Explaining Why There is Something Rather than Nothing

Andrew Brenner*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

    2 Citations (Scopus)


    It is sometimes supposed that, in principle, we cannot offer an explanation for why there is something rather than nothing. I argue that this supposition is a mistake, and stems from a needlessly myopic conception of the form explanations can legitimately take. After making this more general point, I proceed to offer a speculative suggestion regarding one sort of explanation which can in principle serve as an answer to the question “why is there something rather than nothing?” The suggestion is that there may be something rather than nothing in virtue of the truth of certain sorts of subjunctive conditionals.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)1831–1847
    Number of pages17
    Issue number4
    Early online date7 Jun 2020
    Publication statusPublished - Aug 2022

    Scopus Subject Areas

    • Philosophy
    • Logic


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