Abstract
Investors often hold differing opinions on public information quality. This paper shows that such investor disagreement provides a novel explanation for financial market dynamics around earnings announcements. We propose a rational expectations equilibrium model where investors disagree about the precision of a public signal, which separates a pre-news trading period from a post-news trading period. In equilibrium, investor disagreement about public signal precision diminishes informational price efficiency before the news, but enhances it afterward. Consequently, investor disagreement leads to a notable jump in informed trading around the news, a decline in abnormal trading volume before the news and a surge immediately after the news, and underreaction of stock price to announced earnings.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 103762 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Journal of Financial Economics |
| Volume | 152 |
| Early online date | 2 Dec 2023 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Feb 2024 |
Scopus Subject Areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Accounting
- Finance
- Strategy and Management
User-Defined Keywords
- Dynamic REE model
- Informational price efficiency
- Investor disagreement
- Price underreaction
- Trading volume
