Managing careers in organizations

Rongzhu KE, Jin Li, Michael Powell

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Firms’ organizational structures impose constraints on their ability to usepromotion-basedincentives.Wedevelopa frameworkfor identifying these constraints and exploring their consequences.We show that firms manage workers’ careers by choosing personnel policies that resemble an internal labor market. Firms may adopt forced turnover policies to keep lines of advancement open, and they may alter their organizational structures to relax these constraints. This gives rise to a trade-off between incentive provision at the worker level and productive efficiency at the firm level. Our framework generates novel testable implications that connect firm-level characteristics with workers’ careers.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)197-252
Number of pages56
JournalJournal of Labor Economics
Volume36
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2018

Scopus Subject Areas

  • Industrial relations
  • Economics and Econometrics

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