Mereological nihilism and the special arrangement question

Andrew Brenner*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Mereological nihilism is the thesis that composite objects—objects with proper parts—do not exist. Nihilists generally paraphrase talk of composite objects F into talk of there being “xs arranged F-wise” (for example, while nihilists deny that there are tables, they concede that there are “xs arranged table-wise”). Recently several philosophers have argued that nihilism is defective insofar as nihilists are either unable to say what they mean by such phrases as “there are xs arranged F-wise,” or that nihilists are unable to employ such phrases without incurring significant costs, perhaps even undermining one of the chief motivations for nihilism. In this paper I defend nihilism against these objections. A key theme of the paper is this: if nihilists need to employ such phrases as “there are xs arranged F-wise,” non-nihilists will need to do so as well. Accordingly, any costs incurred by the nihilist when she employs such phrases will be shared by everyone else. What’s more, such phrases are intelligible when employed by the nihilist, as well as when they are employed by the non-nihilist, insofar as analyses of such phrases will not essentially involve mereological concepts incompatible with nihilism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1295–1314
Number of pages20
JournalSynthese
Volume192
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2015
Externally publishedYes

User-Defined Keywords

  • Mereological nihilism
  • Composition
  • Special composition question
  • SCQ
  • Special arrangement question

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