Is Nothing Really "Simpler and Easier" Than Something?

It has often been thought that it is surprising that there is something rather than nothing because, as Leibniz put it, nothing is "simpler and easier" than something. The idea seems to be that, in virtue of its relative simplicity, an empty world is the default. In this paper I question this assumption. In fact, I argue, an empty world is not obviously simpler than a world in which things exist. In a world in which nothing exists, there are still various truths -- e.g., modal truths, moral truths, mathematical truths, truths regarding laws, truths regarding counterfactuals. These are nonontological truths, because they are not truths regarding existing things. If something were to exist, however, then it could in principle simplify our total theory by explaining the obtaining of all these non-ontological truths. If that's right, then a world in which something exists might very well be simpler than a world in which nothing exists. While the existence of something complicates the world in one respect, it may simplify the world in various other respects, by explaining why various non-ontological truths obtain.