structures) as an internal force. Although many theoretical strands study these forces in more complex ways, this thesis examines these strands in the broadest sense, as it is not the purpose of this research to consider all of the theoretical details attached to each force. What is important is the fact that there is something of an oscillation, perhaps dialectic, between internal and external forces that stress the importance of positioning foreign intervention in media systems research alongside the political as a matter of synthesis.

1.4 Liberalisation: Definition, History and Structure

As noted in footnote 6 on page 3, the shift toward the liberal media model or the process of media liberalisation¹⁹ is used throughout this thesis interchangeably. However, an important difference between the liberal media model and the liberalization of the media is that the former is generally the outcome of the latter, or what is known as the process. Despite this, the origins of the term liberal and liberalisation have shared historical roots. Both terms for example, are associated with political and economic philosophies that arose in Europe back in the 18th century when philosophers such as Bernard Mandeville, Adam Smith, David Hume, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau were forming ideas that encompassed minimum state intervention and a free market system to maximise individual freedom. In the media sphere, and from the 20th century onwards, this political and economic freedom has translated into the idea that the state should no longer interfere in the operation of the media, and that state owned media should become either public or private. Many of these ideas resulted from the pervasiveness of neo-liberalism²⁰ in which the demonopolization and deregulation of the broadcast media provided a platform for the emergence of a private sector (Jakubowicz and Sükös, 2008).

Similar to Huntington's (1991) third wave of democratization, the liberalisation of the media, which resulted in the commercialization of private and (partly) public broadcasting, has as Hallin and Mancini (2004) have argued, spread across the globe. Therefore, liberalisation, like any other global trend, should not be seen as operating in a vacuum, but part of an increasingly complex global system. Many have argued that political freedom or independence of the media from political control, is a necessary pre-condition for democracy (Gross, 2002). And within international development debates, controversial economic reforms have been attached to the ideology of privatisation and liberalisation to ensure this transition (Williamson, 1993, 2002; Moyo, 2009). Therefore, many countries, especially those considered post-colonial, transitional and aid-dependent, have undergone a dual transition in the past three decades. Firstly, a political transition from authoritarianism to democracy and then from a state controlled economy to a free market economy. Thus, it cannot be ignored that there has been a global push for countries to accept financial liberalization and foreign capital, which not only campaigns for a free

¹⁹ The liberal media model or media liberalization will be used through this thesis and used interchangeably, based on the terms used in different literature. Aware that these refer to processes, models and ideologies, this thesis is referring to the shift towards a liberal media model as outlined by Hallin and Mancini (2004) in chapter 3 of this thesis.

²⁰ This will be discussed in the following section in relation to Thatcherism and Reaganomics.

market system but also provides easier access to traditionally protected markets (Harvey, 2005).

The shift towards Hallin and Mancini's (2004) North Atlantic/Liberal Model model mirrors this trend, which secures the diminishing "role of the state as an owner, funder, and regulator of the media" (ibid: 291). In Africa, Zambian scholar Fackson Banda (2010) argued that the discourse around liberalisation, which "led to the emergence of a multiplicity of privately owned commercial broadcast and print media channels [...] stressed the pre-eminence of private capital over state capital" (ibid: 8). As a consequence, this liberalisation of the media systems has led to multiple avenues for foreign ownership and content into the domestic media sphere. Thus, this deregulatory wave attached to the liberalization of the media should theoretically, as well as practically, result in an injection of pluralism and freedom of speech (Musau, 1999: 138). However, such arguments tend to ignore the economic interests of business elites in having a free market approach to the media, which some have long argued has impacted on journalism quality (see Hallin, 2000). However, as will now be explained in the following section, this thesis draws on, although rather simplistically, the important parallels between media liberalization and neoliberalism to emphasize the features associated with the term liberal.

1.5 Neoliberalism: Definition, History and Structure

As already mentioned, ideology plays an important role in determining a country's foreign policy (Mukwena and Sumaili, 2016). From President Reagan's "Project Democracy" to the economic reform packages that brought about privatisation and liberalization in post-colonial states, both political and economic projects were configured using the same ideology, neoliberalism. Although many have argued that neoliberalism is not solely an ideology but a macroeconomic policy prescription, a philosophy, a discourse or a free-market project (see Plehwe et al. 2006; Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009; Venugopal, 2015), it has undoubtedly become "the most successful ideology in world history" (Anderson, 2000: 17). As neoliberalism represents, among many things, the transfer of ownership from public (government) to the private sector (business), privatisation, deregulation, liberalization and the rise in commercialization (Harvey, 1995; Mensah, 2008), which can be seen in all political, economic, social and cultural spheres.

Those that have advanced this line of thought and critically transposed neoliberalism into one or more of these specific spheres, such as social critic Noam Chomsky, (1999: 19–20) has described neoliberalism as:

“[A]n array of market orientated principles designed by the government of the United States and the international financial institutions that it largely dominates and implemented by them in [...] stringent structural adjustment programmes. The basic rules, in brief, are: liberalize trade and finance, let markets set price (‘get prices right’), end inflation (‘macroeconomic stability’) privatize. The Government should ‘get out of the way’...”

This description resembles many of the ideas set out by the term liberalisation, in that it supports the development of laissez-faire economics²¹. Popularized in the 1980s during the political reign of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US to confront the economic crises of the past, neoliberalism nevertheless remains identifiable to early variants of liberalism, which are based on liberty and private property²² (Freedon, 1996). Therefore, it could be argued that “the resurgence of liberalism in the form of neoliberalism is often attributed to a successful hegemonic project voicing the interests of financial and/or transnational capital” (Jessop, 2002: 455). This thesis reflects this position to suggest that the diffusion of neoliberal norms, values, and beliefs by foreign actors have played a “crucial role in the quest for transformative development in Africa” (Aye, 2015: 215).

Using historical geographer David Harvey’s (2003) concept of ‘accumulation by dispossession’²³ or what Marxist philosopher Rosa Luxemburg (1913) once described as the accumulation of other people’s property, confronts this quest for transformative development in Africa by confronting why matters of privatisation and the expansion of neoliberal policies were developed by Western states to maintain power in former colonial states. Both scholars point out that such policies have placed wealth and power into the hands of a few (a common argument given by many contemporary media imperialism scholars challenging the commercialisation and expansion of multinational media conglomerates, see Schiller, 1969, 1973, 1976; Herman, 1988, 1997, 1999; Mattelart, 1979; Boyd-Barrett, 1977, 1998; 2014; and McChesney, 1997). Harvey’s (2003) concept of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ which was guided by privatization, financialization,

²¹ The origins of which can be traced back to Austrian political philosopher, Friedrich von Hayek and fellow economist Ludwig von Mises during a meeting in Paris in 1938 (Cahill, 2014).

²² The extent that free markets were seen as “the embodiment of freedom” (Robbins, 1961: 104).

²³ This is “Harvey’s adaptation and redeployment of Marx’s notion of ‘primitive accumulation’” (Glassman, 2006: 608)

management and manipulation of crises, and state redistributions not only described the process of transferring state property from public to private ownership as seen in the liberal media model, but the ‘management and manipulation of crises’ which was associated with raising interest rates on “developing countries” and forcing them to accept structural reforms and loans to manage the imposed crisis. In this way, neoliberalism is an articulation of dominant class interests in response to economic and social changes (Duménil and Lévy, 2012).

Interestingly, Hallin and Mancini (2004: 126) definition of neoliberalism as a “global force”, which was used alongside globalisation to “diffuse liberal media structures and ideas” (ibid: 305), did not question these economic or class interests, nor the ideological impact of neoliberalism, which has had the power to “establish and sustain relations of domination” (Thompson, 1990: 56). Given the significance of neoliberalism and the triumph of the liberal media model, it would be hard not to analyse this ideology without studying the ways in which, to use Hallin and Mancini’s words “diffuse ideas”. As pointed out by Manfred Steger (2005:5) “ideologies offer individuals a more or less coherent picture of the world not only as it is, but also as it should be”. In David Harvey’s (2005) book *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, this idea that ideologies project normative ideals, was covered using an example of the WB and IMF, in which he argued were the key representatives of the neoliberalism in “developing countries”. Besides using conditional loans as key instruments for disseminating the neoliberal agenda globally (Dutta, 2015), this extension of neoliberalism into “developing countries” remains significantly under-researched (Bond 2000; DeMartino 2000; Peet and Hartwick 1999; Veltmeyer, Petras and Vieux, 1997). Nonetheless, the economic policy prescriptions that emerged as a consequence of these conditional loans from the WB and IMF have been researched thoroughly (Bond, 2015). Loans which are not only pegged to policies that are “all too often aligned with the commercial and financial interests of those in the advanced industrial countries” (Stiglitz (2003:18), but the same loans that led to the “third world debt crisis”²⁴. Thus reiterating Thompson’s (1990) point above about establishing and sustaining particular relations of domination.

²⁴ See Altvater (1993) and Hickel (2012) who argue that the third world debt crisis was created off the back of excess petrodollars, which the US obtained after threatening OPEC countries to put into Wall Street investment banks following the 1973 and 1979 oil crisis.

Since independence, Malawi has been compelled into accepting the IMF and WB's reform packages²⁵ in return for financial support. These reform packages were interpreted through neoliberalism's predecessor, the Washington Consensus (Doane, 2011; Marois and Pradella, 2015); a concept coined by English economist John Williamson (1993) back in 1989 to describe a set of neoliberal policy prescriptions that were synonymous with liberalization, privatization and deregulation (Jomo and Fine, 2006). In the broadest of terms, the Washington Consensus instructed what recipient governments should do (Gore, 2000). Subject to a great deal of criticism, this approach resulted in high levels of uneven development and reinforced existing differences in the world order (Bairoch, 1993; Chomsky, 2003). Even, Williamson himself (2002: para 1) confessed that the Washington Consensus "have been imposed on hapless countries by the Washington-based international financial institutions and have led them to crisis and misery".

Imposed through a mixture of "voluntary", but mostly "coercive pressures" (Harvey, 2005), these neoliberal policy descriptions also reflect Margaret Thatcher's 1980's slogan "There Is No Alternative" (TINA)²⁶, to demonstrate the invasive domination of these neoliberal ideas. An invasiveness which some have argued, brought about an injection of market logic to all aspects of life (Krikorian and Kapczynski, 2010). Based on this claim, many now argue that neoliberalism is everywhere (Hackworth, 2007; Peck and Tickell, 2002), whether seen to be good or bad, neoliberalism has become "a predominant concept in scholarly writing on development and political economy" (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009: 137).

Therefore, to emphasize the breadth and depth of foreign intervention, I support the claim that neoliberalism should become an object of scientific inquiry (Collier, 2012), in that ideologies should be studied alongside the practical explanations in order to explain why neoliberalism functions the way it does, and promoted in the way it is. If ideologies were neglected, the role globalization would become obsolete. As to study media systems, one must examine how the world is changing, and who is changing it. Because, if the role of neoliberalism is in fact a "paradigmatic shift away from strong governmental control towards deregulation and privatization of the electronic media and telecommunication industries" (Gershon, 2006: 185), understanding how this shift evolved requires a thorough investigation into global forces. In addition, begs the question; can the state, and should the

²⁵ This has included Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) and the Fiscal Restructuring and Deregulation Programmes (FRDP).

²⁶ Used during her time in power as the neoliberal slogan for economic liberalization.

state, remain the core unit of analysis when there is the global push to withdraw government involvement.

1.6 The Outline of the Dissertation

This thesis addresses the relationship between media, politics and foreign intervention, by moving towards a broader analytical framework that examines the external forces that are shaping media systems in the post-colonial, non-democratically advanced context²⁷. Divided into nine chapters, including this introduction, the following chapters have been organised to build on my analytical framework, and informs my argument about the role of foreign intervention in media systems analysis in the following manner;

Chapter Two provides a brief, yet thorough account of the evolution of the media in Malawi and the country's historical relationship with foreign intervention. From the colonial period to the present, this chapter provides the reader with some background context to a possibly unfamiliar country. In doing so, it lays out why Malawi was uniquely placed for this investigation and shows how foreign intervention as a coercive external force challenges research that automatically treats the state as the central unit of analysis.

Chapter Three reviews how media systems have been analysed using a critique of Hallin and Mancini's (2004) media systems framework which positions the state as the central unit of analysis. By highlighting the limitations of their theoretical and methodological approach to the study of post-colonial, non-democratically advanced countries, the chapter proceeds to introduce current media scholars who have incorporated various external forces in their own analyses, namely the work of media scholars Karol Jakubowicz and Miklós Sükösd (2008), and Barbara Pfetsch and Frank Esser (2008). Their studies are centred on interrogating the causes and consequences of globalization, neoliberalism and modernisation to highlight the inherently faulty analysis of studying media systems through a state-centric approach, in so doing, they provide the necessary analytical foundations for the inclusion of foreign intervention.

²⁷ It is important to point out here that from here on out, categorising Malawi's media systems as "non-Western, non-democratically advanced", is not making an overly simplistic dualism between "Western" media systems and "Non-Western" media systems as this in itself is homogenising and simplifying the complexity of media systems, but trying to acknowledge that countries which are reliant on foreign aid share some similarities and therefore some dimensions for future media system analysis.

The second part of this literature review, **Chapter Four** specifically looks at key postcolonial and post-development scholars who critique foreign aid, and foreign intervention more broadly as a means of understanding how foreign actors legitimise their involvement. Drawing on the works of Lord Mawuko-Yevugah in particular who's notion of *developmentality* focuses on the exploitation of development and the idea development has helped foreign donors retain control at a distance, provides the basis for integrating international development, neoliberalism and foreign aid as key variables in media systems research. Although this chapter is somewhat extensive it lays the theoretical foundation for the analyses that follows.

After outlining the prominent themes, which give precedence to external forces, **Chapter Five** revisits Hans J. Morgenthau (1962, 1967) political realist theory of foreign intervention and foreign aid. Two theories, which not only manufacture power, but provide a strong theoretical backdrop to include the economic, structural and ideological forces that are prominent in media system change. With support from contemporary IR thinkers such as Susan Strange, Robert Cox and political scientist Ashok Kumar Pankaj who locate their arguments within Structural Marxism and World Systems theory, provide a better, and more contemporary understanding of foreign aid in relation to the role non-state actors play. However, Morgenthau's concept of bribery as a foreign policy strategy is used to support the role that conditionalities at imposing change.

This is followed by **Chapter Six** which addresses the two methods used for data collection, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and semi-structured interviews. By highlights the importance of policy making tools in shaping the types of media systems being imposed on post-colonial, transitional and aid-dependent countries, this chapter also draw attention to new methods, which have not, to the best of my knowledge, been used before in media systems research.

In **Chapter Seven and Eight** I present, contextualize, and interpret the findings of my research. Separated into two parts, I begin with the results from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which specifically looked at how imperative modal verbs denote authority and thus shape the direction that Malawi's media system has taken. This is followed by the main research findings from the interviews, which brings together, and critically reviews the key arguments in relation to the role that foreign intervention has played in transforming Malawi's media system from it authoritarian populist past. In this chapter, I also put forward three new features to support the claim that foreign intervention, as an external

force, should be considered a new variable in the study of media systems. The chapter ends with the development of a Critical International Political Economy Theory of Foreign Intervention, which allows for a broader understanding of foreign intervention and radically questions the conceptualisation of power and the production of ideologies by foreign actors. I conclude my analysis in **Chapter Nine** by summarizing and elaborating on the results of the research, as well as the theoretical contributions, limitations and possible future directions for media systems research.

Malawi: A Historical Insight



*Image retrieved from Operation World.Org

The media industry in Malawi has gone through four major phases, the Colonial Period (1891-1964), the Post-Colonial Era (1964-1994), the Multiparty Democracy Era (1994-to date), and the event in 2012, which this thesis is based on. This chapter is organized based on these four phases and it begins with an brief overview of Malawi’s political, economic and cultural composition, as Malawi’s media system must be seen against the background of various political and historical conditions²⁸, especially when the relationship between the media and the state across most of Africa “has been a fragile and conflictual one” (Wasserman, 2011b: 157).

In Brief

For over fifty years Malawi’s media system has been in the grip of authoritarian populist ideologies. With television banned for 30 years under the regime of Dr Kamuzu Banda (1964-1994), and the preservation of a state-controlled media, Malawi was one of the last

²⁸ As Hallin and Mancini (2004: 46) rightfully pointed out “media systems are shaped by the wider context of political history, structure, and the culture.”

countries in the world to have television. Located in South-East Africa, Malawi is a small landlocked country bordering Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. Divided into three administrative areas: The North, Central and Southern regions, Malawi consists of 28 districts and nine major ethnic groups; Tumbuka, Chewa, Tonga, Nkhonde, Ngoni, Mang'anja, Lomwe, Yao and Sena, all of which have their own languages and dialects. These different groups make up a population of around 16 million with a GNI²⁹ per capita of US \$250, which places Malawi in the category of a low-income country according to the World Bank (2016).

Formerly known as Nyasaland under the colonial administration of the British Central African Protectorate until it gained independence in 1964, Malawi remains heavily dependent on the British and other foreign donors for financial support. This support takes the form both of direct budget support to the government of Malawi and aid-supported projects. Direct budget support, historically known as “bilateral assistance” can be defined as “a method of financing a partner country’s budget through a transfer of resources from a donor to the partner government’s national treasury” (OECD, 2008: 144). This can take different forms. It can either be mixed with the recipient’s general budget support, transferred to a particular ministry within the government (e.g. Ministry of Communications) or conditional³⁰ support whereby the donor stipulates how and where the money should be allocated. Aid-supported projects on the other hand, are a relatively new source of income. These funds are generally used to fund a particular project, such as a school, hospital or media house. Both forms of foreign financing have different functions, and both are subject to conditionality.


In 2011, it was reported that in all of Malawi’s 28 districts, there were aid-supported projects that were funded by 31 different donors (Ministry of Finance [Malawi], 2011, 12). According to Kalinga (2012) Malawi had around two hundred NGOs operating in the country in 2011, although Pensulo (2015) says that figure is now closer to five hundred. Pensulo goes on to add that this dependency on foreign-funded NGOs “puts the country in a vulnerable position” (ibid: para 12). As Figure 1 shows, Malawi received more aid per capita than the average developing country in sub-Saharan Africa and other low-income countries. Since 2009, nearly 40% of the government’s budget has come from donors

²⁹ GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) is the gross national income.

³⁰ Also known as “tied aid”

(Ministry of Finance [Malawi], 2011; Wroe, 2012), thus Malawi has been, and continues to be, heavily dependent on foreign aid³¹.

Figure 1: Official Development Assistance (ODA) Per Capita 1999-2010



Source: World Development Indicators (2015)

Malawi’s current major bilateral donors include the United Kingdom (UK), United States (US), Norway, Japan and the European Union (EU) of which Germany and the Netherlands are key actors. Each donor uses different forms of assistance. However, bilateral aid donors such as these insist that the projects they fund are “often designed at least partially to help support the economic interests of certain firms or sectors in the donor country” (Radelet, 2006: 6). As the leading U.S. Government agency for foreign aid USAID openly states in its mission statement “U.S. foreign assistance has always had the twofold purpose of furthering America's interests while improving lives in the developing world,” adding that “our work reflects American values” (USAID, 2016).

To ensure that these American interests are upheld and their values are enshrined into Malawi’s, new methods of propagating foreign policy objectives are employed. For example, the introduction of multilateral assistance, which pools resources together from many donors, is steadily increasing. In Malawi, the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), Irish Aid and the Royal Norwegian Embassy created Tilitonse³²

³¹ This percentage was a similar figure to that of 2012, and as Wroe confirms, Malawi “is as dependent upon aid now as it was fifty years ago” (ibid: 143).

³² Tilitonse is a multi-donor pooled grant-making facility supporting more accountable, responsive and inclusive governance in Malawi through grants to projects led by civil society and other like-minded interest groups. Total funding available for grants is £12 million with DFID, Irish Aid and the Royal Norwegian Embassy as the contributing donors. Tilitonse is in line with the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy

(2016) which is one such multi-donor grant making facility with the aim of “influencing institutional reforms in Malawi” (Tilitonse, 2016: para 1). In all circumstances, the role of aid is not only about providing funding but “transmitting knowledge and changing policies in recipient countries” (Gunning, 2001:125). This transfer of knowledge is not only transmitted through policies but through ideologies. This will not be dealt with in the following sections of this chapter, which provides not only a historical perspective, but a more complete picture of why Malawi’s media is the way it is.

2.1 Colonial Period: Colonial Intentions (1891-1964)

The history of the modern Malawian media system and its relationship with foreign intervention began in the 19th century, when Malawi, under the colonial administration of the British³³ saw both the colonial authorities and Christian missionaries begin to create newspapers for white settler communities and locals, respectively. The motivation and intentions of both colonial administrators and missionaries were not based on informing or educating the Malawian populace, but to report on government activities, anti-colonialist propaganda, and the promotion of Christianity.

Many of the earliest recorded newspapers were founded by missionaries such as *Mtenga Watu* (Our Message) which was published in 1895 by the Universities Mission to Central Africa (UMCA) and established by members of the Anglican Church (Lwanda, 1996). The “Christian missionary enterprise was no doubt of prime importance in the Westernization of Africa” (Vilhanová, 2007: 249), as “colonialism used the mass media to inculcate and entrench the belief that colonialism was a modernising practice meant to “develop” the natives [and] the colonial press was part of the campaign to spread and consolidate the ideology of empire” (Gecau, 1996: 194).

Funding for both forms of newspapers (political and religious) was directly received from the administration and the missionaries’ home country. Issues over funding the media remain highly controversial, as the media reflect the interests of those funding them (cf. Thomas and Nain, 2004; Noam, 2016). Newspapers such as *Makani* (News) and *Mutende* (Peace) which were established by the colonial government were also political and under the

and is working with other key partners in the Government’s Democratic Governance Sector Working Group (Tilitonse Fund, 2016).

³³ The British Central Africa Protectorate (BCA) was ratified in 1891 under Commissioner and Consul-General Sir Henry Hamilton Johnston and was renamed in 1907 to Nyasaland until independence in 1964.

editorship of Europeans. In ways similar to many media oligarchs today, the colonialists and missionaries occupied all of Malawi's media space, and served the needs and the interests of foreign actors.

During and after WWII, the colonial administration established various vernacular newspapers and publications either to recruit soldiers to fight for the British or extol the qualities of colonial rule (Chitsulo and Mang'anda, 2011). For example, in 1949 the newspaper *Msimbi* (The Reporter) was used as an anti-communist propaganda tool but also a counter narrative to the growing anti-colonialist movement across Africa (Babu, 1982). Funded by the British government, the newspaper began to be sold commercially which was the start of a new economic model for the print press in Malawi (Baker, 1994). Three years later, the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC)³⁴, the leading opposition of the Rhodesian Federation established *Kwacha* (Dawn)³⁵ and later, in 1959, *Malawi News* (Chitsulo and Mang'anda, 2011). This was one of the first newspapers in Malawi created and written by Malawians³⁶. Funded by local elites, this was strategically used to win the support of Malawians away from the British.

However, unlike *Msimbi*, *Kwacha* had insufficient support from funders and advertisers, as it was rare that businesses would advertise in a paper that was against the Rhodesian Federation (Kondowe, Kishindo, and Mkandawire, 2011). In addition, during this time, Malawi did not have the type of corporate sector that it does now, therefore attracting investment, especially for anti-colonial activities, was particularly difficult. This was never a major barrier for the colonial administration, which soon introduced radio broadcasting in Malawi. However, when "the colonial administration distributed 100 receivers across the country" (Manjawira and Mitunda, 2011: 16), concerns were raised, as radio systems were developed to influence and advance the colonial administration's military needs in the struggle against Germany and Italy (Nyamnjoh, 2005) and advance their politically strategic interests (Hardy et al, 2000). These political and ideological intentions are of great significance, as will be shown in the following sections.

³⁴ Now Malawi Congress Party (MCP)

³⁵ It was first established as a newssheet in 1952 but then became a newspaper in 1955 (McCracken, 2012)

³⁶ During the period of African nationalism or resistance to colonial rule, this period was referred to as "African press for Africans" (Barton, 1979: 13).

2.2 Post-Colonial Era: The 30 Year Dictatorship

After the NAC won independence from Britain in 1964, Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda took over as president. Banda soon turned the NAC into the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and declared Malawi a one-party state. However, between 1964 and 1966³⁷ when Malawi became a Republic, Britain used a system of indirect rule and remained responsible for some administrative duties (Ross, 2009). It was during this time that the government “installed a parliamentary system of government following the British Westminster model” (Meinhardt and Patel, 2003: 3). Since Malawi, like many newly independent states faced economic hardship, “Britain was morally obliged to provide an unspecified amount of budgetary support” (Morton, 2011:11). This financial support soon followed with the support from South Africa, US, West Germany, Denmark and the African Development Bank (Morton, 2011). Malawi’s high rates of economic growth and pro-Western policies impressed donors. However, Banda ruled Malawi using various coercive methods to maintain control over the population. One such method was the use of “draconian censorship laws that curtailed freedom of speech and the press” (Chirambo, 2009:78). Methods that were uncomfortably similar to those of the colonial administration.

This was reinforced with absolute control over the media, which at the time only consisted of one state radio station, under Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC). With few listeners because of the high cost of radios and a limited government budget for the media, MBC initially broadcast out of Zambia, until the “United States government donated a transmitter” (Manjawira and Mitunda, 2011: 18). Donations came in all shapes and sizes. For example, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), which maintained its tradition of independent public broadcasting since its inception by director general John Reith (1927–1938), trained the staff from MBC during its initial set-up. Extolling British broadcasting values, these journalistic training by the BBC became common practice all over Africa during this period (cf. Golding, 1977; Mudhai et al, 2007).

The 1960s and 70s was a period of nation building, and the media was used to foster identity, harmony and economic growth. In conflict with the BBC model, Banda, with his strong developmental patrimonialism governance structure, believed that pluralism, both politically and culturally would impede on his nation-building strategy. In order to gain public support for this developmental strategy, the Banda administration “published *Boma Lathu* (Our Government) in indigenous *chiCherwa*, through which the state kept rural people

³⁷ In 1996 The Malawi News Agency (MANA) was established which was a government controlled agency.

in touch with political developments” (Manyozo, 2004: 75). His nationalist strategy and strict authoritarian governance measures led to one of Banda’s most far-reaching political decisions, a complete ban on television. The MBC Act of 1964 was enacted into law to secure his mandate. This meant that for 30 years Malawians did not have access to television. All information came through MBC Radio 1 and the African Bible College radio, which was funded, and continues to be funded, by the Malawian government and an American Christian organization, respectively, for the purpose of spreading two dominant discourses, government propaganda disguised as independence, and Christianity.

From the 1970s to the 1990s, Malawi, and the world over, faced major political, economic and ideological shifts. For example, the country’s alignment with the West proved problematic during the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, when many of Malawi’s main donors, which included the US, Western Europe³⁸ and Japan faced stagnant economic growth, which led to changes in their foreign aid policies (see Riddell, 2007). The consequence of these external shocks on Malawi’s economy, namely, the decline of foreign aid brought about considerable collateral damage. For example, without significant funds, Malawi’s broadcaster MBC, which is state funded, took a large hit and was unable to air as much as it did.

In the years that followed, Malawi was compelled to accept financial support that was tied to structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). As a way of restoring its declining economic growth, caused by the oil shocks, these macroeconomic programmes gave greater influence to market mechanisms (Lele, 1990). These loans and macroeconomic policies were provided by the two leading US dominated institutions - the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). Some of the SAP strategies involved, liberalizing the economy, reversing declining economic growth, fiscal adjustments, and selling of state assets (including the media) to adjust the negative balance of payments (Easterly, 2003). Because Banda followed many of the policies set by the loan agreements, and openly stated that he was “extremely suspicious of socialism and the Soviet Union” (Wroe, 2012: 142), Western donors governments overlooked his “strict, paternalist, Protestant style” of governance (Venter, 1995: 160)³⁹ even when his party was regularly torturing and murdering political opponents and dissident journalists (Mapanje, 2011). Many have argued that Banda’s

³⁸ This mainly comprised of the UK, France and sometime later, Germany.

³⁹ It has been noted others that donor behaviour was unpredictable during this period (see Brown, 2004). For example, “the United States protested the detention of political dissidents in 1990 but nonetheless rewarded Malawi for its economic reforms by cancelling US\$40 million in bilateral debt during the same year” (Resnick, 2012: 2).

approach to the media was a reflection of the former colonial media systems (cf. Wilcox, 1975). Nevertheless, in an attempt to appease Western donors and maintain financial support coming in, Malawi signed *The Windhoek Declaration* (1991), which promoted the development of an independent and pluralistic media across Africa and endorsed by UNESCO (Eldis, 2011).

Whether Banda knew it or not, “aid was frequently allocated to recipients simply because of their [donors] strategic significance” (Bird, 1999: 16) and the bilateral aid that Malawi received during these years was “generally tied to the procurement of goods and services from the donor country” (Morton, 2011: 13). This could help explain why the US donated a transmitter to Malawi during the early developmental stages of Malawi’s media system. The capitalist expansion of the US during the Cold War was not only about fighting communism, but wealth accumulation and the procurement of US goods by emerging markets⁴⁰. Politically and ideologically, the end of the Cold War also signified a global push towards democracy. As a consequence, “Malawi came under growing pressure from donor countries to follow the path of multi-party democracy” (Venter, 1995: 160). Donors openly linked foreign aid to political reform, and it became clear that aid allocation was becoming increasingly political. The process became even more complex when the motivations of one donor differed from the motivations of another⁴¹. After 30 years of ruling Malawi, Banda had to decide quickly on which side of the geopolitical fence he would stand, remain authoritarian or succumb to the global push towards democracy.

In 1992, other foreign actors began criticizing the regime as a means of influencing his decision. For example, the Catholic Church wrote a pastoral letter to the British Government criticizing the government for its human rights abuses and strict censorship laws⁴². This letter was recited across all churches in Malawi sparked wide spread protests demanding the introduction of multi-party elections. These protests resulted in Malawi’s major donors (UK, US, World Bank, EU) to suspend aid until Malawi announced it would agree to a political referendum (Ihonvbere, 2003). It was this suspension of aid to Malawi that forced the pace of transition. While some argued that this left Banda with no choice but to accept a referendum (Southall and Wood, 1998), other argued that Banda was “ousted

⁴⁰ Others methods included “some kind of “plan” that indicated investment priorities and the “financial gaps” that were to be filled by external resources” (Mkandawire, 2014: 174).

⁴¹ “In one analysis, Schraeder et al. (1998) found that, Japanese aid is motivated by economic and trade interests, Swedish aid supports progressive, socialist-minded regimes, while France’s aid is almost exclusively targeted towards francophone countries” (Werker, 2012: 5)

⁴² And in 1993 he “gave the Minister of Information power to make decision regarding program content” (van der Veur, 2002: 92).

rapidly when he failed to adapt to the new conditionalities of democracy and rights” (Wroe, 2012: 143). Either way, Banda’s erratic behaviour and unchanged oppressive media laws led to “policy-making [being] passed into the hands of the IMF and World Bank” (Kelsall, 2013:44). Such arrangements, illustrated that Presidents were only favoured if they followed the rules set by the foreign actors in their entirety.

2.3 Multiparty Era: Promoting Democracy

"This country is not controlled by donors. Never! You must understand that I am the president of this country. Yes, we are poor. But we want to be poor with our heads up, not with our heads down. And nobody, as long as I am the president, will control me, nobody,"

(President Muluzi told a recent rally in Blantyre: Mpakati, 2002: para 5)

This quote by the first freely elected President President Bakili Muluzi (UDF)⁴³, who “inherited a total external debt of US \$2,025 million, equivalent to 163.2% of Malawi’s gross national income” (Van Buren, 2003” 664) from the Banda regime, was an inaccurate description of Malawi. As previously explained, donors have played a significant role in Malawi’s transition to multipartism which got Muluzi elected, elections which were also funded and supervised by the EU⁴⁴.


In the run up to the elections, “the World Bank ran a series of seminars for the political parties on economic and financial management [...] with policies that reflected World Bank nostrums” (Carver, 1994:486). Such activities by non-state actors reflected the transition from former colonial governments to international financial institution (IFI), which were taking control over the political and economic management of Malawi. As shown in the following graph (Figure 2) Malawi’s political rights scoreboard change drastically from 6 (which is defined as authoritarian/not free) in the lead up to the first multiparty elections to a score of two (which is considered democratic/free) in 1994. From 1990 to 1999, four of Malawi’s major donors applied significant aid cuts as a retaliation to Banda’s strict authoritarian laws (Emmanuel, 2013). Although some donors did initially overlook his strict

⁴³ United Democratic Front Party (UDF).

⁴⁴ During the 2004 general elections, the European Union (EU) Elections Observer Mission (EOM) carried out a media monitoring exercise in the country, which observed the reporting patterns of both state and private media during the elections as a way of protecting democracy through impartiality, transparency and journalist professionalism (European Union Action Service, 2016).

ensorship laws, the wave of human rights groups in tandem with democratisation witnessed donors taking political and human freedom more seriously.

Figure 2: Malawi Freedom House “Political Rights” Score (1990-1999)



Source: Freedom House

Therefore, this influence, which encouraged multiparty elections and deployed as a mechanism for future policy reform packages and change, discredits Muluzi’s quote. Although the specifics of the conditionality set in 1992 are not known, it was clear that the outcome of multiparty elections was met. Thus such a demand on the modification of Malawi’s political ecology was a clear prerequisite for the provision of future aid.

In the months that followed Muluzi’s government “took over the liberalization program agreed to between Western donors, led by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund [and] the MCP government” (Kalinga, 2012: 323). This pro-Western approach helped Muluzi to regain strong diplomatic relations and more foreign aid⁴⁵ after the withdrawal of aid at the end of Banda’s reign. Within Muluzi’s first year, a new constitution was formed, which not only received “considerable input from foreign experts” (Meinhardt and Patel, 2003: 12), but was also drafted in secret (von Donge, 1995). Among many other outcomes, the constitution introduced Section 36, which advocated for an independent press. Yet, it was noted that the Communications Sector Policy Statement and the Communication Act 1998 was crafted by a handful of pro-government professionals, many of which did not have any experience with communication law (Chitsulo, Chimwaga and Kaombe, 2006).

During Muluzi’s time in office, Malawi witnessed the mushrooming of privately owned radio stations and newspapers. Backed financially by foreign donors and defended by international non-governmental organizations (INGO), this new era for Malawi “marked

⁴⁵ These included; “Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Iceland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Republic of China (Taiwan), the United Kingdom, and the United States. Multilateral donors included the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Union, the African Development Bank, and the United Nations organisations” (International Business Publications, 2007: 146).

the beginning of what has become described as the liberalization of airwaves” (Manjawira and Mitunda, 2011: 20). However, many soon closed. As speculated by a report written by ARTICLE 19 in 2000, many of these media houses closed because of low journalism quality, high printing costs, and insufficient advertising revenue, of which the government was the main provider⁴⁶.

In relation to radio broadcasting, Muluzi continued to maintain tight control over the MBC, much to the displeasure of these INGOs, one of which, the International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX) quoted Muluzi as saying; “If I seek legal advice, journalists should not squeal and try to hoodwink the international community that the president of Malawi and members of his government are depriving journalists of their freedom” (IFEX, 1996: para 3). Like Banda and the colonial administration before him, Muluzi maintained a strong propagandist function for the state-owned media. Conversely, under Muluzi’s government, the SADC⁴⁷ *Protocol for Culture, Information and Sport* (2000), the *African Charter on Broadcasting* (2001) and the *African Union Bamako Declaration* (2002) were all signed as a commitment to the liberalization and development of an independent press.

The democratization process that swept across most of the African continent in the 1990s was accompanied by significant constitutional and legislative changes (Ogbondah, 1997). In the run up to the elections in 1999, the Communication Act and the Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA) were formed. This new Act and regulatory body came soon after the eighth consultative group meeting of Malawi’s major donors, who proposed an increase to their aid budget for the country (Van Buren, 2003). At the same time, hundreds of millions were also poured in by Western governments, international financial institutions (IFIs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) all across Africa which “began a concerted effort to provide assistance to the media to develop them along Western lines” (Myers, 2014: 2).

