On the doing-allowing distinction and the problem of evil: a reply to Daniel Lim

Andrew Loke*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In his article ‘Doing, allowing, and the problem of evil’ recently published in this journal, Daniel Lim attempts to undermine the following claims with respect to God: (1) the doing-allowing distinction exists and (2) the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. I argue that Lim’s attempt is unsuccessful, and that his understanding of divine providence has the unacceptable consequence of implying that God is the originator of evil.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)137-143
Number of pages7
JournalInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Volume83
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2018

Scopus Subject Areas

  • Philosophy

User-Defined Keywords

  • Agent causation
  • Allowing
  • Divine providence
  • Doing
  • Free will
  • Middle knowledge
  • Problem of evil

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