TY - JOUR
T1 - Workload, legal doctrine, and judicial review in an authoritarian regime
T2 - A study of expropriation judgments in China
AU - Zhan, Chaoqun
AU - Qiao, Shitong
N1 - Funding Information:
This project is funded by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong SAR (17612618), the National Science Foundation of China (72003208; 72273035), and the National Social Science Foundation of China (22&ZD058). The authors thank Matt Adler, John Ferejohn, Frank Upham, and workshop participants at NYU, UC San Diego, and the University of Hong Kong for comments.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 Elsevier Inc. All rights are reserved, including those for text and data mining, AI training, and similar technologies.
PY - 2024/12
Y1 - 2024/12
N2 - This paper contributes one of the first systematic studies on how courts adjudicate expropriation disputes both in the absence of judicial independence and in the face of resource constraints, extends the study of judicial workload into an authoritarian context, and demonstrates the complicated and dynamic interactions between apolitical and political aspects of courts in authoritarian regimes. Our results demonstrate that legal doctrine can check the abuse of government power even in situations where it is least expected. Specifically, we examined how Chinese courts, faced with an explosive increase in workload caused by a legal reform in 2015, adjudicated expropriation disputes between the government and property rights holders. Employing a difference-in-differences method, we found that an increased judicial workload improved the chances of property rights holders winning their cases against the government. We discovered that judges’ use of hard-edged legal doctrine—administrative procedures, in particular—to save time constrained judicial discretion, which is prone to arbitrary political influence in authoritarian regimes.
AB - This paper contributes one of the first systematic studies on how courts adjudicate expropriation disputes both in the absence of judicial independence and in the face of resource constraints, extends the study of judicial workload into an authoritarian context, and demonstrates the complicated and dynamic interactions between apolitical and political aspects of courts in authoritarian regimes. Our results demonstrate that legal doctrine can check the abuse of government power even in situations where it is least expected. Specifically, we examined how Chinese courts, faced with an explosive increase in workload caused by a legal reform in 2015, adjudicated expropriation disputes between the government and property rights holders. Employing a difference-in-differences method, we found that an increased judicial workload improved the chances of property rights holders winning their cases against the government. We discovered that judges’ use of hard-edged legal doctrine—administrative procedures, in particular—to save time constrained judicial discretion, which is prone to arbitrary political influence in authoritarian regimes.
KW - China
KW - Courts in authoritarian regimes
KW - Expropriation
KW - Judicial review
KW - Legal doctrine
KW - Workload
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85208749474&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106232
DO - 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106232
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85208749474
SN - 0144-8188
VL - 80
JO - International Review of Law and Economics
JF - International Review of Law and Economics
M1 - 106232
ER -