Is the critical trust approach to religious experience incompatible with religious particularism? a reply to Michael Martin and John Hick

Kai Man KWAN*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In contemporary philosophy of religion, many philosophers, e.g., William Alston, argue that we should treat religious experiences as prima facie reliable unless we have reasons to doubt them. I call this a Critical Trust Approach to religious experience. John Hick and Michael Martin have argued that this approach is incompatible with a particularist solution to the problem of religious pluralism. I argue that this is a misunderstanding of the Critical Trust Approach. I further explore how a religious particularist who accepts this approach can deal with conflicts between presumptive data, and argue that the particularist approach to religious experience is not necessarily inferior to atheistic and pluralist approaches.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)152-169
Number of pages18
JournalFaith and Philosophy
Volume20
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2003

Scopus Subject Areas

  • Religious studies
  • Philosophy

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