TY - GEN
T1 - Networking effects on cooperation in evolutionary N-person threshold games
AU - Wang, Weihao
AU - SHI, Benyun
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors would like to acknowledge the funding support from National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 81402760, 81573261), and the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province, China (Grant No. BK20161563) for the research work being presented in this article. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
PY - 2018/2/27
Y1 - 2018/2/27
N2 - Evolutionary game theory has been extensively employed to study the evolution of cooperation in human society. Many previous studies have shown that public cooperation can emerge from positive interactions and social diversity in structured populations. Here we study the evolution of cooperation under N-person interactions, where a minimum threshold of individuals must cooperate to produce public benefits. This is a very common phenomenon in teamwork, especially given the limited capacity of individuals. In this paper, we first present two scenarios of individual contribution mechanisms under an N-person threshold game to characterize such real-world situations. Then, we analyze the stable equilibrium for both scenarios of threshold games in well-mixed populations. Finally, we carry out simulations on three types of complex networks to evaluate the effects of both individual interactions and social diversity on the evolution of cooperation in structured populations. The analytical and simulation results in this paper offer a new insight into the evolution of cooperation in the face of threshold.
AB - Evolutionary game theory has been extensively employed to study the evolution of cooperation in human society. Many previous studies have shown that public cooperation can emerge from positive interactions and social diversity in structured populations. Here we study the evolution of cooperation under N-person interactions, where a minimum threshold of individuals must cooperate to produce public benefits. This is a very common phenomenon in teamwork, especially given the limited capacity of individuals. In this paper, we first present two scenarios of individual contribution mechanisms under an N-person threshold game to characterize such real-world situations. Then, we analyze the stable equilibrium for both scenarios of threshold games in well-mixed populations. Finally, we carry out simulations on three types of complex networks to evaluate the effects of both individual interactions and social diversity on the evolution of cooperation in structured populations. The analytical and simulation results in this paper offer a new insight into the evolution of cooperation in the face of threshold.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85050460970&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/SPAC.2017.8304277
DO - 10.1109/SPAC.2017.8304277
M3 - Conference proceeding
AN - SCOPUS:85050460970
T3 - 2017 International Conference on Security, Pattern Analysis, and Cybernetics, SPAC 2017
SP - 209
EP - 214
BT - 2017 International Conference on Security, Pattern Analysis, and Cybernetics, SPAC 2017
PB - IEEE
T2 - 2017 International Conference on Security, Pattern Analysis, and Cybernetics, SPAC 2017
Y2 - 15 December 2017 through 17 December 2017
ER -