Abstract
The issuer underpricing hypothesis addresses why IPOs with a Directed Share Program (DSP) are substantially more underpriced and why the issuers are not upset over the additional money left on the table. In support of the hypothesis, we find that both the final size and likelihood of DSP adoption are greater when expected IPO underpricing is high. Issuers with a DSP also strategically underprice their IPO through a downward bias in offer price adjustments, but will do so only when the cost is not prohibitive. Finally, the first-day IPO return is relatively higher when directed shares are allocated to customers.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 105-125 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | Journal of Empirical Finance |
Volume | 56 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Mar 2020 |
Scopus Subject Areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
User-Defined Keywords
- Directed share program
- Initial public offerings
- IPO underpricing
- Lockup
- Partial adjustment phenomenon
- Prospect theory