TY - JOUR
T1 - On the Infinite God Objection
T2 - a Reply to Jacobus Erasmus and Anné Hendrik Verhoef
AU - Loke, Andrew Ter Ern
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2016, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
PY - 2016/6/1
Y1 - 2016/6/1
N2 - Erasmus and Verhoef suggest that a promising response to the infinite God objection to the Kalām cosmological argument include showing that (1) abstract objects do not exist; (2) actually infinite knowledge is impossible; and (3) redefining omniscience as (G): for any proposition p, if God consciously thinks about p, God will either accept p as true if and only if p is true, or accept p as false if and only if p is false. I argue that there is insufficient motivation for showing (1) and (2) and that (G) is problematic as a definition of omniscience.
AB - Erasmus and Verhoef suggest that a promising response to the infinite God objection to the Kalām cosmological argument include showing that (1) abstract objects do not exist; (2) actually infinite knowledge is impossible; and (3) redefining omniscience as (G): for any proposition p, if God consciously thinks about p, God will either accept p as true if and only if p is true, or accept p as false if and only if p is false. I argue that there is insufficient motivation for showing (1) and (2) and that (G) is problematic as a definition of omniscience.
KW - Abstract objects
KW - Infinite God objection
KW - Kalām cosmological argument
KW - Omniscience
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84978105465&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11841-016-0539-8
DO - 10.1007/s11841-016-0539-8
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:84978105465
SN - 0038-1527
VL - 55
SP - 263
EP - 272
JO - Sophia
JF - Sophia
IS - 2
ER -