Metaphysical Foundationalism and Theoretical Unification

Andrew Brenner*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Some facts ground other facts. Some fact is fundamental iff there are no other facts which partially or fully ground that fact. According to metaphysical foundationalism, every non-fundamental fact is fully grounded by some fundamental fact(s). In this paper I examine and defend some neglected considerations which might be made in favor of metaphysical foundationalism. Building off of work by Ross Cameron, I suggest that foundationalist theories are more unified than, and so in one important respect simpler than, non-foundationalist theories, insofar as foundationalist theories allow us to derive all non-fundamental facts from some fundamental fact(s). Non-foundationalist theories can enjoy a similar sort of theoretical unification only by taking on objectionable metaphysical laws.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)1661–1681
    Number of pages21
    JournalErkenntnis
    Volume88
    Issue number4
    Early online date21 Jul 2021
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Apr 2023

    Scopus Subject Areas

    • Logic
    • Philosophy

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