Sense Perception and Mereological Nihilism

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Abstract

In the debate over the existence of composite objects, it is sometimes suggested that perceptual evidence justifies belief in composite objects. But it is almost never suggested that we are perceptually justified in believing in composite objects on the basis of the fact that the phenomenology of our perceptual experiences enables us to discriminate between situations where there are composite objects and situations where there are merely simples arranged composite object-wise. But while the thought that the phenomenology of our perceptual experiences cannot enable us to discriminate between situations where there are composite objects and situations where there are merely simples arranged composite object-wise is commonly taken for granted, it requires some defence, both in light of its importance in shaping the debate and in light of its recently coming under attack by a prominent philosopher of perception. In this paper, I offer such a defence.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)68–83
Number of pages16
JournalPhilosophical Quarterly
Volume74
Issue number1
Early online date7 Dec 2022
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2024

Scopus Subject Areas

  • Philosophy

User-Defined Keywords

  • composition
  • mereological nihilism
  • mereology
  • perception
  • special composition question

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