Metaphysical Foundationalism and Theoretical Unification

Andrew Brenner*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Some facts ground other facts. Some fact is fundamental iff there are no other facts which partially or fully ground that fact. According to metaphysical foundationalism, every non-fundamental fact is fully grounded by some fundamental fact(s). In this paper I examine and defend some neglected considerations which might be made in favor of metaphysical foundationalism. Building off of work by Ross Cameron, I suggest that foundationalist theories are more unified than, and so in one important respect simpler than, non-foundationalist theories, insofar as foundationalist theories allow us to derive all non-fundamental facts from some fundamental fact(s). Non-foundationalist theories can enjoy a similar sort of theoretical unification only by taking on objectionable metaphysical laws.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1661–1681
Number of pages21
JournalErkenntnis
Volume88
Issue number4
Early online date21 Jul 2021
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2023

Scopus Subject Areas

  • Logic
  • Philosophy

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