Abstract
A paradox adapted from the well-known 'paradox of increase' has been formulated against composite Christology in recent literature. I argue that concrete-composite Christologists can reply by denying the premise that the pre-incarnate divine nature=the Second Person of the Trinity. This denial can be made by modifying a hylomorphic theory of individuals. Using an analogy from material coinciding objects, this modified theory provides an illuminating account of how a person can gain (or lose) parts over time but remain numerically identical, and it demonstrates that concrete nature and person are not the same thing.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 493-502 |
Number of pages | 10 |
Journal | Religious Studies |
Volume | 47 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Dec 2011 |
Scopus Subject Areas
- Religious studies
- Philosophy