Abstract
This study provides evidence on the frequency and effectiveness of public and private enforcement of non-GAAP reporting. Although investors place weight on non-GAAP measures, there is little evidence on the extent and effectiveness of non-GAAP enforcement. The SEC uses comment letters to oversee non-GAAP reporting. While most firms appear to enhance future non-GAAP disclosures after receiving a comment letter, we also find that firms that receive non-GAAP comment letters are more likely than control firms to receive future non-GAAP comment letters, with the same comments often repeated. In addition, non-GAAP enforcement in the form of SEC AAERs and securities class action lawsuits is very rare. However, we find limited evidence of investor harm from managers’ non-GAAP exclusions that are incremental to analysts’ exclusions. This result suggests investors are skeptical of managers’ non-GAAP exclusions.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 107338 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Journal of Accounting and Public Policy |
| Volume | 52 |
| Early online date | 30 Jun 2025 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jul 2025 |
User-Defined Keywords
- Litigation
- Non-GAAP Reporting
- SEC Enforcement
- Securities Class Actions