The Tenet of Transitory Compensation in Dynamically Stable Cooperation

David W. K. Yeung, Leon A. Petrosyan

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article


Dynamic cooperation represents one of the most complex forms of decision-making analysis under uncertainty. The complexity leads to great difficulties in the derivation of dynamically stable solutions. An essential factor for a dynamically stable cooperative solution is availability of a system of transitory compensations leading to a subgame consistent solution. In this paper, we derive and examine the rationale behind the working of transitory compensation by discomposing the subgame consistent payoff distribution.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)60-65
Number of pages6
JournalInternational Journal of Tomography & Statistics
Issue numberF07
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2007
Externally publishedYes

User-Defined Keywords

  • Cooperative Differential Games
  • Transitory Compensation
  • Subgame Consistency


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