Using an Original Deductive Formulation of the Teleological Argument to Reply to Outstanding Objections to the Argument

Various properties of the universe have been suggested as indicative of the work of ‘a designer. I focus on two such properties: ‘fine-tuning’ and ‘the existence of orderly patterns of events which can be described by advanced mathematics’. While various forms of design inference have been suggested e.g. analogical, Bayesian, likelihoodist, abductive, sceptics such as Roger Penrose objected that there could be alternative explanations which we still do not know of, while appealing to God can be used to solve any problem so it is not helpful. This concern can be addressed by devising an original deductive argument which demonstrates that the following are the only possible categories of hypotheses: (i) Chance, (ii) Regularity, (iii) Combinations of Regularity and Chance, (iv) Uncaused, and (v) Design, and excluding all the alternative categories such that the conclusion of design follows logically (rather than being appealed to solve a problem). In response to the worry that previously unconsidered hypotheses could be lumped together in catch-all baskets, I show that there is an essential feature of each category (except Design) which renders it unlikely as an explanation for the fine-tuning and order. I reply to various arguments against the likelihood of Design e.g. Dawkins’ ‘who made God’ objection, Hume’s objection from ‘imperfections’, and Halvorsen’s objection that almost all physically possible universes are lifeless. I conclude that, while the alternatives to design are unlikely, there is no good reason to think that the Design hypothesis is unlikely. Since the list of hypotheses is logically exhaustive, one can argue for the Design Hypothesis by exclusion without having to first assign a prior probability for Design, thus avoiding the objections by critics (e.g. Elliot Sober) on this point entirely.