Abstract
Empirical social sciences routinely model misinformation as exhibiting dynamics analogous to vaccinable diseases or contagious outbreaks, as in inoculation theory and other epidemiological models. However, idiosyncratic features of the social construction of misinformation violate the biological analogy in significant ways, rendering these models far weaker in effect size, predictive accuracy, and explanatory power than has been claimed. Four arguments are discussed regarding problems with the ontology of misinformation posited in these models, methods for measuring misinformation, individuation of mechanisms, and application of interventions. A conclusion is drawn that model transfer from biology has often been unwarranted in misinformation studies and that alternative methods should be pursued instead.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 158 |
| Number of pages | 23 |
| Journal | Synthese |
| Volume | 206 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 10 Sept 2025 |
User-Defined Keywords
- Misinformation
- Model transfer
- Philosophy of science
- Philosophy of social science
- Social epistemology