Metaphysical Foundationalism and Theoretical Unification

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Some facts ground other facts. Some fact is fundamental iff there are no other facts which partially or fully ground that fact. According to metaphysical foundationalism, every non-fundamental fact is fully grounded by some fundamental fact(s). In this paper I examine and defend some neglected considerations which might be made in favor of metaphysical foundationalism. Building off of work by Ross Cameron, I suggest that foundationalist theories are more unified than, and so in one important respect simpler than, non-foundationalist theories, insofar as foundationalist theories allow us to derive all non-fundamental facts from some fundamental fact(s). Non-foundationalist theories can enjoy a similar sort of theoretical unification only by taking on objectionable metaphysical laws.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 21 Jul 2021


Dive into the research topics of 'Metaphysical Foundationalism and Theoretical Unification'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this