Abstract
Under dynamic cooperation a player may use 'irrational' acts to extort additional gains if later circumstances allow. In this article we present a condition under which even if irrational behaviors appear later in the game the concerned player would still be performing better under the cooperative scheme.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 739-744 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| Journal | International Game Theory Review |
| Volume | 8 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2006 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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