The strengthening of democracy and the liberalization of the economy and the media was used to consolidate and legitimise the West’s victory over communism. Although the state broadcasting monopoly still prevailed in Malawi, the Communication Act (1998) paved the way for four new private and community radio stations⁴⁸ and the introduction of television, ending the 30-year ban. Television Malawi (TVM), which began to air in 1999, was still a

⁴⁶ The report also noted that the government implemented a policy banning advertising media houses who sympathised or identify themselves with opposition parties.

⁴⁷ Southern African Development Community (SADC)

⁴⁸ Dzimwe Community Radio, Power 101, Capital Radio and Trans World Radio (Manjawira and Mitunda, 2011)

government mouthpiece, and due to economic hardship, content from BBC and Voice of America, which was distributed for free, was used to fill the large programming gap. Although three other (all religious) television stations were granted licences by MARCA at this time, they did not air. As represented in Table 2, television viewership was extremely low in the early years.

Table 2: Media audiences in Malawi (1998-2001)

	1998	1999	2000	2001
Radio Listeners	4,929			
Television Viewers		27,000		
Telephone (main line in use)		41,400	45,000	54,100
Internet Users		10,000	15,000	20,000

*In 1995, Malawi had 5 daily newspapers with an estimated circulation of 25,000 copies.

Source: Adapted from UNESCO Statistical Yearbook in Maher, (2004)

Statistics of radio listenership are difficult to assess, because of the collective and community-based nature of listening clubs that UNESCO introduced (cf. Manyozo, 2006). However, it is commonly known that radio remains the primary source of information in Africa (Hyden, et al., 2002; Wasserman, 2011a; Ligaga et al., 2012). Of the few licensed radio stations that existed under Muluzi’s government, most were often owned by government allies or restricted to religious and development-oriented broadcasting (Freedom House, 1999).

The opening up of the media in Malawi was a clear outcome of the IMF urging Malawi to privatise and liberalize the economy. The model of privatization and liberalization actively encouraged Muluzi to sell Malawi’s state-owned banking, aviation, agricultural and telecommunications sectors (Van Buren, 2003). This revival of privatization and liberalization, which was first imposed by the IMF during the SAP era, saw the number of newspapers rise to thirty (Meldrum, 1994). However, in the same way many newspapers mushroomed during the colonial period, they rapidly stopped production because of lack of funding. And because there was little or no money from domestic sources, international organisations such as the IMF gained considerable influence in Malawi’s internal affairs.

The IMF, together with those promoting a Western democratic model became major forces in the promotion, financing and institutionalization of privatization and liberalization principles. So much so, that privatization became a common principle of democratisation, alongside various IMF backed social and economic development programmes. Liberal media optimists at that time, such as Chris W. Ogbondah (1997), believed that “an open market economy and liberal democracy is already attracting and will continue to attract investment in the media industry from within and outside the continent” (ibid: 280). He went on to add that in Malawi, the “privatization of the media has led to the growth of lively newspapers that vie with each other for dissemination of pluralistic views and criticisms of the government” (ibid). While this was true, and the constitutional and legislative changes allowed people to invest and establish their own media houses, economic hardship remained. Malawi remained highly dependent on foreign aid to cover its economic shortfall, and thus tied to whatever conditionalities donors introduced.

The US, which was one of Malawi’s largest donors during the Muluzi era, stated that its interests in Malawi are “fundamentally economic liberalization, structural reform and political transformation” (International Business Publications, 2007:187). During this period aid recipient governments “were under significant economic pressure to privatize the media systems” (van der Veur, 2002: 93), and Malawi was no exception. Muluzi did not agree with these plans and postponed the privatization programme. In 2001, and in response to Muluzi’s decision, the IMF suspended lending. This led to the suspension of donor aid from the UK’s DfID, EU, USAID, Germany and the complete ending of foreign aid from Denmark, because of government corruption and economic mismanagement (Wroe, 2012; Resnick, 2012). In an attempt to pacify foreign donors Muluzi dissolved his entire cabinet, and in 2002 he tried to amend the constitution to permit him to stand for a third term in office. However, in 2004, Muluzi nominated Bingu wa Mutharika (co-founder of UDF) to be his successor. With new hope “donors became very eager to re-establish good relations with the Malawian government under the new president” (Resnick, 2012: 5). In his first term, Mutharika’s efforts were focused on rapidly repairing relations with the IMF (van Buren, 2003) and forming his own party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

After forming the DPP in February 2005, Mutharika was on a charm offensive to get US and UK foreign aid reinstated. Wroe (2012: 142) writes how Mutharika had “to run the Malawian economy along guidelines set out by the IMF, abide by various UN agreements, and adhere to Malawi’s constitutional framework” as prerequisites for governing Malawi and getting the foreign aid reinstated. However, “in the second term of Mutharika’s

presidency, Malawi was being forced to liberalise its economy” (Ntata, 2012: 227). During this period, Malawi’s media did not see any growth, and this became a highly political matter. For example, in the 2008/2009 financial budget, MBC and TVM were denied funding by the opposition-dominated parliament for political bias towards Mutharika’s government (Manjawira and Mitunda, 2011). Mutharika responded by not granting any new television or radio licences. From this period onwards, Mutharika began taking an authoritarian turn. According to Human Rights Watch (2012), Mutharika became increasingly intolerant of criticism. His DPP party passed “several controversial and unpopular bills which advanced censorship and government powers. These included an amendment to Penal Code Section 46, which gives the Minister of Information the right to ban media in the public interest” (Cammack, 2011:8). In addition to this, Mutharika expelled the British ambassador, Fergus Cochrane-Dyett, over a leaked diplomatic cable in which the president was described as autocratic (BBC, 2011).

In reaction to Mutharika’s actions, Britain froze its foreign aid. And again, the United States, Germany, World Bank, EU, African Development Bank, and Norway all followed suit. Mutharika did not respond well and accused the donors of plotting to topple his government, and publicly told foreign donors to “go to hell” (BBC, 2012: para 1). The suspension of aid exacerbated Malawi’s already serious economic problems, and during Malawi’s 2011-12 fiscal year Mutharika announced a ‘Zero Deficit Budget (ZDB)⁴⁹. In retaliation against the donor community Mutharika was “implying Malawi could do well enough on its own” (Kainja, 2014: para 5). In other words, Mutharika wanted to demonstrate that Malawi could succeed without support from foreign donors (Herskovitz).

2.4 From 2012 to date

Following the death of President Bingu wa Mutharika in 2012, Vice President Joyce Banda and her pro-democracy People’s Party (PP) assumed power. In a similar fashion to the newly elected Muluzi and Mutharika, Joyce Banda followed pro-Western policies to win back foreign donors. What was distinctly different about her approach was the rapid change to Malawi’s media landscape. In an effort to win voters, diplomatic ties, and the reinstatement of foreign aid, Banda reversed all the long-standing repressive media laws and policies enacted by her predecessor.

⁴⁹ The ‘zero deficit budget’ was set out under the financial plans of then Minister of Finance Ken Kandodo, which outlined how Malawi could pay its own recurrent expenditures without foreign aid or donor assistance.

In so doing, Banda granted the application of fifteen new TV and radio licences to all political parties and foreign investors. As a consequence of her decisions, Malawi now hosts 42 media houses⁵⁰. As can be seen in Table 3, Malawi has 32 radio stations and 10 television stations. Malawi’s media system also has 2 government newspapers, 9 privately owned newspapers, and 4 four community and religious publications.

Table 3: Operational radio and television stations in Malawi (2015)

Radio Broadcasters

Private Owned	Private Community Religious	State Owned Media
Capital Radio	Radio Tigawane	MBC 1
Power 101	Transworld Radio	MBC 2
MIJ FM	Radio Islam	
Joy Radio	Dzimwe Radio	
Star Radio	Radio Maria	
Zodiak	Seventh Day Adventist Radio	
Galaxy	African Bible College	
Timveni	The Voice of Livingstonia	
Dziko (private)	CCAP Nkhoma Synod Radio	
Nkhotakota Radio	Living Waters Radio	
Mudziwathu Radio	Channel for All Nations Radio	
Mzimba Community	Cavalry Family Church	
Maziko Radio	Radio Alinafe	
Mulhako Radio		
Usisya Community Radio		
Chancellor College Radio		
Matindi		

Television Broadcasters

Private Owned	Private Community Religious	State Owned Media
Luntha	Cavalry Family Church	MBC Television
Zodiak	All for Jesus	
Luso TV	African Bible College	
Beta TV		
Timveni		
Times TV		

Source: Adapted from the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) Malawi Chapter

⁵⁰ Others have stated that Malawi hosts “34 operational broadcasting licensees” (M’ule, 2014: para 1).

However, access to publically available and reliable knowledge as to who owns or funds each media house is remains a challenge. Nevertheless, it is public knowledge that many of the early-developed newspapers, radio and television stations were, and continue to be, concentrated in the hands of the past and present politicians. For example, *The Nation* newspaper is owned by former politician, the late Aleke Banda, to which his daughter is now in control, while *The Daily Times*, *Joy Radio* and *Galaxy FM Radio*, is owned by the family of Kamuzu Banda, Bakili Muluzi and the Bingu wa Mutharika family, respectively (Manda, 2007). ZBS, Capital Radio and Beta TV are owned by former members of parliament and/or MBC staff, and many community radio stations were initially set up by UNESCO. However, some television stations that would be classified as community are in fact private, such as Timveni, which was initially funded by PLAN International, a British NGO that protects the rights of children. When others were asked during the interviews, many declined to answer. However, in an effort to promote transparency over the country's media ownership, MACRA does ask in their licencing agreement where the licence holder gets the funds to set up the media house (see appendix 1). However, assess to that information is non-disclosable. Nevertheless, it is clear from Table 3 that private media houses are now outweighing state controlled media, an important shift towards attaining a liberal media model.

The other distinctive features of Malawi's current media landscape that are worth mentioning briefly are that "most mass circulation newspapers in Malawi are elitist because they are written in English, which is understood by a relatively small sector of society" (Manda, 2007: 254). And given that Malawi has multiple languages, strengthening pluralism and diversity under the liberal media model is often unachievable. Secondly, the majority of programming remains overwhelmingly religious and development-orientated, which reflects the mandate of the Muluzi era. Thirdly, the Malawian government continues to be the main source of advertising revenue (Patel, 2000), and has control over the state broadcaster MBC, amidst foreign donor pressure to change it into a public service broadcaster. And lastly, how development agencies allocate funds for development communication intervention is also unknown "because aid statistics collated by OECD⁵¹ do not detail specific expenditures" (Enghel, 2015: 12).

This era of secrecy was exposed when the People's Progressive Movement (PPM) lodged a complaint to the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) asking why the "British government is sponsoring the campaign of four political parties through radio debates" (Naphazi, 2014:

⁵¹ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

para 1). And this was not the first time the British government has funded privately owned media in Malawi. In the run up to the 2009 elections, the British High Commission in Malawi in collaboration with privately owned Zodiak Broadcasting Station (ZBS) set up the first live parliament debate based on the popular BBC programme *Question Time* (Nyasaland Times, 2014).

However, in 2012, the British High Commission, alongside the other major donors once again withdrew budgetary support, based on what became known as the Cashgate Scandal. This systematic looting of public money by government officials “left the government with a budget deficit of £167m” (Mapondera, 2014: para 9). Given Malawi’s aid-dependent status, the impact of aid withdrawals or freezing of foreign aid is catastrophic. The manipulation of the economy in this way makes the Malawian government vulnerable and exposed to precipitous decisions. This is because, when foreign governments and donors are essential to the revival of the economy, other areas of society, such as the media are affected. Not only did Malawian newspapers, radio and television see a decline in advertising revenues, changes to the whole media system were affected.

In 2013, following the Cashgate Scandal, Banda declined to sign the Table Mountain Declaration which was written by the World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers (WAN-IFRA)⁵² to abolish Insult Laws and Criminal Defamation in Africa and to set free press higher on the political agenda. Therefore, there is no doubt that “since the era of one-party rule, Malawi’s relationship with the donor community has proved erratic and contentious” (Resnick, 2012: 1). Today, diplomatic relations are steady and Malawi’s current President, Bingu wa Mutharika’s brother, Peter Mutharika, has not reintroduced any of the repressive media laws set by his predecessors, nor revoked any of the current TV and radio licences. However, it is too early to tell what will happen if he gets re-elected or what conditionalities donors are placing on Malawi now.

Summary

“We are at a point in our work when we can no longer ignore empires and the imperial context in our studies. (Said, 1993: 5)”

The purpose of this chapter was to provide the reader with a brief, yet comprehensive background to Malawi’s historical past in relation to foreign intervention, and the different roles and methods foreign donors have used in shaping Malawi’s media system. Therefore,

⁵² WAN-IFRA is the global organisation of the world's press.

theoretically and methodologically, as stated in Edward Said's quote, we cannot ignore colonial historical in our research, as it has commonly been argued, "the status of contemporary African media is implicated in the colonial past" (Hyden and Okigbo, 2002: 30). Therefore, new and old media policies, laws and regulations which have been adopted and rejected, and Malawi's status as aid-dependent continues to have an impact on the level of autonomy Malawi has over its political, economic and cultural sovereignty. Although such a view could be criticized for excluding the agency of Malawi's government, the shift towards a liberal media system cannot be understood without taking into consideration the economic causation and the continuation of foreign power. And given the fact that Malawi has been on a relatively stable trajectory towards democratic consolidation since the Banda regime (Banik and Chinsinga, 2016), external forces may get sidelined or downplayed as a force that is influencing Malawi's media system. However, the literature shared in the next chapter, provides empirical evidence that present external forces as key variables in the study of media systems.

Media Systems Research in Transition

The following chapter has been compartmentalised into three interweaving sections, which come together to formulate and justify why external factors should be considered as key variables in the study of media systems. Starting with a brief historical overview of media systems research, this chapter will build a critique around approaches that have placed the nation-state as the core unit of analysis. Here, a brief link to neoliberalism is brought into emphasis its role in the evolution of media systems, while the second part of this chapter, under the subtitle *Externalising Media Systems*, is a collection of scholarly literature that compensates for lack of external factors in Hallin and Mancini's study. Among the external factors examined, globalisation and the role of global institutions received the most attention, while international development and global economic ideologies are not, but will be the focus of the final part of this chapter.

Chapter 4, which is the second part of this literature review, presents literature to build a strong argument for adding the role of international development, as an international discourse, concept, process and academic discipline into media systems research, in order to understand who and what is impacting media systems in the "global south". Therefore, the purpose of this chapter, is to move beyond the current boundaries of analysing and measuring media systems within nation-state borders, and provide an analytical framework that uses new, and what will be described as essential factors within the study of media systems in post-colonial, transitional and aid-dependent countries.

3.1 Studying Media Systems

Before Hallin and Mancini's (2004) *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*, the "first known proposal to comparatively analyse media systems around the world was *Four Theories of the Press*, in 1956" (Mellado and Lagos, 2013: 4). Developed by Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm, their research created four universal media theories (1) Authoritarian (2) Libertarian (3) Social Responsibility and (3) Soviet. Each theory emphasised "that the press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates" (ibid: 1). This idea that the relationship between the media and political system were the central units of analysis cemented much of the research that followed. However, Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm

normative approach received heavy criticism as it “served to celebrate the superiority of the Anglo-American models [...] while placing non-Western models and communist countries in the least favorable light” (Downing, 1996: xiii, 191).

For over 50 years media systems research has been studied through this comparative approach⁵³. Nonetheless, there has been an important shift away from Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm’s normative approach, which describes what media systems should be, towards an empirically based approach⁵⁴ (Thomass, 2007). Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) three media systems, the (1) Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model (2) North/Central Europe or Democratic Corporatist Model, and (3) North Atlantic or Liberal Model, were defined using this latter approach to empirically understand why media systems are the way they are. However, their inward-looking assessment of media systems was confined to role of the nation-state. Although they identify that “[o]utside influences are clearly an important part of the story” (ibid: 255), they maintained that “changes in European media systems are driven above all by processes of change *internal*⁵⁵ to European society” (ibid). By *internal*, Hallin and Mancini are referring to change that is achieved from within each media outlet and political (ruling government) structures. External on the other hand refers to influences emanating from outside interference that impacts the country’s media or government structures. However, this external-internal distinction, should not be regarded as a fixed or dichotomous as both forces continuously interact with each other and often amidst inconsistent and contradictory commands.

Although their most significant contribution to the analysis of media systems is their awareness that “media systems are shaped by the wider context of political history, structure, and the culture” (ibid: 46), Hallin and Mancini only mentioned in passing some of the externally-driven historical events that influenced the internal dynamics of Western media development, such as the “Napoleonic invasion that brought the modern newspaper to Italy” (ibid: 90), and the time when “British political, economic, and media institutions were exported to Ireland, Canada, and the United States” (ibid: 73)⁵⁶. Although these

⁵³ Comparative research “helps us to interrogate the relevance of country and regional studies in the context of global communication and media studies [...] A significant limitation has, however, been the propensity toward largely descriptive comparative studies primarily interested in understanding national differences, rather than developing alternative explanations and theories” (Flew and Waisbord, 2015: 2).

⁵⁴ There are numerous examples of both normative and empirical media models and theories which have developed since 1956 (See Williams, 1968; Hachten, 1981; McQuail, 1987; Sparks and Splichal, 1989; Curran, 1991; Blum, 2005, Yin, 2008).

⁵⁵ Original emphasis.

⁵⁶ Katrin Voltmer (2013) recognizing that the value of the historical condition is of significant scholarly value, and argues that the distinct nature of media systems in Africa and Asia should be understood “in context of post-colonial sentiments” (ibid: 5). In other words, the legacy of colonialism has been inimical to the

historical events are very broad depictions of external factors, which for time and research purposes may have been difficult to assess, they are nevertheless important milestones in the evolution of particular media systems. History is undoubtedly filled with examples of such factors that operate extraterritorially to the nation-state. Borrowing extensively from comparative political theory, which focuses on the internal dynamic of systems, institutions and conflicts, could explain why Hallin and Mancini's (2004) analysis does not develop these external influences. Furthermore, their employment of comparative politics does little to include the "ideological foundations of the modern national state [which] are central concerns of comparative politics" (Boix and Stokes, 2007: 8). Besides highlighting the process of secularization, which involves "the decline of social institutions – mass parties and religious and class-based communities" (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 295), they regard this process as the central reason to explain why there is a global shift towards the liberal model.

They present this shift as the convergence or homogenization thesis. Specific to the spread of Anglo-American journalism practices through the adoption of free-market economies, and the reduction in government intervention (Hardy, 2008), their prognosis for this global shift, or what they refer to as "the triumph of the liberal model" (ibid: 251), was a 'naturally' occurring phenomenon. Based on their observation that there has been a widespread decline in the 'party press'⁵⁷ and a general decline in the state power over the media, which has resulted in an increase for commercial media, they theoretically mirror this global shift against the global theory of modernization, Americanisation⁵⁸ and cultural imperialism. With modernization focusing on the "internal processes of change" (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 255), and Americanisation and cultural imperialism reflecting the exportation of American values, or what they called the "free press crusade" (ibid: 256)⁵⁹, and "the displacement of one culture by another imported culture" (ibid: 255) as external, the theoretical lens which is used to capture change is critical. For example, the use of modernisation theory has often been criticised for being an "oversimplified view of social

development of media systems in these regions. However, the simple idea that history matters without strong evidence of the decision-making that has taken place over time can lead to ambiguous assumptions (Greener, 2005; Pierson, 2000).

⁵⁷ The party press general reflected the ownership of the mass media by political parties, or a newspapers affiliation with a particular political party.

⁵⁸ For examples see Lerner, D. (1958). *The Passing of Traditional Society*, Rostow, W. W. (1960) *The Stages of Economic Growth*, and Miller, T. (1998) *Hollywood and the World*, Strinati, D. (1992) *The Taste of America*, respectively.

⁵⁹ This crusade was used to explain the era following the Cold War era when the US wanted to re-establish democracy in Europe.

change” (Coetze et al., 2007:101). Therefore, to use this theory without a critical assessment of its weaknesses is theoretically concerning.

Another concern found in Hallin and Mancini’s study was their reference to early cultural imperialist critics such as “Schiller, 1969, 1973, 1976; Boyd-Barrett, 1977; Tunstall, 1977” (ibid: 254), without citing more recent scholars such as James Petras (1993), Armand Mattleart (1994), Edward Herman and Robert McChesney (1997)⁶⁰. All of whom have studied cultural imperialism through the contemporary arrangements of ideological domination in an increasingly market-driven world. In so doing, they discounted the substantial growth and impact of contemporary anti-imperialist arguments relating to neoliberalism in Western Europe and North America during the periods of their investigations, besides those Mediterranean countries who adopted “savage deregulation”⁶¹ (ibid: 124).

Scholars who have attempted to synthesise media and neoliberalism further have done so in a variety of ways. As “a predominant concept in scholarly writing on development and political economy” (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009: 137), research dedicated to neoliberalism has focused more on neoliberal policies and the deregulation of the media (Brown 1991; Blevins 2007), specifically news media (Fenton, 2011), the integration of media industries through trans-industrial conglomeration (Kunz 2007) and the global integration of telecommunications (Martinez 2008)⁶². Often synonymous with capitalism, most scholars take a negative approach to the rise in neoliberalism and its incompatibility with democracy (Purcell, 2008).

Robert McChesney (2000, 2001, 2008), a well-known critic of neoliberal policies and the ills of US hegemony and Americanisation, explains that the rise in a global commercial-media market is far from ‘natural’ or a mere coincidence. Advanced during the Reagan (US) and Thatcher (UK) administrations, following a decline in domestic industry, the neoliberal principles of privatisation, deregulation and liberalization and especially the transfer of ownership from public (government) to the private sector (business) is significantly similar to the convergence thesis that Hallin and Mancini were describing. However, the basis of McChesney’s (2001) argument, which differs significantly from Hallin and Mancini’s, rests on a critique of how we look at globalisation and capitalism. In McChesney’s analysis of the

⁶⁰ Other more contemporary scholars include Fuchs (2011) and Mirrlees (2013), but their works were not published before Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) investigations.

⁶¹ A concept created by Nelson Traquina (1995), which allowed commercial broadcasters to operate uncontrolled.

⁶² Others have written on specific national issues, see Fenton (2011) the increased marketization of news and Flew and Cunningham (2010) the creative industries and neoliberalism.

growth and changes to the US media system, globalisation, capitalism and neoliberalism are the drivers of change in unnatural ways. What he means by this is that neoliberalism is an “inexorable force [and] the telos of capitalism as it were, is misleading and ideologically loaded” (ibid: 1)⁶³.

In contrast to globalisation and liberal theorists who see change as inevitable through interaction and cooperation, McChesney’s (2001) stance on these three forces is that they are all based on economic expansion, monopolization and profit-maximisation, very little is concerned with matters of public interest. For example, the centrepiece of neoliberalism, he argues, “is invariably a call for commercial media and communication markets to be deregulated. What this means in practice is that they are “re-regulated” to serve corporate interests” (ibid: 2). He goes on to add that “the current era seems less the result of uncontrollable natural forces more as the newest stage of class struggle under capitalism” (ibid). Therefore, McChesney’s hypothesis provides important arguments about how those with global purchasing power are permitted to control as much as possible. Given the global scale of this phenomenon, McChesney, like many neo-Marxists, divides the world not only between ‘owners and workers’, ‘north and south’, ‘developed and developing’, “but between rich and poor” (ibid: 16).

McChesney adds that these media oligarchs not only dominate the market, but actively influence the policies that dictate the type of global media system which best supports their interests. For example, regional policies, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as well as global organisations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)⁶⁴, use their global power and reputation to support the interests of large businesses, which indirectly impact national media policies. On the ITU website it openly states that - “By joining ITU, you have the opportunity to influence the decisions that impact your business and you will play an important role in the development of Standards and Recommendations for ICTs” (ITU, 2016: para 5). Therefore, such external interests are not only an important feature of understanding why media systems are the way they are, but in whose interest.

However, McChesney’s assessment of neoliberalism falls into the trap of essentialising the global ideology, which many consider “as a signifier for everything that is wrong with the existing social order” (Phelan, 2014: 9). While many of McChesney’s grand claims have not

⁶³ Also see Palley (2005) and Li and Zhu (2005) who argue that the rise in neoliberalism and global imbalances is by no coincidence.

⁶⁴ The ITU is also in control of digital migration (the transition from analogue to digital terrestrial television broadcasting) through the GE06 plan which covers 116 countries (mainly in Africa and Europe).

been disproven, a significant amount of methodological precaution is needed. Others who have followed in McChesney's footsteps such as David Hesmondhalgh (2008) critiques supporters of globalisation theory who ignore the "hidden coercions of free-trade economics" (ibid: 96). His view of contemporary capitalism provides examples such as the US Treasury that "have a considerable influence [...] over the key global economic institutions, the IMF and World Bank⁶⁵, which force vulnerable states to open up their borders for 'free trade' and financial flows" (ibid: 100). This is evident in Malawi's revised Communication Bill (2015: Part I (b) which obligates the country "to remove unnecessary barriers to entry, and attract investment, in the communication sector" (see appendix 2).

This "marketization" (Hesmondhalgh, 2008: 100) of neoliberal policies, which endorse the removal of trade barriers, are now supported by the "European Union (EU) trade blocks such as North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) [and] international trade organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) [which] have contributed to considerable change in the cultural industries since the late 1980s" (ibid: 101). Using a specific example of the compulsory signing of the 'Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights' (TRIPS) in 1994, which was administered by the WTO, Hesmondhalgh claims that these intellectual property (IP) standards secured a global change to all national laws by member states⁶⁶. Hesmondhalgh claims that 149 member states who signed at that time had no notion of copyright law and were therefore forced into adopting Western copyright law.

Here, Hesmondhalgh (2008) and McChesney (2001) teach us how the spread of neoliberalism through global institutions is beginning to have greater influence over the change to media systems than sovereign states. By locating their arguments within the early development of political economy, which was concerned with the establishment of rules, institutions, and practices, media system analysis requires more than grand hypothesis, but Hesmondhalgh (2008) has provided detailed case studies based on empirical

⁶⁵ Also see International Relation scholar Jermone Klassen (2015: 74) who argues that "the neoliberal project of financial globalisation was activated through the economic, political and military means of Washington". Arguing how the US through its Washington based financial institutions the IMF and WB have been used to maintain hegemonic global positions. And the US like many superpowers uses these techniques to build what Klassen calls the "informal empire" (ibid: 78).

⁶⁶ Current Copyright laws under the WTO suggest that; "The rights of authors of literary and artistic works (such as books and other writings, musical compositions, paintings, sculpture, computer programs and films) are protected by copyright, for a minimum period of 50 years after the death of the author. Also protected through copyright and related (sometimes referred to as "neighbouring") rights are the rights of performers (e.g. actors, singers and musicians), producers of phonograms (sound recordings) and broadcasting organizations. The main social purpose of protection of copyright and related rights is to encourage and reward creative work" (WTO, 2016: para 1).

evidence. Therefore, this thesis supports Stephen J. Collier (2012), who has long argued that neoliberalism should become an object of scientific inquiry. In other words, dealt with vigorously, as is done in the positivist sciences.

3.2 Externalising Media Systems

While neoliberalism as an object of inquiry has opened up new possibilities for introducing the role of global institutions in the shaping of current media systems, more concrete empirical observations are needed to support it as an external factor. In this section, literatures by media scholars who have studied other external factors are reviewed. While many attempts have been made to modify Hallin and Mancini's (2004) internally focused analysis of media systems, external forces have not been subject to much scholarly debate. Even though media systems research as a subject remains relatively new, especially within comparative political communications (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995), media scholars have tended to approach the analysis of media systems through more concrete observations. Barbara Pfetsch and Frank Esser (2004, 2008) for example have become well versed in critiquing the state-centric approach. They argue that "in order to capture the empirical development of media systems, additional units of analyses — either above or below the level of the nation state — must be included, depending on the research question of inquiry" (2008:124).

By challenging Hallin and Mancini's analytical framework, which automatically treats the state as a fixed unit of analysis, Pfetsch and Esser, interrogate the causes and consequences of globalization. Similar to studies carried out by Chadha and Kavoori (2005), and Carelli (2014) who also argue that the Hallin and Mancini's assessment does not take into account the "structural and institutional transformation of media systems" in an era of globalization (Chadha and Kavoori, 2005:86), Pfetsch and Esser (2008) centre their methodological critique by arguing that not only have states and societies become globalised, but they are now "confronted by new forces of social change that overcome international borders and operate on a global scale" (ibid: 127). While it is true that media systems are overly tied to the dominance of nation-states, which "fails to adequately account for the 21st century realities of globalization, multicultural societies" (Flew and Waisbord, 2015: 6), it is important to point out that the nation state has a continuing normative appeal amidst these global forces. In his classic work *Politics and Vision*, American political theorist Sheldon S. Wolin (1960: 417) argues that "to reject the state [means] denying the central referent of

the political". As rejecting the state would be rejecting its general authority, both at home and abroad.

Without completely rejecting the role of the state, Pfetsch and Esser, who are known for their work in comparative political communications, locate their theoretical framework within international communications theory in order to emphasize the role of globalisation. They make a case that in order to recognize the relationships that exist between nations, as well as the role of supranational institutions in global affairs, one must study how countries gain access to alternative models, which are often borrowed and adapted to local conditions. For example, in the following quote by Pfetsch and Esser, it becomes evident that certain supranational arrangements are weakening political power over the nation state's media system;

"On the one hand, we see more transnationalized forms of governance, supranational institutions and forms of political decision making. At the same time, we also face new forms of communication beyond the nation state and a fragmentation of media systems within nation states. This simultaneity of fragmentation and transnationalization can be illustrated with the example of the European Union (EU). On the one hand, political integration within the EU undermines the role of EU member states as independent units. Increasingly, powers of decision in vital matters are either integrated or transferred to transnational institutions. On the other hand, we can also observe that within nation states, formal or effective powers are delegated to regional or local units. In this contradictory situation it becomes clear that the level of the traditional nation state is on the losing side" (ibid: 123)

Pfetsch and Esser have drawn our attention to the fact that globalization has made the relationship between the nation state and media systems more complex. Various regional and international treaties or partnership agreements also play a significant role when domestic media decisions are being made. Their use of the term "transnationalization", which is simply referring to how boundaries between multiple actors, both domestic and non-domestic, are progressively disappearing (see Djelic and Sahlin-Anderson, 2006; Bruszt and Holzhaecker, 2009), is used to describe the large number of domestic policies which are highly influenced by decisions made externally to the state. However, their argument could have been stronger if they had made reference to how the EUs policies are developed alongside the EU relationship with a larger body of international decision-making organizations, such as the WB and IMF⁶⁷. Therefore, their use of the term

⁶⁷ The EU regularly consult with the WB and IMF, and who set the parameters of those policies.

transnationalization could be applied to these international actors, as well as private actors, which have the “capacities to demand, set and enforce transnational rules” (Langbein, 2015 :20).

However, what is significantly important in their argument, which reflects Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) view of secularisation, is how countries are no longer “governed by the institutional ideology of the nation” (ibid: 121). If this is the case, what ideologies are being shared through these policies? Scholars such as Göran Therborn (1980), Noam Chomsky (1987a) and Roberto Hybel (2010) have described how ideology has been, and continues to be used, to organize the masses and prevent alternative ideologies from emerging. Therefore, if the ideology of the state is no longer governing the nation, external ideologies through ‘transnationalization’ can be shared, disseminated or even imposed on other nations. If imposed by force, broader theoretical concerns of power must be addressed. As a central conceptual theme used throughout this thesis, is how power relating to the imposition of change can be handled by way of consent or coercion. It is clear from the language that Pfetsch and Esser (2008) use that these external forces are consensual. Using the term “stimuli” (ibid: 126) as a synonym for external forces, Pfetsch and Esser suggest that the EUs role in media policy-making is evoking or encouraging change. Therefore, that it is based on more favourable terms than forceful means.

Attaching their position to the idea that signing international treaties and becoming a member of supranational intergovernmental institutions, such as the EU and United Nations (UN), is consensual rather than coercive, Pfetsch and Esser fail to point out that these treaties and memberships have deep-rooted historical inequalities and pressures. Inequalities which could dismiss the idea that countries with less economic power or political clout within these arenas are operating on an equal playing field. They also fail to state that EU media policy differs across the three main EU institutions, and this is important for discovering who are the influential decision-makers. For example, the “European Parliament tends to put more emphasis on pluralism and cultural issues, while the Commission focuses on the functioning of the internal market” (Peters, 2008:182) in contrast to the European Council, which focuses on “a more market-oriented approach” (ibid). Therefore, a clear demarcation between their ideologies will also be present.

The “impact of international forces on state sovereignty is a long-running theme in the field of international communication” (Morris and Waisbord, 2001: vii), however, as Pfetsch and Esser (2008) rightly point out through their own methodological and theoretical modifications, we must “reconsider first of all the *level of analysis of the research question* and

not question the level of analysis” (ibid: 122). In order to achieve this, we as media systems researchers much take an interdisciplinary approach to our studies which does not pigeonhole our theoretical thinking either into comparative communication research or international communications and “acknowledge that both fields have become increasingly interlinked” (ibid: 129). In so doing, the relationships between countries will also help to reconfigure what categories or dimensions are now important to study media systems, while staying aware of the rapid changes that are determining the conditions of the media (Gurevitch and Blumler, 2004).

3.3 Supranational Institutions and EU Regulation

Two scholars who have taken Pfetsch and Esser’s methodological critique one step further are Karol Jakubowicz and Miklós Sükösd (2008) in their 12 case-study analysis *Finding the Right Place on the Map: Central and Eastern European Media Change in a Global Perspective*. Through this cross-regional comparison of post-communist countries, Jakubowicz and Sükösd also depart from and fine-tune Hallin and Mancini’s analytical framework to locate media system transformation in the broader context of “modernization, globalization and international integration” (ibid: 9), or what others have termed as “international factors” (Levitsky and Way, 2005). Stemming from the Cold War period, they point out a number of important factors that have influenced the change from authoritarian to Western liberal forms of media⁶⁸. However, one key argument which supports the external forces debate, relevant to media systems outside the Western democratically advanced context, is the role of democracy and the regional media policy of supranational institutions as a means of influencing change.

Using a socio-centric approach, Jakubowicz and Sükösd provide substantial proof that transforming a country’s media system from authoritarianism to a liberal Western form requires more than just internal will. Similar to Pfetsch and Esser (2008) they argue that EU membership plays a significant role in the way many post-communist countries change. To quote them at length, they suggested that;

“Joining the EU meant that these countries had to comply with EU regulations (though in the media field as related to society and democracy the EU admits to relying primarily on Council of Europe standards), thus, “mimetic” could be

⁶⁸ Their book covers trends in commercial and public service broadcasting to social exclusion and consumer capitalism.

understood literally in this sense. It is remarked by some analysts of normative media theories that no “post-communist media theory” has been developed. In these circumstances, it never had a chance to develop, as thinking outside the “EU box” was actively discouraged. (ibid: 18).

Jakubowicz and Sükösd raise three interesting issues. One, is whether the act of complying is a matter of voluntary consent or coercion. Two, whether or not there is a difference between compliance and mimicking and its relationship to modernisation theory. And third, whether or not they would argue that the EU is the new architect of media systems. Their idea that post-communist, or non-Western media systems are imitating the West’s historical path is not new. In Edward Said’s (1993) book *Culture and Imperialism* and what leading Cameroonian critic and anthropologist Francis Nyamnjoh (2005) referred to as ‘bandwagonism’⁶⁹, the act of imitating Western media forms has resulted in the failure of countries to develop their own media norms (see Kasoma, 1996). Although Jakubowicz and Sükösd do not reflect on this matter through a post-colonial lens, they state that the use of mimicking, “was a way of achieving realistic and practical approximation to “the West”” (ibid: 18).

