Abstract
Many say that ontological disputes are defective because they are unimportant or without substance. In this paper, we defend ontological disputes from the charge, with a special focus on disputes over the existence of composite objects. Disputes over the existence of composite objects, we argue, have a number of substantive implications across a variety of topics in metaphysics, science, philosophical theology, philosophy of mind, and ethics. Since the disputes over the existence of composite objects have these substantive implications, they are themselves substantive.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 934-949 |
Number of pages | 16 |
Journal | Canadian Journal of Philosophy |
Volume | 50 |
Issue number | 8 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Nov 2020 |
Scopus Subject Areas
- Philosophy
User-Defined Keywords
- Composition
- material objects
- mereology
- metametaphysics
- substantivity