Explaining Why There is Something Rather than Nothing


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It is sometimes supposed that, in principle, we cannot offer an explanation for why there is something rather than nothing. I argue that this supposition is a mistake, and stems from a needlessly myopic conception of the form explanations can legitimately take. After making this more general point, I proceed to offer a speculative suggestion regarding one sort of explanation which can in principle serve as an answer to the question “why is there something rather than nothing?” The suggestion is that there may be something rather than nothing in virtue of the truth of certain sorts of subjunctive conditionals.

Original languageEnglish
Number of pages17
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 7 Jun 2020

Scopus Subject Areas

  • Philosophy
  • Logic


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