Abstract
A paradox adapted from the well-known 'paradox of increase' has been formulated against composite Christology in recent literature. I argue that concrete-composite Christologists can reply by denying the premise that the pre-incarnate divine nature=the Second Person of the Trinity. This denial can be made by modifying a hylomorphic theory of individuals. Using an analogy from material coinciding objects, this modified theory provides an illuminating account of how a person can gain (or lose) parts over time but remain numerically identical, and it demonstrates that concrete nature and person are not the same thing.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 493-502 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Religious Studies |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2011 |