Abstract
TO apply the traditional marginal-cost pricing to drive a user equilibrium of the oligopolistic game to the system optimum, it requires to classify the users into different classes and then charge discriminatory tolls across user classes. By realizing the difficulty of discriminating users when they differ in some unobservable ways, Yang and Zhang investigated existence of anonymous link tolls for transportation networks recently. In this paper, we consider the anonymous link tolls for the oligopolistic game with nonseparable, nonlinear and asymmetric cost functions with fixed demands. With similar techniques developed by Yang and Zhang, we first prove the existence of anonymous link tolls to decentralize the system optimum to a user equilibrium. Then, by deriving some bounds on the so-called price of anarchy, we analyze the efficiency of such a toll strategy when the tolls are considered as part of the system cost.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 347-364 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization |
Volume | 7 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - May 2011 |
Scopus Subject Areas
- Business and International Management
- Strategy and Management
- Control and Optimization
- Applied Mathematics
User-Defined Keywords
- Anonymous link tolls
- Asymmetric cost functions
- Oligopolistic games
- Price of anarchy
- System optimum
- User equilibrium