Subgame-consistent cooperative solutions in randomly furcating stochastic differential games

L. A. Petrosyan, David Wing Kay Yeung*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The paradigm of randomly-furcating stochastic differential games incorporates additional stochastic elements via randomly branching payoffs in stochastic differential games. This paper considers dynamically stable cooperative solutions in randomly furcating stochastic differential games. Analytically tractable payoff distribution procedures contingent upon specific random realizations of the state and payoff structure are derived. This new approach widens the application of cooperative differential game theory to problems where the evolution of the state and future environments are not known with certainty. Important cases abound in regional economic cooperation, corporate joint ventures and environmental control. An illustration in cooperative resource extraction is presented.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1294-1307
Number of pages14
JournalMathematical and Computer Modelling
Volume45
Issue number11-12
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2007
Externally publishedYes

Scopus Subject Areas

  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Computer Science Applications

User-Defined Keywords

  • Cooperative solution
  • Dynamic stability
  • Randomly furcating differential games
  • Subgame consistency

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