Taking into account the political changes that were taking place in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), to which Jakubowicz and Sükösd were referring (post-1989), the term “transplanted” was used in association with “media wars” (ibid:12) to comment on the importation of Western democratic media institutions and policy models. Suggesting that some countries and activists in CEE fought for media independence by way of “media wars”⁷⁰, points towards two important issues. One, that change can often be coercive, and two, that such demands (whether that be at government level or by activists) over a country’s media system analytically characterises what dimensions should be studied when analysing when and how media systems transform. Activists, although their roles were not described in detail by Jakubowicz and Sükösd, are important actors in the transformation of media systems and should be considered a valuable unit of analysis⁷¹.

⁶⁹ A concept which not only argues that “developing countries” are subject to a single form of modernity, but persuades “developing countries” to romanticise Western democracy as functionally perfect.

⁷⁰ “Such media wars included fights by various clan media and several phases of struggle against central control and for independence in Russia and Ukraine from the 1990s; Hungarian media wars around public service broadcasting that became focal conflicts of political struggles (during the 1990s); a famous strike of public television personnel against government intervention in the Czech Republic (2000); similar recent developments in Slovakia; street protests against the persecution of the Rustavi-2 TV station in Georgia (October 2001); street protests in Moscow against the elimination of NTV, an independent TV station (2001)” (Jakubowicz and Sükösd, 2008: 12).

⁷¹ In many cases, activist receive funding from outside sources, which should also be included (see Snow, Soule, and Kriesi, 2004).

In their historical view of systemic transformation, they argue that “joining the EU meant that these countries had to comply with EU regulations” (Jakubowicz and Sükösd, 2008: 18). This idea that they “had to comply” entails demands set by the EU. This form of political decision making, as Pfetsch and Esser (2008) put it earlier, “undermines the role of EU member states as independent units” (ibid: 123). Therefore, the strength of the EU rests on setting the conditions upon which the CEE countries must adhere to in order to be a replica of Western modernity. Described by Jakubowicz and Sükösd under the banner of “Europeanization” (ibid:16), which helped to create the common European media market, the EU “conducted decade-long accession talks with national governments” [which resulted in] the full transplantation of the *acquis communautaire* (the body of EU regulation) to national legislation” (ibid: 18).

However, as pointed out by numerous scholars, lifting particular concepts from Western conditions and transplanting them to other countries is problematic (Berger, 2002; Sparks, 2008; Lauk, 2008). Aware that significant, political, economic and cultural differences exist, this notion of ‘transplantation’ is precariously similar to the highly criticised theory of modernization. A top-down theory that centrally proclaimed that “backward” countries needed to replicate an image of the West in order to modernise (see Lerner, 1958), the EU used this method to ensure the creation of the common European media market was established.

In an attempt to conceptualise how “modernisation” or liberalisation of the media took place in CEE, Jakubowicz and Sükösd (2008) make reference to Samuel Huntington’s (1991) *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, whereby external forces are derived from causative factors such as the spread of democracy by the EU and the United States⁷². In this book Huntington argues that EU membership provided an entry point for the EU to place the necessary pressure on countries to actively pursue democracy and transition away from authoritarianism. He also included the influence of the Catholic Church who opposed authoritarian rule in emerging democratic states⁷³. Therefore, if

⁷² This was picked up by Aida Hozic (2008) in her *chapter Democratizing Media, Welcoming Big Brother: Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Hozic (2008) identifies the US and EU as those international actors which were “aggressively engaged in democracy promotion” (ibid: 145). Other scholars such as Carothers (1999) and Burnell (2000, 2011) have also shown how democracy promotion since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the US’s geo-strategic ambition has placed international actors as key units of analysis.

⁷³ A similar situation can be found in Malawi when the Catholic Church, as an external actor to the state, pushed for multi-party democracy in the 1990’s. Furthermore, Hallin and Mancini (2004: 79) made reference to the church as a “value-producing institution” in passing and the influence it had on the early history of many European societies which can be seen in the Democratic Corporatist and Polarized Pluralist Models. Therefore, depending on the analytical framework being advanced, religion and the church as an institution

Jakubowicz and Sükösd refer to the media in post-communist countries as going through a democratization process and shifting consciously or unconsciously towards Western models of democracy would they agree that “democracies are created not by causes but by causers” (Huntington, 1991:107)? An important theoretical question for those of us studying media systems.

Although Jakubowicz and Sükösd do not point the finger of blame at any given individual agent, they do, like several authors in their book, place some responsibility on market forces. Specific to the way in which commercialisation of the broadcast media have impacted on journalism quality and worked against public service broadcasting, they argue that market forces “provide most of the impetus for media evolution and change in post-communist countries” (ibid: 17). The relationship between media and market forces are often packaged, as Jakubowicz and Sükösd (2008:18) do, through the “liberalization of the media market and the introduction of commercial broadcasting”. And with the European Council taking on a more market-oriented approach to regulation (Peter, 2008), the impact of liberalization on EU members will be significant.

Whilst placing most of their emphasis on EU regulation and market forces, which are both important external forces shaping current media systems, Jakubowicz and Sükösd, like Pfetsch and Esser (2008), overlook the imbalanced power dynamics between the EU as a foreign actor and the nation state. While some have argued that the size and wealth of a country’s domestic economy is an important dimension in this regard (see Toepfl, 2013)⁷⁴, other such as Alison Harcourt (2012), who has also studied post-communist countries, argues that countries which are considered “economically weak” in this new global context are vulnerable to market forces and subsequently external pressure, especially in the field of media policy making by pressure groups. Similar to Jakubowicz and Sükösd’s point about the EU as an influential force in setting out particular rules on member states, Harcourt (2012:137) makes a case that;

“Beginning in the late 1980s, policy experts from international organisations, company associations, foundations, non-governmental organisations and national government departments (e.g. US Agency for International Development, UK Department for International Development, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency)

could be important external forces in the study of media systems. However, they do not warrant attention for the purpose of this thesis.

⁷⁴ In Florian Toepfl’s (2013) article *Why do pluralistic media systems emerge?* illustrates how Russia’s economic power, large oil reserves, commercial interests, geopolitical histories, as well as current linkages with the West reflects the type of media system Russia currently has.

were a common sight in the capital cities of Central and Eastern states. They provided key expertise on the drafting of media laws, codes of practice and the setting up of national associations. International pressure to adopt regulatory systems was used through exclusion sticks (e.g. World Trade Organisation/European Union membership) and aid carrots.”

This observation by Harcourt diverts attention away from the points made by Jakubowicz and Sükösd (2008) who regard change as a matter of “Europeanization” to criticize the use of “exclusion sticks” and “aid carrots”. Harcourt uses these metaphors to explain the coercive pressure used by international organisations and donors during the policy making process. Similar to Jakubowicz and Sükösd’s (2008) assessment of why CEE media systems are becoming similar to those of Western European countries, because they are now “exposed to the same international pressure as states in Western Europe” (Harcourt, 2012: 138), her position embraces a more coercive rationale. As with the arguments made by McChesney (2001) above, Harcourt (2012) views international pressure as increasingly concentrated within the hands of a few powerful organisations and institutions which are pushing for a liberal media system. By dominating the global market, or safeguarding the EU’s common European media market, preferences for a market-oriented approach will continue to be reflected in their policy frameworks, treaties⁷⁵ and protocols.

Authors who have contextualized some of these issues in the “African context”, such as Arthur-Martins Aginam (2005), suggest that international pressure has come in the shape of Pan-African media policies “organized under the auspices of UNESCO” (ibid: 128) and the withdrawal of foreign aid if countries do not sign up to these policies. Therefore, unlike Harcourt (2012), Aginam insists that countries which are dependent on foreign aid face extra external pressures. This is one of the key contextual differences that was pointed out in the introduction⁷⁶ regarding why studying media systems outside the post-colonial, non-democratically advanced context requires a different analytical and theoretical framework. As pointed out by Hadland (2010, 2012) in his analysis of South Africa, and by comparative researchers Blumler & Gurevitch (1995) “the characteristic factors of the contextual environment shape communication processes differently in different settings” (Esser and Hanitzsch, 2012: 11).

Nevertheless, both forms of international pressure illustrate the imbalances of power on the part of those who are extraterritorial to the state and have the financial superiority to

⁷⁵ Such as the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, which advocated for the public funding of public broadcasting that preserved media pluralism, but would not affect trading conditions and competition in the EU.

⁷⁶ Subtitled: Beyond the Remit of “the West”

manipulate countries into adopting specific rules or systems. Based on the ideas of Nigerian political scientist Claude Ake, who, for many years has argued that African states have been forced to democratize as a prerequisite of international aid, Aginam draws parallels between this argument and the fact that the liberal media model has been “foisted onto Africa by the West” (ibid: 126). Identified as “moving along two parallel trajectories: the political and the economic” (ibid), Aginam concurs with Pfetsch and Esser (2008) in that change is tied to the exigencies of globalization. In a similar effort to Jakubowicz and Sükösd’s (2008) analytical framework, which included modernization, globalization and international integration, Aginam (2005) synthesized neoliberalism, democracy and market economics to put forward the idea that they are so “inextricably linked, that one can hardly exist independently of the other” (ibid: 122).

To theorize these global demands Aginam takes a structuralist view of power that does not dismiss the hierarchical positioning of donors and supranational institutions. Like Harcourt, Aginam observes how these powerful groups use foreign aid to preserve the status quo and prescribe the type of media systems “developing countries” should have. In order to illustrate his point, Aginam develops three media models specific to these external forces. The “first is the deregulated free-market model canvassed by the West; second is the primarily public service, civil society-oriented model favoured by UNESCO and African non-governmental organisations (NGOs); and third is the mixed public-private model adopted (even if reluctantly) by many African nations in an effort to meet the basic deregulatory requirements of Western governments and international financial institutions” (ibid: 127). Focusing more on the third, it is important to note how the public service and civil society-oriented model has helped legitimize NGOs’ involvement, or what Florini (2000) describes as the “third force”. A concept which describes the way in which NGOs are a new global power in the transformation of states (Miller, 2009).

Therefore, Aginam (2005: 127) argues that it was no coincidence that “prior to the early 1980s, there were virtually no private (non-state) broadcasters operating in sub-Saharan Africa. However, by 1995, there were at least 137 private operators in twenty-seven countries” and shift that is reflected in Malawi’s media system (see Table 3 on page 37). The push for democratization and privatization by Western governments and foreign NGOs during this period is certainly a key factor in his analysis. According to Aginam, these changing dispositions are a consequence of pressures that are both internal and external to the country under investigation. Although he is careful not to claim that one outweighs the other, as “the ascendancy of a commercial media system in Africa will depend on the extent

to which the state is prepared to accommodate it” (ibid: 137), he stands firm in arguing that “the West have been resolute in forcing a particular neoliberal mode of democracy on the developing world” (ibid: 121).

His position has an important bearing on why the global shift towards the liberal media model cannot be described as ‘natural’. History provides us with many examples of how external forces have imposed change on countries; however, the methodological task faced by Aginam, and subsequently by those who study less transparent countries, is to empirically examine the power relations between governments, donors and supranational institutions, as many such negotiations are done covertly (Zolo, 1992; Easterly 2013). Government secrecy is not new, especially when it comes to foreign policy (see Manning et al., 1972; Goldfarb et al., 2015). However, because of limited empirical evidence scholars often resort to hypothesizing change, such as questioning whether “media transformation within new democracies [is] nothing more than a tool of global economic powers to colonize previously “untapped” social domains via information, entertainment and new technology?” (Blankson and Murphy: 2007: 1). Questions that not only interrogate the geopolitical power imbalances described above, but question whether transformation of the media as being prescribed by external actors. As Pfetsch and Esser (2008) mentioned above, we must “reconsider first of all the level of analysis of the research question and not question the level of analysis” (ibid: 122). Either way, Aginam (2005) has proven that the cultural sovereignty of nations is changing, and the political and economically potency of “developing” countries or newly emerging democracies requires analysis.

Summary

By recognizing the broader dynamics associated with the development and changes to media systems, one needs to take a historical lens to distinguish the impact of globalization, international integration, neoliberalism, democracy and market economics, put forward by Pfetsch and Esser (2008), Jakubowicz and Sükösd (2008), and Aginam (2005). As their research and literature not only support the argument that external factors are important variables for analysis, but how and why we require a different set of analytical and theoretical lenses when studying countries outside the Western democratically advanced context. The period of what has become known as “external arm twisting” by IFIs (Blankson and Murphy, 2007: 6) including the EU, to describe how these influential organisations are setting the global agenda for privatisation, liberalization and broadcast

liberalization exposes the tensions between media systems and external forces. Thus requiring us, as media systems researchers, to look beyond literature on globalisation and seek further knowledge from within the field of international development where IFIs not only operate, but also subjected to significant criticism.

The Rise in International Development and NGOs

The type of external forces that have been described thus far are tightly bound to globalisation and the behaviour of global actors within the international community. Whether tied to Marxist or liberal perspectives, international integration, democracy, neoliberalism, and market economics have all been presented as ‘international factors’ (Levitsky and Way, 2005) which have influenced the changes that have taken place in Western or post-Communist countries. However, two international factors, which have remained marginalised in these discussions, are international development and the role of non-governmental organizations (NGO). Synonymous with other international factors, international development has always been an integral part of the processes and changes that take place in poorer, post-colonial and “developing countries” (Kingsbury, 2016). NGOs, both domestic and international, operate within this sphere and often adhere to the discourse associated with its existence such as “good governance” or “sustainable development” which “identifies appropriate and legitimate ways of practising development as well as speaking and thinking about it” (Grillo 1997: 12).

The prominence of NGOs in Africa, and much of the “developing world”, has been growing rapidly since the end of the Cold War, and become central to this development discourse and practice, whilst promoting the new neoliberal agenda (Hulme and Edwards, 1997; Manji and O’Coill, 2002; Pinkney, 2009). While this agenda supports “the decline of the state and the rise of NGOs as a force in economic development” (Nega and Schneider, 2014: 485), the role of NGOs and international development are no longer tied exclusively to economic growth and poverty reduction strategies. In fact, the role of international development has grown substantially to include matters outside of the economy (Currie-Alder et al., 2014). As noted in the first chapter, foreign donors and NGOs across Africa are making a “concerted effort to provide assistance to the media” (Myers, 2014: 2). In addition, these international non-state actors, which make up the institutional arrangement of international development, have not only increased their presence in the media (Carrington

and Nelson, 2002), but the media's presence in the 'global development agenda'⁷⁷ (Mansell and Raboy, 2011).

Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to bring international development into question and into the discussion of media systems analysis. Whether it is defined as a discourse, a strategic project, a policy instrument or an ideology, international development, as this thesis reveals, it has become intrinsically affiliated to the aid industry and used as a form of legitimate intervention. "[B]orn and refined in the North, mainly to meet the needs of the dominant powers in search of a more 'appropriate' tool for their economic and geopolitical expansion" (Rahnema 1997: 384), international development has become "big business" (Haan, 2009: 1), and more importantly, "the stuff of politics [and] the kernel of crucial decisions" (Gordenker, 1976:11). Therefore, the scholars used in this chapter all employ provocative analyses' that critiques the role international development plays in legitimising foreign intervention as well as particular ideologies and discourses⁷⁸ set by IFIs and donor countries

4.1 Development as Post-Development

Post-development like de-westernising media studies (see Curran and Park, 2000), looks for alternatives to the dominant Western ways of looking at politics, economics and science (Ziai, 2007). Thus, post-development theory is a critique to earlier development literature, which confronts Western or Eurocentric models of development that brought about modernisation, homogenization and essentialism, which discount the various coercive strategies imposed on "developing countries". Columbian anthropologist Arturo Escobar (1995) is one of the most well-known critics of this type of international development. His central argument was that international development constructed the concept of the "third world" through the creation of development policies, which helped legitimise foreign actors intervening in "developing countries". This mechanism, or what he called "efficient apparatus" (ibid: 9) was the way the "first world"⁷⁹ maintained control over former-colonial states. Escobar claimed that these development policies came in the shape of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), programmes that were not only characterized as a "series

⁷⁷ The global development agenda generally refers to the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which replaced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) under the direction of the UN to mobilize efforts to end all forms of poverty and inequality (UN, 2016).

⁷⁸ The use of the term 'discourse' is broad and has various definitions depending on which disciplinary field you use - linguistics, sociology, or philosophy. Fairclough (1989) who is used throughout this thesis refers to discourse as "the whole process of interaction of which a text is just a part" (ibid: 24).

⁷⁹ A term Escobar uses to describe the "West" or "developed countries".

of economic and political reforms initiated by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund” (Rono, 2002: 81), but also designed to impose the neoliberal agenda (WHO, 2015).

Drawing from, and paying homage to, the other post-colonial critiques made by Edward Said, V. Y. Mudimbe, and Homi Bhabha, Escobar (1995) constructs important historical connections between former colonised and colonizer states to articulate how “development was and continues to be for the most part, a top-down, ethnocentric, and technocratic approach” (ibid: 44). As a continuation of control, Escobar used these post-colonial traditions to argue how power has now shifted from colonialists to international development institutions in the form of “Western experts” (ibid: 6). As political, economic and cultural representatives of former colonizers, Escobar foresaw these “Western experts” as dictating new discourses and policies on post-colonial states within a framework set by the West. Based on the hypothesis that these states needed help in modernizing their internal systems, which meant replicating those in the “first world”, Escobar argued that these “Western experts” used this as an entry point to legitimize their intervention⁸⁰.

Others, such as post-colonial scholar Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o (2005) also argued that the fundamentalism of finance is to blame for legitimizing their intervention. Thiong’o argues that “the economic panacea dished out to all who seek loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund [...] has the same identical demand – private or perish” (Thiong’o in Mkandawire, 2005: 155). The use of an ultimatum makes it hard to conceive foreign intervention without some form of coercion. Commonly understood as a form of power for securing advantages over others, coercion, for Thiong’o, is the same now as it was when the colonial system was set up using self-protecting measures, which would punish those that did not comply with the colonial rulers’ demands.

Although this discursive analysis has been regarded as simplistic, Escobar’s identification of “Western experts” and Thiong’o’s criticism of foreign finance confirms what British economist and the founder of modern macroeconomics⁸¹ John Maynard Keynes (1935: 383) once said; “the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else”⁸². Escobar (1995) believed that the hegemonic success of development has rested on Western experts universally legitimizing their ideas and whereby “the need

⁸⁰ A similar argument is made by Alison Harcourt (2012:137) in the following chapter, who argued that “they [western experts] provided key expertise on the drafting of media laws, codes of practice and the setting up of national associations.”

⁸¹ Namely Keynesian economics.

⁸² Quoted from Mankiw (2015: 29).

for it, could not be doubted” (ibid: 5). By legitimating the interests and ideas of the powerful, “development” has fostered a new form of foreign intervention. Powered by “Western experts”, or what contemporary post-development thinkers have called “the tyranny of experts” (Easterly, 2013), raises questions as to who is in control of change. By challenging Western ideas of development, which are not often subject to critique (Ziai, 2007), Escobar (1995) provides sufficient reasoning for questioning ideas that are not created internally to the country they are intended for. Therefore, who defines these terms, ideologies and discourses, is highly important. As highlighted here by George Orwell (1962 [1946]: 2237) in one of his famous essays about the political abuse of language;

“The words democracy, socialism, freedom, patriotic, realistic, justice, have each of them several different meanings [...] a word like democracy, not only is there no agreed definition [...] it is almost universally felt that when we call a country democratic we are praising it: consequently, the defenders of every kind of regime claim that it is a democracy, and fear that they might have to stop using that word if it were tied down to any one meaning. Words of this kind are often used in a consciously dishonest way. That is, the person who uses them has his own private definition, but allows his hearer to think he means something quite different.”

What Orwell and Escobar are pointing towards is the idea that concepts such as democracy and development should not be seen as uncontested. Both need to be deconstructed in order to understand the question of who controls the meaning of such concepts. By alerting us to the linguistic characteristics of foreign intervention, socially created terminologies become important variables to explain who imposes change. As this thesis argues in Chapter 7, critical discourse analysis (CDA), which has been used to understand who the “*power holders*” (Fairclough, 2001b: 51) or media policy-makers in Africa, is seldom used in media systems analysis. Therefore, Escobar, like many post-development thinkers, make us understand that external forces are not limited to conventional mechanisms of control. In fact, they take a post-structuralist approach to power which lies outside of these conventional structures, which are commonly held by Marxist scholars, to claim that power operates in discourses rather than structures. While it is believed that power operates by and through different means, others who also use non-traditional means to explain methods of control are sociologists Henry Veltmeyer and James Petras, who locate their arguments more strongly within the theory of imperialism.

4.2 Development as Imperialism

Henry Veltmeyer (2005) and James Petras (1999), who have taken a neo-Marxist perspective to expand Escobar's intellectual criticism of development, conceptualize their argument by comparing it to the political and economic acquisition of imperialism. Similar to the scholarly works of philosopher Rosa Luxemburg (1913), political psychologist Ashis Nandy (1983), economist Samir Amin (1977, 2015), and sociologist W.E.B. du Bois (1960) all of whom have written extensively on imperialism, Veltmeyer and Petras contemporaries this policy of power and influence into areas of cultural significance. Arguing that imperialism comes in "diverse forms" (Veltmeyer, 2005: 90), Veltmeyer implies that development, foreign aid, trade and investment, and globalization⁸³ are just "different faces of the same dynamics arising out of a project of world domination and longstanding efforts of the United States to establish its hegemony over the whole system" (ibid: 90).

Through a chronological ordering of international development, starting from the post WWII period, Veltmeyer tackles development theoretically through the same post-developmental lens, and like Escobar, rejects the classical development paradigm, which prescribes the stages of change as internal. However, Veltmeyer somewhat departs from Escobar to strongly assert that change is forced through a structural reading of development. Referring to US based IFIs as the "architects of global development" (ibid: 96), he describes Escobar's (1995: 6) "Western Experts" as Westerns hegemons who have been able to control the development agenda and consequently coerce "developing countries" into developing a particular economic model that supports US interests. Veltmeyer describes the US as the main hegemon⁸⁴ during a period of "renewal of the imperial project" (Veltmeyer, 2005: 103) to imply that such behaviour is comparable to the colonial era and, in particular, Europe's territorial acquisition of Africa. Therefore, Veltmeyer offers, by way of a short analysis, a conceptual framework that suggests Western hegemons no longer operate through national or state level structures, but drive their agenda through NGOs, which he says resemble the missionaries of old imperialism. An idea that his colleague Petras (1999) wrote about in an article titled *NGOs: in the Service of Imperialism*⁸⁵. Here, Petras argues that the duty of NGOs is not only to fight poverty and

⁸³ For other examples of definitions that critique globalization, see Frances Fukayama (1992) *The End of History and the Last Man*, which argues that the end of the Cold War represented the triumph of Western liberal democracy and capitalism over Soviet communism.

⁸⁴ His writings about the US were referring to the post-Cold War period when the triumph of the US was prevailing.

⁸⁵ Also see Constanze Schellhaas and Annette Seegers (2009) *Peacebuilding: Imperialism's new disguise?*

inequality, but also to manufacture neoliberal elites that support the ideologies and discourses created by those who provide foreign aid.

This “strategic (geopolitical, foreign policy) project” as Veltmeyer (2005: 90) calls it, lends important analytical weight to the study of media system transformation through a number of means. Firstly, it signifies that NGOs, development, and foreign intervention more broadly, are no longer confined to previously held assumptions about their roles in poverty alleviation, but other areas of national change. Secondly, that neoliberalism is the ideological thinking behind NGOs as they are “pressed into imperial service” (ibid: 89). And lastly, now that political and military force is no longer needed, foreign aid is the new form of imperialism that is seen as “an honest and organized coercive force” (ibid: 101).

In order to support these arguments further, Veltmeyer makes reference to Robert Cooper, a former foreign policy advisor to Tony Blair⁸⁶, who controversially called this new form of imperialism - “new liberal imperialism” in his essay *The Postmodern State and the World Order*⁸⁷. In other words, Cooper was suggesting that the UK use “deception” (Cooper quoted in Veltmeyer, 2005: 101) or double standards in their foreign policy to extend their power and dominion abroad. What Veltmeyer was trying to do by highlighting this case, was to provide the reader with some empirical evidence about how Western states that give foreign aid approach foreign policy. By exposing this, and the role of NGOs as agents or “missionaries of the neoliberal agenda”, Veltmeyer illustrate the techniques used by foreign actors to cover up their coercive influence, and prescribe change in recipient countries as consensual.

Many of Veltmeyer’s arguments came from his co-authored book *Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century*. Here Veltmeyer and Petras (2001) use the concept of “masking” to explain how globalization conceals external forces as “natural”. By listing and criticizing both the empirical and theoretical weaknesses of globalization, they reveal that this so-called ‘movement’ or process of international integration and development are best understood through the imbalances of power. They take issue with the idea that globalization creates an equal playing field, and that all countries should form into a “single integrated market” (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2001:11), a similar outcome which was used to describe Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) convergence thesis. However, the main difference between Veltmeyer and Petras and Hallin and Mancini’s analysis is that these shifts are not

⁸⁶ Prime Minister of the UK from 1997 to 2007 and Leader of the Labour Party from 1994 to 2007.

⁸⁷ Full text can be read here: http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/postmodern_state.pdf

natural; as most of them, one way or another, have been prescribed by “the advocates and beneficiaries of globalization” (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2001: 31).

Although this thesis does not seek to understand who the beneficiaries of the liberal media model are, Veltmeyer and Petras have helped to clarify three important points for consideration. One, that there are other actors, besides the state, influencing the type of internal systems the recipient countries have. Secondly, that particular systems, such as the single integrated market, are founded upon neoliberalism and its central principle, privatization, which, as pointed out earlier by Peters (2008), the European Council wants countries to adopt. And thirdly, this central principle of neoliberalism “is not an isolated phenomenon resulting in local circumstances [it] must be understood as part of a global strategy” (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2001: 92). Therefore, the liberalization of the media cannot be understood as an isolated phenomenon either, as privatization is a key dimension of the liberal media model. However, in a similar vein to Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) convergence thesis, Veltmeyer and Petras (2001) argue that globalization is often presented as “the only road available” (ibid: 8).

4.3 Development as Developmentality

In order to locate the above arguments within a theoretical framework that moves away from the imperialist arguments laid out by Veltmeyer and Petras, it is valuable to use international relations specialist and political economist, Lord Mawuko-Yevugah’s (2014) notion of *developmentality*. Through a post-colonial lens, Mawuko-Yevugah describes *developmentality* as “the exploitation of the ideology of development as a means of reproducing political and economic hegemony in the postcolonial era without any serious commitment to the transformation of the colonial state and the economy” (ibid: 38). Unlike those who used it previously (see Suzan Ilcan and Lynne Philips, 2010), and contrary to Michel Foucault’s internally facing *governmentality*⁸⁸, *developmentality* picks up on the idea that neoliberalism as a global economic ideology is intrinsically linked to the development

⁸⁸ Foucault coined the concept of “governmentality” to understand how disciplinary forms of power worked, embracing a period starting from Ancient Greece through to modern neo-liberalism (Foucault et al, 1991). The “semantic linking of governing (‘gouverner’) and modes of thought (‘mentalité’) indicates that it is not possible to study the technologies of power without an analysis of the political rationality underpinning them. Foucault defines government as conduct, or, more precisely, as “the conduct of conduct” and thus as a term which ranges from ‘governing the self’ to ‘governing others’. All in all, in his history of governmentality Foucault endeavours to show how the modern sovereign state and the modern autonomous individual co-determine each other's emergence” (Lemke - 2001:191-192).

agenda, both of which are externally formed to alter the internal systems of sovereign states.

Mawuko-Yevugah's conceptual framework makes similar claims to those made by Veltmeyer and Petras (2001), in that the strategic involvement of the WB and IMF, who have established themselves as the new economic advisors of the global economy, not only extol the virtues of free markets and private enterprise, but have influenced the neoliberal turn in the development agenda. Mawuko-Yevugah (2014: 37) believes that this neoliberal turn has been designed to "police and regulate the postcolonial state" through what is perceived to be, non-coercive means. By exploring the shifting and uneven power relations among the state, markets, donors and NGOs, Mawuko-Yevugah's forges new ground in conversations about the role of the state, development and neoliberalism to posit that donors, consultants (Western experts) and NGOs are the new architects of foreign aid who use "civil society to legitimise the neoliberal project" (ibid: 34-35), thus making room for non-state actors to influence state policy.

Much of Mawuko-Yevugah's thinking has been inspired by Nigerian political scientist Claude Ake (1996), who is known for evaluating the failure of development policies, the evolution of foreign intervention, and the regulation of sovereign states through foreign aid. With foreign aid as Mawuko-Yevugah's central unit of analysis, he reveals two unfolding issues in relation to Ghana's⁸⁹ changing socio-cultural, political and economic landscape. First, he argues that foreign aid is represented as a form of policy conditionality⁹⁰, which has subsequently become a prerequisite of neoliberalism. Secondly, these conditionalities are "external interventions [which] significantly constrain the capacity of developing countries to experiment with their own models" (Mawuko-Yevugah, 2014: 48). Using arguments which are similar to those made by Escobar (1995), Mawuko-Yevugah is aware that by limiting the choices recipient countries have, IFIs are actively using economic coercion to manipulate the direction that they take. Therefore, exemplifying not only the coercion nature of development, but similar to Veltmeyer and Petras (2001) argument above, foreign aid, like neoliberalism should not be seen as isolated phenomenon, but in fact part of a global strategy.

⁸⁹ His research and book *Reinventing Development: Aid Reform and Technologies of Governance in Ghana* is a detailed case study of the Western African country.

⁹⁰ This paper adopts Olav Stokke (1995:11) definition of conditionality, as "the use of pressure, by the donor, in terms of threatening to terminate aid, or actually terminating or reducing it, if conditions are not met by the recipient. It is a means of changing the priorities or even the values of the recipient".

However, where Mawuko-Yevugah departs from Escobar is in Mawuko-Yevugah's awareness that the nature of development is changing. New power mechanisms between donor and recipient institutions are shifting and the conditionalities set by donors are also changing. This "new aid architecture" as Mawuko-Yevugah (2014: 5) describes it, is based on how the donors are able to retain control at a distance. For the purposes of appearing less coercive, donors are now using various means, as well as intermediaries, to provide aid that is indirect and subtle. Mawuko-Yevugah views this change as governing through developmentality. In other words, donors indirectly control recipient countries by framing the development agenda according to their objectives, thus restricting their choices as to what developmental path to take.

Mawuko-Yevugah also recognises the role local elites play in legitimizing this indirect control. He argues that political and civic leaders in Africa and other regions of the "global south" are persuaded into accepting these externally produced policy prescriptions as common sense" (Mawuko-Yevugah, 2014: 19). Mawuko-Yevugah's use of the term 'common sense' has many aspects in common with the late Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, whose concept of hegemony made 'common sense' a well-known concept in social and political science. However, Mawuko-Yevugah's conceptualisation of 'common sense' reflects Veltmeyer's (2005) ideas about the role of NGOs, but suggests that the African elite were the ones disseminating these externally produced policy prescriptions and making society accept these changes as being in their own self-interest. Similar to the two-step flow of communication model, which hypothesizes the notion that ideas flow from mass media to opinion leaders (see Paul Lazarsfeld et al., 1944), Mawuko-Yevugah observes how donors are replacing the media as the disseminators of knowledge and ideas.

Using a quote from Africanist scholar Ali Al'Amin Mazrui, Mawuko-Yevugah makes a case that this can be achieved through the construction of knowledge, as this is "the ultimate expression of power [...] when these ideas acquire authority and are considered normal and uncontested truths" (Mazrui, 2005: 325 in Mawuko-Yevugah, 2014: 29). One such "uncontested truth" that Mawuko-Yevugah's tackles is the misleading belief that African states have agency in the development process. For him, foreign aid, whether delivered through the state or by a foreign NGO, represents a disproportionate level of donor influence and control over the policy-making process. So much so that IFIs "have the sole authority to give the stamp of approval to an entire national strategy" (ibid: 113).

As a central unit of analysis in Mawuko-Yevugah's assessment of *developmentality*, "the new aid agenda [...] reinforces the undue influence of IFIs" (ibid: 36) and the asymmetrical nature of these aid relations. As a result, he provides alternative ways of viewing external forces that may be applicable to understanding why media systems change. As it has become clear, assessing the internal changes in "developing countries" requires understanding the interconnectedness between foreign aid, international development, the global political economy and neoliberalism. Although Veltmeyer and Petras (2001), as well as, Jakubowicz and Sükösd (2008) have framed these forces under the umbrella term 'globalisation', Mawuko-Yevugah's specific assessment of each is a valuable contribution worth considering when defining the external forces that exist. And because such interconnections are complex, Mawuko-Yevugah calls for an "analysis of power that departs from the ways in which conventional theories of international relations have analysed and conceptualised power" (ibid: 17).

By combining the post-colonial thinking of Edward Said, Achille Mbembe and Ali Mazrui who speak of an invented or fabricated image of Africa, Mawuko-Yevugah constructs a theory of power that rejects the overt forms of power that realists ascribe to, to form a framework which represents the evolution, as well as the continuous changing dynamics of power, through subtle means. For example, if foreign aid, which many have argued makes countries dependent (see Moyo, 2009), assigning neoliberal principles of a free-market to the conditionalities of foreign aid, contradicts the very essence of economic liberalization and freedom. Therefore, creating a theoretical framework that explains how foreign aid "threatens [a country's] sovereignty by inscribing the externally driven and dominated neoliberal policy agenda" (Mawuko-Yevugah, 2014: 36) must include how "the making of this neoliberal order is conflict ridden and full of contradictions" (Rückert, 2007: 95).

Nevertheless, this thesis agrees with Mawuko-Yevugah's (2014) definition of foreign aid which is a "disciplinary mechanism to legitimate neo-liberal intervention" (ibid: 56), to help describe how we view transformations from one system to another. And if neoliberalism is central to the West's incessant pursuit of control or profit, the focus of a country's transformation lies in another country's interests and results in a continuity with the past, not a transition to something new. Therefore, Mawuko-Yevugah's position reflects, in part, the Marxian notion that history is prescriptive and that "men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past" (Marx in Elster, 1986: 277).

Summary

The goal of this chapter was to take stock of the different, yet complementary, arguments that scholars, from different disciplinary backgrounds, have used to explore the role of external forces, and to assess whether they can be employed to support the argument that external forces such as foreign aid may be used as a key variable in the analysis of media systems. While other key variables such as conditionalities, the international development agenda, regional regulation policies, and decisions made at the level of supranational institutions are all worthy of attention, they are, to a large extent, a consequence of foreign aid. Predominately located within globalisation theory to emphasise that these forces are extraterritorial to the state's role in changing a country's internal systems; they were seldom seen as coercive. Nevertheless, this, and the exponential spread of liberalisation of the media, will now be presented within the theoretical framework that contextualises this new way of studying media systems.

A Theoretical Shift

As seen in the previous chapters, the theoretical frameworks employed in media system research have been wide-ranging and geographically specific. From comparative political theory, modernisation and differentiation theory in Hallin and Mancini's (2004) study, to Pfetsch and Esser's (2008) use of comparative political communications theory. However, the majority of theories used to study media systems have generally remained within the branch of social science that have historically been restricted to the changes which take place within countries. For example, in the same way political scientists have studied democratic transitions (Rustow, 1970; O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1986) media systems researchers such as Hallin and Mancini have embodied the same philosophical approach, which places more emphasis on how the political environment affects other systems that are internal to a country with little to no consideration for the wider political-economic context.

Nonetheless, political transition scholars such as O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986: 3) at least proposed a novel question in their study of *Four Theories of the Press* to ask "how important are nongovernmental organisations (churches, political parties, human rights lobbies, aid agencies) in the promotion of democratic transitions?" This question not only broadened who and what affects change, but also challenges the theoretical basis of studying transitions. Although O'Donnell, Schmitter, Whitehead, and Hallin and Mancini maintained that internal aspects (political state structures) overweighed external factors, change can be "explained in terms of internal or external influences or a combination of both" (Esser and Pfetsch, 2008: 128).

