TY - JOUR
T1 - Wilful Non-Compliance and the Threat of Disintegration in the EU’s Legal Order
AU - SCICLUNA, Nicole Brooke
N1 - Funding Information:
I would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers, whose close reading and constructive feedback very much improved the article. I would also like to thank the editors of the special issue for their support. Finally, I would like to thank Airlia Hie Cheuk Yeuk, Venisa Wai Lok Yan and Yip Tsz Yan for their research assistance.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Swiss Political Science Association
PY - 2021/9
Y1 - 2021/9
N2 - This article focuses on the problem of wilful non-compliance with EU law and the threat it poses of (partial) disorderly disintegration within the EU’s legal order. Taking the example of migration and asylum policy following on from the 2015 migration crisis, I posit differentiated integration (DI), which occurs through processes that are formally mediated and collective, and non-compliance, which is unmediated and unilateral, as alternative strategies for member states which are unwilling to accept further integrative steps. While DI does carry costs, including the risk of legal fragmentation, I argue that it is a valuable tool for pre-empting wilful non-compliance – a phenomenon which both exposes and compounds the normative limits of EU law and is, consequently, more corrosive of the EU’s legal order. Thus, the article suggests that the EU ought to be more open to DI, especially when legislating in policy areas that are highly politicised.
AB - This article focuses on the problem of wilful non-compliance with EU law and the threat it poses of (partial) disorderly disintegration within the EU’s legal order. Taking the example of migration and asylum policy following on from the 2015 migration crisis, I posit differentiated integration (DI), which occurs through processes that are formally mediated and collective, and non-compliance, which is unmediated and unilateral, as alternative strategies for member states which are unwilling to accept further integrative steps. While DI does carry costs, including the risk of legal fragmentation, I argue that it is a valuable tool for pre-empting wilful non-compliance – a phenomenon which both exposes and compounds the normative limits of EU law and is, consequently, more corrosive of the EU’s legal order. Thus, the article suggests that the EU ought to be more open to DI, especially when legislating in policy areas that are highly politicised.
KW - Disintegration
KW - EU law
KW - Migration and asylum policy
KW - Non-compliance
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85114357535&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/spsr.12471
DO - 10.1111/spsr.12471
M3 - Article
SN - 1424-7755
VL - 27
SP - 654
EP - 671
JO - Swiss Political Science Review
JF - Swiss Political Science Review
IS - 3
ER -