TY - JOUR
T1 - Why Images Cannot be Arguments, But Moving Ones Might
AU - Champagne, Marc
AU - Pietarinen, Ahti Veikko
N1 - Funding Information:
We want to thank Chiara Ambrosio, Liam Dempsey, Wayne Fenske, Patrick Findler, Leo Groarke, Hans V. Hansen, Parthiphan Krishnan, Melinda Hogan, Martin Lefebvre, Puqun Li, Judy Pelham, Aud Sissel Hoel, Doran Smolkin, Byron Stoyles, as well as anonymous reviewers for this journal. Research for this work was funded in part by the Estonian Research Council (Projects PUT267, PUT1305), the Academy of Finland (Project No. 12786), and the Russian Academic Excellence Project (No. 5-100).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Springer Nature B.V.
PY - 2020/6
Y1 - 2020/6
N2 - Some have suggested that images can be arguments. Images can certainly bolster the acceptability of individual premises. We worry, though, that the static nature of images prevents them from ever playing a genuinely argumentative role. To show this, we call attention to a dilemma. The conclusion of a visual argument will either be explicit or implicit. If a visual argument includes its (explicit) conclusion, then that conclusion must be demarcated from the premise(s) or otherwise the argument will beg the question. If a visual argument does not include its (implicit) conclusion, then the premises on display must license that specific conclusion and not its opposite, in accordance with some demonstrable rationale. We show how major examples from the literature fail to escape this dilemma. Drawing inspiration from the graphical logic of C. S. Peirce, we suggest instead that images can be manipulated (erased, dragged, copied, etc.) in a way that overcomes the dilemma. Diagrammatic reasoning can take one stepwise from an initial visual layout to a conclusion—thereby providing a principled rationale that bars opposite conclusions—and the visual inscription of this correct conclusion can come afterward in time—thereby distinguishing the conclusion from the premises. Even though this practical application of Peirce’s logical ideas to informal contexts requires that one make adjustments, we believe it points to a dynamic conception of visual argumentation that will prove more fertile in the long run.
AB - Some have suggested that images can be arguments. Images can certainly bolster the acceptability of individual premises. We worry, though, that the static nature of images prevents them from ever playing a genuinely argumentative role. To show this, we call attention to a dilemma. The conclusion of a visual argument will either be explicit or implicit. If a visual argument includes its (explicit) conclusion, then that conclusion must be demarcated from the premise(s) or otherwise the argument will beg the question. If a visual argument does not include its (implicit) conclusion, then the premises on display must license that specific conclusion and not its opposite, in accordance with some demonstrable rationale. We show how major examples from the literature fail to escape this dilemma. Drawing inspiration from the graphical logic of C. S. Peirce, we suggest instead that images can be manipulated (erased, dragged, copied, etc.) in a way that overcomes the dilemma. Diagrammatic reasoning can take one stepwise from an initial visual layout to a conclusion—thereby providing a principled rationale that bars opposite conclusions—and the visual inscription of this correct conclusion can come afterward in time—thereby distinguishing the conclusion from the premises. Even though this practical application of Peirce’s logical ideas to informal contexts requires that one make adjustments, we believe it points to a dynamic conception of visual argumentation that will prove more fertile in the long run.
KW - C. S. Peirce
KW - Diagrammatic reasoning
KW - Existential Graphs
KW - Visual arguments
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85066822844&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10503-019-09484-0
DO - 10.1007/s10503-019-09484-0
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85066822844
SN - 0920-427X
VL - 34
SP - 207
EP - 236
JO - Argumentation
JF - Argumentation
IS - 2
ER -