Public and private enforcement of non-GAAP reporting

  • Dain C. Donelson
  • , Antonis Kartapanis
  • , Colin Q. Koutney*
  • , Chris X. Zhao
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This study provides evidence on the frequency and effectiveness of public and private enforcement of non-GAAP reporting. Although investors place weight on non-GAAP measures, there is little evidence on the extent and effectiveness of non-GAAP enforcement. The SEC uses comment letters to oversee non-GAAP reporting. While most firms appear to enhance future non-GAAP disclosures after receiving a comment letter, we also find that firms that receive non-GAAP comment letters are more likely than control firms to receive future non-GAAP comment letters, with the same comments often repeated. In addition, non-GAAP enforcement in the form of SEC AAERs and securities class action lawsuits is very rare. However, we find limited evidence of investor harm from managers’ non-GAAP exclusions that are incremental to analysts’ exclusions. This result suggests investors are skeptical of managers’ non-GAAP exclusions.

Original languageEnglish
Article number107338
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Accounting and Public Policy
Volume52
Early online date30 Jun 2025
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2025

User-Defined Keywords

  • Litigation
  • Non-GAAP Reporting
  • SEC Enforcement
  • Securities Class Actions

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