TY - JOUR
T1 - EMTap: Eavesdropping on Sound Transmitted via Audio Cables by Sensing Electromagnetic Variation Using RFID
AU - Chen, Yunzhong
AU - Yu, Jiadi
AU - Kong, Hao
AU - Zhang, Daqiang
AU - Zhu, Yanmin
AU - Dai, Hong Ning
AU - Chen, Yi Chao
AU - Kong, Linghe
N1 - This research is supported by NSFC (No. 62172277, 62072304), Shanghai East Talents Program (No. 177), and the Seed Funding for Collaborative Research Grants of HKBU (with Grant No. RC-SFCRG/23-24/R2/SCI/06).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 ACM.
PY - 2025/9/3
Y1 - 2025/9/3
N2 - When sound signals are transmitted via audio cables in form of current signals, detectable electromagnetic leakage is emitted around the cables, which could reveal the sound content being transmitted. This paper presents a sound eavesdropping system, EMTap, which senses electromagnetic variation around audio cables leveraging an RFID tag attached to an audio cable for sound content recovery. In some audiovisual scenarios with audio cables, such as offices and meeting rooms, it is assumed that attackers secretly attach a small, battery-free RFID tag to an audio cable without being noticed. Meanwhile, RFID readers are camouflaged as decorations/public facilities placed in/out of rooms to transmit and receive RF signals. When the sound signals are transmitted via audio cables, EMTap first activates the RFID tag to capture the electromagnetic variation patterns around audio cables upon RF signals. Then, EMTap reconstructs sound spectrograms from RF signal-based electromagnetic variation patterns utilizing a designed cross-modal Generative model, Nonlinear Stable Diffusion Model (NSDM). Finally, EMTap converts the sound spectrograms to sound content through sound recognition API. Extensive experiments demonstrate that EMTap achieves an average Mel-Cepstral Distortion (MCD) of 5.49 and Word Error Rate (WER) of 16.19% for eavesdropping on sound transmitted via audio cables.
AB - When sound signals are transmitted via audio cables in form of current signals, detectable electromagnetic leakage is emitted around the cables, which could reveal the sound content being transmitted. This paper presents a sound eavesdropping system, EMTap, which senses electromagnetic variation around audio cables leveraging an RFID tag attached to an audio cable for sound content recovery. In some audiovisual scenarios with audio cables, such as offices and meeting rooms, it is assumed that attackers secretly attach a small, battery-free RFID tag to an audio cable without being noticed. Meanwhile, RFID readers are camouflaged as decorations/public facilities placed in/out of rooms to transmit and receive RF signals. When the sound signals are transmitted via audio cables, EMTap first activates the RFID tag to capture the electromagnetic variation patterns around audio cables upon RF signals. Then, EMTap reconstructs sound spectrograms from RF signal-based electromagnetic variation patterns utilizing a designed cross-modal Generative model, Nonlinear Stable Diffusion Model (NSDM). Finally, EMTap converts the sound spectrograms to sound content through sound recognition API. Extensive experiments demonstrate that EMTap achieves an average Mel-Cepstral Distortion (MCD) of 5.49 and Word Error Rate (WER) of 16.19% for eavesdropping on sound transmitted via audio cables.
KW - audio cable
KW - electromagnetic variation
KW - RFID
KW - Sound eavesdropping
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=105015506444&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/3749459
DO - 10.1145/3749459
M3 - Conference article
AN - SCOPUS:105015506444
SN - 2474-9567
VL - 9
JO - Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies
JF - Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies
IS - 3
M1 - 74
T2 - The ACM international joint conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing and the ACM International Symposium on Wearable Computing, UbiComp/ ISWC 2025
Y2 - 14 October 2025 through 16 October 2025
ER -