TY - JOUR
T1 - Governing eco-cities in China
T2 - Urban climate experimentation, international cooperation, and multilevel governance
AU - Liu, Minsi
AU - Lo, Kevin
N1 - Funding Information:
However, the contribution of the German federal government to the development of the Eco-Park is limited. Besides participating in the national-level joint working group meeting held only three times, the only promotion campaign financed by the German government was the Sino-Germany Eco-Park Investment Briefing Session hosted by the German Ministry of Economy and Energy. Although representatives from more than 120 industries and more than 10 cities attended the briefing session, only 11 companies signed cooperative agreements. Furthermore, when we contacted the Ministry inquiring about the Eco-Park project in 2019, they replied that there had been no follow up on the project. As a German businessman stated:
Funding Information:
The Eco-Park also illustrates how Chinese multilevel governance shapes urban climate governance. From the vertical perspective, the gradual withdrawal of the central government from the Eco-Park leaves local intermediary institutions with heavy burden, weakens the bargaining power of the EAC over upper-level government, and squeezes its negotiation space with international actors. The willingness of the national government to support local experimentation is essential, especially for countries such as China, which has a highly authoritarian system with centralised authority and resources. Continuous financial support from the central government on local experimentation is vital because of the broad task burden of local institutions. Eco-city experiments require not only the application of green technologies in the construction of infrastructure, but also the cultivation of green behaviour through public services. Except for the salary of its personnel and government activity expenditures, which are transferred by the designated local government, the cost of a project’s construction, operation, maintenance, and expansion is financed by the intermediary institution itself. Furthermore, the scope of responsibility of the intermediary institution tend to expand with the development of the eco-city project. This further makes the eco-city project hungry for resources. If the central government does not provide sufficient resources, local institutions need to raise money themselves, which may incentivise them to take climate experiments less seriously to save money. After all, the key performance indicators for local leaders are tax revenue, not public expenditure on climate experimentation and environmental protection. When local intermediaries encounter financial difficulties, they must compromise to stay within the priorities of local governments for the sake of their financial support.
PY - 2021/5
Y1 - 2021/5
N2 - International cooperation has become an important element of urban climate experimentation, particularly in developing countries. Using the Sino-German Eco-Park in Qingdao as a case study, we argue that while multilevel governance and international cooperation are often discussed separately, these two governance tendencies are in fact both important to China's urban climate experimentation. In particular, Chinese multilevel governance enables bilateral cooperation by (re)shaping the national vision at the local level and resolving potential conflicts or contradictions. It also allows local and foreign intermediaries to coordinate and match resources among different interests and actors. The effectiveness of multilevel governance in eco-city projects is conditioned by intermediary institutions’ resources and capabilities. Effectiveness also depends on maintaining the attention of national governments to the eco-city projects. Thus, the cooperative form, the actors’ attributes, and the resources mobilised by actors are three important factors that affect the outcomes of international eco-city projects.
AB - International cooperation has become an important element of urban climate experimentation, particularly in developing countries. Using the Sino-German Eco-Park in Qingdao as a case study, we argue that while multilevel governance and international cooperation are often discussed separately, these two governance tendencies are in fact both important to China's urban climate experimentation. In particular, Chinese multilevel governance enables bilateral cooperation by (re)shaping the national vision at the local level and resolving potential conflicts or contradictions. It also allows local and foreign intermediaries to coordinate and match resources among different interests and actors. The effectiveness of multilevel governance in eco-city projects is conditioned by intermediary institutions’ resources and capabilities. Effectiveness also depends on maintaining the attention of national governments to the eco-city projects. Thus, the cooperative form, the actors’ attributes, and the resources mobilised by actors are three important factors that affect the outcomes of international eco-city projects.
KW - Bilateralism
KW - China
KW - Eco-cities
KW - Intermediary institutions
KW - Multilevel governance
KW - Urban climate experimentation
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85101615579&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.geoforum.2021.02.017
DO - 10.1016/j.geoforum.2021.02.017
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85101615579
SN - 0016-7185
VL - 121
SP - 12
EP - 22
JO - Geoforum
JF - Geoforum
ER -
