Metaphysics of Pregnancy, Personal Identity, and the Objectification of Women

Elselijn Kingma argued for a part-whole model (PWM) of the metaphysical relation between a foetus and its pregnant organism against a foetal container model (FCM) in some talks in 2016. I find in general no problem accepting this proposal. Indeed, my own pregnancy experience tells against the FCM understood in some way. In this paper I want to assess some metaphysical (personal identity) and ethical (objectification of women) implications of both models when applied to human pregnancy. I argue that although they cast different views on personal identity, both may objectify the pregnant organism when some other background social situation or beliefs are added. I claim by no means they are sufficient for objectifying women by itself. The FCM encourages the conception that the foetus(es) and the pregnant organism are distinct objects. Thus, it favours the view that a foetus is a person and multiple persons may exist at the same time and space during the pregnancy process. In a community where women have not already garnered sufficient attention and respect, this model may form or reinforce objectification of women. The point is whether the pregnant organism is viewed as a person. The imagery of the FCM turns audience’s focus on the bun (foetus), thus the foetus is the end and is surely regarded as a person. This may leave the oven (the pregnant organism) as merely a tool or means to an end. The PWM may objectify the woman, too. This may sound counterintuitive at first. Prima facie, the PWM may foster respect towards the pregnant organism because it allows only a single organism to exist throughout the pregnancy, and if any organism is qualified as a person, the whole (the pregnant organism) is certainly far more a suitable candidate than its part (the foetus). So, the model may entail that a foetus is not a person until it is born while the autonomy of the pregnant organism is fully defended in the name of self-ownership. I have no interest in debating whether a foetus is a person; I suspect that there can be no definite answer and more importantly, I also think that it does not matter. I endorse Parfit’s (1971) view that personal identity is obsolete. The PWM, if true, seems to show just another good case for that. I argue that it is possible for the PWM to objectify the pregnant organism irrespective of the foetus’ personhood status. The PWM by itself does not necessarily lead to this problem; it does so if it were to team up with what I call a property view of the part-whole relation, that treats a part as a property to the whole. The analysis is drawn from an analogy with the Marxist insight of alienation of labour in the capitalist society. While liberals such as Locke grounded property right on self-ownership, Marx regarded this very same property right, whether or not coined ‘self-ownership’, is responsible for alienating the subject from his/her labour and thus demeans his/her self-worth. Consumerism and the system of private property turns labour into commodity. In assessing the worth of a person by the commodities one owns, one alienates from oneself and treats oneself and other agents as properties. I argue, similarly, if a mother treats her foetus merely as property yet suppose the relation should indeed be as intimate as close to a source of self-worth, values, dignity and moral responsibility, then the mother would be alienating herself from the foetus and thus also objectifying herself. The conceptual challenge here is that we need to spell out specifically what kind of a part-whole relation it is between a foetus and its pregnant organism. I think there are many possible readings to the part-whole relation. In some situation the property view may apply yet in others it may not be appropriate. For examples, a car has wheels but it makes no sense to say that a car ‘owns’ the wheels. A temporal part of a self is a part of the whole self yet it also makes no sense to delineate a temporal part outside of the whole and to literally claim that the whole owns or disowns a part. An individual is a part to the ethical community yet it does not mean any individual is dispensable or of lesser value than the whole. Yes, sometimes a part can be taken as something dispensable, such as I may lose an arm yet it would not mean that I am not myself. However, does it apply to the case of pregnancy? A whole is its parts aggregated yet different organisation principles may apply in different cases. My preliminary thought is that a part constitutes the whole. Constitution is an intrinsic relation; yet property is typically an extrinsic relation between a person and a thing external to the person. Only a person can own things. Yet even for a person, I own my body does not mean that I can do absolutely anything with my body and treat it like an external thing. For example, there are moral limits on organ selling, prostitution, and I argue, self-slavery. Hence, even if a foetus is only a part, it does not endorse, for example, abortion is alright in any circumstance. I am not claiming whether a foetus is objectively a thing or not; I suspect that no claim of such sort can be established. I think rather that something is wrong if a human pregnant organism (the mother) merely considers her foetus as a thing throughout its development. This way of thinking represents an objectification of the foetus. Paradoxically, in objectifying the foetus, the pregnant woman is also not far from alienating and objectifying herself. I welcome the proposal of the PWM. I also appreciate Kingma’s ambition for making a general case of all pregnant organisms rather than just human beings. My suspicion is that the PWM cannot win the metaphysical battle simply on biological or typological grounds and apply it right away to human cases. There may be something more going on. Like any theoretical notion, we must examine any metaphysical proposal over a diverse range of concerns and judge carefully of its pros and cons.