Based on this proposition, I begin this chapter with an overarching look at change through a political economy framework, which departs from the political reductionist approaches used by O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986), to employ a macro-level analysis that examines the strategic interactions among various actors within the wider socio-economic and cultural context. Employing Karl Marx's theory of political economy for its distinguished and original approach to understanding economics helps to not only internationalise history and economics, but to also include the structural and institutional issues that place power and exploitation (coercion) at the heart of analysis. While it is not the purpose of this research to make any grand claims, using a political economy framework

can help to identify important factors to broaden media system research and rethink the fundamental assumption that the core unit of analysis is the nation state.

Building off this framework, a critical political economy of communications is used to explore these structures within the context of the media and the relationships of dominant actors in imposing change. However, a review of this theory reveals that there is a critical gap in the treatment of some of the central issues of my research, namely, the role of foreign aid which Oliver Boyd Barrett (2002) argues is given little to no attention. For that reason, an assessment of two international relations (IR) theories, the theory of Foreign Intervention and the theory of Foreign Aid are used to address the changes to Malawi's media system. Although both theories were written from the perspective of political realists, world-systems theory and structural Marxism are brought in to contemporise these arguments and provide strong theoretical argument for why external forces are important variables for analysis in media systems research, and justify why analysing countries in the "global south" requires a different set of theoretical lenses.

5.1 A Critical Change to the Political Economy of the Media

If the political economy has played a significant role in democratic transitions (Haggard and Kaufman, 1997), and transitions from authoritarian media systems to liberal media systems imitate those of democratic transitions, political economy is an important component to our understanding of why media systems are the way they are, and why they change. Often characterized by Karl Marx's (1867)⁹¹ own definition of political economy, which he coined in the first Volume of *Capital*, political economy has come to represent how "capital is reproduced [and] how profitability is maintained" (Gamble 1999, 140). Based on this description, which is based on Marx's critique of capitalism, Marx's definition of political economy is intrinsically linked to his concept of *historical materialism*. A concept that served as the analytical tool for explaining change, and whereby capital was the key unit of analysis.

Although Marx's theory of political economy has been repeatedly criticised for being economic reductionist (Linklater, 1990; Hardy, 2014), he never studied the evolution of political and economic change as a series of unconnected events, in fact, he maintained that change should never be understood in isolation from his theories of history and sociology.

⁹¹ *Des Kapital* was first published in German in 1867, but the English edition was published in 1887.

Which were centrally concerned with the relationships between capital, social life and social change, culture, economic exploitation and inequality, and how this translated into the connections between wealth and power. In other words, we should study what actions and reactions take place within the political, economic, social and cultural systems that expose the complex dialectical relationship between all systems, as they do not function in siloes. This was a key failing which Hallin and Mancini (2004) point out in their critique of *Four Theories of the Press*, whereby “Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm did not, in fact, empirically analyze the relation between media systems and social systems” (ibid: 9). In so doing, they overlooked the actual functioning of media system.

However, a key failing of Hallin and Mancini’s analysis of media systems, as well as O’Donnell, Schmitter, Whitehead’s analysis of political transitions, were that they both were based on teleological understandings of change that implied linear transitions towards a liberal and democratic systems, respectively. Under Marx’s definition of political economy, change is always in a continual process of transformation, as capital and the social relations that support it, are always being reproduced. Similar to Veltmeyer and Petras’ (2001) and Mawuko-Yevugah’s (2014) arguments above, a lot can be learnt from integrative analysis approaches. Therefore, the framework used in this research follows this idea that change does not operate in isolation. Yet, it does not see economic factors unilaterally determining change as Marx has lead us to believe. Instead it takes on a critical perspective of political economy, which places the economy and the movement of foreign finance within the wider geopolitical context.

This framework, in part, agrees with Browning and Kilmister (2002: 2) whose goal it was to renew the theory of political economy, and argue that there is “need for [a] radical revision of conventional economic concepts in the light of their inadequacy in dealing with the questions generated”. Just as foreign aid or foreign capital has not been adequately covered in political economy and media systems research, a broader conceptualisation of the economic into the political and the cultural spheres is needed in order to provide essential insights into how different forms of capital are changing the status quo. One way to do this is by rejecting perspectives that historically refer to the political economy as “the management of the economic affairs of the state” (Caporaso and Levine, 1992:1). By doing this we automatically remove the political economy from the restrictive confines of the nation state and place it into the wider economic system that is more relevant in the age of neoliberal globalisation.

One theory that has grown in the age of neoliberal globalisation and within Marx's historical assessment of political economy is the political economy of communications (PEC). A theory that has not only and "traditionally given priority to understanding social change and historical transformation" (Mosco, 1996: 27) but also supports Marx's multidimensional framework. Associated with the Frankfurt School, which was set up in 1923 by a group of Marxist intellectuals, namely Walter Benjamin, Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, PEC like these Marxist intellectuals, is critical of capitalism and the conditions which impacted social change (Berry, 2012). However, these philosophers, sociologists and cultural critics, followed Marx's (1852) view of socio-historical relations which stated that - "Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past" (Marx in Elster, 1986: 277). A simple reading of this statement shows that Marx was emphasising that history continues to shape the practices and institutions that human themselves created. While this classic formulation of history was not specific to the evolution of contemporary media systems, one of the Frankfurt School's earliest members, German philosopher Leo Löwenthal (1900 – 1993) implied that "a study of contemporary media remains a 'meaningless' activity without a historical framework relating the press to the emancipatory struggles of the middle classes and the critical assessment of culture" (Hardt, 2011: 172). Löwenthal's ideas reiterate the points made by Marx in that we must study the media through a historical lens which accounts for multiplicity of phenomena. Others who have also critically theorised the "emancipatory struggles" can be found in the writings of Max Horkheimer (1895 – 1973) who used critical theory⁹² "to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them" (Horkheimer, 1982: 244). However, it is the "critical assessment of culture" more broadly which has grown into a large body of literature and an important prefix to many other theories; the most important one, for the purpose of this research, is the critical political economy of the media (CPE).

Although critical theory by itself has become "interdisciplinary and uniquely experimental in character" (Bronner, 2011:1-2), CPE follows the central characteristics of Marx's political economy, namely issues relating to power, change, and ideology, but more importantly the way Marx believed that society is dichotomized between the dominant class and the

⁹² Some scholars have argued that critical theory was developed in the Frankfurt School and introduced into studies of mass communication and culture (Kellner, 1989).

dominated class, thus seeing the political economy as conflictual⁹³. Meaning society is in a state of perpetual conflict due to the competition for limited resources between the two classes. However, this conflict between classes no longer rests with people or groups in society, but now includes conflicts between states, corporations and all those who operate and compete in the global political economy. Therefore, unlike traditional forms of political economy, “political economy of communications has always contained an important international dimension” (Mosco, 2008: 46) and a “critical signification” (Boyd Barrett, 2002: 186) which has helped us as media researchers to broaden our analytical position.

While the critical dimension of CPE is “associated with macro-questions of media ownership and control” (ibid), the international dimension can best be explained through the rapid increase in international and bilateral trade, technological developments, multinational and transnational organisations, monetary flows beyond national borders, and the involvement of non-state actors which were seen as conflictual in nature (cf. Gilpin, 2001⁹⁴, Walter and Sen, 2008⁹⁵). However, as already mentioned, this rapid increase in economic interactions between countries and international organisations does not extensively cover foreign aid, nor foreign intervention, which are both global in nature and in need of a critical interrogation. Nevertheless, contemporary media scholars such as Robert McChesney (1993, 1998) may have not covered foreign intervention in the same way as its being covered in this thesis, but does provide a critical assessment of dominant global media institutions, which are comparable to those international financial institutions (IFIs). McChesney (1998) uses the early development of political economy that was concerned with the establishment of rules, institutions, and practices by these dominant states to argue that they have become the “new missionaries of global capitalism” (ibid: 2). Meaning, that they are working towards eliminating all economic barriers that hinder access to the media market. If the IFIs are also establishing the free market rules and practices relating to the growth in international trade and global monetary flows (Williamson, 2002; Moyo, 2009; Colomer, 2014), then they should also be analysed through the political economy of communications. To be able to synthesise media, politics and foreign intervention, using Marx’s claims that political economy cannot be studied in isolation, and McChesney’s view that media, politics, economy and society are all interconnected through complex

⁹³ Oppositional perspectives such as liberal do not view political economy as conflictual, but cooperative (see Paul, 2010).

⁹⁴ Gilpin (2001) argues that globalization may be a unique feature of international economic affairs but national economies and policies are the main determinants of economic affairs.

⁹⁵ Walter and Sen (2008) make an interesting assessment about the convergence between international political economy (IPE), comparative political economy, and economics.

arrangement of power relations, a radical revision of conventional economic ideas must be followed. One that is not seen through a single economic relationship, but stipulates a “re-introduction” of critical economical considerations of the media” (Ampuja, 2014: 59).

Therefore, this framework takes notes from a smaller group of scholarship within political economy that is concerned with “the different ways of organising and financing communications” (Hardy, 2014: 7). Because if, global media and monetary scholars such as Salisbury and Barnett (1999: 31) suggest that “the world’s monetary flow system is composed of a single group with the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Canada at the core and the former members of the Eastern Block and less developed countries at the periphery”, understanding such an arrangement requires a critically approach to the political economy of communications that does not overlook the world-systems perspective. A perspective that adopts ideas from post-colonial theory, and do not see established patterns of the international economic order between North and South, developed and developing, central and peripheral as obsolete (cf. Shome and Hegde, 2002; Kumar, 2014). As pointed out by Seth (2011: 167) an “accurate understanding of the expansion of the international system’ requires attention to its colonial origins” (Seth, 2011: 167). This inclusion of history, as Marx, Löwenthal and Hallin and Mancini⁹⁶ have rightly pointed out, serves as an essential tool for understanding change. By including the colonial origins of the current global economic order, especially when studying countries in the post-colonial, transitional and aid dependent context, would not simply be a matter of broadening our understanding of what economic factors are currently missing in media systems research, but highlight the entrenched power relations which begun prior to the establishment of the foreign aid system. Therefore, if the “central aim of critical scholarship is to evaluate the media’s role in constructing and maintain particular relationships of power” (Ott and Mack, 2010: 15), then the roots of media and foreign aid should be traced back to the fundamental basics of Marxism which speaks “of domination, asymmetrical power relations, exploitation, oppression and control” (Fuchs, 2011: 97). However, for this renewed version of critical theory of communications to be considered truly acceptable, it must be firmly based on empiricism, and not rest on an assumption about the systematic treatment of capital. Because if, as McChesney (2008: 12), proposes, that “[p]olitical economists of media do not believe the existing media system is natural or inevitable or

⁹⁶ In their book Hallin and Mancini (2004: 12) stated that they will pay considerable attention to history in their analysis because “media institutions evolve over time; at each step of their evolution past events and institutional patterns inherited from earlier periods influence the direction they take.”

impervious to change”, a critical treatment of the actors involved in these changes must be addressed, and empirically based within the broader geopolitical context. As it is universally accepted that foreign aid, as a form of global capital is used as a means of leveraging change. However, there are two key theories that stem from international relations (IR) theory that support this - the theory of foreign intervention and the theory of foreign aid, to which I now turn. Because while political economy and CPE cover a wide range of factors that are useful for understanding change within media systems and communications more broadly, the field of IR specifically challenges the role of foreign actors that are not global media giants, but the governments and international financial institutions that are also present in the global economy.

5.2 Theory of Foreign Intervention

The theory of foreign intervention was established in international relations (IR) theory, which traditionally focused on matters of “high politics such as security and inter-state conflict” (Eckersley, 2013: 266). As a distinct field of political science, which draws heavily from political economy, IR has privileged these subject matters from the perspective of Western countries. Often criticised for being bias towards the Eurocentric view of international relations, IR theory has changed and is now adopting the realities of those found in “developing countries” (see Mgonja and Makombe, 2009; Acharya and Buzan, 2010). As a result, IR theory has become more critical, postcolonial, poststructuralist and less state-centric (Hönke and Lederer, 2012). These points are highly important if we are to view media systems outside the Western democratically advanced and state-centric perspective. Although the world can no longer be “adequately understood in terms of the fixed territorial spaces of mainstream international relations theory” (Agnew, 1994: 76), the “developed”/“developing”, donor/recipient dichotomies continues to exist. Therefore, a critical assessment of foreign intervention requires critical handling of the historical relationship between particular territorial states and a broader understanding of the economic structures and geopolitical order which influence how states operate.

Granted that foreign intervention is no longer limited to political and military interventions (cf. Schmidt, 2013), and now “comes in many forms and shapes” (Aidt and Albornoz, 2007:7), how states operate under the theory of foreign intervention remains divided between three main schools of thought, realism, liberalism and Marxism. Each school of thought is centrally concerned with how foreign actors influence regime choice and the internal affairs

of other countries (Even and Newnham, 1998; Bonfatti, 2011). Of the three schools of thought, liberals and subsequently neoliberals, could be described as the outliers of the three schools as they focus on how to achieve co-operation, as opposed to realists and Marxists who view the world as anarchic and affected by external forces (Morgenthau, 1946, 1951, 1954). Drawing from this Marxist view which positions the political economy as conflictual, the realist and Marxist schools of thought hold that states, namely powerful states, act in accordance with their own national interest, and are centred on, among many things, having the political and economic influence over other states. Often characterized by the “use or threat of force or coercion to alter a political or cultural situation nominally outside the intervener’s moral or political jurisdiction” (Moseley, 2016: para 1), political realism, in particular, has dominated our understanding of international politics. Developed during the Cold War period when the bipolar system between the great powers - the US and USSR existed - state power was the key variable in IR theory. Founding father of political realism Hans J. Morgenthau (1904–1980) (Jütersonke, 2012; Kunz, 2010), dedicated most of his scholarly works to the nature of, and reasons behind, political intervention.

Contrary to liberals, who reject the idea of power politics (Doyle, 1986), Morgenthau, who was influenced by political philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1660 [1994]), argued that states pursue political power as it is in their own self-interest to do so; therefore, political realism was centrally concerned with how states inherently increase their political power (Jackson and Sørensen, 2010), and how “great powers” use this power to control the decisions of less powerful states (Morgenthau, 1967, 1985). Simplistically expressed as Country A having control over the minds and actions of Country B, Morgenthau (1967:425) recognised intervention as an “ancient and well-established instrument of foreign policy”, which he argued was equivalent to “diplomatic pressure, negotiations and war” (ibid). Without separating these external forces, Morgenthau stresses the instrumental weight that different forms of intervention have.

To illustrate this point, Morgenthau (1985: 237) used the concept of “equilibrium” to represent the impact “outside forces” have on the receiving country. He states, when “the body suffers a wound or loss of one of its organs through outside interference”, or experiences a malignant growth or a pathological transformation of one of its organs, the equilibrium is disturbed” (ibid). Although Morgenthau has been heavily criticised for the use of this metaphor as it has “a number of theoretical pitfalls” (Marks, 2004: 37), namely that, like the human body, the global system is constantly in a state of flux (Marks, 2004), the symbolic narrative behind his words is that intervention has a significant bearing on the

internal systems of recipient countries. From the evidence provided in the background chapter, Morgenthau's metaphor resonates with the various transformations that Malawi has faced. Both colonization and democratisation were consequences of "outside interferences" that were taking place globally, and under the political realist doctrine. Colonialism, for example, was justified for reasons of economic profit making as well as maintaining the status quo between those considered powerful and powerless. Although Morgenthau (1954) did not agree that intervention is based on economic profit making nor did he write about colonialism per se, his comprehension of 'imperialism' is based on states increasing their power, similar to the arguments made by Veltmeyer and Petras (2001).

According to Morgenthau (1954) imperialism, alongside policies of the status quo and prestige were the three basic strategies that determine political activity. Described as *animus dominandi*, the desire to dominate, Morgenthau framework insisted that a powerful "state pursues these policies to maintain, demonstrate and increase power, respectively" (Dowding, 2011: 556). In what he later referred to as a "policy of imperialism" (Morgenthau, 1985: 53), Morgenthau observed that "when the imperialistic policy is not directed against a particular status quo resulting from a lost war, but grows from a power vacuum inviting conquest, moral ideologies that make it an unavoidable duty to conquer take the place of the appeal to a just law against and unjust positive law. Then to conquer weak peoples appears as "the white man's burden," the "national mission," "manifest destiny," a "sacred trust," a "Christian duty" (1954: 104-105). In other words, the objectives and ideologies of powerful states are always justified, but their imperialist intentions are often disguised, making the motivations of intervention difficult to distinguish.

In contrast to Morgenthau's political approach to power, Marxist thought on imperialism, alongside empire and dependency, "constituted a sustained attempt to link theoretically the dynamics of international politics to the changing structure of capital accumulation" (Davenport, 2011: 28). Based on historical and economic struggles, unlike realists' political struggles, Marxism brought the issue of economic relations and the exploitation of capital to IR debates without dismissing the role of the state or politics. In fact, the central tenet of this school of thought is that political phenomena, which realists emphasise as the key unit of analysis, are the result of underlying economic forces. This idea can also be found in the work of post-development theorists outlined in Chapter 4, as well as dependency theorists (see Prebisch, 1950⁹⁷, Rodney, 1972⁹⁸) who were not only inspired by the Marxist doctrine,

⁹⁷ Argentine economist Raul Prebisch (1950) was "known for his contributions to structuralist economics [...] which formed the basis of economic dependency theory" (Crosthwaite, 2013: 21).

but viewed economic relations as exploitative, especially when it comes to the “continuities of North/South economic disparities” (Munck, 2012: 86).

Morgenthau’s (1954) does not agree with the Marxist theories of imperialism and refers to them as “simplistic” (ibid: 46). Against the historical materialist framework and the idea that “men make their own history [...] but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past” (Marx in Elster, 1986: 277), Morgenthau argues that we should not regard “political history as the sole criterion for the possibilities of future achievements” (Morgenthau in Borden, 1947: 755). However, they do share the notion that states possess, at least in theory, a monopoly of force, which allows for greater critique over historical changes, and, in particular, the causes and outcomes which constitute our analysis of change. Therefore, for both realists and Marxists, the successful outcome of foreign intervention continues to depend on “the degree to which one is able to maintain, to increase, or to demonstrate one’s power over others” (Soendergaard, 2008: 6).

However, Morgenthau’s concept of power has been critiqued by philosophers such as Raymond Aron (1966) who suggested that it is underdeveloped on a number of points. Firstly, Aron argued that it does not take into consideration non-state actors who also have power and operate in the global arena. Secondly, the actions of states are not exclusively motivated by power and national self-interest. And thirdly, Morgenthau’s concept of power views the actions of states as synonymous with the intentions and ideologies of their political leaders. Morgenthau’s grand claims and conceptualisation of power, which is a central theoretical concept within IR theory (Forsythe, MacMahon and Wedeman, 2006) has continued to be developed by numerous IR thinkers from within the field. From Steven Lukes’ ([1974] 2005) three faces of power (decision-making power, non-decision-making power and ideological power), and Todd Hall’s (2010) three sources of influence (institutional power, reputational power, and representational power), to Joseph Nye’s (2004, 2009, 2011) soft, hard, and smart power, all are persuasive ways of explaining how foreign intervention is legitimated. However, they are separated between two forms of power, coercive and consensual.

Morgenthau’s (1962, 1967, 1985) political realist position, as well as the Marxist school of thought essentially view power as coercive, while many contemporary neoliberals such as

⁹⁸ Walter Rodney (1972) was a Guyanese Marxist historian who’s book *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* uses Marx’s historical materialist perspective to argue that Africa was deliberately exploited by European colonial administrations.

IR theorists Keohane and Nye (1997) take a consensual view of power⁹⁹. Although Morgenthau has also been criticised for defining “power in the broadest possible terms” (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 446), his analytical and theoretical contributions to power have influenced the works of IR scholar¹⁰⁰ Susan Strange (1988, 1996), whose structural view of power contributes greatly to the contemporary theorising of foreign intervention.

However, unlike Morgenthau, Strange is aware of the increasing power of non-state actors, such as international financial institution (IFIs) and multinational corporations, and therefore takes into consideration the other places where power may be operationalized, and how particular actors are framed in relation to how much power they have and by what means. In her definition of structural power, she argues that;

“Structural power is the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and their scientists and other professional people have to operate. This structural power... means rather more than the power to set the agenda of discussion or to design the international regimes of rules and customs that are supposed to govern international economic relations. That is one aspect of structural power, but not all of it... Structural power, in short, confers the power to decide how things shall be done.... structural power can also be exercised by those who possess knowledge, who can wholly or partially limit or decide the terms of access to it” (1988: 24-25).

Unlike instrumental power, which is centrally concerned with having control over the material world, as highlighted by both realists’ and Marxists’, Strange stresses the multifaceted nature of power, and poses a very important question, which goes beyond the question of who has power, and asks what is the source of that power and why do they have it? (Strange, 1988) Within her four dimensions of power; (1) security, (2) production, (3) finance, and (4) knowledge, she views finance, or economic, power as being the most prominent. In her assessment of the economic forms of power, she advanced the idea that those who have the ability to grant or decline credit, control the economy. Although this thesis is not about questioning who controls the economy, her position on economic forms of power by non-state actors is useful for studying how economic forms of power prescribe change.

Therefore, the link between “money and power was one of the most enduring themes in

⁹⁹ Robert Cox (1973, 1987, 1993) another contemporary IR theorists, but more aligned to the Marxist school of thought and avid follower of Antonio Gramsci (1971) uses his concept of hegemony to also argue for the inclusion of non-coercive forms of power.

¹⁰⁰ Although her work is more aligned to International Political Economy (IPE).

Strange's work" (Cohen, 2016: 112), as she was able to create "a theory which explained how economic power could be exercised without overt coercion" (May, 1996: 167). Through her "in-depth examination of the *financial structure*" (Bieling, 2014: 236), which centrally focused on the interactions between states, markets and multinational corporations, Strange (1996) broadened this use of covert coercive power to include supranational institutions, such as the UN, WB and IMF. For Strange, these institutions, just like states and multinational corporations, can influence the behaviour and actions of other states by spreading or imposing particular values (cf. Walt, 1992, 1996). Based on the rapid pace of economic globalization, which ushered in the neoliberal principles of privatization and deregulation, Strange (1996,1999) witnessed how states were losing control of markets, and therefore argued that; "We have to escape and resist the state-centrism inherent in the analysis of conventional international relations. The study of globalization has to embrace the study of the behaviour of firms no less than other forms of political authority" (Strange, 1999: 354).

Her ideas on how we should study the changes taking place within the *financial structure*, and International Political Economy (IPE) more broadly, provides important analytical insights into who governs change. No matter whose interests are being served or what outcome is desired, the same important questions must be applied, "what means may states employ to influence each other's policies? And to what ends?" (Farer, 1985: 405). For example, those who also study global politics through IPE will have observed that the new "global governors are authorities who exercise power across borders for purposes of affecting policy" (Avant, Finnemore and Sell, 2010: 2). These global governors now include, Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations, regulators and activists, all of whom "create issues, set agendas, establish and implement rules or programs, and evaluate and/or adjudicate outcomes" (ibid). Based upon Strange's (1988) and Lukes' ([1974] 2005) concept of power, as well as Cox's (1973) notion of 'rule-creating' power, which does not rest with who has power, but those who set the rules which others should follow, it also critiques neoliberals, who contend that rules are created by states and institutions for the purposes of cooperation as well as punishment (see van de Haar, 2009). Although neoliberals such as Keohane and Nye (1997), share the same level of analysis with Strange, and argue that the function of international institutions is to influence states by imposing particular values, they remain "characterized by a normative assumption that growth of institutions has been a positive development, particularly in global capitalist affairs" (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2016: para 16), a view which realists and Marxists disagree with.

Nevertheless, what is fundamental to all these debates across the IR spectrum is that intervention is no longer based on political and military terms alone (Huffbauer and Schott 1983), nor is it restricted to the state. Therefore, broadening what is defined as foreign intervention has allowed for a diversified understanding of whose national interests are being served. Although it is difficult to determine and empirically examine foreign intervention within these new contexts, because of the complexity in the global system and the shifts in power relations and government secrecy around decision-making, one form of intervention that is more easily observable is foreign aid.

5.3 The Theory of Foreign Aid

Morgenthau's (1962) theory of foreign aid and concept of bribery provides a strong contribution to understanding how change is coercively applied by powerful states. Pursuant to his political realism position and scepticism towards the global imbalances of power, Morgenthau (1954: preface) argued that "the provision of aid by great powers should not be seen as a means to improve the economic status of target states, but to improve the great power status of those providing aid". This position has been characterised by McKinley and Little (1978, 1979) as the *Donor Interests Model*, as opposed to the *Recipient-Needs Model*, whereby "aid is given to compensate for the shortfalls in domestic resources" (Maizels and Nissanke, 1984: 879)¹⁰¹. While both models provide logical explanations as to why governments give aid, the *Donor Interests Model*, and Morgenthau's realist perspective which views the "transfer of money and services from one government to another performs [as a] function of a price paid for political services rendered or to be rendered" (Morgenthau, 1962: 302), both are categorically linked to achieving foreign policy goals (Ruttan, 1996; Gupta, 1999; Moyo, 2009; Guess, 2011).

As explained by Carothers (1999) in the Introduction Chapter, foreign aid, since the end of colonialism, has been used for achieving foreign policy goals, such as restricting the spread of communism and promoting democracy. From the Marshall Plan¹⁰² to aid assistance in "developing countries" the US has provided various forms foreign aid as a moral rationale for intervention, thus intentionally creating a "developed"/"developing" dichotomy to replace the colonizer/colonized dichotomy. But no matter which dichotomy foreign aid is

¹⁰¹ Others on this liberal side of the argument treat foreign aid as a "public good" (see Mosley, 1985: 373), and views foreign aid as it "addresses global problems (such as environmental protection and infectious disease), further democracy and manage conflict" (Lancaster, 2007: 48).

¹⁰² The post WWII European Recovery Program which helped rebuild Europe.

based upon, it is “an integral part of political policy” (Morgenthau, 1962: 308), and used to set agendas and achieve specific donor interest goals (McKinley and Little, 1978). Although Morgenthau differentiated between several types of foreign aid; humanitarian, subsistence, military, bribery, prestige, and economic development, he argued that all foreign aid is based on fostering Western political interests above all else (Bauer, 1969). In making his case, Morgenthau argued that foreign aid is “given for the purpose of changing the *status quo*” (Morgenthau, 1962: 305). In other words, he believed that “foreign aid must go hand in hand with political change, either voluntarily induced from within, or bought about through pressure from without” (Morgenthau, 1962: 306). This idea that change can be controlled through external pressures replicates the Marxian notion that change is prescribed.

In contrast to neoliberals who are more optimistic about state actors and their potential for cooperative relations (Kegley, 1995), Morgenthau’s framework includes the act of penalising a country when it does not comply with the externally imposed demands set by a donor country. Similar to Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o (2005) argument above, about the fundamentalism of finance being reduced to threats, these externally imposed demands are commonly referred to as sanctions in IR theory (Baldwin, 1985; Krustev and Morgan, 2011). Described as “coercive economic measures taken against one or more countries in an attempt to force a change in policies” (Carter, 1987: 1162), Morgenthau (1962) refers to these coercive strategies as “bribes”.

Historically seen as “an integral part of the armory of diplomacy” (ibid: 302), bribery, according to Morgenthau, was a mode of political advantage, which was often “disguised as foreign aid” (ibid). Today, bribery ranges from economic blockades, to aid suspension and the cancellation of international meetings (Leonard and Franke, 2016). Based on Morgenthau’s normative critique, the concept of bribery has been picked up by several scholars who have stressed that foreign aid, or other economically coercive measures, are used as appropriate means for imposing change on recipient countries (Apter, 1973; Galtung, 1967); Adler-Karlsson, 1968; Schreiber, 1973; Knorr, 1973, 1975; Olson, 1979; Rothchild 1997; Esman and Herring, 2003). While some view economic coercion through punishment (Adler-Karlsson, 1968; Ake, 1993), such as the threat of withdrawing or cutting off foreign aid (Knorr, 1973; Ihonvbere, 2003; Sørensen, 2004), others see change taking place through compliance (Galtung, 1967), whereby countries conform to the demands of more economically powerful states. Rothchild (1997: 102) refers to this type of political

conditionality as a “coercive incentive”¹⁰³.

Since Morgenthau’s (1962) concept of “political services” and “bribery” are no longer seen as fitting in the neoliberal capitalist order, these economically coercive measures have become known in international development circles as conditionalities or what Harcourt (2012) refers to as the ‘carrot and stick’ approach (cf. Esman and Herring, 2003). Defined as “an exchange of policy changes for external financing” (Kahler, 1992: 89) conditionality has become a method that Killick (2005: 1) describes as “requiring governments to do things they wouldn’t otherwise do or to do things more quickly than they would choose to do”, which for many, has resulted in a loss of a sovereignty (Villaroman, 2009), and a reduction in the policy making process (Adedeji, 1995). The significance of conditionalities is therefore essential to our understanding of how and why change occurs. Similar to the threat of punishment for non-compliance (Ake, 1993), especially to those who do not follow the rules and policies of the international financial institutions (IFIs) (Thiong’o, 2005), conditionalities have become a customary part of foreign aid and foreign relations.

As an undeveloped theory, most of the theoretical tenets around foreign aid can be found in World Systems Theory (Wallerstein, 1974, 2000), which is one of the major theories in IR, and dependency theory. Both have their roots firmly embedded in Marx’s writings on international economics and politics and explain foreign relations as a relationship of domination and manipulation amongst nations (Hattori, 2001), or what world systems theorists specifically refer to as a symbolic relationship between superiority and inferiority (Sahlin, 1972). Dependency theorists such as Theotonio Dos Santos (1970) used the concept of “foreign financing” to describe how “foreign capital retains controls over the most dynamic sectors of the economy” (ibid: 232). In this way, dependency, as a common outcome of foreign financing, has left many “developing countries” reliant on donor states, and provided donor states with a legitimate reason to intervene in recipient countries (Santos, 1970)¹⁰⁴. By paying attention to the persistent imbalances of power between “developed” and “developing” states, or what world systems theory define as ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ states, both theories place a strong emphasis on external factors, which does not allow the nation-state to be the sole unit of analysis. In fact, they propose the capitalist world-economy as the central unit of analysis.

¹⁰³ Also see Zartman (1985); Young (1994) for examples of coercive measures by Western powers within African conflicts.

¹⁰⁴ Also see Andre Gunder Frank (1966) *The Development of Underdevelopment*.

This level of analysis was picked up by African Marxist¹⁰⁵ Kwame Nkrumah (1965) who brought to the intellectual scholarship of IR clear links between Africa's colonial past and present day dependency. Using structural Marxism as his theoretical approach, which combines "aspects of structuralism with aspects of dialectical and historical materialism" (Harris, 2001: 216), Nkrumah's historical analysis of foreign aid and imperialism within Africa leads him to two important methodological insights. Firstly, he explains that because there are more specific differences between countries and regions of the world beyond the bipolar system¹⁰⁶ that Morgenthau analysed, how we study foreign aid should be specific to the country under investigation, because case studies provide an in-depth understanding of why and under what conditions foreign aid operates. Secondly, using Vladimir Lenin's (1965) conceptualisation of imperialism, which foresaw finance becoming monopolised, Nkrumah (1965) argued that the Bretton Woods institutions, namely the World Bank and IMF were the new mechanisms for reproducing imperialism¹⁰⁷. Therefore, Nkrumah viewed the international system as being made up of a myriad of social, political, economic and ideological relations that are transgressing national boundaries and undercutting state authority.

This theorising of foreign institutions led to the insights of neo-Marxists, who believed that "imperialism in Africa had matured from the cruder colonial forms and worked through the Bretton Woods institutions while unleashing divisive ideas on political, economic and cultural levels" (Campbell, 2015: para 2). Through this anti-imperialist lens¹⁰⁸, Nkrumah argued that we should start our investigations from critiquing the past. Based on Marx's hypothesis that we should, "not anticipate the world dogmatically, but rather wish to find the new world through the criticism of the old" (Marx, 1867: 212), Nkrumah imports Marx's theory of history to attack neoclassical economics for failing to address why change occurs. Based on these methodological and analytical considerations, Nkrumah (1965: 18) also raises an important theoretical issue, namely that those in charge of change and the capitalist world system operate "not only in the economic field, but also in the political, religious, ideological and cultural spheres".

The role of ideology and the "historical context of past experiences" was picked up by

¹⁰⁵ Also see post-colonial theorist Achille Mbembé (1957/2001)

¹⁰⁶ Namely the bipolar system of the Cold War.

¹⁰⁷ As shared by Loomba (1998: 7), "if the inequities of colonial rule have not been erased, it is perhaps premature to proclaim the demise of colonialism. A country may be both postcolonial (in the sense of being formally independent) and neo-colonial (in the sense of remaining economically and/or culturally dependent)." Adding that "the new global order does not depend upon direct rule" (ibid).

¹⁰⁸ Contemporary scholars such as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000), David Harvey (2003, 2005), and Samir Amin (2010) have all articulated this new world order as a new form of imperialism.

political scientist Ashok Kumar Pankaj (2005: 104), in the most recent review of foreign aid theory. In an attempt to reconceptualise the theory of foreign aid from the theoretical cul-de-sac that political realism created, Pankaj (2005) challenges Morgenthau's Cold War theories of foreign aid, as well as the developmental theorizing that Santos (1970) and Nkrumah (1962) belonged to, to argue that a contemporary revisiting of foreign aid requires a deeper understanding of "the onslaught of neo-liberal political and economic thought over development discourse" (Pankaj, 2005: 103). By linking neoliberalism to the IMF's and WB's "universal drive towards globalization, liberalization and privatization" (ibid) Pankaj points out how neoliberalism is not only an important feature of foreign aid, but also international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). Therefore, recognising, in a similar fashion to neoliberals such as Keohane and Nye (1997), that there is a plurality of actors including non-state actors that have the capacity to influence change through the use of ideologies, his assessment also aligns with Marx's view of political economy whereby change in economic relations do not happen in isolation.

Although, Pankaj made no reference to Robert Cox (1993: 63)¹⁰⁹ whose central idea is that "international institutions perform an ideological role", Pankaj highlighted that role of international development with foreign aid, which has been lacking in political realists conceptualisation of the theory. This inclusion of international development reinforces the view that foreign aid is not only a subject matter of political economy, but also for development economics and international politics. With various state and non-state actors operating within each of these spheres, for different purposes, the role of neoliberalism as the dominant ideology should be analysed according to the type of social or political action it is proposing (Ball and Dagger, 1995).

The spread of neoliberalism through foreign aid, primarily within international development discourse, has been reinforced by those who claim that international institutions have become the new propagators of neoliberalism (Jomo and Fine, 2006; Doane, 2011; Marois and Pradella, 2015), and therefore have just as much power to create and serve dominant ideologies as nation-states. Within this context, IR theorists view ideologies as prescriptive in order to fulfil a number of policy-making functions (Evans and Newnham, 1998). As pointed out by Carroll (2012) many development policies are tied to aspects of neoliberalism via foreign aid conditionalities. However, Pankaj (2005) overlooks

¹⁰⁹ Many of these ideas can also be found in John M. Nelson's (1968) and political-economic realist Teresa Hayter's (1971, 1981) views of foreign aid. Both argued that foreign aid not only promoted and maintain the interests of the donor country, serve ideological purposes, and impose macroeconomic policy packages such as structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and economic liberalization.

the importance of conditionalities within his theorising of foreign aid, and in doing so, fails to take into consideration the fact that in parts of the world where countries are in a globally subordinated position. As critical IR scholar Kalevi Holsti (1983: 233) once proclaimed, “whatever the original objective of an aid program may be there is always the potential that it might at some point be used as an instrument of coercion”. Without confronting this in his own analysis, Pankaj’s theory of foreign aid also fails to notice the asymmetrical power relations that neoliberalism and international development produce, as well as the multiple goals and strategic intentions that donors pursue (Hopkins, 2000).

