On the security of the secure arithmetic code

Hung Min Sun; King Hang Wang; Wei Chih Ting

doi:10.1109/TIFS.2009.2031944

On the security of the secure arithmetic code

Hung Min Sun^*
, King Hang Wang
, Wei Chih Ting

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Computer Science

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › peer-review

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In 2007, Kim proposed a secure compression code called the Secure Arithmetic Code (SAC). The code was claimed to be secure against chosen plaintext attacks. However, we find that the SAC is not as secure as the authors have claimed. In this paper, we show the code is prone to two attacks. The first attack completely breaks the code using an adaptive chosen plaintext attack with a polynomial number of queries. The second attack is a ciphertext-only attack, which removes a part of the output permutation.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	781-789
Number of pages	9
Journal	IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Volume	4
Issue number	4
Early online date	22 Sept 2009
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2009.2031944
Publication status	Published - Dec 2009

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 9 Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure

User-Defined Keywords

Arithmetic codes (ACs)
Communication system security
Data compression

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10.1109/TIFS.2009.2031944

Cite this

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title = "On the security of the secure arithmetic code",

abstract = "In 2007, Kim proposed a secure compression code called the Secure Arithmetic Code (SAC). The code was claimed to be secure against chosen plaintext attacks. However, we find that the SAC is not as secure as the authors have claimed. In this paper, we show the code is prone to two attacks. The first attack completely breaks the code using an adaptive chosen plaintext attack with a polynomial number of queries. The second attack is a ciphertext-only attack, which removes a part of the output permutation.",

keywords = "Arithmetic codes (ACs), Communication system security, Data compression",

author = "Sun, \{Hung Min\} and Wang, \{King Hang\} and Ting, \{Wei Chih\}",

note = " This work was supported in part by the National Science Council, Taiwan, under Contract NSC 97-2221-E-007- 055-MY3 and NSC 97-2745-P-001-001. The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Dr. Bart Preneel. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2009 IEEE",

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AU - Wang, King Hang

AU - Ting, Wei Chih

N1 - This work was supported in part by the National Science Council, Taiwan, under Contract NSC 97-2221-E-007- 055-MY3 and NSC 97-2745-P-001-001. The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Dr. Bart Preneel. Publisher Copyright: © 2009 IEEE

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N2 - In 2007, Kim proposed a secure compression code called the Secure Arithmetic Code (SAC). The code was claimed to be secure against chosen plaintext attacks. However, we find that the SAC is not as secure as the authors have claimed. In this paper, we show the code is prone to two attacks. The first attack completely breaks the code using an adaptive chosen plaintext attack with a polynomial number of queries. The second attack is a ciphertext-only attack, which removes a part of the output permutation.

AB - In 2007, Kim proposed a secure compression code called the Secure Arithmetic Code (SAC). The code was claimed to be secure against chosen plaintext attacks. However, we find that the SAC is not as secure as the authors have claimed. In this paper, we show the code is prone to two attacks. The first attack completely breaks the code using an adaptive chosen plaintext attack with a polynomial number of queries. The second attack is a ciphertext-only attack, which removes a part of the output permutation.

KW - Arithmetic codes (ACs)

KW - Communication system security

KW - Data compression

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/70450285600

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DO - 10.1109/TIFS.2009.2031944

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VL - 4

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JO - IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

JF - IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

IS - 4

ER -

On the security of the secure arithmetic code

Abstract

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