Theism and explanationist defenses of moral realism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Some moral realists have defended moral realism on the basis of the purported fact that moral facts figure as components in some good explanations of non-moral phenomena. In this paper I explore the relationship between theism and this sort of explanationist defense of moral realism. Theistic explanations often make reference to moral facts, and do so in a manner which is ineliminable in an important respect—remove the moral facts from those explanations, and they suffer as a result. In this respect theistic moral explanations seem to differ from the sorts of moral explanations typically offered by moral explanationists.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)447–463
Number of pages17
JournalFaith and Philosophy
Volume35
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2018
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Theism and explanationist defenses of moral realism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this