Many “scholars of international relations have found Gramsci’s (1971) focus on global processes useful for analysing neoliberalism” (Morton 2004 quoted in Riley, 2011: para 1). Gramsci, who was well known for his consensual, rather than coercive views of power, used a much more complex conceptualisation of ideology which appreciated the variations and multifaceted nature of states which were subject to change. Therefore, Gramsci’s conceptualisation of ideology had a global function, to understand how ideologies on a global scale are exercised:

“The complex problem arises of the relation of internal forces in the country in question, of the relation of international forces, of the country’s geo-political position. [...] In any case, one can see how, when the impetus of progress is not tightly linked to vast local economic development which is artificially limited and repressed, but is instead the reflection of international developments which transmit their ideological currents to the periphery” (Gramsci, 1971: 116)

Based on his Marxist reading of domination and the symbolic nature of power, Gramsci was acutely aware that the disadvantageous positioning of periphery states (“developing countries”) in the global economy made them more vulnerable to externally constructed ideologies. Through such an analysis, ideologies “should contain answers to numerous questions regarding economic, political and social systems of states and their foreign policies” (Isakovic, 2000: 60). However, as a complex variable for analysis, which positions “itself as quintessentially anti-ideological, as rational and as a natural state of affairs, as invisible” (Cammaerts, 2015: 2), and “entirely innocent of power” (Eagleton, 1991: 154), makes it, like the motivations of intervention, difficult to analyse. Nonetheless, like foreign aid, it should be analysed according to its “purpose of changing the status quo” (Morgenthau, 1962: 305).

Summary

While “the unexpected difficulties of tackling a multidisciplinary project like this is the inability to apply a simple label to the end product” (Van Belle, et al., 2004: 1), the theoretical framework developed in this chapter emphasises that the range of analytical factors, as well as subjects, involved in media system change should not be studied in isolation, nor theoretically bound to one single theory. Given that there is no shortage of examples of how external forces have influenced the internal dynamics of former colonial states (Southall and Wood, 1998), a contemporary reading of political economy, political realism and structural Marxism not only challenges the liberal perspective of cooperation, but also Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) state-centric approach to the study of media systems.

The critical political economy of communications and structural Marxism in particular, have contributed significantly to a contemporary understanding of this transformation by advancing the role of external factors and actors which requires a critical look into the new political economic arrange in the neoliberal world order. Nevertheless, all theories used in this framework are theoretically equipped to help explain the political origins as well as the economically coercive role of foreign intervention. Although the theory of foreign intervention has not, to the best of my knowledge, been thoroughly contemporised, nor applied to the study of media systems, this framework has been an attempt to minimise this theoretical gap and synthesised the relationship between media, politics and foreign intervention.

Adopting a New Methodological Framework

Methodologically, this research challenges conventional media systems analysis, which maintains that the nation state is the core unit of analysis. As seen in the Chapter 3, media researchers are beginning to acknowledge the complexity and multifacetedness of media systems in post-colonial, transitional and aid-dependent countries. Based on the aims of the research, this study used a case study approach, which is particularly useful when trying to understand why and how certain events occur (Yin, 2003). By examining real-life situations, in this case when President Joyce Banda opened the media to all political parties and foreign investors, this case study approach allowed for the development of theory by building an explanation of the case (Baxter and Jack 2008; Yin 2009). While the strength of the case study approach lies in utilizing a range of evidence from multiple sources, which this thesis was unable to obtain due to the lack of publicly available data on Malawi's media system, this thesis employed semi-structured interviews and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to ensure a wide range of views and ideas provided enough evidence to support the causes of the phenomenon under investigation.

Therefore, this chapter outlines the methodology and analytical framework used to explore the relationship between media, politics and foreign intervention based on the literature and theoretical framing which have provided alternative ways of studying media systems. The methods used were chosen for their empirical contributions to the way in which they advance a deeper understanding of the complex properties associated with media systems analysis. Their anti-positivist position also stresses the need to examine the subjective experience (McNeill and Chapman, 2005), or what Flick et al. (2004: 3) describes "from the inside out". Although this interpretive approach appears primarily to be qualitative, it is, to a certain extent, supported by quantitative procedures within the CDA. This combination of methods allows for greater validity by providing a better understanding of a research problem from a number of perspectives (Creswell, 2003). As the purpose of this research is not to make any overall generalisations about why Malawi's media is the way it is, but to focus more on analysing and conceptualising those variables that are central to developing a holistic understanding of media systems. To understand more about how these new variables were discovered, an outline of the two methods used will now be described.

6.1 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

This thesis analysed and interpreted a corpus of twelve Pan-African Media Declarations, Charters and Protocols that Malawi signed and ratified between 1976 and 2009. These publicly available documents were selected for their influence on the construction and promotion of the liberal media model across Africa, but more importantly, Malawi's national media policies. Policies such as the Communication Act 1998 which is either based on, or tied to, these agreements, which set out several key principles and international media standards. Created, and often funded by, donor governments, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and supranational institutions, or what Fairclough (2001b: 51) described as the "*power holders*" of discourse, these agreements have been important vehicles in framing and shaping media system discourse, as well as providing these *power holders* with the opportunity to exercise their particular ideologies¹¹⁰ and legitimize their involvement. Often described as rhetoric because of its negative association to influence others (Toye, 2013), language has is an "ideological footprint" (ibid: 2), thus an unquestionably important element of politics. However, it should be notes that language can "misrepresent as well as represent realities, it can weave visions and imaginaries which can be implemented to change realities and in some cases improve human well-being, but it can also rhetorically obfuscate realities, and construe them ideologically to serve unjust power relations" (Fairclough, 2006:1).

With its roots in critical linguistics, sociolinguistics, classical rhetoric, applied linguistics and pragmatics, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has become an established academic discipline and a valuable methodology for those studying socio-political sciences and political economy (Billig, 2003; Wodak, 2006). Borrowing heavily from one of CDA's founding fathers¹¹¹ Norman Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995, 2001a, 2003), he defined CDA as a "discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events, texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes" (Fairclough, 1995: 132). Using these non-transparent relationships to understand "who is represented as causing what to happen [and] who is represented as doing what to whom" (Fairclough, 2001: 43), Fairclough's definition of CDA helped to answer the main research questions; (1) To what extent can

¹¹⁰ See Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart (1971) who found in their analysis that the dominant American ideologies of consumerism, classism, and imperialism emerged as a result of the explicit language used in the dominant class discourse.

¹¹¹ Others include Michael Halliday (1985) and Roger Fowler et al. (1979).

foreign intervention be considered a key variable for analysis in media systems research and explain the global shift towards media liberalization? (2) Has this shift has been “natural” or forced? And (3) what were the major ideological forces behind foreign intervention directed towards liberalisation?

Although CDA “is not concerned with evaluating what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’” (Wodak, 2006:65), the research questions required an investigation into “how such practices, events and texts arise out of, and are ideologically shaped by, relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony” (Fairclough, 1995: 132). Therefore, CDA is not only concerned with the linguistic features in the text, but the wider structural relationships of dominance, and the war of ideas¹¹². In order to capture these features, Fairclough’s (1995) three-part analytic model was used, which includes:

- (1) The examination of the linguistic features of texts (‘analysis of text’)
- (2) The notion that texts cannot be analysed in isolation and must be understood in relation to the wider social context (‘social practice’)
- (3) The processes related to the production and consumption of texts (‘discourse practice’)

The production and reproduction of power and ideology are central features of Fairclough’s analytical framework and a key theoretical concept used in this thesis. For Fairclough and other scholars of linguistics, such as Ruth Wodak (2006, 2009, 2014), it is important to understand how power and ideology are constituted, dispersed and legitimized. This thesis looked into the global ideology of neoliberalism, to understand its relationship with the liberal media model and how it came to dominate Malawi’s political, economic and cultural spheres. CDA is uniquely positioned as a research tool as it provides multiple points of analytic entry that enabled me to provide a systematic analysis of how foreign intervention has prescribed particular ideologies that “reflect the values of particular institutions” (Kress, 1985: 67). However, as a researcher, I am aware that ideologies should not be read off texts in a mechanical way (Stubbs 1997). In other words, it was important that I avoided searching for “items that seem to fit the case” (Deacon et al., 2007: 139). Hence why a number of linguistic features were used to help answer, in particular, the second research question and provide the initial themes for the interview questions.

¹¹² Based on Blinken (2002) interpretation, winning the war of ideas is about gaining strategic influence to promote interests abroad, as well as at home.

The first distinctive linguistic feature found in the documents was the use of the imperative modal verbs “*should*” and “*shall*”. Identified for their lexical properties and emphatic value, these particular linguistic features elicited a number of commands, or what Fairclough (2001b: 46) described as “direct requests”. Although others have argued that “at its strongest, SHOULD¹¹³ takes on the meaning of moral obligation, or duty (defined in moral or legal terms). At its weakest, it merely offers advice, if subjective, or describes correct procedure, if objective” (Coates 1983: 59); differentiating the deontic characteristic of words in itself can be subjective. However, pitching them against different words such as *ought* conveys, according to Coates, the function of offering advice rather than obligation, therefore the imperative modal verb *must* was identified to highlight that they are moral obligations rather than offering advice. Furthermore, *must* similar to *should*, is a variation of *have to*, indicating what is essentially conditional rather than desirable (Palmer, 2001). Both verbs were particularly useful when considering the claim that the liberal media model is being forced onto Malawi. Unlike the giving of advice or the making of recommendations, the use of “*should*” and “*shall*” were directly commanding Malawi into adopt specific features that were indicative of the liberal media model. Therefore, imperative modal verbs have a double function. Firstly, they are used to convey authority, and secondly, to contribute to a global media discourse that is essentially designed to uphold liberal values.

The examination of this linguistic feature also involved, among many other things, a close assessment of who is employing these particular commands and their intentionality. These linguistic practices that exercise authority exhibits Fairclough’s (1995) concept of ‘social practice’, which suggests that texts cannot be analysed in isolation. As explained by Sinclair (2004: 148), a “word is not the best starting point for a description of meaning, because meaning arises from words in particular combinations.” Therefore, ‘collocation’, which is the action of “recurrent word combinations” (Bartsch, 2004: 27) was employed to conceptualise of the text. Although ‘social practice’ has multiple meanings under Fairclough’s framework (Wagenaar, 2011), his concept of ‘social practice’ is often located within the macro-sociological tradition of analysing social structures, whereby texts are analysed according to their “social and historical ‘situatedness’” (Cheek, 2004:1144). In other words, the language used in these agreements has a close relationship to particular socio-historical periods or events. For example, the Windhoek Declaration (1991) which “acted as a catalyst in the

¹¹³ Original emphasis.

process of encouraging press freedom, independence and pluralism in Africa” (UNESCO, 2013: 88) was endorsed by UNESCO (*power holder*), which was simultaneously running a series of regional events, titled *Promoting an Independent and Pluralistic African Press* to push countries into adopting the free press narrative (see UNESCO, 1991). Therefore, the level and type of intervention delivered outside of these agreements is just as important as what inside the texts.

The third linguistic feature analysed was intertextuality. As an integral part of Fairclough's (1992: 84) model, “intertextuality is basically the property texts have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated or merged in, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so forth.” To put it simply, the transfer of one text into another to create an “intertextual chain” for the development of a specific discourse (Fairclough, 1995: 77). This reproduction of particular discourses helps *power holders* maintain a consistent message across time. Just as Malawi has a long history with foreign donors, and Marx’s definition of political economy is rooted in history, texts also contribute to history by transforming the past into the present. According to Fairclough (1995) this is managed through the “marketization of public discourse” (ibid: 135), whereby certain messages are marketed in such a way that they become naturalized, institutionalized, and commonly used “buzzwords”¹¹⁴ (Cornwall and Eade, 2010). Therefore, their choices of these words were neither random nor arbitrary, but highly reflective of their intentions.

This is particularly relevant to the fourth linguistic feature, “textual synonymy” (Fairclough, 2001), or re-wording. This linguistic method is associated with how certain ideological agendas are structured upon particular words. For example, words and phrases such as free press, free market, the right to communicate, free flow of information, freedom and independence, are synonymous with liberalization. But more than that, they share similar ideological characteristics. Therefore, a list of words and phrases were identified within all twelve documents for their association with the central concepts of neoliberalism (1) Liberalization & Deregulation (2) Privatisation & Commercialisation. The purpose of this linguistic exercise was to illustrate how the dominant ideology of neoliberalism, which has been promoted heavily by Western governments, donors, INGOs and supranational institutions use these documents as a means of strengthening and reinforcing the neoliberal

¹¹⁴ For a detailed analysis of the use of buzzwords, Andrea Cornwall and Deborah Eade (2010) book *Deconstructing Development Discourse: Buzzwords and Fuzzwords* illustrates how buzzwords not only shapes our imagined worlds, but also justifies interventions and conceal ideologies.

ideology, the same arguments that Escobar (1995) Veltmeyer and Petras (2001) and Mawuko-Yevugah (2014) were claiming. Although discourses are not ideologies, both supply the words that have the power to establish “norms for developing conceptualizations that are used to understand the phenomenon” (Shapiro, 1981: 130). Through a deconstructive reading of their shared linguistic features, media liberalization as a discourse, and neoliberalism as an ideology generated a corpus of common buzzwords that were shared between the two.

What is also shared is the idea that power can be theoretically aligned to both post-structuralism and structural Marxian. Although CDA is theoretically aligned to post-structuralism, unlike the structural Marxian approach used in this thesis to understand global economic structures, it became clear that power operates inside and outside of these structures. This dual approach emphasises a constant oscillation between the two that define, construct and maintain the value of power. It is through this connection between both forms of power and the linguistic features above that provided a number of key themes relating to the evolution of the liberal media model in Malawi, which became the theoretical and analytical direction for the semi-structured interviews, to which I now turn.

6.2 Semi-Structured Interviews

Keeping in line with the interpretative approach, this second method was used as an opportunity to delve into new and unexplored themes (Rubin and Rubin, 2006) that emerged from the CDA. In contrast to the normative media systems methods, which rely heavily on publically available data, this research conducted 54 semi-structured interviews with government officials, foreign donors, media regulators, new TV licence holders, journalists and media activists to compensate for the lack of data on Malawi’s media systems. For that reason, semi-structured interviews were selected because of three primary considerations.

Firstly, semi-structured interviews are well suited for the exploration of perceptions and opinions with regards to often complex and politically sensitive issues (Bruter and Lodge, 2013). For example, questions relating to former and current governments and their leaders needed to be handled carefully and were only included after my own background research on the interviewees’ political history was conducted. Secondly, the openness of these interviews allowed for the probing of more information and clarification of answers, during

and after the interview, respectively (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). This was particularly important when some words were explained in Chichewa, Tumbuka and Yao (Malawian languages) by the interviewees. For example, “liberal” or “liberal media” can be expressed as “munthu wo tseguka maganizo” or “kuwulutsa maganizo osiyanasiyana” and “transition” can translate as “kusintha” “ndondomeko yosintha kachitidwe ka zinthu” or “mayiko amene akusintha” (countries in transition). Therefore, the art of listening to the nuances and interpretations was required as a matter of translation as well as clarification. Thirdly, the varied professional, educational and personal histories of the interviewees precluded the use of a standardized interview schedule, which would have restricted the chance of new themes emerging (Bryman, 2004). For example, the international development agenda and a stronger emphasis on neoliberalism surfaced as a result of allowing new themes to emerge.

Based on these primary considerations, each interview started with a broad set of introductory questions such as “How would you describe Malawi’s current media system”? In this way, the conversation was not only opened up in preparation for what was to come, but to learn early on, the difference between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’ Malawi’s media system. Focusing on the former for this research, the art of listening attentively (Clough and Nutbrown, 2007) to these nuances was crucial, as well as structuring the questions accordingly (Cohen, et al., 2007). Also, knowing that “qualitative interviewing is heavily influenced by a theoretically constructivist orientation which considers reality to be socially constructed” (Brennen, 2013: 28), each interviewee was selected for their familiarity with the research subject; as it has often been argued that interviewees are “more likely to be meaning makers not passive conduits for retrieving information” (Holstein and Gubrium, 2001 in Warren, 2001: 83). This non-random convenience sample was used for the initial selection of ten interviewees, based on their knowledge and availability (Boyle and Schmierbach, 2015). These ten interviews were pre-arranged before my arrival in Malawi, and were conducted between March and September 2015, with the exception of two that were conducted via Skype upon my return.

It was presumed that the ten pre-arranged interviews would lead to more interview contacts, methodologically known as nominated or snowball sampling (Richards and Forse, 2013). This approach, once a certain level of trust was achieved, resulted in numerous recommendations, which I may not have been able to gain independently. However, due to the political sensitivity of the research topic and history of censorship in Malawi, each interviewee signed a consent form prior to being interviewed on the grounds that their

names would not be disclosed. A coding scheme was developed to reference each interviewee by professional role and date of interview to protect their wishes to remain anonymous. Interviewing in this way permitted me to broaden the possibilities of compiling detailed narratives and multiple realities without the interviewees feeling any fear of repercussions. It was also made clear to each interviewee that they did not have to answer any questions that they felt were too sensitive, or disclose any information that could harm their position. They also had the right to withdraw from the interview at any point.

With the aim of gaining a deeper understanding of the changes taking place in Malawi's media, or what Clifford Geertz (1973) refers to as a "thick description", it was important to gain access to particular interviewees. However, due to the difficulty of obtaining some interviews with government officials and foreign donors, a convenience sample was also used to accommodate the limitations on accessibility and proximity to the selected key interviewees. This sample was based on my own judgment to confirm whether the person has the authority to speak on behalf of that particular government department or organization. For example, requests to interview the President of Malawi and specific government ministers were met with rejection, but on a number of occasions led me being transferred to someone that was unfamiliar with the research topic. Nevertheless, being open to convenience sampling, I reduced non-respondent distortion by rejecting certain interview offers that could have resulted in invalid conclusions being drawn.

The majority of interviews were conducted in the interviewees' place of business, as a matter of convenience, and for some, safety. Each interview lasted between 45 minutes to two hours using a set of ten pre-established questions (see appendix 3), to ensure specific themes were covered while maintaining flexible to new themes (Bryman, 2004). However, these were modified according to who was being interviewed. Nevertheless, in order to focus on these emerging themes, all the interviews were audio taped and transcribed verbatim. While this was time consuming, it was a necessity to ensure the accuracy of each interview, as well as ensuring moments of self-reflexivity (Stronach, et al. 2013). Once the cycle of interviewing was underway, it was often difficult to notice when the interviews reached a point of saturation (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006). A copy of the transcript was sent to the interviewees to ensure further accuracy. Once these were received back, they were later analysed using NVivo, a qualitative data analysis software which will be explained in more detail in the following section.

6.3 Data Analysis and Coding

Building on Fairclough’s analysis, which is based on revealing and interpreting patterns of power, the interviews were independently coded to identify themes based on answering the central research questions. Using NVivo, a qualitative data analysis software that helped to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of analysing qualitative data (Bazeley, 2007), each interview was entered into the software to conduct primary and secondary level coding¹¹⁵. The initial coding phase was completed after each interview was transcribed through the process of open (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008) and descriptive coding (Saldaña, 2013), and matched against prior research on media systems. At this level of analysis, a total of 33 distinct concepts and categories surfaced from the data (see appendix 4).

These 33 codes formed the basic themes for analysis, which guided the second level coding. During this stage it was essential to narrow these concepts down, in order to manageably answer the research questions. The interview transcripts were reviewed multiple times, and analysed concurrently with data collection. Codes were changed and recoded using memos¹¹⁶ in NVivo which helped me “to keep a track of coding decisions” (Richards and Morse, 2013: 224). This process continued until the data reached a point of saturation, whereby no new codes emerged. This deductive process consisted of comparing between codes and new findings in order to analyse their relationships and guide the data collections further (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Eventually ten central themes (see Table 4) were amalgamated from the revised codes and organized around each specific research question, and listed here in order of prevalence.

Table 4: Central Themes from Interviews

Themes	
1. Liberalization and media liberalisation	6. Neoliberalism
2. Democracy and democratisation	7. The development agenda
3. Internal vs. external change	8. Modernisation traits
4. Foreign aid	9. Foreign content
5. Foreign donors	10. Colonial legacy

¹¹⁵ While Nvivo was employed for the interview material, it was not used for the CDA documents, as Nvivo is considered more effective when dealing with a corpus of data.

¹¹⁶ “Memos are a type of document that enables you to record the ideas, insights, interpretations or growing understanding of the material in your project. They provide a way to keep your analysis separate from (but linked to) the material you are analysing” (QRS International, 2015: para 1).

With the intention of discovering new research dimensions, and insights, for the purpose of enriching media systems research, these central themes are discussed in more detail in the final chapters, which accompany the new concept *Forced Liberalization*, and the two new research dimensions *Development Parallelism*, *the Neoliberal Parallelism*.

6.4 Trustworthiness and Transferability

Although qualitative research is subjective and does not need to be tested against validity, to safeguard against any methodological criticisms, the disciplinary standards of trustworthiness and transferability were used when treating each method. Borrowed from Guba and Lincoln (1985, 2004), the notion of “trustworthiness”, under the auspices of interpretivism, parallels positivist criteria of validity, generalisability, and reliability. Trustworthiness involves establishing credibility, or a confidence in the ‘truth’ of the findings, and this was established through congruence. Based on “two or more independent people about the data’s accuracy, relevance, or meaning” (Elo, et al., 2014: 2), congruence was established when 48 of the 54 interviews strongly concurred that foreign intervention played a large role in Malawi’s adoption of the liberal media model.

Fully aware that myself as the researcher can also “be the greatest threat to trustworthiness” (Poggenpoel & Myburgh, 2003: 320) I ensured that my own personal opinions were not part of the interview process. However, the use of “iterative questioning” (Shenton, 2004:67) was employed as a strategy to elicit information when contradictions emerged or falsehoods were detected. For example, questions were often rephrased when interviewees revealed that they held two opposing ideas about what a liberal media model was. As already mentioned above, credibility was upheld through a process of cross-checking. Each interview was transcribed verbatim and time coded for ease of cross-checking during the analysis stage. Each transcribed interview was also emailed back to the interviewee to verify that their answers matched what they intended to say, as they are the ultimate judge of credibility (McConville and Bryson, 2014). It should also be mentioned here that I gave each interviewee the opportunity, to ask and add any further comments that they had not included during the initial interview. Around five interviewees did. Although this did not result in any new themes, their added contributions did solidify many of the existing themes and issues raised in the CDA.

Transferability on the other hand, which Guba and Lincoln (1985) proposed as another

alternative for assessing trustworthiness, was used to measure whether or not the inclusion of external forces in media system analysis can be applicable in other contexts (Shenton, 2004). Acknowledging that many countries within the “global south” are subject to conditions from foreign donors, it was not the aim of this research to make any general assumptions. Although, in the context of expanding current media system research, I concur with the notion that we, as social researchers, “must offer insights extending beyond the specific cases under study” (Bryman, 2004 in Welsey, 2014 :144). However, based on the data collected, it was not possible to make direct comparisons because the political and cultural set up of each country differs. Nonetheless, it is hoped that this research does make a substantive contribution to the knowledge of media systems research, and that this could result in comparative research in the future.

6.5 Ethical Considerations

The three main ethical considerations that were taken into account, and already covered above, were confidentiality, anonymity and consent. As part of any such research, before I embarked on my field trip to Malawi, I obtained an ethical approval from Hong Kong Baptist University’s Research Ethics Review Panel, which outlined these three ethical implications. Once this was approved, every effort was made to ensure these ethical guidelines were adhered to. For example, all interviewees were sent an information sheet (see appendix 5) outlining the nature of the research. Included in this information sheet were issues relating to confidentiality and anonymity, as well as a request for consent. It was important that each interviewee signed the form prior to being interviewed. As a matter of reassurance, all issues relating to confidentiality and anonymity were reiterated at the beginning and end of the interviews.

All interviews that were transcribed in NVivo, were done so on a personal computer which only I, as the researcher, had password access to. Each interviewee was reassigned a coded number in the analysis chapter, so no names and positions were revealed. The original transcripts containing the identifiers have been securely stored in a Word file on the same password-controlled computer. Only my supervisor and the Research Ethics Review Panel can review the details to verify the authenticity of the interviews. Finally, as stated in the university’s Research Ethics Review Approval form, all data will eventually be destroyed after I have disseminated my research findings.

Identifying the Power Holders

This research aimed at examining the under-explored issue of foreign intervention in association with the study of media systems, through a detailed case study of Malawi's recent transformation from authoritarian populism to Western forms of liberalism. The findings confirm that this shift cannot be explained by internal factors alone, based on the premise that transformation of the media does not occur in a vacuum. The media, like any other system inside a country, lies within a network of wider geopolitical structures. Foreign aid, which is one such structure, as well as their conditionalities and externally developed media policy agreements are used to actively manufacture particular media systems. Therefore, this chapter has been divided into two separate but interrelated parts to stress the different external forces that have contributed to why Malawi's media is the way it is.

Beginning with a critical analysis of the twelve Pan-African Media Declarations, Charters and Protocols listed in Chapter 6, this section identifies how specific linguistic strategies, such as imperative verbs, were employed by *power holders* (Fairclough, 2001b: 51) as a means of prescribing the type of media African states should have. This is followed by a breakdown of how the principles of neoliberalism have manifested themselves within these policy agreements, thus supporting Cox's (1993) claim that international institutions carry ideologies. In so doing, specifically answering what are the major ideological forces behind foreign intervention that are directed towards liberalisation? more specifically, the principles of neoliberalism that are shared with the liberal media model.

Part two of this chapter presents an interpretative analysis of the 54 interviews that were conducted to gain insights into why Malawi's media changed when it did. This analysis is compartmentalized into six distinct sections to answer all three research questions, and provide sufficient support for including foreign intervention and its ideological forces in future media systems analysis.

7.1 Malawi “Should” Change

Media Declarations, Charters and Protocols are increasingly becoming influential instruments in shaping media systems and creating a common language that reflects what the international community has agreed upon as the core principles of the global media model. Concerned with “who is represented as causing what to happen [and] who is represented as doing what to whom” (Fairclough, 2001: 43), this chapter not only identifies who are the actors responsible for promoting these core principles but how they have become embedded within Malawi’s media system.

The document authors, or what Fairclough (2001b: 51) referred to as the *power holders* or “Western experts” to use Escobar’s terms (1995: 6), employed the linguistic strategy of imperative modal verbs to ensure compliance. The imperative modal verbs “*should*” and “*shall*” were symbolic of Fairclough’s (2001b: 46) “direct requests”. As seen here in the first agreement that Malawi signed in July 1976¹¹⁷, which was an outcome of a meeting organized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), it was clear that:

“African Governments should ensure the total decolonization of the mass media and increase the production of radio and television broadcasts, cinematographic films which reflect the political, economic and social realities of the people in order to enable the masses to have greater access to and participation in the cultural riches” (Cultural Charter for Africa: Article VI Use of Mass Media)

From a sociolinguistic perspective, there are a number of points regarding the language used and the discourse developed through the use of these imperative modal verbs. Firstly, this Charter, which was the first of its kind to support the growth and direction of the cultural industries across the continent, used the imperative modal verb “*should*” 25 times and “*shall*” 14 times, therefore commanding a total 39 direct requests. Secondly, this overwording of the modal verbs “*should*” and “*shall*” illustrate what, and to some extent why, the *power holders* were “preoccupied with certain aspects of reality” (Pierce, 2008: 293), namely, the development of the liberal media system across Africa. Overwording also demonstrates how popular policy discourse is constructed through language and into a commonly accepted discourse. Thirdly, a closer look into words and phrases such as “*decolonization*” and “*increase production*” not only evokes feelings of liberation, which were commonplace in the 1970s following the wave of independence, but could also be seen as an attack on state-controlled media. Because the instruction to “*increase production*” would require media

¹¹⁷ However, the Charter was into place on the 19th September 1990 along with 33 other African states to support the development of the media.

houses to commercialize, in other words strengthen the “economic influence on the structures and the functioning of the media system” (Saxer, 1998 cited in Gerth et al, 2009: 72). Therefore, language used in this context is not only a “loaded weapon” (Bolinger, 1980: 1) that demands change by intentionally silencing alternative ideas, but is also political, insofar as it defines as well as propagates particular ideas as legitimate. Lastly, it should be pointed out that this particular document was developed by the OAU¹¹⁸, which was, and continues to be, funded by foreign donors (Aljazeera, 2013). While each member state has a vote in the AU, it should not be ruled out that the decisions of the Executive Council and those funding its operations could influence outcomes. As shown in Table 5 under the heading ‘Power Holder’, all of the documents studied were either written and/or funded by foreign actors. What can also be seen in Table 5 is the number of times “*should*” and “*shall*” were used in all twelve documents. In total “*should*” and “*shall*” were applied 125 and 108 times, respectively. Each document contained between 10 to 47 articles or statements such as the one above, which were the general obligations or terms of agreement that Malawi and other African states must adhere to upon signing.

Table 5: Use of Imperative Verb “Should” and “Shall”

Agreement	Power Holder	Pages*	“Should”	“Shall”
Cultural Charter for Africa (1976)	AOU with funding from foreign donors	15	Used 25 times	Used 14 times
Windhoek Declaration (1991) Promoting an Independent and Pluralistic African Press	UNESCO	3	Used 12 times	
Dakar Declaration on the Internet and the African Media (1997)	Panos London	1	Used 9 times	
Protocol for Culture, Information and Sport (2000)	Southern African Development Community (SADC)	26		Used 59 times
African Charter on Broadcasting (2001)	UNESCO	2	Used 26 times	
Yaoundé Declaration (2002)	ITU	2		Used once but applied other imperative verbs such as “must”
Charter on African Media and the Digital Divide (2002)	Highway Africa	3		
Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa (2002)	The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Part of AU and funded by European Community ¹¹⁹)	6	Used 16 times	Used 25 times
Bamako Declaration (2002)	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)	11	Used 37 times	
Table Mountain Declaration	World Association of	2		Used once but applied

¹¹⁸ Now the African Union (AU).

¹¹⁹ African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (2016) History. <http://www.achpr.org/about/history/>

(2007)	Newspapers and News Publishers (WAN-IFRA)			other imperative verbs such as “must”
Dakar Declaration (2008) Shaping the Future of African Media	African Media Leaders Forum (AMLF) with funding from WB	1		
African Media Initiative Charter (2009)	BBC World Service Trust and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)	6		Used 10 times but applied other imperative verbs such as “must”
			Total: 125	Total: 108

* Please note that each agreement uses different font size and line spacing so the number of pages is not representative of the amount of statements in each.

The reduction of state control and an increase in press freedom were the central components of all twelve agreements, and the central characteristics of the liberal media model that Hallin and Mancini (2004) defined. Statement 1 of the African Charter on Broadcasting (2001) offers the clearest example of this quality - “*All State and government controlled broadcasters should be transformed into public service broadcasters*”. Article 20 of Protocol for Culture, Information and Sport (2000) also unambiguously states that - “*State Parties shall take necessary measures to ensure the freedom and independence of the media*”. However, it was the Windhoek Declaration (1991), which has been hailed as one of the world's most progressive steps towards the liberal media model (MISA, 2016).

The Windhoek Declaration (1991) which contains 19 statements based on the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Berger, 2011), employed the imperative verb “*should*” 12 times, which occurred in over half of the 19 statements contained within the document. Because of the *worldwide trend towards democracy and freedom of information* (State 5 of the Windhoek Declaration) and the respect for the UN body, the Windhoek Declaration shaped and guided many of the succeeding agreements. This transfer of ideas from one text into another is a powerful way to reproduce particular discourses, and what Fairclough (2003) described as intertextuality. This borrowing or expansion of the liberal media discourse creates an important linguistic strategy where the dominant narrative becomes hegemonic, institutionalised, and naturalized (Fairclough, 1992; 1993). So much so that Statement 9, which asserts that “*African States should be encouraged to provide constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and freedom of association*” was not only transferred into successive declarations, but was also incorporated into Malawi’s new constitution under Chapter IV of its Human Rights laws. This was just three years after the Windhoek Declaration was actively promoted through a series of regional events organised by UNESCO titled *Promoting an Independent and Pluralistic African Press* (see UNESCO, 1991). Although there is no empirical evidence between these regional events, which urged countries to adopt a free press laws, the connection between the two cannot be overlooked,

as it could be, as Blankson and Murphy (2007: 6) described it, a matter of “external arm twisting.”

According to Fairclough’s (1995) three-part analytic model, these regional events represent what he defined as ‘social practice’, whereby texts cannot be analysed in isolation. By featuring ‘social practice’ as a method of understanding the relationship between what the text states and the wider social context and structures are doing in order to shape the media across Africa, provides some evidence that there is a link between these regional events and Malawi adopting free press laws within its constitution. Linking this to the points raised in Chapter 2 by Meinhardt and Patel (2003: 12) who states that Malawi’s constitution received “considerable input from foreign experts”, implies that some external forces played a role in both documents. Moreover, it should also be added here that UNESCO was established in the United States at the same time the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were established. As two of the largest international financial institutions’ (IFIs), which set up a global system of rules, institutions, and procedures to regulate the monetary system (see Strange, 1988; Underhill and Zhang, 2004; Bradlow and Hunter, 2010), all three institutions share the same mandate when it comes to countries adopting the liberal media system. However, the development of a specific discourse through ‘social practice’ should not be taken for granted, but if it can only be established through CDA, other empirical evidence should be provided.

While the line between persuasive discourse and demands may be difficult to recognize, highly respected institutions such as the UN, WB and IMF will often go unnoticed as controllers of such demands and discourse. However, critics of this influential group of *power holders*, such as Williamson (2002), Moyo (2009), Harvey (2005) Easterly (2013), will maintain that their control over a country’s political, economic and now cultural spheres makes them, according to Veltmeyer’s (2005) definition, the “Western hegemons” of the new imperialist project. The *power holders* in the second column of Table 5 are all, directly or indirectly, related to one of these three international institutions, thus conceivably generating a dominant ideology. For example, the Bamako Declaration (2002), which was commissioned by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)¹²⁰ used “should” 37 times, and the SADC-Protocol for Culture, Information and Sport (2000) used

¹²⁰ “Established by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations (UN) in 1958 as one of the UN’s five regional commissions, ECA’s mandate is to promote the economic and social development of its member States” (UNECA, 2016: para 1)

“shall” 59 times¹²¹. What emerges from this over-wording of these imperative modal verbs is a powerful discourse, one that gives an authoritative voice to their demands (Machin and Mayr, 2010), thereby providing *power holders* with a space to use language as a means of “external arm twisting” (Blankson and Murphy, 2007: 6). By framing particular statements, demands and ideologies in this way, they to become hegemonic, institutionalised and naturalized (Fairclough, 1992; 1993).

A means by which texts become institutionalised is through the idea that texts have histories (Bakhtin, 1986) and carry with particular ideologies. The Windhoek Declaration (1991) has played a very important role in articulating the liberal media model by systematically reproducing its core values using its universally accepted statements and authoritative demands to make particular ideas institutionalised. For example, the African Charter on Broadcasting (2001), which was also funded and promoted by UNESCO, not only became the poster child of the Windhoek Declaration, but also “continues to be seen as a blueprint for broadcasting reform in Africa” (Buckley/PANOS, 2011:13). And the linguistic use and continuation of the imperative verb “*should*” reproduces the authoritative demands set by the international institutions:

PART II: PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING

- 1. All State and government controlled broadcasters should be transformed into public service broadcasters, that are accountable to all strata of the people as represented by an independent board, and that serve the overall public interest, avoiding one-sided reporting and programming in regard to religion, political belief, culture, race and gender.*
- 2. Public service broadcasters should, like broadcasting and telecommunications regulators, be governed by bodies, which are protected against interference.*
- 3. The public service mandate of public service broadcasters should be clearly defined.*
- 4. The editorial independence of public service broadcasters should be guaranteed.*

The Charter which used “*should*” 26 times in total also uses “over-wording” (Fairclough, 1992) or what Halliday (1978) defined as “overlexicalisation”. This linguistic strategy is commonly used for two overlapping reasons, one, to accentuate the intentions of the *power holder*, and two, to lay down the foundations to build a common discourse. These subtle linguistic choices implicitly convey numerous *direct requests* that actively defend the liberalization of the media on the continent. Therefore, I suggest that the combination of reproducing UNESCO’s core liberal media values through the use of over-wording is by no

¹²¹ This is excluding the use of “shall” under statements related to sport sections.

means unintentional, and in fact is used to persuade Malawi into adopting their ideas. Persuasion, which has commonly been associated with propaganda is an attempt to manipulate the actions of those being persuaded in order to achieve a “response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett and O'Donnell, 2012: 1). Therefore, the use of “*should*” 26 times offers a propagandist demand which reflects a one-way flow of knowledge (Fowler et al., 1979) from *power holder* to signatory, thus preserving the unequal power relations between “developed” /“developing”, donor/recipient, core and periphery.

