TY - JOUR
T1 - Did a local distribution company procure prudently during the California electricity crisis?
AU - WOO, Chi-Keung
AU - Lloyd, Debra
AU - Clayton, William
N1 - Funding Information:
On March 16, 2001, SCWC signed a 5-year, $95/MWH fixed price contract for a 15 MW energy block with Mirant Americas Energy Marketing (MAEM). SCWC also signed a smaller contract with Pinnacle West Capital Corporation (Pinnacle) for 8 MW of winter (November 1–March 31) power priced at $75/MWH for 2001–2002, $48/MWH for 2002–2003, and $36/MWH for 2003–2004. While the contract prices were high by historic standards (e.g., the average spot market price was under $40/MWH before the crisis that began in summer 2000), the signing decisions were supported by the following reasons ( Dickson, 2001 ). First, an existing 1-year contract for a 12 MW energy block at $35.5/MWH was due to expire on April 30, 2001. Second, few suppliers were interested in contracting with a small buyer like SCWC in the presence of a large buyer (California Department of Water Resources (CDWR)) that was willing to pay a premium for price certainty and to buy large quantities for delivery over the next 10 years. Finally and most importantly, SCWC believed that the California electricity crisis was going to get worse before it got better, with little relief in sight.
PY - 2006/11
Y1 - 2006/11
N2 - To manage cost risk, prudent procurement of electric power requires that some portion of a buyer's energy demand be met through long-term contracting. Under cost-of-service regulation or performance-based regulation, a local distribution company (LDC) should be allowed to fully recover all prudently incurred power procurement costs. However, the regulatory test of prudence is an ex post review with the threat of disallowance. This paper presents an economic analysis of procurement prudence involving a small LDC, Bear Valley Electric Service (BVES), which serves a resort area in Southern California. The key findings are: (a) high and volatile prices and rolling blackouts characterized the market environment faced by the owner of BVES, Southern California Water Company (SCWC), at its signing of a 5-year fixed price contract; (b) SCWC was a price-taker with no incentive to act imprudently; (c) the contract was obtained via a competitive bidding process; (d) the contract price was comparable to the benchmark price of contemporaneous contracts; (e) the fixed price contract was economic when compared to available alternatives; and (f) despite (a)-(e), a negotiated settlement with the state regulator and a large user resulted in substantial disallowance. The policy implication is that a regulator should approve a prudent procurement plan proposed by an LDC to remove the unreasonable risk of an ex post review. If the LDC strictly adheres to the plan, the resulting electricity purchases are per se prudent and should entitle the LDC to full cost recovery.
AB - To manage cost risk, prudent procurement of electric power requires that some portion of a buyer's energy demand be met through long-term contracting. Under cost-of-service regulation or performance-based regulation, a local distribution company (LDC) should be allowed to fully recover all prudently incurred power procurement costs. However, the regulatory test of prudence is an ex post review with the threat of disallowance. This paper presents an economic analysis of procurement prudence involving a small LDC, Bear Valley Electric Service (BVES), which serves a resort area in Southern California. The key findings are: (a) high and volatile prices and rolling blackouts characterized the market environment faced by the owner of BVES, Southern California Water Company (SCWC), at its signing of a 5-year fixed price contract; (b) SCWC was a price-taker with no incentive to act imprudently; (c) the contract was obtained via a competitive bidding process; (d) the contract price was comparable to the benchmark price of contemporaneous contracts; (e) the fixed price contract was economic when compared to available alternatives; and (f) despite (a)-(e), a negotiated settlement with the state regulator and a large user resulted in substantial disallowance. The policy implication is that a regulator should approve a prudent procurement plan proposed by an LDC to remove the unreasonable risk of an ex post review. If the LDC strictly adheres to the plan, the resulting electricity purchases are per se prudent and should entitle the LDC to full cost recovery.
KW - California electricity crisis
KW - Electricity procurement
KW - Regulatory disallowance
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33646902992&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.enpol.2004.08.022
DO - 10.1016/j.enpol.2004.08.022
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:33646902992
SN - 0301-4215
VL - 34
SP - 2552
EP - 2565
JO - Energy Policy
JF - Energy Policy
IS - 16
ER -