TY - CHAP
T1 - Methodeutic of Abduction
AU - Bellucci, Francesco
AU - Pietarinen, Ahti Veikko
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgments Supported by the Estonian Research Council personal research grant PUT 1305, Abduction in the Age of Fundamental Uncertainty (A.-V. Pietarinen, 2016-2018), and the HSE University Basic Research Program funded by the Russian Academic Excellence Project ‘5-100’ (A.-V. Pietarinen, 2018-2020).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
PY - 2021/5/30
Y1 - 2021/5/30
N2 - Peirce’s claims that methodeutic “concerns abduction alone” and that “pragmatism contributes to the security of reasoning but hardly to its uberty” are explained. They match as soon as a third claim is taken into account, namely that “pragmatism is the logic of abduction,” not of deduction or induction. Since methodeutic concerns abduction and not deduction or induction, it follows that pragmatism is a maxim of methodeutic. Then, since pragmatism contributes to the security of reasoning but not to its uberty, it follows that methodeutic contributes to the security of the only reasoning it is concerned with, namely abduction. We then explain two related issues of methodeutic of abduction. First, in addition to the maxim of pragmatism, which suggests how to choose among experimental hypotheses contributing to the security of reasoning, there is the maxim of simplicity, which suggests hypotheses that are preferable for investment and which contributes to uberty of reasoning. Second, a third maxim of abduction is economy, which suggests adopting hypotheses that contribute to the advantageousness of reasoning even when pragmatism and simplicity cease to apply. These three maxims—experientiality for security, simplicity for uberty, and economy for advantageousness—are the bedrocks of Peirce’s methodeutic of abduction.
AB - Peirce’s claims that methodeutic “concerns abduction alone” and that “pragmatism contributes to the security of reasoning but hardly to its uberty” are explained. They match as soon as a third claim is taken into account, namely that “pragmatism is the logic of abduction,” not of deduction or induction. Since methodeutic concerns abduction and not deduction or induction, it follows that pragmatism is a maxim of methodeutic. Then, since pragmatism contributes to the security of reasoning but not to its uberty, it follows that methodeutic contributes to the security of the only reasoning it is concerned with, namely abduction. We then explain two related issues of methodeutic of abduction. First, in addition to the maxim of pragmatism, which suggests how to choose among experimental hypotheses contributing to the security of reasoning, there is the maxim of simplicity, which suggests hypotheses that are preferable for investment and which contributes to uberty of reasoning. Second, a third maxim of abduction is economy, which suggests adopting hypotheses that contribute to the advantageousness of reasoning even when pragmatism and simplicity cease to apply. These three maxims—experientiality for security, simplicity for uberty, and economy for advantageousness—are the bedrocks of Peirce’s methodeutic of abduction.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85107215885&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-61773-8_5
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-61773-8_5
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:85107215885
SN - 9783030617721
SN - 9783030617752
T3 - Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics
SP - 107
EP - 127
BT - Abduction in Cognition and Action
A2 - Shook, John R.
A2 - Paavola, Sami
PB - Springer Cham
ER -