On the Infinite God Objection: a Reply to Jacobus Erasmus and Anné Hendrik Verhoef

Andrew Ter Ern Loke*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Erasmus and Verhoef suggest that a promising response to the infinite God objection to the Kalām cosmological argument include showing that (1) abstract objects do not exist; (2) actually infinite knowledge is impossible; and (3) redefining omniscience as (G): for any proposition p, if God consciously thinks about p, God will either accept p as true if and only if p is true, or accept p as false if and only if p is false. I argue that there is insufficient motivation for showing (1) and (2) and that (G) is problematic as a definition of omniscience.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)263-272
Number of pages10
JournalSophia
Volume55
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2016

Scopus Subject Areas

  • Religious studies
  • Philosophy

User-Defined Keywords

  • Abstract objects
  • Infinite God objection
  • Kalām cosmological argument
  • Omniscience

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'On the Infinite God Objection: a Reply to Jacobus Erasmus and Anné Hendrik Verhoef'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this