On the doing-allowing distinction and the problem of evil: a reply to Daniel Lim

Andrew Loke*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

    2 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    In his article ‘Doing, allowing, and the problem of evil’ recently published in this journal, Daniel Lim attempts to undermine the following claims with respect to God: (1) the doing-allowing distinction exists and (2) the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. I argue that Lim’s attempt is unsuccessful, and that his understanding of divine providence has the unacceptable consequence of implying that God is the originator of evil.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)137-143
    Number of pages7
    JournalInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion
    Volume83
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2018

    Scopus Subject Areas

    • Philosophy

    User-Defined Keywords

    • Agent causation
    • Allowing
    • Divine providence
    • Doing
    • Free will
    • Middle knowledge
    • Problem of evil

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