On beginningless past, endless future, God, and singing angels: An assessment of the Morriston-Craig dialogue

Whether the past or future can be infinite is an interesting question for theologians working on the relationship between God and Time as well as Eschatology. In a recent exchange, Wes Morriston concluded that if William Lane Craig's familiar line of argument against the possibility of a beginningless series of events worked, it would work just as well against the possibility of an endless series of predetermined events. He argued that neither Craig's claim that an endless series of events is potential infinite nor the claim that future events don't exist is successful in blocking this conclusion. I argue that a proponent of the Kalam Argument does not have to follow Craig's denial of an actual infinite number of propositions, and I show how Morriston's conclusion can be blocked. In particular, I argue that an asymmetric treatment of past and future is justified on a dynamic theory of time, while the distinction between abstract and concrete infinities is helpful for responding to Morriston's counter-argument based on the number of angelic praises yet-to-be-said.