On the doing-allowing distinction and the problem of evil: a reply to Daniel Lim

Andrew LOKE

doi:10.1007/s11153-017-9614-5

On the doing-allowing distinction and the problem of evil: a reply to Daniel Lim

Andrew LOKE^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Religion and Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In his article ‘Doing, allowing, and the problem of evil’ recently published in this journal, Daniel Lim attempts to undermine the following claims with respect to God: (1) the doing-allowing distinction exists and (2) the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. I argue that Lim’s attempt is unsuccessful, and that his understanding of divine providence has the unacceptable consequence of implying that God is the originator of evil.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	137-143
Number of pages	7
Journal	International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Volume	83
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-017-9614-5
Publication status	Published - 1 Apr 2018

Scopus Subject Areas

Philosophy

User-Defined Keywords

Agent causation
Allowing
Divine providence
Doing
Free will
Middle knowledge
Problem of evil

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10.1007/s11153-017-9614-5

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On the doing-allowing distinction and the problem of evil: a reply to Daniel Lim

Abstract

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