Incentive framework using shapley value for BitTorrent-like systems

Xiaowei Chen*, Xiaowen CHU, Xiaolei Chang

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in book/report/conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

BitTorrent is the dominating protocol in nearly all regions. Various reputation models and incentive mechanisms are proposed in recent years. However, many of them are designed for general peer-to-peer networks, only a few are designed for BitTorrent even though some models and mechanisms assert that they can be applied to BitTorrent-like systems. In this paper, we propose an incentive framework based on reputation history instead of tit-for-tat in BitTorrent. It is derived from the coalition games concept of Shapley value that will encourage selfish peers who seek to maximize their own profits to converge to Nash equilibrium. We show that this profit sharing framework exhibits several fairness properties that support the argument that this distribution of profit is desirable. Moreover, we improve SepRep reputation model and tailor it to the needs of BitTorrent protocol. In particular, we utilize the tracker of BitTorrent to process global reputation and trust values assisting the local values maintained by each peer.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationICICS 2009 - Conference Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information, Communications and Signal Processing
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009
Event7th International Conference on Information, Communications and Signal Processing, ICICS 2009 - Macau Fisherman's Wharf, Macao
Duration: 8 Dec 200910 Dec 2009

Publication series

NameICICS 2009 - Conference Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information, Communications and Signal Processing

Conference

Conference7th International Conference on Information, Communications and Signal Processing, ICICS 2009
Country/TerritoryMacao
CityMacau Fisherman's Wharf
Period8/12/0910/12/09

Scopus Subject Areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Information Systems
  • Signal Processing

User-Defined Keywords

  • BitTorrent
  • Incentive
  • Peer-to-peer network
  • Reputation
  • Shapley value

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