Why Pragmaticism is Neither Mathematical Structuralism nor Fictionalism

Ahti Veikko Pietarinen*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in book/report/conference proceedingConference proceedingpeer-review

Abstract

Despite some surface similarities, Charles Peirce’s philosophy of mathematics, pragmaticism, is incompatible with both mathematical structuralism and fictionalism. Pragmaticism has to do with experimentation and observation concerning the forms of relations in diagrammatic and iconic representations of mathematical entities. It does not presuppose mathematical foundations although it has these representations as its objects of study. But these objects do have a reality which structuralism and fictionalism deny.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy
Subtitle of host publicationPhilosophy of Mathematics
EditorsMyung Hyun Lee
PublisherKorean Philosophical Association
Pages19-25
Number of pages7
ISBN (Print)9781889680927
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2008

Publication series

NameProceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy
Volume41

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