Examining Normative and Applicable Aspects of the Plebiscitary Theory of Secession

In this article, I rely on the reflective equilibrium methodology in providing a critical overview of the strongest and weakest arguments through which prominent proponents of plebiscitary secession theories defend the right to (unilateral) secession from internationally recognised states; a right that should – in their opinion – be achieved via referendums. By doing so, I demonstrate that the said right – although conceivable in the realm of normative theory – is rarely applicable in practice in a meaningful/justified manner. Instead, more often than not, it is prone to being (mis)used as an excuse for validating interest driven and unethical political conduct, either by separatist/irredentist nationalists or by regional/global powers that support such secessionist causes (as a part of their own geopolitical strategies). In fulfilling the main aim, I therefore argue that plebiscitary theories of secession do not provide answers to questions concerning the likelihood of just implementation of the said right in real-world cases, while their theoretical arguments come across as incomplete when dealing with the relationship between individual and collective rights, but also with issues concerning the nature and motives of contemporary secession movements.