TY - JOUR
T1 - Talk May Be Cheap, but Deeds Seldom Cheat
T2 - On Political Liberalism and the Assurance Problem
AU - Wong, Baldwin
AU - Li, Man Kong
N1 - Funding Information:
This paper results from an ongoing Faculty Development Scheme (FDS) project on “Exploring the Idea of Public Reason” (#FDS14/H12/20), funded by Hong Kong's University Grants Committee. The earlier version of this article is presented in the panel “The Past and Future of Democratic Community” held in ECPR General Conference. We would like to thank the audience and commentators for their very helpful comments. We particularly thank Benny Chao for his insightful comments and suggestions.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 The Authors. American Journal of Political Science published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Midwest Political Science Association.
PY - 2024/10
Y1 - 2024/10
N2 - In a well-ordered society, democratic officials face an assurance problem. They want to ensure that others will act reasonably when they do the same. According to political liberals, public reason can solve this problem, but the details of how assurance is generated are unclear. This article explains the assurance mechanism in political liberalism. Apart from public reason, mutual assurance is also provided by a long-term record of civic deeds. By performing civic deeds over time, officials signal their reasonableness to each other. This record of civic deeds is costly to unreasonable officials and thus represents a reliable way to differentiate trustworthy fellows from others. The article also shows that a recent critique of political liberalism, which argues that public reason is merely cheap talk and thus political liberalism fails to provide mutual assurance, misses the point. It overlooks that assurance is created through talks and deeds together.
AB - In a well-ordered society, democratic officials face an assurance problem. They want to ensure that others will act reasonably when they do the same. According to political liberals, public reason can solve this problem, but the details of how assurance is generated are unclear. This article explains the assurance mechanism in political liberalism. Apart from public reason, mutual assurance is also provided by a long-term record of civic deeds. By performing civic deeds over time, officials signal their reasonableness to each other. This record of civic deeds is costly to unreasonable officials and thus represents a reliable way to differentiate trustworthy fellows from others. The article also shows that a recent critique of political liberalism, which argues that public reason is merely cheap talk and thus political liberalism fails to provide mutual assurance, misses the point. It overlooks that assurance is created through talks and deeds together.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85147500626&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/ajps.12770
DO - 10.1111/ajps.12770
M3 - Journal article
SN - 0092-5853
VL - 68
SP - 1353
EP - 1365
JO - American Journal of Political Science
JF - American Journal of Political Science
IS - 4
ER -