Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution

David W. K. Yeung*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

99 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper presents a cooperative differential game of transboundary industrial pollution. A noted feature of the game model is that the industrial sectors remain competitive among themselves while the governments cooperate in pollution abatement. It is the first time that time consistent solutions are derived in a cooperative differential game on pollution control with industries and governments being separate entities. A stochastic version of the model is presented and a subgame-consistent cooperative solution is provided. This is the first study of pollution management in a stochastic differential game framework.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)143-160
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Optimization Theory and Applications
Volume134
Issue number1
Early online date14 Jun 2007
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2007
Externally publishedYes

Scopus Subject Areas

  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Control and Optimization
  • Applied Mathematics

User-Defined Keywords

  • Payoff
  • Optim Theory
  • Differential Game
  • Pollution Abatement
  • Optimality Principle

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this