Intellectual officers, professional journals, and military change in the Northeast and National Revolutionary Armies, 1928–1937

This article discusses the ways in which Chinese soldiers learned from foreign military developments in the decade before the outbreak of the Second Sino–Japanese War (1937–1945). Focusing on the Northeast Army (Dongbeijun) and the National Revolutionary Army (Guomin gemingjun), the article analyzes the role of Chinese intellectual officers in military change. It considers how they used professional military journals, which were at the time a new means of disseminating military knowledge, as a medium to discuss military issues, resolve differences in opinion, and push forward changes in tactics, equipment, and organization. It also suggests that some intellectual Chinese officers were fixated on the pursuit of a post-First World War modern approach to war that relied mainly on technology and industrial capability. However, this “modern” approach to war proved in practice to be rather inappropriate for contemporary conditions in the Republic of China.