TY - UNPB
T1 - Impossible Worlds and Logical Omniscience
T2 - A Note on MacPherson’s Logic of Belief
AU - Pietarinen, Ahti
PY - 1998/1
Y1 - 1998/1
N2 - MacPherson (MacPherson, 1993) argues that the impossible worlds semantics does not provide a plausible framework for dealing with the problem of logical omniscience for epistemic logic, since it amounts to equivocation of logical connectives. It is shown, however, that MacPherson’s own logic of belief, put forward to avoid logical omniscience, can nevertheless be embedded and interpreted in the impossible worlds semantics.
AB - MacPherson (MacPherson, 1993) argues that the impossible worlds semantics does not provide a plausible framework for dealing with the problem of logical omniscience for epistemic logic, since it amounts to equivocation of logical connectives. It is shown, however, that MacPherson’s own logic of belief, put forward to avoid logical omniscience, can nevertheless be embedded and interpreted in the impossible worlds semantics.
M3 - Working paper
T3 - The tenth White House papers: Graduate research in the cognitive and computing sciences at Sussex
SP - 8
EP - 13
BT - Impossible Worlds and Logical Omniscience
PB - University of Sussex
ER -