According to Fairclough (2001a), statements such as these produce asymmetric power relations as they contribute to the domination of some over others. In Statement 10 of the Windhoek Declaration (1991), it even instructs *power holders* where to support the media:

“The international community—specifically, international organizations (governmental as well as nongovernmental), development agencies and professional associations should as a matter of priority direct funding support towards the development and establishment of non-governmental newspapers”

By prescribing and determining the role foreign actors should take in accelerating the pace of change, exemplifies even further the role foreign intervention plays in a media system's transformation. However, this thematic preoccupation of *power holders* with the liberalisation of the media also stresses how the media in Africa should be fostered in accordance with international development agendas. In 1991, when of the Windhoek Declaration was established, Malawi was still under authoritarian rule, and the NGO community was used as a means of endorsing more democratic values. Ten years on, the NGO community have grown and created what Lord Mawuko-Yevugah (2014) defined as *developmentality*, the means to exploit development as discourse, through such agreements to secure the liberalisation of the media.

As seen here in the Charter on African Media and the Digital Divide (2002), which not only sets out the parameters of what media should be, but what it should do: “*empower African media to play a more meaningful role in promoting democracy, and in explicating and contextualising crucial issues of poverty, the environment and sustainable development*”. By institutionalising or naturalizing (Fairclough, 1992; 1993) development it becomes in Fairclough's (1995: 54) terms “common sense”. By reshaping the values of what the media should be and do through this populist strategy of promoting the development agenda, the use of these media agreements has become an effective way of disseminating various realities and dominant worldviews.

I associate this trend with the research dimension *development parallelism*. Akin to Hallin and Mancini's (2004: 28) *political parallelism*, which refers to the “*organizational connections*”¹²² between media and political parties or other kinds of organisations, including trade unions, cooperatives, churches, and the like [...] which funded and helped distribute them”, *development parallelism* was coined to describe the relationship between media and international development. More specifically, the extent to which international development and its community of foreign donors and international non-governmental organization (INGOs) influence the organisational structure and journalistic professionalism of media houses, as well as the extent to which the media reflects development issues through their programming.

In Hallin and Mancini's analysis of *political parallelism* they also emphasised that the media and political parties have a long history in Western Europe in North America. The same can be said for foreign donors and NGOs with the media in Malawi and other aid-dependent countries. This is an important element to the definition of *development parallelism*, as these partnerships are critical to creating a common language around media liberalisation in order to become hegemonic, institutionalised and naturalized (Fairclough, 1992; 1993). Regional media organizations, such as the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), which was opened in Malawi in 1997, has been funded by the British High Commission, the American Embassy, the Tilitonse Fund and the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA). Established to protect the fundamental right of free expression and a liberal media system, MISA was founded on the principles set out in the Windhoek Declaration (MISA, 2016). Collectively, these donors deploy a similar discourse that supports development; the type of development that advocates change, accountability and good governance through private sector involvement.

Examples of this can be seen through the distinctive linguistic method of collocation. Simply defined as the action of “recurrent word combinations” that become commonly accepted (Bartsch, 2004: 27), this morphological structure helps to build a discourse, one which is often linked to Fairclough's (1992) linguistic strategy of ‘re-wording’. This was articulated by the father of British linguistics John Rupert Firth (1957: 11), who argued that “you shall know a word by the company it keeps”. Akin to Fairclough's idea that texts cannot be analysed in isolation, the collocations used in these agreements, as seen in Table

¹²² Original emphasis.

6, illustrate how these few combinations were used recurrently to build a common discourse.

Table 6: Collocation of the imperative verbs “should” and “shall”

Should be...	Shall be...
open, transformed, pursued, provided, promoted, strengthened, developed, set up, implemented, fair, required, improved	encouraged, determined, free
Should...	Shall not ...
federate, benefit, withdraw, include, promote, undertake, enact, prepare, adopt, devote, recognize, encourage, create, establish	promote, use their power, seek, impose, be controlled

While most of these word combinations must narrate a discourse that all signatories will accept and institutionally be familiar with, they reflect a quality of ‘politeness’ which is often used when seeking compliance towards a proposed demand (see Brown and Levinson, 1987¹²³). For example, the use of the words *benefit*, *devote*, and *create* all denote a positive tone, but the collocational properties of these combinations remain *direct requests*, and therefore function in a highly authoritative way.

While the framing of the imperative verbs “*should*” and “*shall*” has exemplified the imperative potential of language, pronouns also play a similar role when *power-holders* define what the liberal media should be. As exemplified here in the Windhoek Declaration:

Statement 2. By an independent press, we mean a press independent from governmental, political or economic control or from control of materials and infrastructure essential for the production and dissemination of newspapers, magazines and periodicals.

Statement 3. By a pluralistic press, we mean the end of monopolies of any kind and the existence of the greatest possible number of newspapers, magazines and periodicals reflecting the widest possible range of opinion within the community.

The pronoun “*we*” is often used in a strategic way to indicate an institutional identity of a group membership (Sacks, 1992). However, “*we*” as used in the statements above carries more meanings than just group membership. Firstly, the pronoun “*we*” clearly distinguishes who the *power holders* are, and who the signatories are, creating what is known as the “*us*”

¹²³ Their use of politeness is associated with speeches rather than text, but their face-theory provides an interesting universal framework for politeness strategies.

versus “*them*” dichotomy or the construction of “othering”¹²⁴. Dichotomies of otherness as used here are set up as being natural through the process of positioning, categorising or constructing group boundaries. Similar to Marx’s political economy of class differences, the dominant majority, who in this case are the authors of these statements, exemplify these forms of superiority and inferiority which are often embedded in particular identities (Okolie, 2003). Such divisions between groups reinforce the point made in the Introduction Chapter that studying media systems in the post-colonial, transitional and aid-dependent context cannot escape the legacy of the “developed”/“developing”, donor/recipient dichotomies.

Secondly, as Orwell (1962 [1946]) and Sükösd (1997/98, 2000) pointed out in Chapters 3 and 4, those who control the means of defining certain systems, such as an “*independent and pluralistic press*” are actively legitimizing their ideas upon “*them*” to maintain these existing power relations. Given that Malawi has accepted the liberal media system as defined by the *power holders* outlined in these documents, caution should be given to the linguistic framing of language in media policy contracts. Attention should also be carried out on the ideologies embedded in these documents as they too shape the type of media systems being imposed on “others”.

7.2 Ideological Imperative

In the same way that Hallin and Mancini (2004) identified the ideological identities of political parties and journalism to capture the relevance of ideologies in particular media systems, this thesis identified the linguistic features of neoliberalism that are attune to the liberal media model. Based on the notion that language is laden with ideologies (Fairclough, 1995), the second research dimension *neoliberal parallelism* will be presented to stress the “opaque relationship” (ibid: 132) between the dominant global ideology and the “triumph of liberal media model” (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 251).

Grounded in Marxist traditions where ideologies are seen as powerful mechanisms used by the ruling class (*power holders*) to control the “subordinate classes” (*them*), it is crucial to decipher the ideological traits enshrined in these documents in order to claim that power is used through language. As defined by David Harvey (1995) in the Introduction Chapter, neoliberalism has been broadly defined by four central principles: the free market (economic

¹²⁴ This construction of “othering”, as defined by Pandey (2004: 155) “is a technical term used to describe the manner in which social group dichotomies are represented via language”.

liberalization), deregulation (minimal state intervention), privatization (from state to private ownership), profit maximization and commercialization, all of which were found to be common features in all twelve Pan-African media agreements. These key words and phrases were broken down into two groups (1) Liberalization & Deregulation (2) Privatisation & Commercialisation, due to the significant overlap between the principles (see Table 7). For example, phrases such as *the removal of political obstacles* and the *removal of regulatory obstacles* were treated for their semantic compatibility. A method that is not about replacing certain words by their synonyms but understood based on group synonyms. Therefore, centred on Fairclough’s (1989:110) request for understanding “what ideologically significant meaning relations are there between words”, his linguistic strategy of ‘textual synonymy’, was used to show how words are often used interchangeably.

Table 7: Re-wording or “textual synonymy” of central concepts

Central Concept of Neoliberalism	“Textual Synonymy” of central concepts in media agreements
Liberalization & Deregulation	Free press, free market, removal of regulatory obstacles, protected against interference, right to communicate, free flow of information, diversity, freedom and independence, press freedom, freedom of expression, free and independent press, media freedom, editorial independence, access to information, democratise, cooperation and collaboration, building of information society, independent, free access, liberate, access, respect for the freedom, dissemination of information, decolonization of the mass media, promote human rights, fundamental freedoms, pluralistic, open and participatory, fair and transparent, universal access, inclusion, free speech, removal of political obstacles, guarantee public service, decentralised cooperation, not controlled by any particular political party, government controlled broadcasters should be transformed into public service broadcasters, universal access, arbitrary interference, development partners, integration, pluralistic media, freedom and independence, financial and editorial autonomy to the news, co-operation, avoid control, watchdog, public institutions, voluntary self-regulation.
Privatisation & Commercialisation	Participation, private sector, removal of regulatory obstacles foreign trade, strengthening international relationships, profit, partners, remove barriers, economic diversity, advancement of technology and communication tools, investment and funding strategies, strengthening our collaboration, stakeholders, global investor community and financial institutions, corporate entity, promote greater interaction and exchanges, enabling environment, introduction of new technologies, development, growth, benefit, removal of political obstacles.

Liberalization & Deregulation

Starting with the central concepts of liberalization and deregulation, these two concepts have generally represented a relaxation of government restrictions, or the complete elimination of coercive state actions (Phelan, 2014). This idea is characteristic of the liberal media model that Hallin and Mancini (2004) defined; a media model where the role of the nation-state should be minimal for the maintenance of a free and pluralist “fourth estate” (ibid: 199). Thus, the words free and freedom we used on numerous occasions and synonymous with the liberalization of the media.

Both words were used multiple times in all twelve agreements, but in various contexts. However, they were linked, quite specifically, to neoliberalism’s ambition for curtailing government restrictions on the development of the media. As seen here in the following two excerpts: “*Media Freedom means an environment in which the media operate without restraint*” (SADC Protocol, 2000), and African states should be: “*Aware of the existence of serious barriers to free, independent and pluralistic broadcasting and to the right to communicate through broadcasting in Africa*” (African Charter on Broadcasting, 2001).

Here the use of the words *restraint* and *barriers* are tantamount to the promotion of deregulatory action. For example, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) which commissioned the Bamako Declaration (2002) permeated deregulation through the promotion of distinct economic activities - “*The removal of regulatory, political and financial obstacles to the development of communication facilities and tools*” (Statement 3). This neoliberal discourse is equal to that which was championed in the West by Thatcher and Reagan in the 1970s. Consequently, deregulation has continued to gain significant momentum towards the elimination of barriers, as it is not only a government doctrine, but a economic doctrine. Based on *laissez-faire* economics, which advocates the removal of government regulatory obstacles, the state’s role, according to neoliberalism and the liberal media model, is an inhibitor of this free market approach.

The *free flow of information* also implies the removal of trade barriers, which is also linked to freedom of expression. As seen here in Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa (2002): “*Desiring to promote the free flow of information and ideas and greater respect for freedom of expression*”. While the *free flow of information* is based on the elimination of barriers, it is a necessary prerequisite for journalists to carry out their role in society as

government watchdogs. But as history has shown us, through the NWICO¹²⁵ debates, the *free flow of information* was the one-way flow of information from “developed countries” to “developing countries” (Schiller, 1977; Thomas and Nain, 2004; Thussu, 2007). Therefore, it should be noted that the *free flow of information* and the removal of trade barriers are both organized under the ideological vision of neoliberalism, and the pursuit of Western states to expand into new markets. Taking this historical look at neoliberalism and how ideas and practices were inherited and modified into the present, reflects how ideologies are reproduced (Fairclough, 1995).

The next distinctive characteristic of neoliberalism, which was also discovered through the ideological reading of these agreements, and which overlaps with the next central concept, privatisation, is the transfer of ownership from government or public to a privately owned entity. In Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) liberal media model, this is synonymous with the transformation from state-controlled broadcasting to public or privately owned broadcasting. This convergence to a highly market-driven media system relies on a strong public broadcasting sector and government that has little to no involvement in the regulation of the media. As illustrated here in the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa (2002):

“State and government-controlled broadcasters should be transformed into public service broadcasters, accountable to the public through the legislature rather than the government, in accordance with the following principles: - public broadcasters should be governed by a board which is protected against interference, particularly of a political or economic nature” (Statement VI: Public Broadcasting)

Both statements instil a discourse of deregulation on broadcasting and media regulation no matter which broadcasting model a country employs (the US commercial broadcasting model or the UK’s strong public broadcasting model), both are characterized by the transfer of control away from government hands.

Privatisation & Commercialisation

The last central concepts found in these agreements were privatisation and commercialisation. While privatisation is synonymous with the above concepts, namely the transfer from public to private ownership, it cannot be separated from the development of

¹²⁵ New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) debates of the 1970s and 80s were highly controversial as it was argued that the deployment of the free flow of information, resources and technologies were in the favour of the “developed countries” (Nordenstreng, 1984). As advocates of the free-market model, Reagan and Thatcher argued that NWICO was curbing their neoliberal agenda (cf. Cowhey, 1990).

private sector more broadly. Due to low readership, high costs of newspaper printing and television sets, and the scarcity of electricity in many countries across Africa, there was a strong call in these agreements to increase private sector involvement in order to achieve the same media markets that could be found in Europe (modernisation theory). As seen here in Article 6 of the SADC Protocol (2000) it stressed - "*Member States shall encourage the participation of the private sector*", and the Dakar Declaration (2008), which advocated the development of media in Africa on these profit-orientated principles:

"Call on the global investor community and financial institutions, banks and national, regional and international organizations to recognize the African media industries as profitable investment opportunities"

In order to arrive at this point, the state must support a free-market economy that allows foreign actors to invest in the country. This free-market model again reemphasises the central neoliberal principle of little to no government control. If African countries adopt this approach, it would be replicating the early developments of the liberal media model in Europe. A time when market forces put pressure on the party press, which Hallin and Mancini (2004) argue resulted in its decline. This shift was explained in their convergence thesis as a consequence of commercialisation. Therefore, this idea that media industries should be recognised "*as a profitable investment opportunity*" signifies the shift from media as a tool of state propaganda to a capitalist model based on profits. This shift towards privatisation was also found in Article 14 of the SADC Protocol (2000), which stated that African states should "*make cultural industries a major cornerstone of their national economies*". Similar to the points raised in the previous chapter, it becomes evident that the authors of these documents are again using what Fairclough (2003) described as intertextuality. In order to build a neoliberal discourse, texts must be constituted or developed using elements from other texts. From making the media part of the national economy to being a profitable investment, not only reflects the privatisation of the media industry, but also the deregulation of state owned media.

Similar to the nexus between commercialisation and "Americanisation" in Hallin and Macini's (2004: 254) research, where they argued that the commercialisation of the media could conceivably result in the importation of "American media content and imitation of American practices" (ibid: 277), making the media part of the national economy would make this feasible. Therefore the language used must, as Nyamnjoh (2005) earlier argument posits, romanticise Western models as functionally perfect. Because joining of the "privatisation bandwagon" (Nyamnjoh: 2005: 12) will lead to weaker states succumbing to

the demands of multinationals whose aim it is to make a profit (Chomsky, 1999). In neoliberal economics, privatisation and commercialisation are about driving down costs through competition in order to increase profitability (McDonald, 2008), as seen here in the Charter on African Media and the Digital Divide (2002):

“African governments and telecommunications regulators should - support the use of technologies that increase availability, accessibility and affordability of Information and Communication Technologies”

The key word here is *affordability*. Unless African countries are developing and creating their own *Information and Communication Technologies*, private investors will be necessary. A point that was mirrored in The African Charter on Broadcasting (2001):

“Licensing processes for the allocation of specific frequencies to individual broadcasters should be fair and transparent, and based on clear criteria which include promoting media diversity in ownership and content”

The diversity in ownership is another way for the *power holders* to impose the neoliberalism discourse that supports the economic transfer of control to the private sector. Expanding on the licensing processes, another key dimension of Hallin and Mancini’s liberal media model is a strong and independent regulatory apparatus. Described as “savage deregulation” (ibid: 124) if “broadcast licenses are granted directly by the government, rather than by an independent regulatory agency” (ibid: 126), which is the current situation in Malawi, the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa (2002), which was funded by European Community wrote that:

“A State monopoly over broadcasting is not compatible with the right to freedom of expression [and] an independent regulatory body shall be responsible for issuing broadcasting licenses and for ensuring observance of license conditions” (Statement V: Private Broadcasting)

While the weakening of the government’s role within the media sector is a reflection of the neoliberal principle – deregulation, the issuing of licences is part of Malawi’s legal framework; therefore it must be changed if foreign owners are permitted to invest in the African media market.

By privileging neoliberal logics around the free market, deregulation, privatization and profit maximization through commercialization, which these media agreements share through media liberalization, minimal state intervention, and the transfer of power from state broadcasting to private ownership, I associate this trend with the research dimension *neoliberalism parallelism*. Coined to emphasise, as well as support the claim that language is

laden with ideologies (Fairclough, 1995) and that international institutions carry ideologies (Cox, 1993), *neoliberalism parallelism* describes how this dominant hegemonic ideology (Chomsky, 1999; Fourcade, 2006; Mudge, 2008) corresponds with the liberal media model being advocated by these agreements. Unlike Hallin and Mancini's (2004) *political parallelism*, neoliberalism is the ideology behind the organisational connections and the organisations themselves. Advocated by those who have the power to prescribe the liberal media model on other countries, neoliberalism has become a major ideological force that explains why there has been a shift towards the liberal media model in the post-colonial, transitional and aid-dependent context.

Summary

This section of the findings and analysis chapter has highlighted the various linguistic mechanisms used to illustrate how “language is an instrument of control” (Hodge and Kress, 1979:6) and plays an essential role in the ‘social construction of reality’ (Fairclough, 2001). As language corresponds to the views of those who create it - *power holders*, thus providing terms and conditions which evoke a discourse that goes far beyond language itself. Using the imperative verbs “*should*” and “*shall*”, not only reproduced the Western liberal media model to African media systems, but also created a commonly accepted discourse that emphatically commanded countries to adopt the liberal media model, thus illustrating that shifts towards the liberal model has not been natural. This exercise of power over the direction that African media systems should take also highlights the fact that although “discourses are not ideologies” (Fairclough, 1992 in Fischer, 2003:77), the relationship between neoliberalism and the liberal media model show how discourses “intersect with ideologies, which supply the words of a discourse” (ibid). Therefore, the words used in all twelve agreements were neither random nor arbitrary, as the *power holders* in these documents not only define the liberal media model in accordance to their ideology, but view language as an “ideological investment” (Fairclough, 1992: 7) one which repositions their authority in the global world order.

The Change Makers

Moving away from the Pan-African treatment of foreign intervention, this section deals specifically with Malawi. By analysing and extracting key themes from the interviews, this chapter is divided into five interrelating subsections that examine the role of foreign intervention as an important variable for analysis in the study of media systems. Following decades of forced trade liberalization through Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) and macroeconomic policies throughout the 1970s and 80s, donor governments and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) continue to use foreign aid and conditionalities as mechanisms of economic power to force Malawi into agreeing to their rules and their systems. Therefore, conditionalities are always in accordance to what the donors insist on being the most pressing issue at the time. Legitimized through the need for economic growth, development and free expression, Western donors are now actively spreading the liberal democratic agenda to all corners of the world through this economically coercive system.

8.1 “He Who Pays the Piper Calls the Tune”

Since the end of colonial rule in Malawi, foreign actors, such as the *power holders* described in the previous section, have used various strategic foreign policy tools to prescribe change. Based specifically on the time when President Joyce Banda opened up Malawi’s media landscape in 2012, there was an overwhelming consensus amongst the interviewees that “foreign aid played a big role in the opening up of airwaves, especially television” (Academic 1 - 15/08/15). However, this is ascribed to a long history that Malawi has encountered with foreign actors intervening in the media, as explained by one former newspaper editor:

“During the Cold War we were given these cartoons by someone for free from somewhere, I can’t remember exactly, but we would print them only to realise that they were all anti-communist, which the CIA were planting [...] and the CIA funded the two ears¹²⁶ of our newspaper [...] the Rothschilds also brought newspaper space” (Economist-11/07/2015)

The planting of ideological propaganda to win anti-communist support during the Cold War reflects the point raised by Nkrumah (1965:18), that those in charge of implementing

¹²⁶ By “two ears” the interviewee was referring to the two main columns of the newspaper.

change operate “not only in the economic field, but also in the political, religious, ideological and cultural spheres”. This “pragmatic anti-communist objective” as Carothers (1999: 20) described it, reveals the different means and intentions that foreign actors have had. Being heavily political, during this period in Malawi’s media history, it was not important what type of media system Malawi had, but what it could achieve for those funding it. This type of instrumental power being used by external forces reflects Morgenthau’s (1962: 302) idea that the “transfer of money and services from one government to another performs here the function of a price paid for political services rendered or to be rendered”. Although this example given by the economist was not government-to-government, the CIA is a service of the United States federal government, therefore a direct subsidiary. The Rothschilds, on the other hand, who have been described as “The World’s Bank” (see Ferguson, 1998), are one of the richest families in the world, and as Morgenthau (1967, 1985) stressed, with great wealth comes great power. And this became apparent when one media practitioner, who has worked in Malawi’s media industry for over three decades, stated that:

“The Democrat had external funding, although I wasn’t in top management I knew that it was the same funders which had something to do with the JFK foundation, who funded The Post in Zambia, which helped push the new multi-party democracy and so it was the same funders who were doing the same thing here in Malawi” (Journalist 3 - 27/07/15)

This was confirmed in another interview with a local media practitioner who claimed that Germany “*was supporting it [the liberalisation of the media], just to promote democracy in Malawi*” (Media Practitioner 23 - 23/07/15). Therefore, there was a common agreement that Western donors “*supported the media so much because they knew that it [the media] would be the pillar that would be the driving force to change politics in a country like Malawi*” (Journalist 3 - 27/07/15). Referring to the media as the fourth pillar of the estate, as defined by Irish political theorist Edmund Burke (1729 –1797)¹²⁷, the media in Malawi, according to these two interviewees, was strategically employed to safeguard democracy. Similar to the point raised by Hallin and Mancini (2004) who highlighted how the US Department of State would “promote the US conception of press freedom and journalist professionalism around the world to re-establish democracy in European countries” (ibid: 255-256), reiterates the clear relationship between media and politics.

To build on this relationship, the inclusion of foreign intervention, in the way it has been presented thus far, raises three important points for the study of media systems. Firstly, the

¹²⁷ The press was and continues to be described as the fourth pillar of democracy, which it shares with the other three administrative bodies; the executive, the legislature and judiciary.

study of its history plays a significant role in understanding why and how Malawi's media system evolved. Secondly, the link between the building and maintenance of democracy by external forces is intrinsically linked to the liberal media model. And thirdly, implementing change has never been the sole responsibility of foreign governments alone; private foundations, such as the JFK Foundation were routinely using their economic power to prescribe political and ideological change. Therefore, as proverbially put by one media practitioner, *"he who pays the piper calls the tune"* (Media Practitioner 5 - 27/07/15). Referring specifically to foreign donors, the interviewee was making a case that those with an economic upper hand in foreign relations have the power to decide what the change will be, and how it will be made. As one donor openly stated:

"The role of the civil society and the international community should be the watchdog role [...] and freedom of the media is one of the things that Malawi is clearly committed to, if we see that this is being challenged, we raise it" (Donor 5 -12/06/15)

Based on another donor's confirmation that *"press freedom was one of the issues that were highly prioritized by the donors"* (Donor 4 - 30/07/15), the extent to which donors define the functions of Malawi's own media system, reinforces the subordinate position Malawi has when it comes to making decisions about the type of media system it should have. Just as democracy and multipartism was a priority post-independence, these donors have made it clear that press freedom is their latest priority, supporting the data given by Myers (2014: 2) that foreign donors are making a "concerted effort to provide assistance to the media". It is important to add here that regional NGOs such as the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) which is, and has been, funded by private foundations and foreign donors, such as the Open Society Institute (OSI), Panos, GTZ¹²⁸, and a number of foreign embassies, fosters under the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) regional mandate the provisions of the Windhoek Declaration (1991), which calls for "an independent, pluralistic and free press as essential for democracy and economic development" (MISA, 2015: para 1). Although Morgenthau did not take into consideration the increasing power of non-state actors, he rightly foresaw how Western governments had a "new task of creating and maintaining new institutions and procedures through which the new common interests of nations can be pursued" (Morgenthau, 1973: 541).

Characteristic of the *Donor Interests Model* (McKinley and Little, 1978, 1979), the placing of donor interests or priorities over those of Malawi's was seen by some interviewees as a

¹²⁸ Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) is a German owned international cooperation organisation.

reflection of the past: *“there is still a lot of colonisation, it may be subtle, but it is there”* (Media Practitioner 8 - 29/04/15). And this is reinforced by the idea that, many of those interviewed refer to them as the new *“colonial masters”* (Government Official 6 - 15/05/15). Akin to the arguments put forward by Nkrumah (1965) and Veltmeyer (2005), who both suggested that new forms of imperialism are merely different faces of the former colonial order, Malawi’s aid-dependent status not only amplifies these existing power imbalances between “developed” and “developing” countries, as well as the donor and recipient relationship, but also helps donors maintain this power hierarchy. In the words of a local government official: *“we are powerless, they come and say they want to support A, B, C, D and we will give you so much”* (Government Official 1 - 04/08/15). By not having any power over the direction or shape of media, the push toward a more liberal media model as defined by these donors cannot be described as “naturally occurring” nor can the nation state be automatically treated as a fixed unit of analysis without interrogating the role of other actors. However, one media practitioner blamed Malawi’s docile character and history of being controlled as the root cause of this unequal relationship: *“we are over submissive, we do not have any critical approach on whatever is being pushed onto us”* (Media Practitioner 20 - 02/05/15).

This idea that Malawi is ‘submissive’ mirrors the literature presented in the introductory chapters, which stressed that those subject to external forces, especially foreign aid, are likely to be vulnerable to manipulation (Hattori, 2001; Held and McGrew, 2002; Harcourt, 2012). As noted by one interviewee who previously worked for the government, president Dr. Kamuzu Banda *“foresaw the manipulating nature of the west”* (Media Practitioner 22 - 16/08/15). However, as pointed out by a current government official, if *“they rely on the pocket of that funder, you don't bite the finger of the hand that is feeding you”* (Government Official 4 - 22/07/15). This proverb, similar to the one used by Media Practitioner 5, indicates the extent to which foreign aid can be used as an economic lever to set the rules of engagement (see Stokke 1995), and in this way Malawi’s *“financial independence is compromised”* (ibid). This loss of sovereignty, as Villaroman (2009) described it, reinforces the claim that the nation state should not be automatically treated as the core unit of analysis.

Although attempts have been made by the government of Malawi to become less economically dependent on foreign aid, which has included raising taxes and setting in place a TV licence structure (similar to that found in the UK), in order to bolster Malawi’s independence, Malawi’s fragile economy and low public incomes among the majority of Malawians meant that this could not be achieved. Therefore, economic uncertainties also

play a substantial role in the changes which occur to Malawi's media system, because even if there is an internal willingness to change, *"the challenge is sustainability, because once that funding is gone it's very rare to see the continuity"* (Media Practitioner 3 - 27/10/15). This was evident when Joyce Banda was given the task of gaining donor funds back after Bingu wa Mutharika lost it in 2011. However, she was heavily criticized for her lack of autonomy against the donor community, and was described as being controlled by the international community:

"It was almost like she was a puppet [...] people thought she was just pleasing the international community [...] The international community had raised issues to do with the media, media freedom and other issues, so whatever she did people would say okay, is she listening to the people, or she is listening to the international community" (Media Practitioner 13 - 01/06/15)

As an extension of the *Donor Interests Model*, the international community, which was acting as the "puppet master" in this excerpt, raises concerns over who is defining the functions of Malawi's media system. Although it could be argued that as the head of state, Joyce Banda had the authority to make the final decisions about the future of Malawi's media system, it was learned from one of Malawi's major donors that *"the USA for one loved Joyce Banda [...] she was a product of [DONOR]"* (Donor 2 - 08/06/15). This idea that she was a "product" of the US suggests she was somehow created by the US, and they loved her because she followed the values of the US. Based on this comment, would her decisions be of her own making? As noted above, the US has a history of fostering their own type of press freedom and journalistic professionalism (Hallin and Mancini, 2004); therefore, making Joyce Banda a 'product' of US made her an indispensable tool that was needed to shape Malawi's media systems in accordance with US interests.

As part of these discussions, issues relating to where she obtained her advice and the intentions behind that advice become important topics for discussion. Besides the US, the UK, which controlled Malawi for over 70 years, was repeatedly criticized for their involvement in Malawi's internal affairs, and when it came to the media, it was argued that *"the British had a lot of influence, probably it was the British High Commissioner and the British who supported the media. That would have been at the top of their agendas when they were talking to her"* (Journalist 3 - 27/07/15). Although it was never revealed by the donors in any great detail as to what their intentions or interests were in promoting a liberal media model, it was disclosed by some that *"having just one state media is not a healthy state of affairs"* therefore, *"it's important to grow the private sector"* (Donor 4 - 30/07/15). As discussed in the

previous section, the growth of the private sector is associated with the principles of neoliberalism, in which, decentralization, or the selling of state assets is a key outcome. Interestingly, the dissemination of particular ideologies is not the only outcome donors want to achieve, “*our job is not just to provide the money, but to facilitate the access to the thinking [which] rejects the old way of doing things*” (Donor 3 -12/06/15). Suggesting that Malawi requires “modern thinking” which requires breaking away from its own traditions and past, reflects points made by in Lerner’s (1958) book *The Passing of Traditional Society*, whereby the Middle East and much of the postcolonial world following WWII required modernization through an injection of Western values and expertise. Based on this proposition, it should force us, as media system researchers, to revisit the meaning of modernisation and Americanisation in today’s understanding of external forces. Therefore, it could be argued that the liberalization of the media, and the liberal media model in particular, are the new forms of modernization and Americanisation, representing external forces projecting a normative model onto another country. By using Susan Strange’s (1988, 1996) multifaceted conceptualisation of power to broaden what we mean by power and external forces, we can understand where it comes from and how it is disseminated. Thus, the shift towards the liberal model as a result of increasing commercialization in the media may not be a ‘naturally occurring’ phenomenon if those providing the capital are tying it to “*grow the private sector*”. This passing of Western values and expertise reproduces what the very points Marx and Engels were articulating in *The German Ideology* whereby the interests of newspaper publishers, governments, and business interests were becoming routinely present:

“The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class, which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it (1846/1932: 64-65).

The dominant ideology, which for Marx and Engels was the growth of capitalism, is similar to the dominant ideology of neoliberalism today, which emphasizes the growth in the private sector. While the idea that dominant interests are played out through this intellectual force, the idea that donors, as the new ruling elite, have “*a lot of influence on the landscape of our broadcasting industry*” (Government Official 6 - 15/05/15), synthesizing foreign intervention into the study of media systems, is not only a as a financial feature, but a mental or ideological feature of foreign intervention. This control over the means of mental production was reflected in another interviewees testimony to how donors economic

control was manipulating the actions of the state, “*we’re always being told that this is what we are supposed to do [in other words] we’re being moulded*” (Academic 2 - 23/07/15). This idea that Malawi is being shaped strengthens the arguments made by Jakubowicz and Sükösd (2008), Nyamnjoh (2005) and wa Thiong’o (2005) which view external forces as an act of intentional coercion rather than compliance. It also reinforces the claims made by Aginam, (2005) that the liberal media model was foisted onto Africa by the West. As metaphorically put by a local media-based NGO:

“After fifty years we are crying for fish instead of asking for a hook so we can be catching fish on our own. We should go to the lake at time of our convenience and go get the fish from the lake, but still we want other people to kill fish for us at their convenient time” (Media Practitioner 11 -17/04/15)

This metaphor perfectly reflects the significance and consequence of dependency, which is emphasized by the financial and structural constraints faced by Malawi’s government. However, the interviewee also points out that some of the responsibility lies with the government for accepting these conditions and thus reproducing Malawi’s subordinate status. However, it is clear from the quotes in this section, that as the world becomes more interconnected through globalization, and countries like Malawi remain economically dependent on the new “*colonial masters*” (Government Official 6 - 15/05/15), it is possible to argue that “the inequities of colonial rule have not been erased, [and therefore] premature to proclaim the demise of colonialism” (Loomba, 1998: 7).

8.2 “Most of the Aid has Conditionalities”

This method of controlling others through economic means shows that Malawi is experiencing what is at the core of Morgenthau’s (1962) theory of foreign aid, bribery. As an integral part of diplomatic efforts (McGowan et.al., 2006), conditional loans or foreign aid conditionalities are commonly seen as essential mechanisms for donors to exercise control and implement change. And long-standing Government officials are very aware that “*most of the aid has conditionalities*” (Government Official 1 - 04/08/15) and the influence they have over the country’s political, economic and cultural policies.

Since the introduction of multipartism in 1993, Malawi has faced increasing international pressure to sustain its liberal democratic governance structures. In order to make that happen, Western donors, as pointed out by one of the journalists in the previous section, support the liberalization of the media, to safeguard democracy. Therefore, Western

governments who have routinely used their economic strength, will actively use various “disciplinary mechanisms” (Mawuko-Yevugah, 2014: 56) to urge Malawi to be more democratic in return for financial support. For example, it was noted that during his 8-year reign (2004 –2012), President Bingu wa Mutharika *“had to be seen as democratic to get money, as we were living in a time when you will be penalised for being undemocratic”* (Economist – 11/07/2015). As wa Thiong’o (2005) stated “the economic panacea dished out to all who seek loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund [...] has the same identical demand – private or perish” (Thiong'o in Mkandawire, 2005: 155). Subjecting Malawi to economic penalties or punishment is not new. On numerous occasions donors have tried *“to democratise MBC, but it was not opening up [so] donors pulled out”* (Media Practitioner 3 - 27/10/15). In so doing, the donors have the power to see the state media perish. However, the reasons or intentions behind these conditionalities vary and never static. Over the years, donors have been *“requesting that we change our policies”* (Government Official 1 - 04/08/15), while these have changed since multipartism, it was clear to some that the government would never be *“working against Western interests”* (Media Practitioner 1 - 09/09/15) for fear of being punished. This point validates Farer’s (1985) concerns that no matter what interests are being served, the methods economically powerful states employ to influence another state’s policies, and to what ends, can mean the different between being coercive or consensual.

However, this research identified a very specific policy change, which was the opening-up of Malawi’s media landscape in 2012 by President Joyce Banda, when she granted 15 new TV and radio licences to all political parties and foreign investors. The reason that this particular action taken by Banda was so distinct was because the general public *“read from the newspapers, [that the] EU has said they should open up for the licences, [and] the British High Commissioner was asking for the opening up the media”* (Media Practitioner 3 - 27/10/15). Although some said she did it *“to gain support”* (Media Practitioner 16 - 23/04/15) and to *“impress the donor community”* (Media Practitioner 21 - 01/05/15), it was strongly felt by others that:

“It was a conditionality from the West to put it simply, and why I’m saying that is because if people have been pushing for it before, why should it be only be during 2012 when Joyce Banda come into power” (Journalist 1 - 13/05/15)

This was confirmed by another government official, who said *“it was in compliance with the donor community”* (Government Official 6 - 15/05/15). One possible reason for these comments could be due to the fact that many were questioning whether or not the media

was on the government agenda at all, as brought up by another government official; *“I’m not really sure whether the opening up of the media and TV licences was one of the key agendas within the manifestos of the political parties”* (Government Official 2 - 14/04/15). Although there was some level of certainty by this interviewee, it was pointed out by Journalist 3 in the previous section that it was at the top of the British High Commissioner’s agenda when they were talking to her.

