Subgame consistent cooperative solutions in stochastic differential games

David W. K. Yeung*, Leon A. Petrosyan

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

61 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Subgame consistency is a fundamental element in the solution of cooperative stochastic differential games. In particular, it ensures that: (i) the extension of the solution policy to a later starting time and to any possible state brought about by the prior optimal behavior of the players would remain optimal; (ii) all players do not have incentive to deviate from the initial plan. In this paper, we develop a mechanism for the derivation of the payoff distribution procedures of subgame consistent solutions in stochastic differential games with transferable payoffs. The payoff distribution procedure of the subgame consistent solution can be identified analytically under different optimality principles. Demonstration of the use of the technique for specific optimality principles is shown with an explicitly solvable game. For the first time, analytically tractable solutions of cooperative stochastic differential games with subgame consistency are derived.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)651-666
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Optimization Theory and Applications
Volume120
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2004
Externally publishedYes

Scopus Subject Areas

  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Control and Optimization
  • Applied Mathematics

User-Defined Keywords

  • Stochastic differential games
  • cooperative solutions
  • subgame consistency
  • dynamic stability

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