TY - JOUR
T1 - Is the critical trust approach to religious experience incompatible with religious particularism? a reply to Michael Martin and John Hick
AU - Kwan, Kai Man
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2013 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2003/4
Y1 - 2003/4
N2 - In contemporary philosophy of religion, many philosophers, e.g., William Alston, argue that we should treat religious experiences as prima facie reliable unless we have reasons to doubt them. I call this a Critical Trust Approach to religious experience. John Hick and Michael Martin have argued that this approach is incompatible with a particularist solution to the problem of religious pluralism. I argue that this is a misunderstanding of the Critical Trust Approach. I further explore how a religious particularist who accepts this approach can deal with conflicts between presumptive data, and argue that the particularist approach to religious experience is not necessarily inferior to atheistic and pluralist approaches.
AB - In contemporary philosophy of religion, many philosophers, e.g., William Alston, argue that we should treat religious experiences as prima facie reliable unless we have reasons to doubt them. I call this a Critical Trust Approach to religious experience. John Hick and Michael Martin have argued that this approach is incompatible with a particularist solution to the problem of religious pluralism. I argue that this is a misunderstanding of the Critical Trust Approach. I further explore how a religious particularist who accepts this approach can deal with conflicts between presumptive data, and argue that the particularist approach to religious experience is not necessarily inferior to atheistic and pluralist approaches.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84880552192&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.5840/faithphil200320229
DO - 10.5840/faithphil200320229
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:84880552192
SN - 0739-7046
VL - 20
SP - 152
EP - 169
JO - Faith and Philosophy
JF - Faith and Philosophy
IS - 2
ER -