When discussing this particular time-period with the interviewees, in particular when Joyce Banda was constitutionally sworn-in¹²⁹ in 2012, her first 100 days in office became a significant period in this shift towards the liberal media model. Defined as a period for both internal and external observers to assess her future policies, it was raised by one interviewee that *“she was really under pressure to perform”* (Media Practitioner 8 - 29/04/15). During these initial months in power, as discussed in the first chapter, Joyce Banda was given the task of restoring the weakened diplomatic ties with the international community which President Bingu wa Mutharika left after he antagonised donors with his zero-aid budget strategy in 2011. Referring specifically to the UK and U.S. as the key figures in this international community, it was picked up by one local academic that the issue of strategically timed diplomacy is also noteworthy:

“I think what happened during the Joyce Banda regime is mirrored very well with what happened during Dr. [Kamuzu] Banda’s time. When there was a power vacuum there was an opportunity for the international community to use a lot of diplomatic power to use what we call “soft power” to force things along, and the licensing of television stations was just part and parcel of what was happening at that particular time” (Academic 4 - 23/07/15)

This interviewee, who had witnessed all of Malawi’s presidents being sworn-in, implied that the transition period between one president and another was an opportunity for the international community to secure a foothold in Malawi’s internal affairs. Given her vulnerability due to this political vacuum, reversing Bingu wa Mutharika’s longstanding repressive media laws and policies prompted people to question whether this shift in relation to Malawi’s media history was an internal strategy or an externally-created policy attached to the reinstatement of foreign aid. According to Morgenthau (1985: 53) such political vacuums made it an “unavoidable duty to conquer”, and this was shared among many of those interviewed, who proposed that *“it was a conditionality from the West”* others

¹²⁹ Joyce Banda who served as the Vice President of Malawi under Bingu wa Mutharika’s administration was constitutionally sworn in as President following the death of Mutharika, as according to Section 83 (4) of the Constitution (1995): “Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of President, the First Vice-President shall assume that office for the remainder of the term”.

also pointed to the fact that it had to be externally imposed because *“politicians are still nervous about a completely liberalised media, which is perfectly understandable, every politician is threatened by people who write freely”* (Journalist 2 - 09/08/15). Given Malawi’s history of authoritarianism and the reluctance to liberate Malawi’s state-owned broadcaster, Malawi Broadcasting Cooperation (MBC), the opening-up of the private and community media could be seen as a quid pro quo to broker a deal with the international community, without affecting the status of MBC, as neither Joyce Banda nor her predecessors have changed it from being a state-owned broadcaster.

Besides this particular time-period, it was also noted that the international community used other means to impose the liberal media model in Malawi. For example, the passing of the Access to Information Bill, which defines the scope of public information that the public can access, has been advocated for by journalists and NGOs who were keen to have this piece of legislation enacted. Although it has now been approved as of February this year, it was revealed during the interviews last year in 2015 that *“donors have really been pushing for the Access to Information Bill to be passed fast”* (Government Official 1 - 04/08/15). Following the Cashgate Scandal, the international community were keen to see Malawi respect Article 37 of the Constitution which states, “every person shall have the right of access to all information held by the State”, as well as its promise to the African Union (AU) Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003) which Malawi ratified. In order to achieve this, it was disclosed that *“the international community were using that as a precondition for aid. I remember we had colleagues from the World Bank and IMF asking about that [Access to Information Bill]”* (Media Practitioner 22 16/08/15). This point, being made here by someone who worked in close proximity to those in the media and government, mirrors the evidence given by Wroe (2012) in Chapter 4 who revealed that donors in Malawi have been known for threatening to withhold aid unless certain conditions are met. Given this vulnerability to external pressure, it was compellingly conveyed by one government official that:

“When somebody sponsors you, you are really controlled by the conditions that may be put in place; you cannot put in your own ways of doing things when the conditions are compelling you to do the other way round. So obviously you have to stick to the conditions that have been agreed between you as a media house and your donor. So of course you find yourself dancing to the tune of the donor to fulfil the demands that you may have put in place” (Media Practitioner 5 - 27/07/15)

This excerpt corresponds with Lord Mawuko-Yevugah’s (2014: 48) idea that conditionalities are “external interventions [which] significantly constrain the capacity of

developing countries to experiment with their own models”. The restrictive nature of foreign aid exemplifies why the shift towards the liberal media model cannot be seen as ‘naturally occurring’ as Hallin and Mancini (2004) predicted in this case study, as the type of media model being created is governed by the conditionalities set by the donors.

In contrast to many of the government official and media practitioners, donors often saw this shift as naturally occurring, as one donor mentioned in a discussion about a shift towards the US commercial model: *“I do think that’s been a natural progression because as technology is developing, more and more people are realizing that they can make money with this, whether it’s a newspaper, or a TV station”* (Donor 4 - 30/07/15). While Hallin and Mancini identified this shift with the rise in the commercialisation of media markets and an outcome of objective US journalism practice which others have gone on to follow, this donor foresaw this rise in commercialisation as equating to the rise in capital. In response to this, one local journalist saw this as problematic, in that: *“we have created capitalists not journalists”* (Journalist 3 - 27/07/15). Although this cannot be said for the whole of Malawi’s media system, the shift towards a more commercial media, based on profit-making, does not reflect Malawi’s history of having a state-controlled broadcaster for populist purposes. However, donors have tried on numerous occasions to change this: *“in the run up to elections, there was a constant message about trying to open up state media to all the opposition parties and to give everyone equal air time”* (Donor 4 - 30/07/15). Therefore, instilling the liberal or the commercial liberal media model into the fabric of Malawi’s political system required donors to use methods that are seen to consolidate their democratic principles. When I asked one of Malawi’s long-standing media practitioners whether any of these shifts have been natural the response was: *“It’s natural because we have been conditioned all these years to believe it’s natural”* (Media Practitioner 1 - 09/09/15). Therefore, it has become evidently clear that shift towards the liberal media model has been anything but natural, but rather the result of external forces, through various methods deployed by non-state actors.

8.3 Forced Liberalization

The last two sections have provided evidence to answer the central question, which is to what extent can foreign intervention be considered a key variable for the analysis of media systems and explain the global shift towards media liberalization? This section builds upon the evidence provided to answer the second question: has this shift been “natural” or forced? The concept ‘natural’ was introduced by Hallin and Mancini (2004) who expressed that

many countries around the world were gradually shifting towards the liberal media model, founded on evidence that there has been a decline in secularism and political parallelism. However, given the complex interrelationships that exist in the current global order attention much be paid to these in the boarder global context. In order to test this assumption, this research asked those interviewed about whether this is true, or whether external forces have coercively imposed change to take place in Malawi.

For over three decades, foreign donors and international financial institutions (IFIs) have used foreign aid and their liberalization policies to constrain Malawi's autonomy and ability to design its own political, economic and cultural systems. From Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and Fiscal Restructuring and Deregulation Programmes (FRDP) to Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), liberalization has been central to all strategies. Now, specific efforts to change Malawi's media system into a more liberal one, has become the ambition of many former colonial states, IFIs and supranational institutions. As disclosed here by one US donor in Malawi:

"We want to support the media, we want to make sure that the media is able to report freely, so we'll support a free media, free speech, and if its issues of capacity, if we can we'll help them to get there [...] I would say [we have]¹³⁰ achieved its goal in terms of helping the media to be more open" (Donor 2 - 08/06/15 15/08/2015)

This quote not only reflects the specific objectives that foreign donors wish to achieve for Malawi, but the wider geopolitical forces in operation. Over the years, there have been numerous examples of how foreign actors have used force, as well as consent, to promote democracy, curtail communism and to advance the neoliberal world order (see Stokke, 1995; Carothers, 1999; Cox et al, 2000; Sørensen, 2006; Burnell, 2011). From the interviews conducted, there seems to be a continuation of such methods to pressure countries into changing their internal systems in alignment with dominant Western systems. As pointed out here by a local journalist:

"Most of the opening up all over the third world is from Western pressure, it has been Western pressure based on money [...] so I would say that to a greater extent in most of the poor countries, most of the things that they were implementing in terms of liberalization is by imposition" (Journalist 1 - 13/05/15)

Therefore, this notion that liberalisation is part of a larger global push, reflects one interviewee's observation that the same thing happened when Malawi, and the majority of Africa was forced to democratise: *"I think the biggest challenge was the international community,*

¹³⁰ The name of this donor was replaced here to ensure they remain anonymous.

because it was forcing people to say go, go into democracy” (Media Practitioner 11 -17/04/15). This parallelism between democratisation and the liberalization of the media is highly important as it strengthens the argument that external forces have been coercive, and there is a considerable body of literature which supports the claim that democratisation was externally forced on “developing countries” (see Ogbondah, 1997; Burnell and Ware, 1998; Carothers, 1999; Ihonvbere, 2003).

However, Mawuko-Yevugah’s idea that aid is a “disciplinary mechanism” provides the necessary backdrop to understanding the various means by which foreign actors have been able to maintain influence over “developing countries”. While Mawuko-Yevugah, alongside others, such as Stokke (1995), Sørensen (2004), Carothers (1999) and Burnell (2000, 2011) have argued that conditionalities have been the primary vehicle used by IFIs, economically powerful donors and states to shape the internal systems of “developing countries”, only a few scholars have described these as coercive, and even fewer have moved beyond these common descriptions of conditionalities to recognise that the suspension of aid, which employs a mix of threats and punishments, is also a form of coercive control (Chatterjee, D. and Scheid, 2003; Mushi 1995; Rothchild 1997). Now there is mounting evidence from within Malawian that they had little or no choice in liberalising the country’s media, as one media practitioner explains: *“even if the government will be reluctant to do that, they’ll still be forced to open-up. So there is no choice, we have to move with the times and with the rest of the world”* (Media Practitioner 22 16/08/15).

This idea that Malawi had “no choice” to open the media up supports the claim by those in the previous section that donors rather than the state have been behind such decisions. However, what is distinctive about this quote and those above, is the word “forced”. When asking interviewees whether they thought that the shift towards a more liberal media system was a naturally-occurring phenomenon or forced, there was a general consensus that: *“we are not naturally following it [the western liberal model] we are being forced to”* (Media Practitioner 3 - 27/10/15). Again, the word “forced” was a prominent feature when discussing Malawi’s shift towards the liberal media model. Based on this word, the concept *Forced Liberalization* was coined. Created with the purpose of expanding the analytical framework within present media systems research, this term was initially devised to challenge the presumed ‘naturalness’ of media liberalization which Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) proposed.

The changes that took place in Malawi are anything but natural. Therefore, *Forced Liberalization* not only represents the imposed liberalisation of the media, but also reflects the liberalisation of the economy through the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1970s and 80s and the Washington Consensus that was propagated by the IFIs in the 1990s. These wide spread liberalisation reform packages became the central ingredient for conditionalities. Therefore, to suggest that change is natural requires revision. In fact, evidence from another interviewee pointed out that the “Western” agenda towards liberalisation of other sectors was also forced, and that this too will impact on the development of the media sector:

“[The privatisation of electricity] has been forced on Malawi, because Malawi is not at a point where it can sell electricity, because I mean, we look at the majority of the population, 80% of the population are in the rural areas and they are not connected to the electricity grid, so if they are going to privatise it, it’s going to be more expensive, it means those people are going to be cut out completely” (Journalist 5 - 04/08/15)

The point being made here is that the liberalisation of the media does not occur in a vacuum, it is part of the wider political economy, and the global shift towards the neoliberal agenda, which will be discussed in the following section. However, it’s worth pointing out here that the media should not be studied in isolation. Methodologically, to study media systems based on this excerpt indicates that what is happening elsewhere, not just politically but economically, must be addressed. Just as the relationship between media and politics cannot be measured without the third dimension of foreign intervention, in the post-colonial, transitional and aid-dependent advanced context, media systems more generally should be theoretically studied in relation to the international political economy. As one media practitioner compellingly put it when asked about the consequences of being part of the international community and their policies:

“that is the biggest challenge that we face, we do not know how to defend ourselves, meaningfully defending ourselves, [...] whatever is being pushed onto us, that’s why most of the economic policies, media policies and what have you, are policies that we adopted but we probably needed to modify them so they are able to fit in our shoes [...] there is a need for us to start thinking as international people, we can only be part of the software of internationality if you are able to subscribe and understand what’s happening at that level” (Media Practitioner 20 - 02/05/15)

This quote is interesting for several reasons. First, it highlights the fact that Malawi is currently in a weaker position within the global system in comparison to those who are currently pushing the global liberal agenda and their policies, with emphasises the point that studying media systems within the post-colonial, transitional, aid-dependent context

requires a different analytical and theoretical lens. Secondly, using the phrase “*whatever is being pushed onto us*” reinforces the claim that Malawi’s media system has been shaped by outside forces. Thirdly, expressing the idea that Malawi must think “internationally” in order to be a stronger figure in the global system, which can only be achieved by “subscribing” to the approaches and models taking place at a global level, again mirrors the points made by Strange (1988) whereby power operates at the global political economy level. She foresaw the structure of global economy as being run by rich countries whose investments and multinational businesses possess the greatest economic power, thus political power. In order to help solidify this argument, the following sections illustrate how two global forces operate within the global political economy, which exemplify the demands put on countries to change their internal systems.

8.4 Neoliberalism Parallelism

As pointed out by one interviewee in the previous chapter, neoliberalism “*is everywhere, we can’t escape from it*” (Media Practitioner 16 - 23/04/15). From “the breaking up of the licencing monopoly enjoyed by the former Malawi postal and telecommunications corporation” (Chitsulo, Chimwaga and Kaombe, 2006: 34) to the mushrooming of privately owned radio stations and newspapers in the 1990s under the Muluzi administration, Malawi has witnessed several ways in which neoliberalism has manifested itself within the liberalisation of the media in Malawi. Another has been through the use of neoliberal advisors, or what Escobar (1995: 6) referred to them as “Western experts”, who instructed President Joyce Banda to liberalise at the time when the TV and radio licences were given:

“Gregory Mills heads the Brenthurst Foundation, based in Johannesburg, South Africa and was Joyce Banda's advisor at that time. The Foundation was established in 2005 and funded by the Oppenheimer family to strengthen African economic performance, which were very neoliberal, they advised her to liberalise quickly, which is very irresponsible” (Economist – 11/07/2015)

Without much knowledge about the Oppenheimer family, it was later discovered that South Africa’s Oppenheimer family and Singapore state investor Temasek Holdings set up a \$300 million (US) private equity fund to invest primarily in consumer goods and agricultural sectors, but also in the media across Africa (Reuters, 2011). As already mentioned, private foundations and large corporations play a significant role in shaping the media and furthering policies that may be centered on political or economic self-interest. This realist view of power relays McChesney’s (2001) assessment of neoliberalism, which views

deregulation of the media as a means for economic expansion, monopolization and profit-maximisation. While “he who pays the piper calls the tune” becomes evident, the ideologies that are affixed to those paying should also be a point of measurement. Assessing the appropriate units of analysis for the study of media systems requires a holistic understanding of all the components which impact the direction a country takes. As seen in the following excerpt, the donor community actively support this neoliberal approach:

“Yes the neoliberal principles of privatisation and free market approach has affected the growth of the media in many ways, liberalisation has opened up the airwaves and telecommunications industry” (Donor 1 - 15/08/15)

This second method conflates the core principles of neoliberalism with process of media liberalisation. This was echoed by another donor, who also emphasised that their agenda was the promotion of the private sector onto Malawi as a means of advancing the liberal media model:

“In terms of private sector it’s an important area, I think the [donor³¹] feels that the private sector should be given more responsibility. I think it’s important to grow the private sector, the private sector here is quite small and it tends to focus on very much on the Malawian market, now is the time that Malawi should start to look outside” (Donor 4 - 30/07/15)

In both examples, it is clear that the words that they used are neither random nor arbitrary. Privatisation, free market, liberalisation, and private sector all denote neoliberalism, and as one of “the defining political economic paradigms of our time” (Chomsky, 1999: 7), it would make sense as to why so many donors, corporations and private foundations are using it.

After the BBC extolled their British broadcasting values through the training of journalists in Malawi and across Africa (Golding, 1977; Mudhai et al, 2007), and USAID (2016) provided foreign aid, which reflects American values, neoliberalism has become the next major mechanism in which external values are produced. As another donor openly stated: *“we all come with our own backgrounds, as [donor country³²] we basically come with a social democratic background, which means that we do believe in the free market” (Donor 5 - 12/06/15).* More loosely defined by one journalist as the imposition of “*Western values*” (Journalist 1 - 13/05/15), many of those interviewed were concerned that this imposition of neoliberalism through the liberalisation of the media would *“create a market for their products, their content, their gadgets [...] America will benefit for the selling of content and China for manufacturing, the two superpowers” (Media Practitioner 16 - 23/04/15).*

³¹ Donors name has been removed for the purpose of anonymity.

³² Donor country’s name has been removed for the purpose of anonymity.

The two points raised here reflect McChesney's (2001) views on economic expansion, which follow Hallin and Mancini's (2004: 255) point that "we generally associate Americanization today with the conservative influence of neoliberalism." One of the core element of neoliberalism was translated by one government official who articulated that "*privatisation is all about foreign companies expanding their reach, not internal companies being able to compete in the world economy or even the building of their own nation*" (Government Official 1 - 04/08/15). Given that donors think "*competition brings about maturity*" (Donor 1 - 15/08/15), there is a clear disparity between how the donors view economic expansion and how the Malawian government view it. McChesney (2000, 2001, 2008) has long argued that this shift towards privatisation has allowed foreign actors to operate freely and use their global purchasing power to gain control over other countries. Large corporations and foreign donors alike have replaced the role of the state, which has historically used its political power to prescribe changes. This loss of sovereignty reflects how Malawi is increasingly vulnerable to external forces and the ideologies to which they are attached.

Another way in which neoliberalism has manifested itself in relation to the liberalisation of the media in Malawi has been through the principle of deregulation, or the transfer of ownership from public (government) to the private sector (business). According to Hallin and Mancini's (2004) liberal media model, being market-dominated with little to no state intervention is a key characteristic of this media system, but is also a key characteristic of neoliberalism. And for many years' donors have condemned Malawi for continuing to have a state-controlled broadcaster. As confirmed by one long standing Member of Parliament: "*there was a lot of pressure from stakeholders that MBC must reform, from donor partners led by Michael Nevin, now the British Ambassador, that MBC must reform*" (Government Official 5 - 17/08/15). Akin to the structural reforms of the 1980s, from which Malawi continues to struggle to recover, programmes and conditional loans have been characterized by various economic and political reforms¹³³ which WHO (2015) and Veltmeyer (2005) pointed out earlier, are designed to encourage the neoliberal agenda.

Therefore, it is not only questionable as to what ideological forces are behind foreign intervention that can help explain this shift towards the liberal media model, but whether or not these new "reforms" are driven by new programmes or camouflaged as new ones? For example, it was the same SAPs that ordered Malawi to deregulate the Ministry of Information, the government department responsible for the media sector:

¹³³ See Rono (2002) on page 60.

“The Ministry of Information used to control many organisations such as telecommunications and regulation, but that was all privatised, SAPs said to decentralise ministries, so the ministry of information [...] does not control telecommunications or regulation authority, although it appoints their boards it left the ministry with nearly nothing to do” (Media Practitioner 7 – 16/04/2015).

Donors have also used conditional loans to support organisations such as the Media Council of Malawi (MCM)¹³⁴, to promote deregulation: *“by not having a Media Council you open the space for the state to take it, [therefore] it was an attempt to ensure the state doesn't move into it”* (Donor 1 - 15/08/15). Using neoliberal principles as a means of shaping Malawi’s media system towards the liberal media model reflects the various ways the two systems coincide.

Akin to the arguments made by Mawuko-Yevugah (2014) and Veltmeyer and Petras (2001), it has become clear that neoliberalism coincides with foreign aid. Whether through conditional loans as just mentioned, or as part of a wider global strategy by economically powerful states and institutions, Malawi continues to witness an unprecedented push for minimal state interference and the promotion of privatisation under the banner of neoliberalism by the international community. However, the growth in the free-market ideology, which is the dominant meta-narrative of the neoliberal system, also coincides with the core characteristic of the shift towards the liberal media model, the commercialisation of media markets. Linked to minimal state intervention, those new TV and licence holders have adopted a commercial approach, as confirmed by the Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA): *“We are going commercial because most of the applicants that apply here are commercial oriented, they don't want to go community wise, because they say the community sector don't make profits”* (Government Official 6 - 15/05/15).

This issue of survival reflects the arguments made by Harcourt (2012) who insisted that the size and wealth of a country’s domestic economy is an important and often overlooked factor when studying media systems. Although some of the donors don’t see this to be an issue, one believed that *“there should be a free market where these organisations, these companies are allowed to compete”* (Donor 3 -12/06/15). And the attitude of another donor, which reaffirmed the previous, stated that *“if you are a small media house or community radio that cannot pay [...] or compete, you will be squeezed out”* (Donor 1 - 15/08/15). However, unlike many Western, democratically advanced countries, Malawi’s economy is not strong enough to accommodate all these new licence holders, and given the fact that most of Malawi’s

¹³⁴ The role of the Media Council in Malawi is to promote professionalism within the media sector.

media outlets are small media houses and community radio stations, the market for advertising is limited, as explained here by one media licence holder:

“In the past we used to enjoy that monopoly, companies will come we didn’t have to go out and look for advertisements, now we compete at a small shop with these other radio stations with other TV stations looking for an advert at a very small shop, that’s a challenge” (Media Practitioner 13 - 01/06/15)

Based on these licence holders’ concerns, neoliberalism as a non-contextual system is universally promoting principles that do not work because they are not locally applicable, thus leaving many media houses dependent on donor assistance. There is a general feeling that Malawi’s media system *“will be moving a lot towards commercial, but now it’s more of a case of how do you survive”* (Media Practitioner 19 - 16/05/15). By extolling the virtues of private enterprise and free markets within the media industry, Malawians are increasingly exposed to the *“language of privatisation, liberalization, globalisation, the global village, the MDGs¹³⁵”* (Media Practitioner 7 – 16/04/2015). Thus, this thesis hypothetically shares the concerns of scholars who fear that the profit-maximizing behaviour of foreign owners whose interests it is monopolize the media landscape, diminish professional journalism and the pluralism of opinions (see McManus, 1994).

Given this context, it would be safe to say that McChesney (2001: 1) was right to point out that, “neoliberalism is ideologically loaded” and driving change in unnatural ways. The next section takes this issue further to embed the role of international development as another means of legitimising the role of foreign intervention.

8.5 Development Parallelism

Thus far, foreign intervention has been identified in relation to foreign aid, its conditionalities and its relationship to neoliberalism. However, a common thread that was discovered during the interviews which ties all three together is the role of international development. Although international development in Malawi has become synonymous with economic development since the arrival of the IFIs and their SAPs, international development has grown substantially to include matters outside of the economy, such as the media (also see Carrington and Nelson, 2002; Mansell and Raboy, 2011). This growth into other domains has simultaneously manufactured a collection of interconnected buzzwords

¹³⁵ Millennium Development Goals

such as democracy, liberalization, transparency, accountability and good governance, and on a number of occasions, interviewees expressed their concerns about development as a foreign-imposed concept:

“It’s about human rights, good governance, democracy and the media, it makes sense as democracy is not our agenda, it’s not even our issue, democracy is something that has been imposed [...] they are the owners of democracy, they have the agenda, most of them are capitalists so they will actually use democracy to advance their interests in their home countries, unfortunately these are big currencies of power and there is very little that we can do, sometimes you will be scratching an elephant on the back if you want to think otherwise” (Media Practitioner 20 - 02/05/15)

In this interview, the pronoun “they” was used to refer to Western governments and foreign donors to emphasise that the media, or more specifically, the liberal media model in this context has become located within the same common discourse as human rights, good governance, and democracy which is not only externally produced, but an idea that Malawi does not own. This point also shares some similarities to the arguments made by Mawuko-Yevugah (2014) whose concept of ‘*developmentality*’ describes how the exploitation of development as an ideology reproduces hegemony, but has also become a means of legitimising their involvement; the way in which this has manifested itself is through the creation of this common discourse. As confirmed in an interview with one of Malawi’s major donors:

“I came here from New York with a different media environment and I know this too because in New York when you say you work in development, people don’t know what you’re saying, but here everybody knows what you’re saying [...] when you see how much is devoted to development, development jargon that I didn’t even know, but here people get to know it, because it’s all part of the media and the nation’s conversation, and so much money is here specifically for these development issues” (Donor 2 - 08/06/15)

It was from this idea that “development” is used in the media to export the development agenda set by the “*big currencies of power*” that the research dimension *development parallelism* was coined. Affiliated with Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) *political parallelism* which more broadly refers to relationships between the media and politics but more specifically “media content [and] the extent to which the different media reflect distinct political orientations in their news and current affairs reporting” (ibid: 28), *development parallelism* also offers to two separate but interrelated issues. Firstly, how the media has become a key dimension of national and international development and secondly, the extent to which the media air development-specific content paid for by donors. Just as European political parties have had a long-standing relationship with media organisations, development agencies and donors

have long featured in Malawi's media, as confirmed by the same donor, "*we work with the media, public affairs and our partners to get our messages out [...] we try hard to tell stories and bring media to events and encourage more development*" (Donor 2 - 08/06/15). Therefore, a free and independent media is a necessary tool for foreign donors to endorse and disseminate their development content and agenda. This has not gone unnoticed by Malawians, as development content as prescribed by foreign donors is dominating Malawi's media:

"For instance, a radio program like Pakachere¹³⁶ [...] you have it on MBC Radio 2, you have it on 101 FM, and then another NGO comes in and when you add that all up, it can actually come up to 5 hours of broadcasting, so in essence maybe the radio stations do not actually know that that's happening, but I think that, in the end, that's how it is. And as you go along you'll discover that they have a certain allocation within their broadcasting that's allocated to development without them really realizing" (Academic 2 - 23/07/15)

This idea that so much airtime is going to development '*without them really realizing*' reflects the point that Monbiot (2016: para 2) made regarding neoliberalism, in that its "anonymity is both a symptom and cause of its power". Being able to make media houses unaware that development is consuming a large part of their airtime because it is free or paid for by donors or NGOs is prescribing the type of media Malawi has. Thus, in a similar way to how high-interest loans and conditional loans have exacerbated dependency, Malawi's media houses are increasingly becoming dependent on content that is structured according to the aims and objectives of the donor:

"[M]ost of the development coming from the West is a package, because if you read the newspapers you see donor A is looking for proposals for media organisations to do A, B, C, D so they specifically tell you what you are supposed to do, it's unlike media organisations to say this is what we want to do" (Media Practitioner 3 - 27/10/15)

As can be seen in Table 8, the Tilitonse Fund as described in the Chapter 2, was a multi-donor grant making facility created by DFID, Irish Aid and the Royal Norwegian Embassy to promote the development agenda, which specifically covered transparency and accountability to leading private media houses.

¹³⁶Pakachere is a health and development NGO that provides social and behaviour change communication content and is funded and supported by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), USAID, UNICEF, UNFPA, and the National Aids Commission (NAC).

Table 8: Foreign Funded Media Projects in Malawi

Organisation	Title	Objective	Coverage	Duration
Maziko Radio Station	Promoting development and good governance through radio	Facilitate empowerment of marginalised groups with knowledge on governance, transparency and accountability	Ntchisi	2 years
Radio Tigabane	Women and girls' voice on gender based violence	Increase inclusiveness and responsiveness of traditional and religious leaders in activities that help eliminate gender based violence	Mzimba and Rhumpi	1 year
Malawi Institute of Journalism	Photo Journalism Project	Using photo journalism as a tool to enhance transparency and accountability	Blantyre, Lilongwe, Mzuzu	2 years
Zodiak Broadcasting Station	Dela Lathu, Chitukuko Chathu	Empower citizens to define their own development projects in their areas	National	2 years
Nation Publications Limited	Fuko	Strengthening citizen voice and action for institutional change	National	2 years
National Media Institute of Southern Africa	Campaign for enactment of legislation and popularisation of the contents of the Access to Information Bill	Increase access to information on rights, entitlements and responsibilities for citizenry	Multiple	2 years

Source: Foreign donor¹³⁷.

This example not only illustrates that those with economic power have the means to control the type of media Malawi has, but that this has also filtered down into daily journalism practices, as one media specialist declared: *“the NGO gives money so the reporter will write. So they indirectly co-determine what is published and what is aired”* (Media Practitioner 16 - 23/04/15). Such control over the media reflects Strange’s (1998) idea that power does not rest with who has it, but how they set the rules. Comparable to Cox’s (1973) notion of ‘rule-creating’ power, this donor fund could be seen as another method of external forces setting the agenda according to what their interests are. Aligned to McKinley and Little’s (1978, 1979) *Donor Interests Model* which reproduces Morgenthau’s realist perspective of foreign aid, this economic stranglehold over many media houses, means that some donors can decide which media they want to survive and for what purposes.

¹³⁷ The name of this source cannot be identified for the purpose of anonymity in disclosing this material.

For example, in 2010 the government, which is the largest advertiser in Malawi, pulled out all its advertising from Malawi's leading newspaper, *The Nation*, in an attempt to cripple the newspaper financially and to punish it after it criticised then President Bingu wa Mutharika's administration. However, as was described by a media practitioner at the newspaper: *"the commercial sector and the development sector stepped in and said we are going to support you because we believe that having you around is important for the economic agenda and the political development agenda"* (Media Practitioner 6 - 28/07/15). By defining the media's role as *'important for the economic agenda and the political development agenda'* shows that the media should be analysed in relation to the political-economy, both at a national level and global level.

As reinforced by one of the donors who supported *The Nation*: *"for us the emphasis is on the development agenda and this very much dominates our engagement"* (Donor 3 -12/06/15). There is a fear that the future of Malawi's media would be subject to foreign actors if they continue to have an economic hand in the broadcasting industry: *"For as long as there are foreign development agencies, NGOs will have their hands in TV production, that's going to be the case, they are going to tell us exactly what kind of things we want to see"* (Academic 1 - 15/08/15). Although one donor stated that they would like to see a *"media that's free from outside interference"* (Donor 4 - 30/07/15), their indirect top-down approach, which post-development theorists such as Santos (1970) and Nkrumah (1965) criticise as imperialist, supports the claim that external influences, should be a key variable for analysis in explaining why countries are transitioning towards a liberal media model. And given Malawi's turbulent history with IFIs, and heavy reliance on "foreign financing" (Santos, 1970), finding money in a country that is economically weak makes Malawian media houses compelled to rely on content and support by foreign NGOs with the purpose of disseminating their agenda. And while some donors have not provided substantial funds in the past, the funding the media will be an important matter in future discussions, according to one large donor: *"I don't think we have given a huge amount of financial support, I think that is something we might look at under the 11th European Development Fund"¹³⁸, I think this is something quite important, but what shape or form that support takes is not yet decided* (Donor 4 - 30/07/15). Therefore, analyzing decision-making and who the decision makers are within the media system framework is required if we are to be sensitive to the role of power in all of its forms. While it is too soon to know what consequences will come out of NGOs supporting the

¹³⁸ The 11th European Development Fund (EDF) is the new 2014-2020 programme for the development of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries (European Commission, 2016).

media, the growth in development content could harm media pluralism, which is a key aspect of a liberal media model.

Concluding thoughts

“Most of the change in Malawi has been externally based, even to date”

(Journalist 1 - 13/05/15)

The interviews conducted for this research was an attempt to abide by Hallin and Mancini’s (2012) request to the research community to broaden and even modify present research dimensions, in order to understand media systems in different contexts. This case study, which has incorporated foreign intervention into the existing media and politics relationship in Malawi, has not only broadened current analytical frameworks, but challenged the status quo that automatically places the state as the core unit of analysis. Significant evidence has been provided to confirm this, and identify foreign aid as the single most important variable in foreign intervention. Therefore, the findings of the interviews are consistent with those scholars who have given greater emphasis to external forces when it comes to change. While some argued that globalization is one of the most powerful engines of change (Babones 2006; Jakubowicz and Sükösd, 2008; Pfetsch and Esser, 2008), foreign intervention, which includes the role of international development and the economic ideology of neoliberalism, have become additional global forces.

As the first section, *He Who Pays the Piper Calls the Tune* revealed, the international donor community is using economically coercive means to dictate exactly what type of media system Malawi should adopt. Using conditionalities has been the most powerful instrument to help donors pursue this economic, as well as political, objective. However, as shown by the actions of President Bingu wa Mutharika, the donor can only be successful if the country recognises the tune upon hearing it. President Joyce Banda did recognise it, and with the aim of winning back foreign aid, accepting the rules and conditionalities set by those who control the means to provide capital was unavoidable. Therefore, the economic position of a country in relation to its media system, as raised by Harcourt (2012), is significant. I associate this economic dimension alongside the other key factors that have been raised during this case study of Malawi’s media system. These have been aggregated in Table 9 in order to outline the many variables that make up foreign intervention.

Table 9: New Dimensions for Analysing Media Systems

Dimension	Variable
Economic Status	<p>Level of dependency on foreign aid (e.g. the amount of foreign aid received in comparison to countries GDP):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Low income/GDP - Economically weak
Foreign Aid	<p>Degree of foreign aid that directly or indirectly supports changes to internal systems:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Impact from the withdrawal or suspension of aid - Conditionalities attached to both direct or indirect foreign aid
Conditionality	<p>The level of directorial control donors or global institutions have over media values and rules</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Influence over internal systems - Linked to neoliberal ideologies
Media Policy Agreements	<p>The role of international policy agreements in shaping particular media models</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Level of policy driven influence - Linked to neoliberal ideologies
Political Status	<p>The role of the state (internal influence) and political history:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Forced democratization - Autonomy over policy-making decisions and outcomes - Media as a government priority

In an attempt to broaden and modify Hallin and Mancini's (2004) conceptual framework, a political economy of foreign intervention has been broken down into five research dimensions to make a clear case that Malawi's low income status and economically weak position makes it vulnerable to external forces as suggested by Harcourt (2012). But as with any categorization of this sort, foreign aid is a highly complex dimension, and each variable that makes up its existence require independent scrutiny. For example, while the withdrawal or suspension of aid, the relationship with neoliberalism as a global ideological force which supports privatisation and deregulation, as well as the directorial control of media policy agreements all serve as important variables for media systems analysis in the

aid-dependent context they require a more thorough investigation than the exploratory one carried out here. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the history of Malawi's colonial past, these dimensions have provided an economic and ideological insight into countries' media and political spheres.

Towards a Critical International Political Economy Theory of Foreign Intervention

In order to incorporate these issues namely, the production of neoliberalism, the disadvantageous positioning of “developing countries”, the conditionalities and policies attached to foreign aid, and the historical significance of a country’s past, a critical theory of international political economy and foreign intervention must be considered in order to understand why global shifts happen. While many of the different schools of thought within the theory of foreign intervention and foreign aid have been contested, both theories can be interlinked to the overarching theory of critical international political economy (CIPE). Centred on the structural transformations that Susan Strange (1988, 1996) was referring to, CIPE owes much of its theoretical debt to two academic schools of thought. Firstly, Marx’s (1990 [1867]) critique of political economy, which examined the economic conditions of existence through an economic interpretation of history¹³⁹. And secondly, the early development of international political economy (IPE), which was concerned with the establishment of rules, institutions, and practices that were “not pre-determined by ‘natural’ or inevitable procedures, [but by] historically formed human intervention” (Abbott and Worth, 2002: 1). By synthesising past and present contributions of political economy, most notably our understanding of the way in which power is structured, where it comes from and how it is renewed (see Garnham, 2000), this approach to understanding external forces will depend on what themes are accentuated and why.

