Do Behavioral Biases Influence the Length of Sell-Side Analysts’ Observable Careers?

Manapon Limkriangkrai, Robert B. Durand*, Lucia Fung

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Analysts’ observable careers are short. Around half of the analysts we study have observable lives of approximately three years. Using the IBES database as a proxy for the length of analysts’ careers, we find that distraction and herding shorten observable lives. There are important roles for economically rational influences. The length of observable careers is reduced by inaccuracy in forecasting. Issuing a first forecast early but, on average, delaying forecasts for the portfolio of firms they cover also increase analysts’ life spans. We find no robust association between life span and optimism or overconfidence.

    Original languageEnglish
    Number of pages17
    JournalJournal of Behavioral Finance
    DOIs
    Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 23 Jun 2022

    Scopus Subject Areas

    • Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
    • Finance

    User-Defined Keywords

    • Behavioral finance
    • Distraction
    • Forecast inaccuracy
    • Overconfidence
    • Sell-side analysts
    • Timeliness of forecasts

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