The efficiency analysis for oligopolistic games when cost functions are non-separable

Deren Han, Hai Yang, Xiaoming YUAN*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


By deriving an upper bound of the so-called 'price of anarchy', this paper analyses the efficiency of oligopolistic games in networks with non-separable and asymmetric cost functions, splittable flows and fixed demands. The new bound is determined by the optimal objective function values of some optimisation problems. In particular, for some special cases, the bound turns out to be explicit in the sense that it is representable explicitly by the number of players, and the constants measuring the degree of asymmetry and non-linearity of the cost function.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)237-257
Number of pages21
JournalInternational Journal of Mathematical Modelling and Numerical Optimisation
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2010

Scopus Subject Areas

  • Numerical Analysis
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Applied Mathematics

User-Defined Keywords

  • Equilibrium
  • Non-separable
  • Oligopolistic games
  • PoA
  • Price of anarchy
  • System optimum


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