CIPE evolved around the same time that international development became a universal discourse and when the “International Monetary Fund was tightening its grip over massively indebted countries in the global south” (Cafruny et al. 2016:5). Identified as one of the major institutions in Strange’s (1988, 1996) *financial structure* analysis and Pankaj’s (2005) contemporary theorising of foreign aid, critical theory within the study of IPE “does not take institutions and social power relations for granted” (Cox, 1981: 129). Therefore, it is essential to understand how these issues of power are becoming embedded in the media and their consequences on media system change. As much of what these theorists base their knowledge on is the Marxian idea that social change is prescribed. This idea has served as an important intellectual springboard for IR theorists, especially those in the world systems school of thought, as well as the post-development thinkers mentioned in chapter 4, who are often attacked for overemphasizing the power of external forces and devaluing internal

¹³⁹ The economic interpretation of history developed the methodological approach of ‘historical materialism’ (Lorimer, 1999)

forces (Jones, 2001). While critical theory aims at reversing such forms of external domination, through practical goals for social transformation (Horkeimer 1995), this framework uses critical theory to ensure that the study of media systems is neither ahistorical, nor discounts the role of ideologies, which “advocates of globalization avoid theorizing [especially] the nature and role of oppression in relation to neoliberal policies” (Peterson, 2003: 2). Although the term “critical” must be treated with some caution as it has generally tended to be aligned to the early dependency, world systems¹⁴⁰ and later Marxist theorists such as Robert Cox which are theoretically determinist (Goodin, et al., 2012), a critical treatment of IPE must not discount internal actors such as the government in structural change. Furthermore, critical theory alongside those working in Marxists and post-colonial traditions have all put forward critiques of international relations and share a concern with the construction of power and the state, which theories like political realism tend to take for granted.


Therefore, understanding why Country A wants to have control over the minds and actions of Country B (Morgenthau, 1967) continues to unite theorists from IPE, IR and International Development to not only question who has the power to prescribe change, but what is the source of that power and why do they have it? (Strange, 1988). Critically analysing power relations helps to answer why specific global systems and ideologies emerge. For example, the media, which is defined as an important component of the political economy, has also drawn inspiration from the CIPE tradition to understand change (Hardy, 2014). External forces such as foreign ownership of the media, media concentration and asymmetrical power relations have all been analysed by critical political economy of the media (see Smythe, 1960, 1981; Schiller, 1969, 1973, 1976; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Mosco, 1996; Garnham, 2000; Fuchs, 2011). As noted in the theory chapter, the theoretical framework being advanced here follows a smaller group of scholarship that is concerned with “the different ways of organising and financing communications” (Hardy, 2014: 7), and the influence of neoliberal principles, such as “the global pressures of privatization” (Mosco, 1996: 75).

Since this central claim of critical political economy of communications does not recognise the type of “foreign financing” that Santos (1970) was referring to in dependency theory, a move towards a Critical International Political Economy Theory of Foreign Intervention would appropriately accommodate these theoretical gaps. Based on Morgenthau’s (1962)

¹⁴⁰ It should be noted that World systems theory has provided IPE with inspiration to focus on the way change occurs (Ortner, 1994).

theory of foreign intervention and Pankaj's (2005) contemporary assessment of foreign aid, as well as the role of ideologies as conceptualised by Gramsci (1971) the theoretical framework being advanced here, as depicted in Figure 3, pulls together all the major components contributing to the complex arrangement of foreign intervention. Foreign intervention cannot be theorised through foreign aid alone, nor as the manifestation of neoliberalism, but as an interplay between these components, as well as media policy-making.

Figure 3: Theoretical Framework



While both the major theories used in this theoretical framework have contributed to advancing the importance of external forces, by integrating them a multi-causal understanding of the phenomenon can be explored (cf. Slaughter, 2011). Therefore, a multidisciplinary approach (see Moolakkattu, 2009) is required in order to understand the relationships between media, politics and foreign intervention. The three central disciplines described in this framework, namely IR, IPE, and international development, overlap

conceptually, and none of them are bound by one single theory. Just as international communication theory is not theoretically bound to globalization theory (Braman, 2002), the uniqueness of these disciplines in that they import from others, such as law, economics and sociology, to further their theoretical and analytical contributions to global relations. As argued by Strange and Tooze (2009: 216) there will be “no inherent incompatibility between a realist approach to international issues and the structural method of analysis developed mainly by Marxists and dependency theorists”¹⁴¹. While such a strong position on theory has been argued by others, such as Buzan, et al., (1993) who stated that theories are simply different perspectives contributing to a larger totality, the theoretical framework being advanced here is not replacing one theory with another, but combining ones that are already connected through IR theory. Therefore, we should be open to insights from other disciplines (Strange, 1991), especially in a globalised world, where it is increasingly difficult to know exactly where the source of power, especially economic power is located. An issue that many media scholars who analyse media ownership face.

By blending realist, structuralist and Marxist conceptualisations of power can only contribute to a greater understanding of the complex factors that shape global relations and change. Just as there is some logic in realism’s assumptions about states operating on self-interest as a matter of survival and exploitation, there is logic in the Marxist view of power that scrutinizes the state’s ability to have full control over the global forces that affect it. The reason structural power is important to this theoretical framework is because it sees “power that organizes and orchestrates the systemic interaction within and among societies [but also directs] economic and political forces on the one hand and ideological forces that shape public ideas, values and beliefs on the other” (Haviland et al., 2015: 345). Therefore, understanding foreign intervention through these different, yet overlapping perspectives, requires a contemporary look at the diversity of external forces, without dismissing the internal forces or being too epistemologically open or economically determinist.

Summary

It is important to be aware that a Critical International Political Economy Theory of Foreign Intervention may be analytically inadequate and theoretically problematic at this stage, as a critical rewriting of the theory of foreign intervention must include all the multi-causal factors that impact change. This constructive theory is a step towards revising old

¹⁴¹ See example by Christian Fuchs (2010) who used Joseph Nye’s (2009) conceptualisations of smart power to “counter the misperception that soft power alone can produce effective foreign policy” (ibid: para 2) and Strange’s economic power to restore a contemporary view of new imperialism and cultural imperialism.

theories in order to keep tackling the 'who', 'how' and 'why' questions through research that substantiates the claims made by Morgenthau (1962) and his theory of foreign aid as a foreign policy tool, as well as Susan Strange's (1988, 1996) critical take on structural power to reinforce the claim that change is not a naturally occurring phenomenon, but prescribed. In order to do this, it is necessary to move away from the state-centric approach and from consensual theories of power to openly interrogate and critique the neoliberal conditions that are impacting on this global trend towards liberalisation in all its forms. Therefore, a CIPE of Foreign Intervention must be both descriptive and explanatory, to understand why media systems are the way they are, but also what tools are needed in order to provide adequate descriptions of the particular media system under investigation (Dekkers, 2015).

Changing the New Research Agenda

The aim of this thesis has not only been to emphasise the need to construct an interdisciplinary research agenda for the study of media systems by challenging conventional research approaches, but the adoption of an explicitly critical research agenda to understand the multifaceted nature of change. From a historical examination of foreign intervention in Malawi to the application of neoliberal ideologies within political, economic and cultural domains, this research intended to address three specific questions, (1) To what extent can foreign intervention be considered a key variable for analysis in media systems research and explain the global shift towards media liberalization? (2) Has this shift has been “natural” or forced? And (3) what were the major ideological forces behind foreign intervention that are directed towards liberalisation? Based on challenging Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) hypothesis that a ‘natural’ shift towards the liberal media model is taking place globally through an automatic treatment of the nation-state as the key unit of analysis, this research found that foreign intervention to be an important variable for analysis.

Using a case study of Malawi’s recent transformation from its authoritarian past towards the liberal media model, this research problematized existing units of analysis to synthesize media, politics and foreign intervention. With support from previous literature, media systems research is moving beyond the parameters of Western democratic countries and beyond the relationship between media and politics. As a result, this thesis recognises that the level of analysis, the units of analysis and the dimensions and variables that make up this analysis need changing. While it may seem that this research excludes the nation state from its analysis, there is no single dimension nor variable that can provide a holistic understanding of why media systems are the way they are. Without the inclusion of foreign intervention, insights into the power held by the non-state actors in post-colonial, transitional and aid-dependent countries will remain undeveloped.

Therefore, Malawi presented media systems research with a unique case study to identify foreign intervention as a key variable for analysis. Malawi’s history and current vulnerability to external forces contributed to a better understanding of the dimensions and characteristics of media systems in post-colonial, transitional, and aid-dependent contexts, thus providing a number of key points in relation to the specifics of foreign intervention. In this final chapter, I summarize these main points as the main outcomes of this research. The

general conclusions emphasize why including external forces helps provide media systems analysis with a complete interpretation of why media systems are the way they are. This is followed by the main contributions, as well as, research limitations. The last section of this chapter deals with the prospects for the future of media systems research and any new research directions that may prove useful.

8.1 Main Outcomes

In this thesis, both the interviews and the critical discourse analysis (CDA) have shown that external forces played a significant role in understanding why Malawi's media system has shifted towards the liberal media model. Based on Malawi's past, it was clear from the interviewees that *"most of the change in Malawi has been externally based"* (Journalist 1 - 13/05/15). From the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) to the Catholic Church's push for democratisation, the liberalisation of the media in Malawi has become the latest internal system that has changed as a consequence of these external forces.

What each of these non-state actors had in common was their relationship to foreign aid. The findings revealed that the one of the conditions attached to Joyce Banda getting the foreign aid reinstated, which former President Bingu wa Mutharika had lost after his relationship with the international donors worsened in 2011, was the release of fifteen TV and radio licences. Therefore, the main reason that President Joyce Banda opened up the media when she did, and the central features of its opening-up, were based on this key variable. Without critically interrogating the power of foreign aid, this research could not argue that foreign aid was a foreign policy tool used by international donors to prescribe change. Conditional aid or what Morgenthau (1962) defined as bribery in his theory of foreign aid provided a convincing argument that change was coercively applied by powerful states.

With little or no power to resist this demand, Joyce Banda was seen by those interviewed as nothing more than a *"puppet of the international community"* (Media Practitioner 13 - 01/06/15). While this does not imply that she or her administration had no agency, like many Presidents before her, Banda was vulnerable to the rules and conditions set by the donors because of Malawi's dependency on foreign aid. By having this economic upper hand, the proverb *"he who pays the piper calls the tune"* (Media Practitioner 5 - 27/07/15) was raised

by number of interviewees to emphasize the extent of power that foreign actors have over Malawi's political, economic and cultural systems.

This proverb also validates the claims made by Harcourt (2012) who argued that countries, which are considered 'economically weak', are more vulnerable to external pressure especially in the field of media policymaking. I therefore associated this global push for a liberal media model with *Forced Liberalization*. This concept was employed to convey what many interviewees were proclaiming, "*we are not naturally following it [the western liberal model], we are being forced to*" (Media Practitioner 3 - 27/10/15). This concept was an important finding as it challenged Hallin and Mancini's (2004) convergence thesis. Although their convergence thesis was specific to Western democratic countries, the shift towards the liberal media model is taking place globally should not exclude the external forces which are operating coercively. The donor community reaffirmed this arrangement, when one stated that if Malawi's media was not going in the right direction they would "*raise it*" (Donor 5 -12/06/15). This constant threat of punishment was a sign of the international donor communities' power over the decision-making process, and reemphasises the weaker role of "developing countries". This lack of agency, I suggest, provided foreign actors with the necessary means to enforce change. Foreign donors in particular have continued to undermine Malawi's sovereignty by imposing their own policies through these conditionalities. Therefore, it is fair to say that donors are the new "global governors [...] who exercise power across borders for purposes of affecting policy" (Avant, Finnemore and Sell, 2010: 2).

I linked this idea to the global discourse and practice of international development. As a complex and multidisciplinary field of study, international development was included as it was a way for foreign actors' to legitimise their involvement in Malawi. Moreover, it was discovered that almost all the media houses in Malawi, at one point or another, used or depended on content created by foreign NGOs because it is free, and locally produced content is expensive. Although this was not part of the original focus of this thesis, it was learnt that this dependency on content was another means for foreign actors to legitimately disseminate their ideologies and agendas. In order to capture both of these points, the research dimension *Development Parallelism* was coined to describe the relationship between media and international development. More specifically, the extent to which the media reflect the international development agenda and the discursive power foreign actors have within Malawi's media system. In addition to these points, international development as a

global discourse has also, for all analytical, theoretical and practical purposes, continued to refashion the global division between North and South, “developed” and “developing”, and rich and poor. CDA reinforced this position by unveiling how *power holders* (Fairclough, 2001b) use policymaking instruments to prescribe the “us” vs. “them” dichotomy but prescribing the type of media African countries should have. Through the study of the twelve Pan-African media policy agreements, the imperative modal verbs “*should*” and “*shall*” that used throughout the agreements were testament to the coercive nature of these relationships and foreign intervention. This linguistic strategy deployed by *power holders* runs parallel to the coercive nature of the conditionalities imposed. Therefore, I argued that it would be an analytical error to view the shift towards the liberal media model as natural when language created externally is prescribing what a country’s media should be.

The CDA also found *Forced Liberalization* to be a recurring theme that was constructed over time. These externally funded and endorsed media policy agreements have been prescribing the core principles of the liberal media model through the use of Fairclough’s (2001b: 46) “direct requests” since 1976. The authoritative language continuously produced and reproduced the dominant discourse that was advocating for liberalization, thus the marketization of this discourse served as an important means to impose, as well as institutionalise the liberal media model.

Parallel to these findings was the fact that these documents functioned with the aim of furthering the neoliberal principles of liberalisation, privatisation, and deregulation. With a strong emphasis on press freedom and minimal state intervention, the liberal media model, as proposed by the *power holders*, was simultaneously incorporating neoliberal principles into these policy agreements. Therefore, the shift from state-owned broadcasting to private broadcasting not only supported the claims made by Fairclough (1995) and Cox (1993) that texts and international institutions are ideologically driven, but also reconfirms the idea that the shift towards the liberal media model was not solely an endogenous process. Just as Pfetsch and Esser (2008) and Jakubowicz and Sükösd (2008) argued, globalization cannot be excluded from studying media systems, I argued that neoliberalism, which is intrinsically linked to globalization, cannot be excluded from the study of media systems either.

Although the term neoliberalism has been criticized for serving “too many different phenomena” (Venugopal, 2015: 166), its explanatory function as a leading ideology behind these policymaking documents and the donors interviewed could not be overlooked. It was

at this point in the research that the research dimension *Neoliberal Parallelism* was coined, as the relationship between neoliberalism and the liberal media model became increasingly evident as a key feature of both CDA and the interview discussions. For example, when one interviewee stated that Joyce Banda was instructed to open up the media by some externally influential “*neoliberal advisors*” (Economist – 11/07/2015), Escobar’s (1995) notion of “Western experts”, as well as Meinhardt and Patel’s (2003: 12) “foreign experts” symbolized the multifaceted nature of external forces and the ideologies attached to these forces. Based on Veltmeyer’s (2005) definition of the “Westerns hegemons” these foreign actors have come to redefine what we understand as the new agents of the imperialist project. Each one has performed an extensively influential role in reproducing this continuum of control over Malawi’s internal affairs, which has been legitimized by Malawi’s dependency on the same foreign actors.

Metaphorically described as “*colonial masters*” by one interviewee, accentuates the historical connection between all those that have influenced the decisions that has shaped Malawi. Both the literature and the CDA have shown this to be true. When at various stages of Malawi’s media evolution from the colonial era to the present, different IFIs, foreign donors, and international non-governmental organizations (INGO) have been able to generate substantial power over Malawi’s internal affairs and the creation of its current media system. Reflecting the postcolonial ideas of Nkrumah (1965), this continuation of control over former colonized states illustrates that theorizing media systems within the post-colonial, transitional and aid-dependent context requires a critical approach.

Drawing on the work of Susan Strange (1998) and her structural view of power that positioned these influential non-state actors at the centre of international political economy (IPE) helped me to develop a theoretical framework that could begin addressing my empirical findings. In an attempt to incorporate the key aspects of Morgenthau’s (1962, 1965) realist approach to foreign intervention, besides his concept of bribery, matters of exploitation, the production of neoliberalism, the disadvantageous positioning of “developing countries”, the conditionalities and policies attached to foreign aid, as well as the historical significance of a country’s past also needed to be incorporated. Therefore, as a matter of theoretical correctness this research established a Critical International Political Economy Theory of Foreign Intervention to integrate these dimensions. Although this theory has not been fully developed, it should be seen as a starting point to embody and incorporate IPE, foreign intervention and the critical political economy of communication,

which share many key features with the former disciplines, such as why global shifts happen, and to whom.

By drawing on particular aspects of each theory, I was able to emphasize the importance of economics in the political realist perspective of foreign intervention, and the role of foreign intervention in the critical political economy of communications. As a result, this framework allowed me to reconsider who the *power holders* were, and the multifaceted nature of foreign intervention. By showing how historical processes such as colonialism, democratization and SAP's were externally imposed and often attached to foreign aid, this provided the theoretical basis to maintain the Marxian notion that "men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past" (Marx in Elster, 1986: 277). Therefore, the continuation of past interventions which determines the who, how, and why certain changes take place, provided the necessary theoretical insight for understanding the liberalisation of Malawi's media.

9.1 Contributions

This thesis represented a unique attempt to integrate foreign intervention, in particular foreign aid, into the analysis of media systems. While previous research provided a valuable scholarly foundation for drawing to our attention to the role of external variables such as globalization and regionally-based regulatory restrictions, this research generated four major contributions, which interrogated the causes and consequences of foreign intervention and challenged the role of the state as the central unit of analysis. Although existing accounts have also challenged the role of the state as the central unit of analysis, none have provided a framework or a set of specific variables for analysing media systems.

Therefore, the first contribution that this research made was the development of seven new research variables (see Table 10). Given the lack of economic factors in current media systems research, besides Hallin and Mancini's (2004) state endowment and subsidies of the media, these seven variables stress the economic dynamics associated with the foreign intervention as evidenced in this research.

Table 10: Economic Dimensions

Economic Dimensions

These dimensions stress the power of foreign intervention, in particular, foreign aid, in shaping the structure and functioning of a media system.

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- Level of dependency on foreign aid (e.g. the amount of foreign aid received in comparison to a country's GDP)
 - Degree of foreign aid that is directly or indirectly supporting media development
 - Conditionalities attached to both direct or indirect foreign aid
 - Structural relationship between the media and donors (e.g. colonial legacy)
 - The level of directorial control donors or global institutions have over media values and rules (e.g. policy driven influence and ideology)
 - The share of foreign ownership in the media market¹⁴²
 - The impact of the withdrawal or suspension of aid

This research is fully aware that these research variables are complex, hard to come by, especially in an era of political and economic uncertainty and rapidly changing international ties. Therefore, these variables should not be considered as comprehensive, or static. However, it is hoped that these seven variables will contribute to expanding existing variables in media systems research to help explain why media systems are the way they are, and why the strategic interests and conditionalities tied to foreign aid have always been relevant and continue to be relevant as media systems evolve. I believe that such contributions are valuable and will strengthen media system research by comprehending new realities from the experiences individual countries encounter. It is only by dissecting the dominant status quo or scrutinising well-established or recognised frameworks that new variables emerge.

For example, the concept *Forced Liberalisation* and the new research dimensions *Development Parallelism* and *Neoliberal Parallelism* emerged because external forces were positioned as important to the understanding of Malawi's media system. However, both *parallelisms* are full of connotations, ambiguities and blurred descriptive lines. Nevertheless, it was important that this research included these new dimensions to adequately explain why Malawi's media is the way it is. And while Malawi is not alone in experiencing these *parallelisms* or the coercive forces of foreign aid, it has not been the intention of this research to make any grand generalizations about countries that are considered "developing", aid-dependent or 'economically weak' without any form of comparative analysis.

¹⁴² This idea was also developed by Toepfl (2013)

The second contribution, which has also been raised in the previous section, is the theoretical framework. Previous research that examined external forces has not theoretically located their arguments within international relations or international political economy (IPE), therefore neglecting many important concepts such as force, power and economic coercion in a meaningful way. Based on Ashok Kumar Pankaj's (2005) contemporary re-visiting of foreign aid, which recognized that foreign aid was a suitable subject matter of IPE and intrinsic to the global development agenda, was analytically productive in several ways. For example, contextualizing Malawi's media system within these fields emphasised that media systems research in the post-colonial, transitional and aid-dependent context cannot be studied in isolation, nor be theoretically bound by one single theory. In addition, in a globalized world we must understand media systems in relation to their interconnections with other economic, political and social systems, both locally and internationally.

In addition, the framework fostered Susan Strange's (1988, 1996) critical take on structural power, which brought to light the idea that powerful states are no longer the sole owners of power. By including non-state actors, I learnt that who funds the media, other than arguments made by McChesney (1997, 2001) regarding media conglomerates, is an important subject matter for media systems analysis. And lastly, a critical IPE approach, unlike international communications, not only takes on a historical lens to analyse future trends, but also recognizes the relationship between donor and recipient countries. Although media systems will inevitably vary if theorized along different disciplinary lines, the inclusion of foreign intervention should, if nothing else, provide more breadth to the dimensions in which media systems are studied.

The third contribution is the development of literature regarding Malawi's media system to make up for the dearth of publicly available material. Although interviews are generally regarded as the opinions of individuals rather than strong empirical evidence, it was hoped that the data collected enriches the literature by providing a profound insight into the interactions between media, politics and foreign intervention.

The last contribution made was the use of critical discourse analysis (CDA) in media system research. To the best of my knowledge current media systems research has neglected CDA in its investigations, because most of the countries under investigation generally had a plethora of statistical and publicly available data. As a critical methodological tool for

reading texts, CDA provided greater insight into who was influencing the shape and direction that Malawi's media system was taking, and also compensated for the lack of, or access to, publicly available data. Although CDA is a qualitative and interpretive methodology, and there are an "overwhelming number of textual features which are potentially worthy of inclusion in any critical discourse analysis" (Fairclough, 1992: 74), I would argue that the discursive deconstruction of documents, such as those used in this study or any other policies or mandates¹⁴³ that represent a country's media system, must be examined for a holistic treatment of media systems. Without using Fairclough's (1995) strategy of 'intertextuality' and the linguistic concept of 'social practice' it would have not become apparent that those who fund these documents were simultaneously promoting the liberal media narrative through a series of regional events. For that reason, CDA has contributed greatly to the evolving knowledge of why there is a shift towards the liberal media model, and proven to be a valuable methodological approach for those of us who are interested in examining the external factors impacting change in post-colonial, transitional and aid-dependent countries.

9.2 Limitations

Although the amount of interview data was sufficient for the purpose of this study, some limitations existed and are worth mentioning. Firstly, there was the issue of publicly available data. As previously mentioned, current media research relies heavily on statistics and publicly available data, and Malawi's shortage of such material made building an empirically sound argument difficult. For example, official documents and information on Malawi's political history is limited to a few post-colonial interpretations of the country's history¹⁴⁴ and Presidential biographies, while the media and foreign intervention are primarily documented in old newspaper clippings and NGO reports which often carry political biases. As a result, there is a risk that important issues may have been missed.

Getting access to archival data was also problematic. In the UK's National Archives, under the country's 20 year rule (formerly 30 years, with more recent documents being phased in, under an amendment to the 1958 Public Records Act and the 2000 Freedom of Information

¹⁴³ This can include ministerial documents, constitutions, policy reports, and donor contracts, which makes them powerful political instruments for the analysis of media systems.

¹⁴⁴ For example, Harri Englund's (2002) *A Democracy of Chameleons: Politics and Culture in the New Malawi*, Joey Power's (2010) *Political Culture and Nationalism in Malawi: Building Kwacha*, and John McCracken (2012) *A History of Malawi, 1859-1966*.

Act, made in the 2010 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act), no government documents or donor contracts within the past 20 years could be accessed. Aware that donor contracts are often classified and politically sensitive, my only option was to contact the donors directly. Only one out of the eight donors I approached provided me with a copy of a donor contract and what they have funded. However, the annexes that hold the crucial information about the terms and conditions of the agreement were removed. Access to these documents would have been examined using CDA to validate and strengthen the argument put forward in this thesis.

Thirdly, gaining access to particular interviewees was also a major obstacle. Although I was fortunate enough to be able to contact many high-level donor officials and politicians, some declined an interview, leaving some possible explanations as to why Malawi's media system shifted from its authoritarian past unanswered. The fourth limitation relates to methods. It was initially proposed that this research would carry out the methodological technique of triangulation, or what Richardson (2000) described as crystallization¹⁴⁵. Featuring focus groups as the third method alongside the semi-structured interviews and CDA, it was hoped that focus groups would not only produce a greater understanding of the questions posed, but also demonstrate how focus groups, as a method, are underutilised in media systems research. It is believed in that we must incorporate the "opinions of the ordinary man in the street, his attitudes and reactions to public decisions" (Langley, 1979: 7–8) as the general public are not only receivers of the media but often important stakeholders in the transformation of media systems. Civil society and the general public have been an excluded group in previous research efforts to analyse media systems. Grouped as possible advocates of the new media model or dissenters from it, emphasizes their role in the formation of change. However, due to the limited time available, as well as, the necessary means for translation because of the multiple languages used in Malawi, focus groups were deemed impracticable. Another course of action that was impracticable was conducting a comparative research investigation. Therefore the fifth limitation was the use of a single case study, as it could not provide grounds for generalization. Although it was not the purpose of this research to make any grand generalizations, a "deeper understanding can be gained by an international comparison" (Engesser and Franzetti, 2011: 273), by developing typologies, validating concepts, and contextualizing theories (Esser & Pfetsch, 2004).

¹⁴⁵ The term crystallization has been used over triangulation, which simultaneously displays refracted realities, whereas, Richardson (2000) argues that the central image for qualitative inquiry should be the crystal, not the triangle; as "crystals grow, change, alter [. . .] crystals are prisms that reflect externalities and refract within themselves, creating different colors, patterns, arrays, casting off in different directions" (ibid: 934).

The last limitation that is worth mentioning is gender. As a female researcher, gaining access into a male-dominated industry within a country that is highly patriarchal remains challenging. It was felt on several occasions that the interviewees did not accept the status of a female researcher, especially in a country that has low levels of female literacy and academic achievement, so the difficulties I faced as a female researcher were often considerable.

9.3 Future Research and New Directions

Despite the limitations of this research, it is hoped that it has made a modest contribution to enhancing and furthering the academic body of literature on media systems research. By establishing the link between media, politics and foreign intervention, this research may advance the field of media systems in important ways. Namely, the inclusion of foreign aid and its conditionalities as key variables for analysis, which interrogate the imbalances of power that exist between foreign actors and recipient countries. Therefore, I hope that foreign intervention will serve as a valuable starting point, especially for those studying aid-dependent countries.

Nevertheless, substantial improvements are still needed before a body of research that can reflect other countries in the same post-colonial, transitional and aid-dependent context is established and is good enough for comparative research. Future research will need to continue revising and advancing current theoretical frameworks as well as refining the concepts developed under the new economic dimensions, in order to achieve meaningful progress in this field. By challenging the state-centric approach, it is hoped that this research will enrich further debate and discussion within the fields of media, development and international relations. As a result of adopting a more multidisciplinary approach, future researchers can be appropriately equipped to move beyond the state-centric boundaries of media system analysis to discover more research dimensions that illustrate the complexities of geopolitical realities. In doing so, it is also hoped that new lines of inquiry will be created and open up a whole range of possibilities and opportunities for future research, in both Western and non-Western contexts, as external forces are prominent features in all countries and therefore should be studied in equal measure to internal forces.

I also hope this research encourages future researchers to examine countries that remain under-researched in order to identify new and emerging issues that are valuable to our

understanding of media systems. Although recent case studies are already in existence, such as Adrian Hadland's (2010) research on South Africa, Chuka Onwumechili's (2007) research on Nigeria, and Fackson Banda's (2006) research on Zambia, they remain book chapters rather than full case-study investigations for the advancement of media systems research.

Therefore, I concur with the points made by Hallin and Mancini (2012: 217) who argued that those who are interested in media systems analysis should expect "many styles of comparative analysis in the future, no matter if they are small or large scale, qualitative and/or quantitative, descriptive or interpretive". By modifying, extending and refining the methods and the analytical framework used in this research and previous research efforts, the accumulation of publicly available data on various media systems will grow and contribute to this evolving academic field. For example, future researchers interested in aid-dependent countries could draw contrasts between foreign donors to discover the extent to which their influence impacts the direction of media systems and undermines national sovereignty. Studying the ideologies, or guiding principles behind donor spending could also provide insightful intellectual knowledge about the nature of media systems. Although the ability to generalize would be difficult, analysing the different ideologies could facilitate a meaningful comparison across different donors and countries. In addition, using CDA as means of achieving this could create the methodological momentum to make CDA a commonly accepted approach to the study of media systems.

While it has become empirically clear that economic coercion, rather than consent, remains the guiding factor to the changes to Malawi's media system, other forms of power such as Antonio Gramsci's notion of hegemony should be assessed. His contributions to understanding non-coercive forms of power provide equal analytical and theoretical weight to the concept of power used in this thesis. Although the study of power is complex and the practical ways of assessing it remain challenging, both global and local configurations of power could contribute to our understanding of why media systems are the way they are, and therefore should not be excluded from the analytical table.

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List of Appendices

1. MACRA Licencing Application Guidelines 2016

- (iii) Projected volume of business, indicative prices for the services and market share for the first five (5) years of operation;
- (iv) Detailed investment appraisal (financial and technical feasibility);
- (v) Detailed market assessment; and
- (vi) Sufficient documentary evidence to prove that the applicant has the financial capability to meet the capital investment required in carrying out the activity proposed. In addition, details of proposed financing structure including proposed sources of funds (whether domestic or foreign). The minimum requirement for paid up capital of the applicant as specified in the Authority's assessment criteria.

2. **Communication Bill 2015**

Communications

(i)

COMMUNICATIONS BILL, 2015

MEMORANDUM

This Bill seeks to repeal the Communications Act (Cap. 68:01) and replace it with a new law to address the challenges being faced in the electronic communications sector, posts, information society and content.

The Bill contains twenty two Parts

Part I contains preliminary matters, namely, short title and commencement. The Part also contains objectives of this legislation, which are—

(a) to recognize the convergence of technologies and services for telecommunications, broadcasting, and information through the establishment of technology and service-neutral licensing regimes,

(b) to remove unnecessary barriers to entry, and attract investment, in the communications sector;

(c) to facilitate the deployment and use of communications services;

(d) to encourage the adoption of new services and technologies within the communications sector,

(e) to encourage the participation of indigenous Malawians in the communications sector;

(f) to facilitate the provision of free communication technology activities; and

(g) to ensure the enhancement and respect for consumer protection.

The Part also provides for the interpretation of certain words and terms used in the Bill.

Part II establishes the Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (the "Authority"), and provides for its duties, functions and powers, which generally include to regulate and monitor the provision of communications services and ensuring that, as far as it is practicable, reliable and affordable communications services are provided throughout Malawi and are sufficient to meet the demand for such services in accordance with the principles of transparency, certainty, market orientation, efficiency, and consumer satisfaction.

The Part also provides for the membership of the Authority, meetings of the Authority, the appointment of the Director General of the Authority, powers and functions of the Director General of the Authority, the appointment of other members of staff of the Authority, matters relating to disclosure of conflict of interest, and other matters including oath of secrecy, funds of the Authority, accounts and audit, and annual report.

B. No. 24

3. 10 Pre-Established Interview Questions

- How would you describe the current state of Malawi's media?
- What specific differences have you seen since the lifting of the TV banned from Kamuzu Banda era?
- What role does the government play in relation to the media?
- How is MBC funded? And how are private media houses and community radio's funded?
- Why weren't the previous TV and radio licences under Bingu wa Mutharika given?
- Is media policy and law seen as a priority to the other changing taking place in Malawi?

What significant political, economic or social changes have affected this change?

- What were the reasons behind Joyce Banda's decision to give those fifteen TV and radio licences to any political party and foreign investor?
- What role have foreign donors played in Malawi's media?
- Which media laws or policies have changed subsequent to new political parties?
- What type of media model do you think Malawians want?

4. The 33 Distinct Concepts Selected from Interview Data

- | | |
|---|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. External pressure 2. Liberalisation 3. Economic factors 4. Development agenda 5. Neoliberal ideologies 6. No ideologies 7. Democracy 8. Western terminologies 9. Dependency 10. Contradictions 11. External funding 12. Modernisation traits 13. Globalisation 14. Aid and donors 15. Foreign vs. local content 16. Media ownership | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 17. Culture 18. Colonial legacy 19. Authoritarian backlash 20. Media comparisons 21. Forms of change 22. Internal changes 23. Elections 24. Media definitions 25. Looking South 26. Resistance 27. Media is polarised 28. Joyce Banda 29. Pluralism and diversity 30. Digital migration 31. Journalism allowances 32. Ethics and professionalism 33. Ethnic and tribal affiliations |
|---|---|

5. Interview Information Sheet



HONG KONG BAPTIST UNIVERSITY STUDY INFORMATION SHEET

“Synthesizing Media, Politics and Foreign Intervention: An Examination of Malawi’s Broadcasting Transformation”

You have been invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of this study is to understand Malawi’s recent TV broadcasting transformation, from its one pro-state TV channel to a pluralistic broadcasting system and analyze whether the shift towards a Western liberal democratic model relates to the wider geopolitical influences of foreign intervention. If so, should result in being a new factor for further media systems research.

INFORMATION

You have been invited to take part in this research project. If you accept, you will be asked a number of questions related to Malawi’s recent TV broadcasting transformation.

Before the interview starts you will have the opportunity to ask me any questions about the research that you might have.

The interview will last approximately 1 hour. However, it can be shorter or longer depending on your information and time. It will be conducted in English but you can use Chichewa or Tumbuka if you feel you cannot translate particular terms or phrases.

A set of [10-15] questions will be asked about Malawi’s recent TV broadcasting transformation. However, you are not compelled to answer all these questions and you can share your experience and knowledge on the topic area in a manner that is more suitable for you. I may ask questions related to radio and newspaper development, as this will give me the chance to understand Malawi’s transformation more broadly. You will not be asked to share personal beliefs, practices or stories unless you wish to share.

The interview will take place in [location], as agreed with yourself. No one else will take part in the discussion, only I will be present during this interview. The entire interview will be tape-recorded for transcription purposes only to ensure accuracy in my reading of the interview, but only with your permission. You will not be identified by name on the tape. The tape will be kept securely on my private computer which has a password that no-one has access to. The information recorded is confidential, and no one else except myself as the researcher [Suzanne Temwa Harris] will have access to the tape recordings. The tapes will be destroyed after 7 years.

BENEFITS

There will be no financial rewards given for your involvement, but your participation is likely to help me find out more about the influence of foreign influence has on Malawi’s broadcasting system.

CONFIDENTIALITY

Please be assured that the information you provide will not be shared outside of the research purpose. The information that will be collected from this research project will be kept private. Any information about you will have a code number on it instead of your name.

CONTACT

If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, you may contact the researcher, Suzanne Temwa Harris at 13479520@life.hkbu.edu.hk and [+852 55740162]. If you feel you have not been treated according to the descriptions in this form, or your rights as a participant in research have been violated during the course of this project, you may contact the Committee on the Use of Human and Animal Subjects in Teaching and Research by email at hasc@hkbu.edu.hk or by mail to Graduate School, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong.

PARTICIPATION

Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may decline to participate without penalty. If you decide to participate, you may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty and without loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. If you withdraw from the study before data collection is completed your data will be returned to you or destroyed.

CONSENT

I have read and understand the above information. I have received a copy of this form. I agree to participate in this study.

Signature of the Interviewee _____ Date _____

Signature of the Researcher _____ Date _____

CURRICULUM VITAE

Academic qualifications of the thesis author, Ms. HARRIS Suzanne Temwa:

- Received the degree of Bachelor of Sociology & Third World Studies from University of Westminster, July 2006.
- Received the degree of Master of Media & International Development from University of East Anglia, October 2009.

August 2017