Remanufacturing in a competitive market: A closed-loop supply chain in a Stackelberg game framework

Shaolong Tang, Wenjie Wang, Gaoguang Zhou

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In this work, we study a closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing in a competitive market, where the supply chain is a price taker. A Stackelberg game framework is considered, where a manufacturer (leader) has sufficient channel power over a retailer (follower). We develop analytical models to show that a closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing in a competitive market can achieve the same return rate as that in the centrally coordinated channel by employing a contract between the manufacturer and the retailer. The contract consists of a wholesale price, and a progressive transfer price scheme with additional allowances (or charges) for the returned products. Our models also take into account the effect of green initiatives on consumers’ purchase intention by relating the green achievement from remanufacturing to consumer demand. In practice, our models can be directly applied to a closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing in a competitive market.
Original languageEnglish
Article number113655
Number of pages14
JournalExpert Systems with Applications
Volume161
Early online date28 Jun 2020
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 15 Dec 2020

User-Defined Keywords

  • Remanufacturing
  • Stackelberg game
  • Closed-loop supply chain
  • Competitive markets
  • Progressive transfer prices

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