The European parliament and the co-decision procedure: A reassessment

Roger M. Scully*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

68 Citations (Scopus)


In this paper, I reassess the co-decision legislative procedure introduced by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. Specifically, I examine the dispute as to whether co-decision enhanced or diminished the European Parliament's influence over EU law making. Employing a combination of formal analysis of the different stages of the procedure and evidence from its actual operation, I argue that Garrett and Tsebelis’ claim that co-decision reduces Parliament's legislative powers is both theoretically and empirically unsupported. The implications for the Parliament's position within European politics are evaluated in the conclusion.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)58-73
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Legislative Studies
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - Sept 1997

Scopus Subject Areas

  • Political Science and International Relations
  • Law


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